Adaptive Security in Smart Grid
Raja Ben Abdessalem and Mohamed Hamdi
MEDIATRON Laboratory, Higher School of Communication of Tunis, University of Carthage, Tunis, Tunisia
1 STAGE OF THE RESEARCH
The power infrastructure is being replaced by
digital systems based on renewable resources, to
meet the growing electricity demand and the
gradual depletion of fossil fuels as well as to satisfy
the customer’s needs in the near future. Smart grid
lets users manage, control and predict their energy
use. Therefore, the smart grid provides energy
efficiency and reduces peak power demand while
maintaining resilience, reliability, flexibility and
security of the grid (Santacana et al., 2010).
Consequently, smart grid should respond rapidly to
load changing conditions, reduce the cost of
interruptions and power quality disturbances and
reduce the probability and impact of attacks.
Smart grid introduces two-way communications
where electricity and information can be exchanged
between utility and its customers in real-time
(NIST,
2010b). However, the expansion of data
communication over the power grid, the large
number of involved parties and the heavily
interconnected communications increase
vulnerabilities and raise new security challenges.
Potential network intrusion caused by intentional
attackers may lead to a variety of damages (Metke
and Ekl, 2010).
Moreover, an intrinsic feature of smart grids is
that it is at the heart of critical services. In addition
to the direct impact that might be generated by the
occurrence of an attack, indirect losses can also be
taken into account. Therefore, specific security
models have to be developed in order to cope with
such issues.
This current research aims to develop an
adaptive risk-based security framework for smart
grid that addresses these security problems taking
into account smart grid requirements. The
framework will manage data in real-time, estimate
risks using game theory approach and apply the
appropriate adaptive security decision-making. We
mainly focus on analyzing security, privacy risk and
requirement capture for adaptive security in smart
grid. We also study the existing adaptive security
frameworks and to describe their limitations and
benefits. We fellow the Design Science
methodology (Hevner et al., 2004) to develop a
risk-based adaptive framework for the protection of
smart grid as well as to develop underlying
analytical models.
2 OUTLINE OF OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this thesis is to develop risk-based
adaptive security framework for smart grid that will
monitor in real-time smart grid environment to
detect possible threats, analyze and predict risk
damages using game-theory approach. Our
framework will adapt security decisions for
identified changes using decision-making.
The key objectives of this thesis are:
• Developing the adaptive security monitoring
model that uses a continuous cycle of a monitoring
framework for smart grid environment, based on the
Genetic Message-Oriented Secure Middleware
(GEMOM).
• Building models for estimating and predicting
risks and benefits using game theory. The thesis
will also further improve the accuracy of estimation
and prediction mechanisms by applying optimized
algorithm for resource allocation.
• Building the adaptive decision-making model
that adapt to the dynamic changing conditions of
smart grid by selecting the best adaptive security
model for a given situation and applying the
identified changes.
3 RESEARCH PROBLEM
Smart grid infrastructure might be vulnerable to
different forms of threats such as malware, intrusion
and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks; The smart grid
includes several devices that have two-way
9
Abdessalem R. and Hamdi M..
Adaptive Security in Smart Grid.
Copyright
c
2014 SCITEPRESS (Science and Technology Publications, Lda.)
communication with the electric system. These
numerous end points, which are located in insecure
large scale environments, bring new vulnerabilities.
A single vulnerability in a device can be used and
exploited to compromise all devices connected to
the network. In a smart grid, energy consumption,
pricing data and customer information can be
vulnerable to attacks. Therefore these critical
informations need to be protected. Thus, some
security goals need to be achieved and many
security parameters should be ensured such as
availability, confidentiality and integrity. Many
requirements and constraining issues should be
considered while designing security techniques and
algorithms for the smart grid.
Big-data Requirement. Advanced technol-
ogies and application are integrated in the smart
grid. Accordingly, a huge amount of privacy-
sensitive data will be generated for further
control, analysis and real-time pricing methods.
