Sequential Games with Finite Horizon and Turn Selection Process - Finite Strategy Sets Case

Rubén Becerril-Borja, Raúl Montes-de-Oca

2016

Abstract

A class of models of sequential games is proposed where the turns of decision are random for all players. The models presented show different variations in this class of games. In spite of the random nature of the turn selection process, first the number of turns per player is fixed, and afterwards models without this property are considered, as well as some that allow changes in other components. For all the models, a series of results are obtained to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria. A possible application is shown for drafting athletes in sports leagues.

References

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Becerril-Borja R. and Montes-de-Oca R. (2016). Sequential Games with Finite Horizon and Turn Selection Process - Finite Strategy Sets Case . In Proceedings of 5th the International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - Volume 1: ICORES, ISBN 978-989-758-171-7, pages 44-50. DOI: 10.5220/0005696400440050


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icores16,
author={Rubén Becerril-Borja and Raúl Montes-de-Oca},
title={Sequential Games with Finite Horizon and Turn Selection Process - Finite Strategy Sets Case},
booktitle={Proceedings of 5th the International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - Volume 1: ICORES,},
year={2016},
pages={44-50},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0005696400440050},
isbn={978-989-758-171-7},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of 5th the International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - Volume 1: ICORES,
TI - Sequential Games with Finite Horizon and Turn Selection Process - Finite Strategy Sets Case
SN - 978-989-758-171-7
AU - Becerril-Borja R.
AU - Montes-de-Oca R.
PY - 2016
SP - 44
EP - 50
DO - 10.5220/0005696400440050