Does the Playing Field Determine the Game?

An Impact Analysis of Structural Virtual Network Characteristics on Political

Actions

Henning Staar

, Monique Janneck

, Frederik Metzger

, Stefan Berwing

and Thomas Armbrüster

Department of Psychology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Luebeck University of Applied Sciences, Luebeck, Germany

Business School, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

Faculty of Law, Social Sciences and Economics, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

Keywords: Virtual Networks, Micro-politics, Influence Tactics, Network Structures.

Abstract: Virtual networks are often characterized as having less formal and hierarchical structures. Instead, informal

actions and so-called political behaviour of individual members play an important role regarding power and

decision-making. In this paper we investigate the relation between structural characteristics of virtual

networks and informal influence tactics of network members. Results show that there are indeed numerous

relations between the ‘playing field’ provided by the network structure and the behaviour of individual

network players. Surprisingly, an increase of formalization, e.g. through the use of agreements, fixed

principles and rules or even contracts, did not constrain informal political behavior. On the contrary, higher

formalization was comprehensively associated with higher use of micro-political tactics.

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, globalization and technological

developments have led to new forms of

organizational structures that go beyond classic

individual enterprises and gain increasing

importance on the market. Among those, so-called

virtual networks have been studied intensively for

quite some time (e.g., Davidow & Malone, 1992;

Goldman, Nagel & Preiss, 1995; Kock, 2000;

Travica, 2005). Nevertheless, there is still need for

research regarding their formal and informal

mechanisms of governance and leadership: The vast

majority of existing research in this area has focused

predominantly on the level of either structural or

behavioral characteristics (Provan, Fish & Sydow,

2007). As such, some authors solely rely on the

network’s formal structures and design (e.g., formal

roles like network managers) to explain network

success (Provan & Kenis, 2007), while others

emphasize the informal dynamics and individual

interest-driven actions between agents as the

relevant key factors for decision-making (Elron &

Vigoda-Gadot, 2006). The interaction of virtual

network structures and informal, political behavior,

however, has seldom been studied so far.

Trying to bridge this gap, the aim of our paper is

to investigate whether structural characteristics of

virtual networks – formalization, centralization and

interaction – are crucial to explain several forms of

political behavior in virtual networks. In our paper,

‘politics’ refers to informal actions of individual

stakeholders to gain power and exert influence

(Ansari, 1990; Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson, 1980;

Pfeffer, 1992). Originating in organizational science

and psychology, political behavior within

organizations has been extensively researched in the

last decades (e.g., Ferris et al., 2000, 2002; Vigoda-

Gadot, 2003) but is continuously gaining attention in

the field of network research (Huxham & Vangen,

2004). Focusing on both, formal network structures

and informal political processes is particularly

interesting due to the fact that on one hand formal

instruments are seen as a vital tool to coordinate

processes in the common collaboration. On the other

hand, inter-organizational networks are typically

characterized by a lack of structures, hierarchies and

limited formal authority to give directives therewith

giving way to informal political behavior as a mode

571

Staar H., Janneck M., Metzger F., Berwing S. and Armbrüster T..

Does the Playing Field Determine the Game? - An Impact Analysis of Structural Virtual Network Characteristics on Political Actions.

DOI: 10.5220/0004500105710580

In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies (STDIS-2013), pages 571-580

ISBN: 978-989-8565-54-9

 2013 SCITEPRESS (Science and Technology Publications, Lda.)

of decision making (cf. Rittenbruch, Kahler &

Cremers, 1998; Travica, 2005). Thus, it is sensible

to assume that formal structures and informal actions

of individual stakeholders are not independent from

each other but rather shape the mutual possibilities

and limits in governing the network.

To investigate whether structural network

characteristics have an impact on political behavior

in virtual networks, we conducted a quantitative

study with representatives of various networks,

questioning them about their networks’ design and

the use of behavioral political actions to gain power

and influence in their collaboration.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Virtual Networks

Virtual networks take various forms (see e.g.,

Travica, 2005 for an extensive review). However,

most definitions agree that virtual networks are

forms of “inter-organizational, cross-border ICT-

enabled collaboration between legally independent

entities, usually with a specific economic goal” (Pitt,

Kamara, Sergot & Artikis, 2005, p. 373). Further,

virtual networks vary considerably regarding the

stability of membership and participation and also

the duration and goals of the cooperation (Davidow

& Malone, 1992; Martins, Gilsen & Maynard,

2004). At the same time, network members often

still act as individual competitors on the market.