These data can be extremely vulnerable to
attacks and can be extracted using data mining
techniques by different agents such as criminals
and insurance companies that determining
health care premiums based on customers’ life
styles. Therefore, it is very critical to define the
communication infrastructure requirements to
provide a secure and reliable service (Gungor et
al., 2011).
Resource Limitations. The smart grid
operating systems have unique performance
and reliability requirements. The limited
availability of computation and communication
capabilities makes the security of smart grid
more complex. Some smart grid devices have
limited bandwidth. However, a significant
communication channel is required to ensure
the integrity using authentication algorithms.
Thus, authentication algorithms should be
designed to operate on lower bandwidth
channels. Moreover, smart grid devices have
limited computational power, memory and
storage. This can lead to using weaker security
controls. Consequently, the security algorithms
and mechanisms should be adapted to these
constrained devices.
Real-time Requirement. The smart grid uses a
wide area measurement and control to measure
the electrical network parameters, to supervise
data acquisition and to take decision in real-
time. In addition, customers require a real-time
transmission of critical information, such as the
power consumption, to adjust their
consumption and to control peak demand.
Customers’ personal information (such as their
activities, the type of devices used and the
energy consumption) can be exposed to various
kinds of attacks which can damage customer
privacy. Therefore, security algorithms with
minimum computational cost should be
deployed to ensure the real-time requirement.
Many threats manifests in real-time scenarios.
Hence, adaptive security is used to increase
awareness and to provide real-time detection and
prevention. Adaptive risk management provides
automated risk analysis and dynamically adapt to
changing conditions. However, most current risk
management frameworks that address the security
and the privacy problems do not consider these
smart grid requirements. Therefore, this current
research focuses on the development of adaptive
risk management that takes into account the smart
grid requirements. This framework will learn, and
adapt to changing environment dynamically and
will anticipate unknown threats.
4 STATE OF THE ART
In this section, we motivate the need for the risk-
based adaptive security, we give brief state-of-the-
art in existing privacy and security risk models and
we underline their limitations and advantages.
4.1 Adaptive Security
Security and privacy threats manifest in real-time
scenarios. Therefore, different vulnerabilities may
be introduced to the system. Possible changes might
expose the system to new security threats (Salehie
et al., 2012). To address these threats, adaptive
software models promise to increase awareness,
automating monitoring, detection and prevention.
Therefore, security controls can be adapted
according to the security and privacy requirements’
failures at runtime in order to protect critical assets.
Adaptive security will check integrity of data if a
theft of energy is detected (for example if the
energy usage does not much with the reported meter
data). In addition, to ensure security controls at
runtime, access to the grid’s data need adjustment.
Adaptive security and privacy aims also to monitor
information exchanged to detect possible threats
especially in case of mobility where privacy
concerns for example user behavior can be revealed.
Thus, privacy policies, in such case, need to be
adjusted to mitigate possible threats.
ICETE2014-DoctoralConsortium
10
4.2 Existing Adaptive Risk
Management Frameworks
Traditional security measures such as firewall,
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) or Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPS) usually lack the
correlated domain and situational awareness needed
to analyze events and inputs. Consequently, they
cannot adapt their security postures to evolving
situations and transitions.
Risk management provides automated risk
analysis by discovering critical assets; realizing
their weaknesses and the suitable risk mitigation
approaches.
To achieve the vision of a secure smart grid
infrastructure, a combined framework for risk
management has been proposed in (Riadh W. Y.
Habash and Burr, 2013). The risk management
framework is used to identify threats and
vulnerabilities, to analyze risks and to recommend
new controls in order to reduce the risks. This
process is periodically repeated to account for
changes in the threat situation; and set up policies
that address human behavior, which is the basis for
all security risks.
Authors in (Ray, 2011) proposed an adaptive
risk management framework that exploits near real-
time security state and events of power and
information systems to adapt security postures of
the grid to the situational awareness. Security risks
is evaluated using a systematic methodology that
consist of identifying all assets (such as power and
information systems), assessing vulnerabilities of
each asset, analyzing all potential threats that can
exploit the identified vulnerabilities, identifying the
appropriate security control mechanisms and finally
determining the optimum security postures for each
asset.
