Towards Advanced Enterprise Information Systems Engineering
Solving Resilience, Security and Usability Issues within the Paradigms of
Socio-Technical Systems
Wilson Goudalo
1,2
and Christophe Kolski
1
1
LAMIH-UMR CNRS 8201, University of Valenciennes, Valenciennes, France
2
Research and Innovation Department, ABE - Advanced Business Engineering, Lagny, France
Keywords: Enterprise Information System, System Resilience, Information Security, Privacy,
Human-Computer Interaction, Usability, User eXperience, Socio-Technical Systems, Design Patterns.
Abstract: Resilience and Security are very important attributes for most enterprise Information Systems (IS). These
systems have human users with various capabilities, experiences and behaviors. Therefore, they have to be
resilient, secure and usable. Resilience requires the capacity to prepare and adapt, facing perpetuating
evolutionary conditions, and to restore full capability after an incident or an attack. We track and solve
Resilience, Security and Usability issues jointly in Enterprise IS. This challenge requires considering the
ergonomics of interactions, effectiveness and efficiency of the task realization, user satisfaction, and trust as
well as human feelings when using the secure services. In this paper, we propose an approach based on
paradigms of socio-technical systems to model the interplay between resilience, security and usability. We
detail a case study illustrating the proposed approach and detailing the elaboration of user-experience-based
design patterns.
1 INTRODUCTION
Information systems, and more precisely the services
they deliver, have completely invaded our lives and
play an increasingly prominent role. This is verified
for individuals, as well as for organizations and for
enterprises (Larson, 2008).
Security concerns are crucial in many services
(SBIC, 2008), (IBM, 2014), (KPMG, 2014) and
(Umhoefer, 2014). As a quality attribute, the
meanings of security have evolved, and the
technologies in the industry and in the standards
have adapted to this evolution. In the field of IT
systems, the initiatives were mostly based on
“securing the perimeter”. In the case of Information
system and the extended enterprise, initiatives have
evolved into guaranteeing security strategy in depth.
To improve the security strategy in depth, Goudalo
and Seret (Goudalo, 2008) proposed a
methodological approach that operates on building a
membership canvas of all stakeholders of the
company.
Therefore, there is an urgent need for new
approaches focusing on human aspects including
usability to ensure the security of systems. Indeed
systems are used by humans, although they are
increasingly automated. Ferrary showed that human
resources are now at the heart of the business model
of organizations and indicated “the human factor as
a main source of operational risk in banking”
(Ferrary, 2014). Cranor and Garfinkel’s book
indicates the research trends in security and usability
(Cranor, 2005). Clarke and Furnell’s book presents
the state of the art on “the human aspect in success
of the security” (Clarke, 2014). Most initiatives are
carried on specific security solutions. We notice a
lack of research on the overall engineering of
security from the point of view of HCI (Human-
Computer Interaction).
In this paper, we introduce first the concept of
socio-technical systems as an engineering approach.
We also explain how resilience, usability and
security can be addressed by using a socio-technical
systems approach. We introduce then our socio-
technical systems resilience approach, through
design patterns based on user experiences. A case
study on medical analysis laboratory is used to
illustrate the application of our suggested approach.
400
Goudalo, W. and Kolski, C.
Towards Advanced Enterprise Information Systems Engineer ing - Solving Resilience, Security and Usability Issues within the Paradigms of Socio-Technical Systems.
In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems (ICEIS 2016) - Volume 2, pages 400-411
ISBN: 978-989-758-187-8
Copyright
c
2016 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
2 PARADIGMS OF
SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS
2.1 Socio-technical Systems versus
Information Systems
The concept of socio-technical system was created in
the context of labor studies by the Tavistock
Institute in London by the end of the 50’s (Trist,
1967) and (Emery, 1967). Sperber and Wilson treat
the relevance of communication (and cognition) in
social context (Sperber, 1995). Socio-technical
systems aim to model all together human, social and
technological capabilities in using and dealing with
value added services. Singh defines socio-technical
systems (STS) as multi-stakeholder cyber physical
systems (Singh, 2013). They contend with
complexity and change in both the cyber and the
physical (social) worlds.
Socio-technical approaches can help the design
of organizational structures and business processes
as well as technical systems. It is largely
acknowledged that systems which are developed
using a socio-technical approach are more likely to
be acceptable to end-users and to deliver real value
to stakeholders. There are notable differences
between IT systems and socio-technical systems
modeling and engineering approaches in terms of
interactions (figure 1):
(1) IT systems modeling focuses on the technical
description of the components of the systems
and the interactions between them in order to
deliver a certain service.
(2) Social systems include all human interactions
and cooperation, on social and cultural values.
(3) Information systems include all users’
interactions with the IT systems, integrating
their organization, implementation and
management.