Thus, collaboration in virtual business networks has

also been termed coopetition (Brandenburger &

Nalebuff, 1997) and describes the permanent and

delicate balancing act between cooperation and

competition of the participating organizations.

In our research, we take a view of virtual

organizations as networks of independent

enterprises. Member organizations engage in this

form of cooperation because they expect economic

advantages, e.g. by sharing resources, forming

buying syndicates, organizing vocational training

together, attracting new customers and expanding

their range of services or products or developing

new products and services together. This is

especially important for small and medium-sized

enterprises (SMEs) that might be in danger of losing

their competitiveness in a globalized market.

Based on this characterization, we will use the

terms virtual networks and inter-organizational

networks interchangeably in this paper.

2.2 Political Influence Tactics

In current publications some authors have pointed

out that especially informal actions of individual

members of virtual networks may play a crucial role

in shaping and governing the network (cf. Greer &

Jehn, 2009; Huxham & Beech, 2008; Huxham &

Vangen, 1996, 2001, 2005). In organizational

science, so-called micro-political processes are

understood as strategies of individuals to achieve

their goals, realize ideas, or push certain interests

(Cialdini, 2001; Vigoda & Cohen, 2002). In their

research, Janneck & Staar (2011) have identified a

number of typical informal behavioral patterns – so-

called micro-political tactics – being used in virtual

networks (table 1).

Table 1: Micro-political tactics in virtual networks.

Rational

Persuasion

Spreading information to the network

partner(s) to clarify one’s concerns.

Assertiveness

Engaging in open confrontation with or

putting pressure on the network

partner(s).

Exchange

Offering to do a network partner a favour

in return; Signalising to reciprocate for

the network partner’s support

Inspirational

Appeals

Calling upon the common vision, the

basic idea of a network; emphasizing the

need to pull together for being

successful.

Self-Promotion

Emphasizing one’s efforts regarding the

network collaboration or one’s value for

the network.

Inspiring Trust

Trying to appear open-minded about the

network partners’ concerns; purposefully

presenting oneself as a network partner

who is willing to share information and

resources.

Visibility

Trying to show presence via electronic

media; Purposefully using all available

channels to call attention to one’s

concerns.

Proactive

Behavior

Looking for opportunities to play an

additional part in the network beyond the

primary role; taking over new tasks

and/or roles within the network to extend

one’s scope of action.

Mediating

Trying to mediate between partners

during negotiations and discussions;

Keeping a non-committed position in

discussions and controversies instead of

taking sides with a party straight away.

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To date, the majority of research has declared

micro-politics as a useful concept especially for

polycentric networks with limited formal structures,

hierarchies and rules of governance (e.g., Pearce,

Yoo & Alavi, 2005). The rationale behind this

perspective is the following: When formal structures

of leadership are missing, individual activities to

form interest-driven coalitions and build an

influential position in order to maximize the benefit

from the cooperation are very likely to occur and

should be especially effective in these networks due

to the ‘open playground’ (Janneck & Staar, 2011).

However, these considerations remain theoretical so

far. The empirical examination of this underlying

assumption – whether the lack of structures, rules

and roles is giving way to informal processes and

tactics of influence and negotiation at all – still

endures. Accordingly, an exertion of political tactics

in relation to several structural network

characteristics is necessary to understand the

premises of informal influence behavior in virtual

networks.

2.3 Structural Characteristics

and Micro-political Behavior

in Virtual Networks

Beyond the basic properties of virtual networks that

we illustrated above, the following structural

characteristics can be seen as crucial in shaping the

‘playing field’ of these collaborations (cf. Metzger,

Oberg & Armbrüster, 2010):

2.3.1 Formalization of Processes and Roles

In general, virtual networks are frequently described

as being distributed through rather loosely coupled

associations and a lack of formalized processes,

rules and roles – especially at early stages of the

network’s life cycle (Ahuja & Carley, 1998).