Authors in (Sridhar et al., 2012) proposed a
vulnerability assessment framework aiming to
quantify risk using Stochastic Petri Nets. The Petri
Nets are used to model the cyber network and to
obtain the probability of a successful attack. This
framework identifies and handles multiple events,
then analyzes the risk without providing response
strategies. However, Petri nets are facing
difficulties in application due to their computational
efficiency and scalability (Tang et al., 2004).
4.3 Gap Analysis
Table 1 describes the limitations and the benefits of
exiting adaptive risk management frameworks, and
the benefits of our proposed framework as
comparison as shown in the table below. In this
Table, limitations are indicated by ”(-)”, benefits by
”(+)”, ”Req.” (Requirements) indicates the
important smart grid requirements and ”Ref.”
(References) indicates some existing risk
management frameworks.
The risk management of the power grid control
information should exploit historical vulnerability
and threat data in order to enable domain specific
statistical analysis and characterization of attack
probabilities and risks.
Following this, we propose a risk-based adaptive
security framework using game theory that can
model the dynamic behavior of stakeholders. This
framework detects in real-time unknown security
and privacy threats, respond to them, and adapt to
the environment and changing degree of security.
The benefits of our proposed framework are
presented in Table 1.
4.4 Game Theory
The game theory is widely used to study a variety of
security problems (Bier and Azaiez, 2010)
(Manshaei et al., 2013). Game theory is a rich
mathematical tool that analyzes and models the
interaction between an attacker and a defender (the
players). The game theory methods can be very
useful in improving current risk analysis by
clarifying the risks of adversarial situations. The
game theory models, that can distinguish clearly
between strategic choices and random variable, can
make risk assessments more sensible and effective
for allocating defensive resources than current risk
scoring models (Cox, 2009).
5 METHODOLOGY
5.1 Introducing New Concepts
In this work, we develop a new methodology for
dynamic risk assessment based on the approach
proposed in (Poslad et al., 2013). The overall
adaptive security approach is illustrated in Figure 1.
The synthetic methods are concerned with
building models of phenomena related to the
development, operation and use of aggregated
services, mainly models of software artifacts. We
subject to the overall framework of Design Science
(Hevner et al., 2004), where information system
artifacts are built, and evaluated. Evaluation will be
performed using Action Research (Baskerville,
1999), case study research, and formal modelling of
AdaptiveSecurityinSmartGrid
11
Table 1: Gap analysis of existing risk management frameworks.
Req.
Ref.
Real-time Resources limitations Big data
(Riadh W. Y.
Habash and
Burr,
2013)
(-) The framework does not incorporate
attack prevention that accurately
predicts future events and adapts
accordingly in real-time.
(+) The framework is adapted to human
behavior by repeating periodically the
risk management process.
(-) The unified framework
is not optimized since it
contains several steps
(+) The risk strategy
depends on the available
resources.
(-) The framework cannot
manage a large volume of
data.
(Ray, 2011)
(-) The framework does not incorporate
attack prevention.
(+) The security control posture
changes in near real-time in response to
changes in the power and information
system state changes.
(+) This framework
depends on the available
resources.
(+) This framework can
include data centers and
Intelligent Electronic
Devices (IEDs) as well as
emergent infrastructure and
p
rocesses.
(Sridhar et
al., 2012)
(-) When the number of functional
alternative Services increases, many
transactions missed their deadlines
because they could not get enough
resources in time.
(+) Petri nets can model the
coordination algorithms of the real-
time grid transaction and verify their
correctness.
(-) Petri nets consume a lot
of resources when many
services are used.
(+) Petri nets can analyze a
large volume of statistics.
Our
proposed
framework
(+) The adaptive security monitoring
model collects data in real-time.
(+) SCAP enables sharing metrics and
measurements of smart grid in realtime.
(+) Our framework incorporates attack
prevention to estimate risk in real-time.
(+) Our framework enable security
control to coordinate with changes in
security state and events.
(+) Automated process
enables monitoring a larger
number of security metrics
with few resources and low
costs.
