with the set of local maximizers of F, and players’
preferences all agree on the set of strategy profiles.
In artificial intelligence, these games may model
coalition formation in multiagent systems (Rahwan
and Jenning, 2007; Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006).
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
Via polynomial MLE, near-Boolean functions of
n variables take values on the n-product of high-
dimensional unit simplices, thus enabling to approach
discrete optimization problems, namely set pack-
ing/partitioning, through an objective function de-
fined over a continuous domain, and with feasible so-
lutions found at extreme points of the simplices. Least
squares approximations with polynomials of bounded
degree are discussed in terms of additive separabil-
ity of partition functions, while near-Boolean n-player
games flexibly model strategic coalition formation.
Apart from settings in artificial intelligence such
as combinatorial auctions and coalition structure gen-
eration in multiagent systems discussed above, near-
Boolean optimization seems generally interesting for
objective function-based clustering (Rossi, 2015), and
for graph clustering in particular (Schaeffer, 2007).
Specifically, for a given weighted graph, edge weights
and vertices’ weighted degrees may be used (in alter-
native ways) to obtain a quadratic MLE in expression
(2), i.e. a polynomial with degree 2. Then, optimiza-
tion with respect to such an objective function pro-
vides a method for partitioning the vertex set. This de-
serves separate investigation in a forthcoming work.
Along an alternative route, through the core con-
cept in cooperative game theory, it may be interesting
to consider the following problem: for given generic
(i.e. non-additively separable) global game or parti-
tion function h ∈ R
B
n
, determine a quadratic MLE in
(2), i.e. a set function w such that µ
w
(A) = 0 for all
A ∈ 2
N
,|A| > 2, satisfying h
w
(P) ≥ h(P) for all parti-
tions P ∈ P
N
of players, where h
w
(P) =
∑
A∈P
w(A),
and with h
w
(P
>
) = h(P
>
) for the coarsest partition.
The idea behind this problem comes from a novel ap-
proach to the solution of global games h (Gilboa and
Lehrer, 1990), and shall be explored in future work.
REFERENCES
Aigner, M. (1997). Combinatorial Theory. Springer.
Reprint of the 1979 Edition.
Alidaee, B., Kochenberger, G., Lewis, K., Lewis, M., and
Wang, H. (2008). A new approach for modeling and
solving set packing problems. European Journal of
Operational Research, 186(2):504 – 512.
Boros, E. and Hammer, P. (2002). Pseudo-Boolean opti-
mization. Discrete App. Math., 123:155–225.
Bowles, S. (2004). Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions,
and Evolution. Princeton University Press.
Chandra, B. and Halldorsson, M. M. (2001). Greedy local
improvement and weighted set packing. Journal of
Algorithms, (39):223–240.
Conitzer, V. and Sandholm, T. (2006). Complexity of
constructing solutions in the core based on synergies
among coalitions. Artificial Intel., 170:607–619.
Crama, Y. and Hammer, P. L. (2011). Boolean Functions:
Theory, Algorithms, and Applications. Cambridge
University Press.
Gilboa, I. and Lehrer, E. (1990). Global games. Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory, (20):120–147.
Gilboa, I. and Lehrer, E. (1991). The value of information -
an axiomatic approach. Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics, 20(5):443–459.
Gr
¨
unbaum, B. (2001). Convex Polytopes 2nd ed. Springer.
Hammer, P. and Holzman, R. (1992). Approximations of
pseudo-Boolean functions; applications to game the-
ory. Math. Methods of Op. Res. - ZOR, 36(1):3–21.
Hazan, E., Safra, S., and Schwartz, O. (2006). On the
complexity of approximating k-set packing. Compu-
tational Complexity, (15):20–39.
Korte, B. and Vygen, J. (2002). Combinatorial Optimiza-
tion. Theory and Algorithms. Springer.
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., and Green, J. R. (1995).
Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press.
Milgrom, P. (2004). Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Monderer, D. and Shapley, L. S. (1996). Potential games.
Games and Economic Behavior, 14(1):124–143.
Papadimitriou, C. (1994). Computational Complexity. Ad-
dison Wesley.
Rahwan, T. and Jenning, N. (2007). An algorithm for dis-
tributing coalitional value calculations among cooper-
ating agents. Artificial Intelligence, 171:535–567.
Rossi, G. (2015). Multilinear objective function-based clus-
tering. In Proc. 7th Int. J. Conf. on Computational
Intelligence, volume 2 (FCTA), pages 141–149.
Rota, G.-C. (1964a). The number of partitions of a set.
American Mathematical Monthly, 71:499–504.
Rota, G.-C. (1964b). On the foundations of combinatorial
theory I: theory of M
¨
obius functions. Z. Wahrschein-
lichkeitsrechnung u. verw. Geb., 2:340–368.
Roth, A. (1988). The Shapley value. Cambridge Univ. Press.
Sandholm, T. (2002). Algorithm for optimal winner deter-
mination in combinatorial auctions. Artificial Intelli-
gence, (135):1–54.
Schaeffer, S. E. (2007). Graph clustering. Computer Sci-
ence Review, 1(1):27–64.
Slikker, M. (2001). Coalition formation and potential
games. Games and Econ. Behavior, 37(2):436 – 448.
Stanley, R. (1971). Modular elements of geometric lattices.
Algebra Universalis, (1):214–217.
Continuous Set Packing and Near-Boolean Functions
95