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6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the analysis of the SSL/TLS
handshake protocol by using the interpretation
functions-based method. In fact, we proved that the
SSL/TLS protocol is correct with respect to the se-
crecy property. This result is conducted by consider-
ing the famous Dolev and Yao intruder model. In our
future works, we will extend this model with more
algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives in or-
der to analyze the secrecy properties in more and re-
alistic intruder model. In fact, in (Paulson, 1997b), L.
Paulson has proven that the Bull protocol preserves
the secrecy by using an intruder model that does not
take into account any algebraic property of crypto-
graphic primitives. However, he proved that attacks
are possible on this protocol if some algebraic prop-
erties of ⊕ or of exponentiation are considered in the
intruder model.
Also, we gave in this paper, a new and practical
safe interpretation functions (DEK and DINEK func-
tions) that could be used to analyze all kind of keys-
agreement protocols. Therefore, we want to investi-
gate in our future works the analysis of others keys-
agreement protocols such as Kereberos with some in-
teresting algebraic properties. Also, we want to study
and give more safe interpretation functions.
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