tial computations with a fixed schedule
3
. We use a
simplistic economic ABM of firms that trade and pro-
duce goods in order to explore and discuss two al-
ternative modes of scheduling: the timetable model,
where all agents complete one step after the other, and
the heliotropic model, where one agent after the other
completes steps. In particular, our work in progress
focuses on the questions how much randomness is
necessary, whether and how the model behaviour be-
comes mathematically tractable, and how model in-
put and output relates to economic data from national
statistics. We argue that a better understanding of
these questions, and of economic ABMs in general, is
relevant to climate policy making. Therefore, the cli-
mate policy background is sketched in Section 2 be-
fore Section 3 briefly describes the simplistic model.
First results are presented in Section 4 and discussed
in Section 5, before Section 6 concludes.
2 CLIMATE POLICY AND ABMs
The motivation for our work on economic ABMs
stems from the climate change context. Climate
policy analysis and recommendations are generally
based on standard economic modelling; the most fre-
quently used models are computable general equilib-
rium models (Capros et al., 1999, for example) or op-
timal growth models (Nordhaus, 2008; Stern, 2007).
The general set-up is to concentrate on a a busi-
ness as usual (BAU) growth path as the single sta-
ble equilibrium path of the system, that is optimal
in the short run, and compare this with a situation
where measures for the mitigation of greenhouse gas
emissions are taken. Mitigation is framed as a wel-
fare trade-off between present and future generations:
greenhouse gas emissions are an external effect of the
present upon future generations, so that for these the
path is not optimal. The current generation uses the
atmosphere (as also a few previous generations did) as
a “waste dump” for emissions without considering the
future negative effects this will due to climate change
resulting from the emissions. Introducing a price on
emissions, this externality can be internalized, that is,
eliminated. However, on the BAU growth path this
implies costs in the short run, usually expressed in
terms of a reduction in GDP, because the current gen-
eration will have to pay for using the atmosphere, that
before it simply used “for free”.
This widely accepted welfare trade-off argument
has coined a narrative of mitigation as a problem of
3
Here fixed is meant as in opposition to event-driven.
The schedule may still involve randomness in the order in
which agents act.
burden sharing (Jaeger et al., 2012). While the miti-
gation costs are legitimated by the benefits of avoided
climate change and its impacts, these benefits lie in
a rather far away future, so that on shorter planning
horizons, such as the election periods of politicians,
the costs seem much more relevant. In this setting, in-
ternational negotiations have made little progress to-
wards significant world-wide reductions of emissions.
There is, however, in this argument a fundamen-
tal assumption that is problematic: the existence of a
unique stable equilibrium growth path of the system
is warranted neither by economic theory nor, much
more importantly, by real-world observations as sum-
marized in empirical data. For example, Ormerod
et al. (2009) find that the US, the UK, and the Ger-
man economic system from time to time switch from
a steady to a weak pattern. Also, the comparison of
countries that at a certain point in time were in similar
situations but now differ in economic growth, such as
Poland and Hungary at the moment, deserves the con-
sideration of different growth paths.
Likewise for economic theory: the Arrow-Debreu
framework of general equilibrium shows the existence
of equilibria in an abstract setting – a growth path is
determined by prices that, for each time-step under
consideration, balance supply and demand. However,
equilibria need not be unique nor stable. Assump-
tions made to guarantee uniqueness and stability in-
clude that of a single representative agent, discussed
for example by Kirman (1992).
Hence, the narrative of climate change mitigation
as a problem of burden sharing is not the only story
to be told. Jaeger et al. (2012) suggest to “reframe
the problem of climate change, from zero-sum game
to win-win solutions”, i.e., mitigation measures which
are beneficial for the economy. Win-win strategies for
climate policy can be identified when widening the
focus – from concentrating on a single equilibrium to
considering several possible equilibria (Jaeger et al.,
2010; Shi and Zhang, 2011). A low carbon econ-
omy needs a good deal of restructuring as compared
with the current economic situation, for example from
fossil to renewable energy. Such a structural change,
from the perspective of economic theory, involves a
shift to another equilibrium growth path. Win-win op-
portunities arise when the new path is in some sense
“better” than the current one. In this case, micro-costs
which occur due to mitigation measures, such as in-
creased energy prices due to emission trading, can be
more than compensated by macro-benefits, such as
higher growth and less unemployment, that the new
growth path entails (Jaeger et al., 2010).
Equilibrium selection is a coordination problem
(Jaeger, 2012): as for the case of conventions (such
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