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companies in different ways are for example
Electronic Warfare (covering any action involving
the use of and getting access to the electromagnetic
spectrum and to control it), Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), data
mining processes, Communications Intelligence
(COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT),
Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Countermeasures
(ECM), (the above mentioned) social network
analysis as well as social engineering, Competitive
Business Intelligence (CBI), Open Source
Intelligence (OSINT), (micro-)drones or unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV), and Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) as intelligence gathering by means of
interpersonal contact respectively information
collected and provided by human sources, etc.
Others are white collar crime, economic espionage
and industrial espionage. Generally spoken, the
latter aspects comprise (semi-)governmental
organisations or individuals aiming on information
gathering from different types of ‘competitors’,
typically using a mix of all above quoted
instruments. Several instruments are mainly used in
the military sector, but also are relevant for all kinds
of organisations. Anyway, actors in the field of
intelligence gathering are intelligence service
providers, capital market agents, intelligence
agencies as well as competing companies (e.g.
efforts regarding market and customer data,
strategies, technologies, construction plans, R&D
results etc.).
Another critical aspect leads to potential impacts
for companies based on the European Data
Retention Directive (EU, 15 March, 2006),
implemented by law in most EU states. What about
possible spy szenarios? First, mobility patterns:
González, Hidalgo and Barabási (2009) analysed
human mobility and derived patterns of humans’
movements. Movement data generate data of
humans and the economic cycle (see e.g. related
products on market of the MIT-spinoff Sense
Networks). Based on his data from the German
Telekom (2009-2010), the politician Malte Spitz
published his comprehensive movement and
communication profile (including interacttive
graphics, travelling and social network/relationship
analysis) to warn against data retention (Biermann,
Feb. 24, 2011). The results are more than profound.
What does this probably mean to organisations and
their employees? Movement data (e.g. based on
mobile phone location) allow to segment groups
regarding profession, social status, personal
circumstances, relationship analysis, habits, routines,
state of health, and others. Second, a combination of
these issues regarding working and private life of
employees may generate much more additional
information. Third, according to Tsolkas and
Wimmer (2013) some further relevant aspects can be
pointed out: (1) Based on an analysis of all
employees’ mobile phones for a longer time, an
exposure of communications chains, triggered by a
specific event could be disclosed (e.g. similar
patterns regarding the acquisition of a huge order). It
is thinkable that, for example, such events occur
more than once. In such cases, based on generated
data, probably the arrival of a new event may
automatically be predicted and deployed by an
offender. (2) On the basis of social structures and
networks of employees, it can be possible to identify
the role of a specific person inside a group. If it is
possible to identify functionally important persons
of the organisation, diverse threat analyses are
possible: poaching or interference of the person (e.g.
during temporal limited and huge projects),
attacking the person due to his/her habits or
preferences, targeted approaching and sounding out
of information (e.g. as preparation for
eavesdropping). (3) Based on employees’ location
data of their smartphones using the same cell, most
likely offenders are able to discover who is with
whom at what location (restaurant, supplier,
headquarters, etc.), also probably the purpose of a
meeting. An example: if such a meeting is held at
the headquarters of a competitor, an offender may
draw conclusions from that (e.g. regarding a
potential company take-over or negotiations about
an intensive cooperation in a specific field, etc.).
Since PRISM, Tempora, XKeyscore and other
disclosures of Edward Snowden, Whistleblowing is
on everyone’s lips. Currently in media discussed
occurrences of spying in huge dimensions has
brought the topic of extensive surveillance of
governments to the public at large. However, the
whole issue is not that surprising: huge surveillance
activities of intelligence agencies in current times of
technological opportunities as well as committed
cooperation between such institutions are nothing
new, notably not since ECHELON
i
and other
communication surveillance equipment as well as
relevant legislation after 9/11. Or as Weiße (2011)
argues: Bringing the current situation to mind by
asking ‘what was?’, and then questioning ‘what is?’
seems easy to be answered. We can multiply ‘what
was?’ by the factor 10 and probably are at the ‘what
is?’. Currently, the European Union funds the
project INDECT (intelligent information system
supporting observation, searching and detection for
security of citizens in urban environment;
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