(+) The predictive model
will use an optimized
algorithm for resource
allocation to choose the
best strategy.
(+) Our framework uses
SCAP that can monitor a
large volume of data.
Figure 1: The overall adaptive security approach.
relevant information flows. The methods are also
concerned with validating the models using formal
criteria and with drawing conclusions from those
models. Examples on the use of such methods:
Make models based on the formal semantics of
programming languages, and analyse the properties
of those models, using for example flow analysis to
determine flow of information. This leads to sound
conclusion using well-established theoretical
methods. The security models will be realized as a
prototype specification, accompanied with brief
guidelines and profiles for use. Additional
validation of the design based on formal modelling,
will be carried out. The other methods, from
software and systems engineering, are used to
analyse existing smart grids systems and plan their
use.
5.2 Developing, Validating, and
Testing New Models
Our proposed framework aims to adapt dynamically
the security postures to the changing conditions by
monitoring smart grid environment in real-time,
ICETE2014-DoctoralConsortium
12
analyzing the collected information (to anticipate
unknown threats) and making adaptive decision.
Figure 2 illustrates our adaptive risk management
framework for smart grid. The framework is
composed of three models: the adaptive monitoring
model, the predictive model and the adaptive
decision model.
Figure 2: Adaptive risk management framework for
Smart Grid.
5.2.1 Adaptive Monitoring
The adaptive security monitoring model collects
data in real-time from different devices such as
meters and sensors. However, the interoperability
among them is a critical requirement to integrate
security and risk mitigation. In this context, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) developed a framework that includes
protocols and model standards for information
management to achieve interoperability of smart
grid devices and systems (NIST, 2010a). Authors in
(DHS, 2011) proposed three interdependent
building blocks to enhance cybersecurity:
interoperability, automation and authentication.
Interoperability defines cyber communities by
policies which permit to cyber participants to
collaborate dynamically in automated community
defense. Automated process enables monitoring a
greater number of security metrics with fewer
resources, lower cost and greater reliability and
efficiency than using manual process. Automated
monitoring provides measurable, relevant and
timely information. Many technical security
controls can be used for monitoring with automated
tools. Automated tools, such as Security Content
Automation Protocol (SCAP) (Barrett et al., 2009),
help monitoring large volumes of data. SCAP is
used to communicate data in a standardized format
for performing security automation capabilities and
promoting interoperability of security products.
SCAP integrates the Common Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS) and Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) in order to
provide quantitative and repeatable measurement
and scoring of software flaw vulnerabilities across
system. The standardization makes security metrics
and measurements easier to share. In order to ensure
an up-to-date threat and vulnerability knowledge in
the smart grid system, we propose to use shared
metrics and measurement repositories such as
SCAP.
Our adaptive security monitoring will use a
continuous cycle of a monitoring framework for
smart grid environment, based on the Genetic
MessageOriented Secure Middleware (GEMOM).
GEMOM, which was proposed in the European
Commission’s Framework Programme 7 project
GEMOM (2008-
2010), develops a messaging platform that is
resilient, evolutionary, self-organizing, self-healing,
scalable and secure (Abie et al., 2009).
5.2.2 Predictive Model
The predictive model uses the monitored
information to estimate and predict risks based on
game theory approach. The game theory is suitable
for modeling and analyzing the complexity of
interaction between stakeholders and adversaries as
well as their behaviors and the choice of their
strategies. However, the players’ strategies can
include allocations of resources to prepare for
possible attacks. The predictive model will use an
optimized algorithm for resource allocation to
choose the defender’s best allocation of defensive
resources, taking into account the attacker’s best
response.
5.2.3 Adaptive Decision
Adaptive decision model will enable security
control to coordinate with changes in security state
and events. The resulting predictive model helps
smart grid to take decisions on their security
strategies while considering their resource
constraints.
Adaptive security decision-making will adapt
security control according to the level of security
and the role of stakeholders.