(4) Social-technical systems provide a way of
understanding all human interactions with the
various IT systems, their components, as well
as cooperation with other systems. Socio-
technical systems approach also the
interactions between the systems, all the
stakeholders and their organization and the
entire social environment, both the cyber and
the physical worlds.
These dimensions define the information in
terms of interactions among actors, which can be:
social reliance (actors rely on others to achieve their
goals), and information exchange (actors exchange
relevant information). As it will be detailed later on,
many security issues arise from the interaction
between actors, and on how the exchanged
information is accessed. Therefore, user experiences
are a main concern when analyzing security.
Figure 1: Socio-technical system representation.
2.2 Security and Privacy in
Socio-technical Systems
In socio-technical systems, a set of human and
automated agents (organized or not) interact to
complete tasks, according to a certain objective.
These have characters converging and/or diverging
characters or conflicting objectives. Feelings and
conflict situations are quickly transposed into the
socio-technical systems.
In other words, users of the systems can be
animated by malicious intents. This is the case of
hackers who find their playground in the socio-
technical systems. At the same time, the systems
process personal data, sensitive data and very private
character data. The tasks and data are sensitive and
highly valuable.
In socio-technical systems, privacy is an
important matter as well and must be protected.
Actually, in the case of medical health data, the
privacy requires special attention in terms of
confidentiality. This is one of the objectives of
security. Another objective of security is to
guarantee the safety, the integrity and the reliability
in processing all tasks. Difficulties of security in
socio-technical systems arise in ensuring these
objectives, due to two reasons.
Towards Advanced Enterprise Information Systems Engineering - Solving Resilience, Security and Usability Issues within the Paradigms of
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First, solutions of security (a too constraining
usage) may constitute security vulnerability or may
prevent the completion of tasks. Secondly, users’
behavior (errors, unintentional actions) may
constitute security vulnerability. Human factors are a
main source of operational risk in companies
(Ferrary, 2014), and the trust of users in the socio-
technical system is necessary (IBM, 2014). Clarke
and Furnell’s work reports success of security from
the human aspect point of view (Clarke, 2014).
2.3 Usability Difficulties in
Socio-technical Systems
Socio-technical systems expose users to social issues
and to technology issues. Users resort to technology
to deal with social issues and vice versa. Usability is
a property that depends on interactions among users,
systems, tasks, and environments where processes
are operated in both the cyber and the physical
words. Human factors are the main source of
operational risk in companies (Ferrary, 2014).
Usability concerns human factors. Usability is not a
specific property of persons or of things, which we
may measure by a “usability thermometer”, or
evaluate by applying widely accepted scientific
formulas (Lewis, 2014).
Usability difficulties are focused on: Personal
human factors experiments; Measuring behaviors
and attitudes captured when users complete the key
tasks; Measuring capabilities of the systems to
provide adequate conditions for carrying out tasks
(Cranor, 2015).
3 FOUNDATIONS
In this section, we define the concepts of resilience
applied to socio-technical systems, usability and of
security as well as the interplay between them.
3.1 Resilience Applied to
Socio-technical Systems
Resilience is a major concern nowadays, in order to
prevent an accident and more to restore a safer state
after an accident or intentional fault (Laprie, 2008)
and (ReSIST, 2015). Resilience, actually in relation
to the concern of accident (Hollnagel, 2006), is
applied in many domains such as socio-technical
systems engineering.
Luzeaux (Luzeaux, 2011) wrote that “resilience
is obtained via the capacity to monitor conditions at
the edges of the performance envelope, and the
ability to adapt the operational behavior of the
system to potential developments in this envelope”.
Luzeaux (Luzeaux, 2011) defined the four
functions of the resilience, which are “avoidance
(capacity for anticipation), resistance (the capacity
for absorption), adaptation (the capacity for
reconfiguration) and recovery (the capacity of
restoration)”. Figure 2 illustrates the resilience as an
active virtue integrated in all operations and
systems, in the field of defense (Palin, 2013).
Figure 2: Illustration of resilience in the field of defense
(Palin, 2013).
Resilience is also applied in the field of
information technology and security. In this case,
resilience is defined as “the capacity to perform
during an incident (unintentional accident or
intentional fault) and then to come back to a normal
state” (ANSSI, 2014).
In this context, we define resilience as the
capacity to prepare and adapt facing perpetuating
evolutionary conditions and to restore full capability
after an accident or an attack.
3.2 Usability Models
HCI researchers have suggested different approaches
in usability studies. Hertzum and his colleagues
included cultural aspects in usability studies
(Hertzum, 2007). Bevan suggested including
flexibility and safety to create a more comprehensive
quality-of-use model (Bevan, 2009). Seffah and his
colleagues suggested quality-of-use schemes that
included 10 factors, 26 sub-factors, and 127 specific
metrics (Seffah, 2006); see also (Braz, 2007). Winter
and his colleagues proposed a two-dimensional
model of usability that associated a large number of
system properties with user activities (Winter,
2007).