However, virtual networks are not necessarily

formal vacuums without any governance by rules

and procedures (Pitt et al., 2005). In fact,

formalization in virtual networks is of gradual nature

and can be reflected in low-formalized processes

like oral agreements that are made between member

organizations or documentations of processes being

set up in writing, through mandatory rules and

principles, to highly formalized instruments like

closed contracts that form the framework of the joint

collaboration (cf. Metzger, Oberg & Armbrüster,

2010). Beside the formalization of processes, some

collaborations implement formal roles within the

network like coordinators, network managers or

directors, therewith creating an official structural

responsibility for certain processes (Provan & Kenis,

2007). In the prevailing literature higher

formalization of processes and roles in virtual

networks is often seen as a means to curtail informal

interest-driven political actions through the

implementation of official guidelines (cf. Huxham &

Beech, 2008; Elron & Vigoda, 2003). From a

political perspective, however, formalization of

processes and roles may not necessarily result in

decreasing micro-political activities among agents.

Several studies from intra-organizational research

indicate that even highly formalized organizations

offer possibilities for micro-political behavior or

may even elicit informal influence attempts that act

as a counter balance to inflexible formal structures

(Ferris et al, 2002). This latter aspect of micro-

politics as an informal corrective to formal structures

leads to the question of who the network’s political

agents actually are: Intra-organizational research

shows that political actions are not necessarily

depending on legitimate power and are hence not

restricted to certain formal roles (Dosier, Case &

Key, 1988; Yukl & Falbe, 1990). Accordingly, both

scenarios in virtual networks seem reasonable to

assume: Members who do not fill a formal position

in the virtual network could especially rely on

informal tactical behavior as their ‘weapon of

choice’ to contribute to network-related decisions.

At the same time, members who are holding formal

roles are likely to strengthen their position through

the additional use of political actions – not to

mention that tactical behavior could have played a

major role in the selection process.

2.3.2 Centralization of Decision Making

Another feature that is often associated with virtual

networks is their polycentric organization, i.e. in

absence of legitimate hierarchical power (cf. French

& Raven, 1959) there is limited formal direction and

guidance resulting in relatively high degrees of

autonomy of the network members (e.g., Hoffman,

Stearns & Shrader, 1990; Vigoda-Gadot, 2003).

Nevertheless, there are a wide variety of network

designs that incorporate some form of focal

government leading to higher degrees of

centralization in decision-making processes and to

an imbalance regarding the formal proportion of

power in the network. However, quite similar to the

discussion on formalization mentioned above, the

effects of centralization in virtual networks on

political behavior are not quite clear so far: On one

hand, it has been assumed that the lack of

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centralizing structures roles could give way to

informal processes and tactics of influence as a

compensatory form of governance and leadership

(Pearce, Yoo & Alavi, 2005). On the other hand,

structural hierarchical tendencies could argue for an

increase of political actions as a counter balance –

this phenomenon has been widely discussed in

organizational literature as the so-called ‘bottom-up

leadership’ (Rao, Schmidt & Murray, 1996; Yukl &

Falbe, 1990).

2.3.3 Interaction of Network Members

Due to the fact that virtual network members are

typically spatially separated in their daily routines

the way interactions take place is likely to be

different from traditional organizational settings in

several ways:

First, communication and coordination of work

activities in virtual network collaborations is often

enabled and facilitated through a more or less

extensive use of information and communication

technologies (ICT) (e.g., Franke, 1990; Travica,

2005). Several authors suggest that higher relevance

of computer-mediated interactions is comes along

with changing opportunities to influence others

(Sussman et al., 2002; Wilson, 2003). As the

importance of ICT for coordination processes differs

considerably among networks, effects on political

behavior can be expected. Previous research on

political processes in virtual networks indicates that

technology-based interactions may be especially

susceptible to – at least some – informal influence

processes (Elron & Vigoda-Gadot, 2006; Spears &

Lea, 1992; Williams, 2003). However, more

empirical research is needed to make sophisticated

explanations for different tactical actions (table 1).

Second, virtual networks differ in their way of

how opportunities for mutual interactions are

managed – this refers to the frequency and

importance of planned, regular network meetings as

well as to ad-hoc situations. Of course, political

behavior is reliant on interactional settings.

However, little is known about the effects of

frequency and type (planned vs. ad-hoc settings) of

interactions on political opportunities.

