efficiency and appeal of the technology and its
related services, and both direct and indirect
associated costs (Timmers, 1998; Teece, 2010;
Ghezzi, 2013). It is a further supply-side activation
determinant that in turn affects several modifiers of
technology diffusion as identified by TAM-derived
models (e.g. new technology’s price/performance
ratio, user and firm expected benefits, and user
experience).
2.4 Technology
The Technology macro-determinant addresses the
technology landscape in which the innovative
technology is embedded and derived, consisting of
the past and present technological choices made by
the players involved, and represented in the
following determinants.
Infrastructure (T1): the underlying enabling
technology infrastructure – e.g. traffic networks in
ICTs, Energy or Transport industries – and its core
functionalities and characteristics – e.g. capacity or
bandwidth, availability, reliability, localization
(Ghezzi et al., 2010).
Device (T2): the tools and instruments employed
by individual or business users to exploit the new
technology, and their key features – e.g. cost,
compatibility, interoperability, performance, user
experience.
Enabling services and applications (T3): the
constellation of systems, services and applications –
e.g. creation, integration and publishing tools,
management and delivery platforms, storage systems
– built on the infrastructure and enabling the new
technology’s stages of development, translation into
a set of services, and commercialization.
3 EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
The empirical assessment method chosen for this
study is historical analysis, i.e. the process of
assembling, critically examining, and summarizing
the records of the past (Gottschalk, 1969).
Information gathered from published sources about
the commercialization of the technological
innovations related to Mobile Video Calls was
analyzed and employed to test the importance of a
technology activation and market activation analysis
through the REST model.
In the first years of the 21
st
century, Mobile
Network Operators were looking for new revenue
generating value added services to make up for
market saturation and shrinking margins. Mobile
video calls soon became a paramount innovative
service among those tentatively launched by
Operators: some players, like H3G Italy, even made
this the core of their offer and market penetration
strategy. However, as the customer base and
revenues never took off, it became apparent that
such service and the related innovation had inherent
criticalities. Such criticalities could not have been
spotted by traditional models on technology
adoption, as they did not only refer to user
characteristics: they largely depended on the supply-
side surrounding ecosystem.
At the strategic level, the mobile value network
was neither structured not ready to support the
service, since the key players (e.g. device
manufacturers and content providers) lacked the
necessary commitment, as Operators provided them
with no incentive to craft a surrounding offer that
could have boosted the service demand; in addition
to this, the business model and revenue model built
around the service was too expensive or simply
unappealing. At the same time, technology
determinants were not activated: the network
infrastructure would have needed an expansion to
support the increased data traffic, but no player was
willing to overinvest in an innovation whose uptake
was far from being certain; the share of customers
owning a smartphone was too little at that time, and
even such devices of devices enabling video calls
had neither the characteristics nor the performance
to ensure a satisfactory customer experience. In
addition, no complementary application or service
were bundled to video-calls.
This report clearly shows that the market for
video calls was not activated when Operators first
launched their services: a lack of technology
activation hence determined the resounding market
failure they experienced.
A technology activation analysis employing the
REST model would have probably highlighted the
supply-side hurdles and pitfalls, thus sparing
Operators expensive investments.
Similar considerations and conclusions could be
drawn for other failed innovation such as MiniDisc
format, where a lack of market activation at multiple
sides covered by and unified in the REST model
(including: strategic agreements; value network;
business model; network of complementary
technology and products; ancillary services and
applications) prevented the rise of this potentially
interesting technology. At the strategic level, in fact,
there was no strategic agreement between two of the
main competitors (Sony and Philips). While Sony
introduced the MiniDisc technology, Philips focused
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