In socio-technical systems, usability rhymes with
both the absence of usability problems and the
measurements of effectiveness, efficiency, and
satisfaction. Usability implies the ergonomic quality
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of the Human Computer-Interaction, regardless of
the type of access media.
In terms of ergonomic requirements, the ISO has
published a number of standards. The ISO 9241-12
published in 1998 (ISO 9241-12, 1998) explains the
seven principles for the presentation of information.
We define them briefly: Clarity (the content is
displayed quickly and accurately), Discriminability
(the information can be distinguished with
precision), Brevity (only the information required for
the task are displayed), Consistency (the same
information is presented identically on the entire
application), Detectability (information is properly
encoded in the right place), Readability (the
information is easy to read), Comprehensiveness (the
meaning of terms is clearly understandable). The
ISO 9241-110, published in 2006 (ISO 9241-110,
2006), describes seven high-level principles for the
design of dialogues: suitability for the task, self-
descriptiveness, controllability, conformity with user
expectations, error tolerance, suitability for
individualization, and suitability for learning.
Shackel proposed three criteria to measure
usability: performance of the task, user satisfaction
and costs of use (Shackel, 2009). For the
performance of the task, we consider the
effectiveness and efficiency of interaction. An
interaction is effective if users can perform the task
successfully. An interaction is efficient if users can
perform the task successfully for an acceptable
period, with a consumption of acceptable resources.
Satisfaction of users during the interaction considers
the performance of the task and subjective feelings.
The cost of the use considers, beyond the
consumption of acceptable resources, the impact of
the interaction on the health and safety of users, and
on the reputation integrity of users in the socio-
technical systems. The system must adapt to any
user, within the predefined population, without
distinction of age, size, ethnicity, educational or
linguistic level, as well as those who have difficulty
with some physical or cognitive operations. This
adaptation must also comply with security
requirements.
3.3 Security and Privacy Models
The family of standards ISO 2700x (ISO/IEC 2700x,
2010) is entirely dedicated to information security
including the organizational dimension (private or
public companies). The standards present how to
establish, implement, maintain and continually
improve a management system for information
security. These standards model security in terms of
confidentiality, integrity and availability of
information by applying a risk management process.
They give to all interested parties (users, operators
and owners of socio-technical systems) the
insurance that security risks are managed
appropriately.
On one hand, we noticed how security risks are
managed using a harmonized process, and secondly
we noticed the three fundamental criteria of security
that are confidentiality, integrity and availability of
information. Briefly, we develop each of these four
points:
1- The process incorporates the interested parties
and their respective requirements. It takes into
account the interfaces and dependencies between
the activities of the organization and its
stakeholders within the extended enterprise.
2- Confidentiality (Information should neither be
made available or disclosed to a user, entity or
unauthorized process).
3- Integrity (The information must not be modified,
altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner).
4- Availability (Access by an entity, an authorized
user or process to the services offered by the
socio-technical system must always be possible;
Operations to illegally occupy the processing
time must be detected). Other properties of the
security of Information Systems, such as Proof,
Traceability and Authenticity derived from these
three basic criteria.
The security criteria characterize constraints or
properties on system assets, describing their security
needs. The harmonious process brings the answer,
dealing with company issues that are human,
financial, branding, regulatory and legal. Goudalo
and Seret (Goudalo, 2009) define the process for the
engineering of security of enterprise information
systems in seven major activities designated by the
term Security Acts. The first two of them (Identifying
business assets and Defining security goals to
achieve) assess security needs on corporate assets.
Other international standards also address security
and security risks of information system. This is the
case of the ISO 15408 (Common Criteria, CC)
focusing on three audiences that are producers,
evaluators and users, the ISO 13335 and ISO 21827.
We also identify local standards and norms as
Cramm (in the United Kingdom), Mehari and Ebios
(in France), Octave (USA and Canada). The basic
criteria of security remain the same, and to them are
added the various properties and attributes of
security such as proof, trace, non-repudiation,
identification, authentication, privacy, trust and
others.
Towards Advanced Enterprise Information Systems Engineering - Solving Resilience, Security and Usability Issues within the Paradigms of
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In socio-technical systems, the attributes of
Privacy and Trust undeniably join to security.