Based on the theoretical discussion on the

relationship between structural characteristics and

political behavior, the following conclusions

emerge. So far, the vast majority of studies have

evaluated either political tactics in virtual networks

isolated from the structural ‘playing field’ where

influence attempts take place or vice versa – but the

consequences of structural configurations for

informal political opportunities are barely taken into

consideration. Our study aimed to bridge this gap

and should offer first insights into the

interdependencies between formal structures and

informal, micro-political behavior in virtual

networks. Since theoretical and empirical previous

knowledge in this issue is sparse, we have chosen an

explorative approach and refrained from the

formulation of directional hypotheses.

3 METHOD

3.1 Subjects

Overall, 2.100 virtual networks were contacted by

means of a systematic internet research across

Germany. All addressees were asked if they would

care to participate in a study on cooperation in inter-

organizational networks. Overall, 340 questionnaires

were sent back. For this study, a total of 232

questionnaires could be used (11% return). Around

40% of the respondents held a formal position

within the network (e.g. network manager). The

sample characteristics are illustrated in table 2.

3.3 Instruments

Micro-political influence tactics were measured with

an inventory that captured the nine tactics from table

1 based on the work from (Janneck & Staar, 2011;

see Appendix). The original version for political

agent respondents was used. In this version the

Table 2: Sample characteristics.

Enterprise size 1 – 850 employees

Network size 2 – 2.100 member organizations

Primary objective of network Products (n = 44)

Supply of Services (n = 168)

Research and Development (n = 48)

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respondent rated his or her own influence attempts

towards other members of the joint collaboration

(e.g., “I use rational arguments to convince my

network partners”). The 6-point-likert scale ranged

from 1 = “never” to 6 = “always”.

Structural characteristics – namely Unwritten

Agreements, Mandatory Rules and Principles,

Closed Contracts, and Documentation of

Coordination Processes – were measured with

single items that were developed in the course of a

larger project on inter-organizational networks

(Metzger, Oberg & Armbrüster, 2010). Again, 6-

point-likert scales were used ranging from 1 =

“never” to 6 = “always” or from 1 = “strongly

disagree” to 6 = “strongly agree”.

Furthermore, all participants were asked to

indicate network-specific data such as the name,

network and enterprise size, length of cooperation,

primary objectives, legal form and business sector of

their enterprise and the virtual network.

4 RESULTS

4.1 Formalization and Political Tactics

To analyze the impact of different forms of

formalized processes on the nine influence tactics,

Pearson's product-moment correlations were

calculated. As can be seen from table 3 there are low

to medium positive significant interrelations

between the constructs of interest. Mandatory Rules

and Principles and Closed Contracts even show

significant correlation coefficients with each of the

nine tactic scales ranging from r = .16 – .29. The

highest correlation can be found between Rational

Persuasion and Unwritten Agreements (r = .44): The

more oral agreements are made, the more intensively

this tactic is pursued. Exchange reveals only two

significant correlations to the distinct forms of

formalization indicating that the use of this tactic is

not affected in general by formalization of

processes. Taken together, the results indicate that

formalizing processes in the joint collaboration is

accompanied with higher use of political tactics.

To answer the question of how the (non-)

occupation of formal roles is related to political

activity, the group of respondents holding a formal

role was compared to those who did not on their use

of the nine tactics. Therefore, t-tests with the tactics

as dependent variables were performed.

In table 4 the compared means of the groups as

well as the p-values are listed. The results reveal that

indeed all but one group (Exchange) differs

significantly on the .05-level or on the .01-level

respectively. Interestingly, values are continuously

higher for the group of respondents with formal

roles: Holding a formal role in the virtual network is

associated with higher use of the nine influence

tactics.

4.2 Centralization and Political Tactics

To assess the impact of centralization on different

tactics, again Pearson's product-moment correlations

were calculated. As can be seen from table 5, two

Table 3: Correlations between Political Tactics and Forms of Formalization: Processes

(n = 163 – 206).

