![](bg8.png)
attacker is not able to derive directly from a single
measurement of the side channel the actual interme-
diate value being computed. Providing a description
of the leakage function, both formally analyzable and
modeling the actual experimental evidence, is still a
subject for open debate (Galea et al., 2014). More-
over, an interesting research direction is to provide
tighter lower bounds for the attacker effort, once such
a leakage function has been specified.
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