4.1 Speed
One of the most obvious benefits of the proposed ar-
chitecture is the fact that the delivery of data to the
intended destination would be performed as quickly
as the hardware would allow. Delivery of data to
any other location would be dependant on networks
and network layers, and hardware and hardware lay-
ers. Even though data may always succeed in getting
to the intended destination, services which would re-
quire fast delivery would still have to wait for data to
be sent. For security monitoring processes, the differ-
ence in the time taken to do this could be important.
4.2 Overhead
Overhead can be broken down into two main areas,
performance overhead and network overhead. The
redirection of data to alternative locations affects both
of these. Even copying a file onto another location on
a local hard disk can noticeably slow down a running
machine, so any opportunity with which this kind of
costly data transfer can be avoided would be prefer-
able to the average user.
An interface able to move data from one layer to
another could also be used to specify a duplicate lo-
cation in the hypervisor layer to place data at the mo-
ment it is created in the hardware. The simultaneous
writing of the data to both locations avoids the need to
copy any data later on, so the job does not need to be
performed a second time (unless required for another
reason).
The fact that data would no longer necessarily
need to be sent over a network would relieve the pres-
sure on networks too. This would allow for virtual
machines which have a need to preserve network ca-
pacity to use their network speed for purposes other
than the back up of data.
4.3 Security
Although sending information over networks is not
inherently insecure if done correctly, keeping data
within a trusted boundary does have its advantages.
The ability to send data directly to another level on
the same hardware prevents attacks such as a man in
the middle attack from taking place, a worry for those
with particularly sensitive information.
The most obvious point of attack for the VM
owner’s data is by a malicious administrator, who
would be able to access the VM owner’s data and
their VM image, but would not be able to access them
without also gaining the passwords with which they
were encrypted. However, this danger would exist
anywhere on the cloud on which a user stores data.
By keeping data within trusted confines, it would at
least reduce the need to look for additional services
which can offer third party storage.
4.4 Energy
Energy use has become a much more important con-
cern for organisations, as they have started to become
aware of the costs of its use. Energy costs will be
of most concern to cloud providers, due to the huge
amounts of energy required to power their data cen-
tres. There are ways in which this concern could be
passed to users as well. Firstly, if cloud providers ever
decide to start using energy units as part of the cost
calculations for their services. Secondly, due to wider
concern about energy use, it is not unlikely that cloud
providers could start to provide a breakdown of the
energy use of individual virtual machines.
Work looking at the energy use of different kind
of cloud services, and measuring the energy used to
send cloud data around the world, is now being pro-
duced (Schien et al., 2012). Our suggested architec-
ture could provide a way to decrease overall energy
use in the cloud, by reducing the need to send data
over the various hardware and network layers (which
for users who redirect huge amounts of data could
amount to a significant saving). Even for users who
redirect small amounts of data, this could add up to a
worthwhile reduction in energy use (especially over
time, or from a collection of machines). With en-
ergy consumption becoming an environmental con-
cern too, this is the kind of approach regular cloud
users may express an interest in too.
5 PROBLEMS
Although our discussed design is intended to reduce
issues, there is still the possibility that there will be
problems.
5.1 Malware
In theory, malware might be able to use the opportu-
nity to pass data directly to a hypervisor as an ideal
opportunity to launch an attack. Despite this worry,
hypervisors have so far proven to be well isolated
against attack from VMs.
Nevertheless with security threats constantly
evolving, there may develop new ways in which clev-
erly designed malware could use the access to the hy-
pervisor provided here to attack the host, and by ex-
tension, the running VMs on the host. As an addi-
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