Unwritten

Agreements

Mandatory Rules

and Principles

Closed Contracts

Documentation of

Coordination Processes

Rational Persuasion .44** .23** .18** .21**

Assertiveness .04** .17** .17** .16**

Inspirational Appeals .22** .28** .26** .13**

Exchange .07** .21** .26** .06**

Self-Promotion -.11** .25** .26** .21**

Visibility .18** .25** .29** .20**

Mediating .22** .16** .19** .18**

Proactive Behavior .16** .17** .25** .17**

Inspiring Trust .32** .24** .25** .19**

Note.

Sample Size differs due to Pairwise Deletion for Missing Data;*

p < .05; **

p < .01.

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Table 4: Correlations between Political Tactics and Forms of Formalization: Roles.

Respondent: Formal

Role

(n = 86 – 93)

Respondent: No Formal

Role

(n = 113 – 116)

Rational Persuasion 4.77

4.51

.079

Assertiveness 2.92

2.50

.014

Inspirational Appeals 4.51

4.11

.016

Exchange 2.91

2.74

.386

Self-Promotion 2.68

2.28

.024

Visibility 3.94

3.54

.032

Mediating 3.62

3.27

.019

Proactive Behavior 3.29

2.85

.009

Inspiring Trust 4.43

4.07

.019

Note.

Sample Size differs due to Pairwise Deletion for Missing Data.

Table 5: Correlations between Political Tactics and Forms of Centralization

(n = 199 – 207).

„Particular network

members give orders in

coordination processes”

“Coordination processes are implemented

through a person in power (network manager,

coordinator etc.)”

Rational Persuasion .14** .16**

Assertiveness .17** .17**

Inspirational Appeals .08** .15**

Exchange .01** -.05

Self-Promotion .12** .20**

Visibility .08** .21**

Mediating .07** .20**

Proactive Behavior .13** .22**

Inspiring Trust .11** .17**

Note.

Sample Size differs due to Pairwise Deletion for Missing Data;*

p < .05; **

p < .01.

Table 6: Correlations between Political Tactics and Forms of Interactions

(n = 163 – 211).

Ad-hoc Contact Regular Meetings

Importance of

ICT

Rational Persuasion .17**

.34**

.32**

Assertiveness .06**

.07**

.09**

Inspirational Appeals .08**

.20**

.26**

Exchange .18**

.02**

.15**

Self-Promotion .04**

.06**

.12**

Visibility .12**

.16**

.32**

Mediating .13**

.17**

.24**

Proactive Behavior .13**

.18**

.22**

Inspiring Trust .22**

.26**

.28**

Note.

Sample Size differs due to Pairwise Deletion for Missing Data;*

p < .05; **

p < .01.

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single items were used to indicate forms of

centralization: First, we asked if particular network

members are giving orders when processes are

coordinated in the virtual network. In addition,

respondents should answer if coordination processes

are implemented through a person in power (e.g.,

network manager, coordinator). In examining the

results illustrated in table 5, the two questions show

different interrelations with the tactics. While there

is only one small significant correlation between

Assertiveness and the existence of network members

giving orders (r = .17), the existence of a person in

power in the network reveals small but significant

positive correlations with eight out of nine tactics,

ranging from .16 to .22. These results suggest that

the implementation of a focal agent who coordinates

processes in the network is related to a more intense

use of micro-political behavior.

4.3 Interaction and Political Tactics

In order to analyze the relationship between different

forms of interaction and the use of influence tactics,

further correlations were calculated. The results are

shown in table 6. As can be seen, there are small

significant positive correlations between the

opportunity for Ad-hoc Contact and the three tactics

Rational Persuasion, Exchange and Inspiring Trust

with coefficients between .17 and .22. Further, six

out of nine tactics are significantly associated with

the formation of Regular Meetings. Again, small

significances were found, except for one medium

correlation of r = .34 between Rational Persuasion

and this form of interaction.

Regarding the importance of ICT for

coordination processes in the network small

significances were apparent for seven out of the nine

tactics. Worth to mention, all significant positive

correlations were higher in relation to the other

forms of interaction, thereby revealing two medium

significances (Rational Persuasion, Visibility).

Across forms of interactions, especially Rational

Persuasion and Inspiring Trust seem to be stable in

their association with several interaction forms: The

more opportunities for planned or ad-hoc

interactions are given, the higher the use of these

tactics. The same applies to the importance of ICT

for coordination processes.

