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cloud stakeholders. In addition, we have designed a
complete software architecture needed to run the pro-
tocol and protect the VM data. Our protocol enables
technical trust which allows cloud users to validate
the security guarantees given by the cloud provider
before using the provisioned service. We also imple-
mented the designed protocol to evaluate its feasibil-
ity in terms of implementation effort and complex-
ity. Finally, we performed security analysis to val-
idate that all security requirements are fulfilled and
all identified threats have been addressed comprehen-
sively. In our analysis, we showed how a user VM can
strongly be bounded to a particular platform to ful-
fill users’ security requirements. However, this strong
binding also limits the flexibility with respect to load
management, platform upgrade, etc. These limita-
tions can be reduced by adding trusted VM migration
mechanism to the solution. Our suggested architec-
ture allows opportunities for such extensions but the
details are left for future research.
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