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implementations, due to different reasons that
mainly involve security, scalability and social
acceptance. Currently, it can be said that computer
system design and cryptographic protocol techniques
are becoming mature enough to create secure
systems that can exploit all i-voting potential.
This paper describes our new i-voting system
proposal designed to fulfill democratic election
principles. To this end, the system uses a blind
signature based anonymous channel protocol
together with certain reinforcing elements, such as
network smartcards and adapted interfaces for
voters, NVP inspector agents at server side and vote-
proof protection for secure receipt usage.
The i-voting system employs two smartcards to
protect voter privacy, supports multiple permit
requesting and vote casting, tallies votes in
collaboration with inspection groups, and allows
universal and individual verifications, full audit and
secure vote-complaining.
After functional and cryptographic validations,
we believe that our design includes all desired
features for a secure i-voting system, providing
voters with even better capabilities than in
traditional voting, as verifications (both universal
and individual) and complaining can be easily
performed. Thus, like in other Internet based
services, the big problem is reduced to Denial of
Service attacks, which can be countered by proper
usage of the several Virtual Polling Station facilities.
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