6 EXPECTED OUTCOME
The proposed risk management framework ensures
an adaptive security for smart grid by monitoring
data in real-time, predicting risks and adapting
AdaptiveSecurityinSmartGrid
13
security decisions to changing circumstances. Our
framework is based on a continuous cycle of
adaptive monitoring, predictive analytics and
automated adaptive decisionmaking. In our future
work, we aim to develop the adaptive monitoring
model using automated process and based on the
GEMOM Middleware. Then, we plan to develop the
predictive model that will estimate risks and the
decision-making model.
REFERENCES
Abie, H., Savola, R., and Dattani, I. (2009). Robust,
secure, self-adaptive and resilient messaging
middleware for business critical systems. In Future
Computing, Service Computation, Cognitive,
Adaptive, Content, Patterns, 2009.
COMPUTATIONWORLD ’09. Computation World:,
pages 153–160.
Barrett, M., Johnson, C., Mell, P., Quinn, S., Scarfone, K.
Stephen Quinn, K. S. M. B., and Johnson, C. (2009).
Guide to adopting and using the Security Content
Automation Protocol (SCAP). NIST Special Publ.
800-117 (Draft), U.S. National Institute of Standards
and Technology.
Baskerville, R. L. (1999). Investigating information
systems with action research. Commun. AIS, 2(3es).
Bier, V. M. and Azaiez, M. N. (2010). Game
Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats. Springer.
Cox, Jr., L. A. T. (2009). Game theory and risk analysis.
Risk Analysis, 29(8):1062–1068.
DHS (2011). Enabling Distributed Security in
Cyberspace: Building a Healthy and Resilient Cyber
Ecosystem with Automated Collective Action. DHS
National Protection and Programs Directorate.
Gungor, V., Sahin, D., Kocak, T., Ergut, S., Buccella, C.,
Cecati, C., and Hancke, G. (2011). Smart grid
technologies: Communication technologies and
standards. Industrial Informatics, IEEE Transactions
on, 7(4):529–539.
Hevner, A. R., March, S. T., Park, J., and Ram, S. (2004).
Design science in information systems research. MIS
Q., 28(1):75–105.
Manshaei, M. H., Zhu, Q., Alpcan, T., Bacs¸ar, T., and
Hubaux, J.-P. (2013). Game theory meets network
security and privacy. ACM Comput. Surv.,
45(3):25:1–25:39.
Metke, A. and Ekl, R. (2010). Smart grid security
technology. In Innovative Smart Grid Technologies
(ISGT), 2010, pages 1–7.
NIST (2010a). Nist framework and roadmap for smart
grid interoperability standards, release 1.0.
NIST (2010b). The smart grid interoperability panel-
cyber security working group: Smart grid cyber
security strategy and requirements. NIST IR-7628.
Poslad, S., Hamdi, M., and Abie, H. (2013). Adaptive
security and privacy management for the internet of
things (aspi 2013). In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM
Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing
Adjunct Publication, UbiComp ’13 Adjunct, pages
373–378, New York, NY, USA. ACM.
Ray, P. D. (2011). Interoperating grid cyber security
systems: Adaptive risk management across unified ot
and it domains. Grid-InterOp.
Riadh W. Y. Habash, V. G. and Burr, K. (2013). Risk
management framework for the power grid cyber-
physical security. British Journal of Applied Science
and Technology.
Salehie, M., Pasquale, L., Omoronyia, I., and Nuseibeh,
B. (2012). Adaptive security and privacy in smart
grids: A software engineering vision. In Software
Engineering for the Smart Grid (SE4SG), 2012
International Workshop on, pages 46–49.
Santacana, E., Rackliffe, G., Tang, L., and Feng, X.
(2010). Getting smart. Power and Energy Magazine,
IEEE, 8(2):41–48.
Sridhar, S., Govindarasu, M., and Liu, C.-C. (2012). Risk
analysis of coordinated cyber attacks on power grid.
In Control and Optimization Methods for Electric
Smart Grids. Springer New York.
Tang, F., Li, M., and Huang, J. Z. (2004). Real-time
transaction processing for autonomic grid
applications. Eng. Appl. Artif. Intell., 17(7):799–807.
ICETE2014-DoctoralConsortium
14