In general, the use of tactics seems to be

dependent on the importance of ICT in network-

related coordination processes indeed. In two cases,

however, these tendencies are not apparent: Self-

Promotion and Assertiveness show no significant

interactions across all forms of interaction.

5 DISCUSSION

Does the structural ‘playing field’ in virtual

networks – in terms of formalization, centralization

and interaction – have an impact on the political

influence behavior that is displayed by the network

members? And if so, do structures rather inhibit or

promote certain tactical actions? To find answers,

the aim of the present study was to determine

whether interrelations would be found between

distinct structural characteristics and the

respondents’ reports on their influence attempts in

the virtual network collaboration they were engaged.

On the whole, results indicate that the use of

political tactics is not independent from the

structural characteristics of the joint collaboration.

Surprisingly, an increase of formalization, e.g. the

use of agreements, fixed principles and rules or even

contracts did not constrain informal political

behavior. On the contrary, higher formalization was

comprehensively associated with higher use of

micro-political tactics. The same tendencies were

revealed for centralization in terms of a person in

power (network managers, coordinators etc.) that

coordinated network processes.

Further, we investigated whether there is a

difference in the frequency of micro-political

behavior depending on the occupation of formal

roles. Thereby, both directions seemed possible:

Members who do not fill a formal position in the

virtual network could especially rely on informal

tactical behavior to be able to contribute to network-

related decisions. At the same time, members who

are holding formal roles could try to strengthen their

position through the additional use of political

actions. Interestingly, the latter was the case:

Respondents with a formal role within the

collaboration used eight of the nine tactics – except

for Exchange – more intensively compared to

respondents without a formal role.

These findings might seem surprising at first

sight, since it is reasonable to assume that stronger

formalization and centralization build up a

governmental structure so that informal influence

activities should become less important. However,

according to our results, the opposite seems to be the

case: Formalization and centralization do not thwart

political agents in virtual networks. Even more,

tactical behavior appears to function as a

counterbalance to formal structures. At the same

time, micro-political behavior cannot be regarded as

a means that works against the network structures in

the sense of ‘leadership from the bottom up’. In fact,

results indicate that influence tactics are used

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especially by members who are already in a formal

position, possibly trying to stabilize or even improve

their role.

A possible explanation could lie in the perceived

imbalance of power that is inevitably accompanied

by a stronger implementation of structures: In

formalizing or centralizing processes, power

structures and relations become more obvious for all

network partners. As a consequence, this may result

in micro-political processes to gain or keep

influence.

With a view to forms of interactions and their

impact on political tactics two aspects shall be

briefly discussed: First, higher opportunities for

formal and informal contact show a slight trend to

higher political engagement. However, only some of

the tactics showed significant relations.

Consequently, more interaction is not necessarily

accompanied by more political interaction. Second,

ICT seem to have a catalytic effect on political

influence attempts. Small to medium positive

correlations could be found for seven out of nine

tactics, especially for tactics that can be regarded

more or less as virtual in nature like Visibility.

However, other tactics are affected as well. How can

this be explained? As was stated above, ICT

fundamentally changes interaction settings.

Following this approach, higher importance of ICT

in virtual networks could imply that the relevance

for network members to reduce Anonymity and to

establish Awareness is more urgent. Political tactics

could be one solution of ‘getting one’s way’ (Kipnis,

Schmidt & Wilkinson, 1980) when communication

and coordination is conveyed through media. This is

also supported by the results from Janneck & Staar

(2011), who found that the use of micro-political

tactics was associated with the relevance and use of

ICT in virtual networks.

This also raises interesting questions regarding

the design of communication and cooperation media.

It is feasible to assume that the degree of openness,

awareness, and transparency provided by a

groupware or similar communication media will

influence communication styles and therefore also

political behavior (cf. Janneck & Staar, 2011). How

exactly the design of cooperative systems influences

micro-political behavior needs to be investigated in

future studies.

The following conclusions can be drawn from

the results of the present study. The first conclusion

follows from the ongoing discussion concerning the

effect of network structures on the agents’

opportunities for political behavior. On that note,

some researchers have argued that especially limited

formal structures and roles may lead to influence

behavior (cf. Janneck & Staar, 2011). Despite the

fact that micro-politics occurred to a considerable

degree across the whole sample, formalization,

centralization and interaction tended to increase

micro-political behavior. Accordingly, postulated

recommendations to inhibit micro-politics through

stronger structuring have to be critically reflected

(cf. Elron & Vigoda-Gadot, 2003, 2006). Following

this perspective of many authors, micro-politics is

regarded a rather negative force working against

legitimate structures. The results indicate that this is

not necessarily true: Network members who hold

formal roles used tactics more intensively.

According to that, political behavior may rather be

seen as an additional possibility to participate in

leadership and governance issues.

Beside the formulated research questions, the

present study’s results further suggest that micro-

political behavior is far from being an extraordinary

appearance or just an ‘emergency solution’ for

single agents in virtual networks. Rather, micro-

politics in these forms of collaboration seems to be a

vital tool for members in general to improve the

individual ability to act in network issues. This

perception, in turn, gives rise to the question on the

influence outcome. In other words: Who is the

profiteer of micro-political maneuvers? At a basic

level, we have taken a neutral perspective on micro-

politics in this paper defining informal influence

behavior as neither good nor bad. In addition, no

empirical answers can be given with a view to the

present study’s focus. However, former research in

this area indicates that micro-political tactics of

individual agents are not necessarily driven by

selfishness and mere self-interests. Likewise, tactical

behavior can serve both individual and collective

interests or might even be put to the full service of

common network goals (Janneck & Staar, 2011).

The study offers some limitations. The first

limitation is set by the selection of the sample: We

did not analyze whole networks and the inner

dynamics between various members. Instead we

used single network representatives to gain insights

into the field of informal and formal interrelations.

Of course, it is problematic to act on the assumption

that one single person can objectively or fully reflect

the political situation in the virtual network. Further,

we did not control for the distinct communication

channels that were used. Accordingly, we were not

able to differentiate between different media and

resulting effects on political behavior. In addition,

the present study offers some methodical limitations:

Since we used a classic single-shot design, no causal

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conclusions can be drawn. Whether structures have

an impact on political tactics or vice versa cannot be

clarified in the present study.

Taken together, the analysis of network

structures and political tactics provide a first step to

gain insights into interdependencies of virtual

network design and social influence processes.

Accordingly, future studies should continue to

evaluate virtual networks’ ‘playing fields’ and

informal influence tactics to broaden the picture.

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APPENDIX

Table A: English Version of the Virtual Politics Inventory.

To achieve my goals within the network…

Rational Persuasion

I try to convince others with my knowledge in that

matter.

I use rational arguments to convince my network

partners.

I describe in detail the reasons for my concerns.

I spread information to the network partners to

clarify my concerns.

Assertiveness

I clearly express my displeasure towards my network

partners.

I engage in open confrontation with my network

partners.

I put pressure on my network partners.

Inspirational Appeals

I try to highlight that we are all in the same boat.

I call upon our common vision, the basic idea of a

network.

I emphasize the need to pull together for being

successful.

Self-Promotion

I emphasize my efforts regarding the network

collaboration.

I emphasize my value for the network.

I refer to positive outcomes due to my work and/or

the central position of my company within the

network.

Exchange

I affirm that I would show my gratitude for a

partner’s favor.

I offer to do my network partner a favor in return.

I promise to reciprocate for my network partner’s support.

Mediating

I achieve my goals better when I behave neutrally towards my

partners.

I try to stay neutral and mediate between partners during

negotiations and discussions.

I keep a non-committed position in discussions and

controversies instead of taking sides with a party straight away.

I try to be the mediating tie in cases of disagreement.

Claiming Vacancies

I look for opportunities to play an additional part in the network

beyond my primary role.

I adopt some additional tasks as they turned out to be

advantageous.

I take over new tasks and/or roles within the network to extend

my scope of action.

Being Visible

I always try to show presence via electronic media.

I purposefully use electronic media to call attention to my

concerns.

I always try to be available and present on all communication

channels.

Inspiring Trust

I try to appear open-minded about my network partners’

concerns from the very beginning.

I purposefully try to show that I am a good and worthy network

partner (showing mutual exchange, trustworthiness, etc.).

I purposefully present myself as a network partner who is

willing to share information and resources.

Right from the start I tried to show my reliability towards the

other network members.

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