Westin, in his notable book “Privacy and freedom
opening the modern field of law and privacy,
defined Privacy as “the request of individuals,
groups and institutions to determine for themselves
(on their own) when, how and to what extent
information about them can be communicated to
others” (Westin, 1968). Alain Westin adds that
“every individual is constantly engaged in personal
adjustment process in which balance the desire for
intimacy with the desire of disclosure and
communication.” Moreover, Privacy is a legal topic
with a critical issue, since disruption of Privacy
deals with penal/criminal law (French Penal Code,
2015). We use Privacy as both the confidentiality
and the integrity of information dealing with the
private aspects of individuals, groups and
institutions in society. In her course materials
(Cranor, 2006) and (Cranor, 2015), Cranor defines
different views on privacy: Privacy as limited access
to oneself (the extent to which we are known to
others and the extent to which the others have a
physical access to us); Privacy as control of
information (beyond limit of what others know
about us, we must control, which implies individual
autonomy, we can control the information in a
meaningful way).
The presence of respect for the privacy policy
(Privacy) builds consumer confidence. Rousseau et
al. (Rousseau, 1998) define the trust as a
psychological condition including the intention to
accept vulnerability based on positive expectations
of the intentions or behavior of another.
Trustworthiness (reliability from the point of view of
security) defines the property of a system which
performs only what is required (except for an
interruption of the environment, user errors and
human operators, and attacks by hostile parts) and
that does not make things (Schneider, 1998).
3.4 User Experience in Socio-technical
Systems
The socio-technical system approach facilitates the
identification and formulation of user experiences. A
positive user experience is usually based on
convenience (time savings or reduced physical or
mental work), the confidence that the socio-technical
system “works properly”, and the perception of its
usefulness. The concept of “works properly” implies
(instills) the trust. According to Sasse (Sasse, 2007),
the user experience takes into account all the
usability criteria, with additional factors (Cranor,
2015). Birge (Birge, 2009) emphasizes the lack of
research on the design of technical solutions for
communication and information technology in the
field of “user experience and security” (Trust and
User eXperience - TUX).
In summary, the security objective is to evaluate,
eradicate and prevent errors, faults and attacks. If
occurrences, the resilience objective is to tolerate
and outdo the impacts, and to guarantee services in
degraded mode according to the conditions of the
service layer agreements. The objectives of security
and resilience must be ensured, while maintaining a
positive user experience.
We specify that a good usability (HCI and
positive user experience) should promote the success
of the security and resilience. It is although vice
versa.
4 A RESILIENT BUILT-IN
APPROACH OF
SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS,
BASED UPON DESIGN
PATTERNS
Today, most of the security built-in systems are not
usable. Users who have to use these systems bypass
the security devices and this behavior generates
security gaps.
The issue is to replace a security built-in system
approach by a resilient built-in socio-technical
system approach based on design patterns. This
socio-technical approach takes into account
interdependence between security and usability.
In such a way, this approach allows to adapt
facing perpetuating evolutionary usage conditions
and usability problems. Figure 3 portrays the
underlying process in the proposed approach.
We use patterns to describe the problems and the
solutions of security/usability problem. Patterns
have been widely considered in many human
endeavors that require a combination of skill and
training. In the 70’s architect Alexander pioneered
the recognition, naming, and use of patterns, while
working on urban planning. In the late 80’s
computer scientists working in the field of object-
oriented design discovered Alexander’s work and
adapted design patterns to software (Salloway,
2002). Schumacher (Schumacher, 2003) argues that
the security engineering can benefit from the use of
patterns, but he fails to present specific patterns to
accomplish this goal. The Open Group has edited a
book on security design patterns (Blakley, 2004), but
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has not addressed the alignment between usability
and security.
Figure 3: User experience based design pattern approach.
4.1 Stage #1: Identify the Boundaries
This stage consists in defining the boundaries of the
eco-systems including the entire social environment
and the various actors. We integrate their interactions
in both the cyber and the physical worlds, using
BPMN (Business Process Modelling Notation) to
model the processes, activities (sub-processes) and
individual tasks performed by each actor involved in
the process. The detailed description of the
interactions between the technical components of the
information system is described using UML diagrams
including use cases. Links between the BPMN and
UML diagrams (misuse cases) are also described
during this stage (Piètre-Cambacèdés, 2010).
4.2 Stage #2: Analyze Risks
This stage produces the list of potential problems.
We use different methods to analyze the description
of the socio-technical system produced during the
previous stage including cognitive walkthrough
(Wharton, 1994) (Mahatody, 2010), marked Petri
Nets, simple and cross-domain risk analysis methods
(DCSSI, 2009). Risks include on the one hand
security threats (such as faults, frauds, blackmail,
identity usurpation) and on the other hand usability
issues. They lead to malfunction, denial of service or
destruction of the socio-technical system.
The study focuses on the problem, the origins
and the reasons as well as the consequences of not
improving some aspects. This study highlights the
relations of proximity and interdependence between
the HCI and the privacy security. Our proposal uses
firstly a multi-domain approach to risk analysis, and
secondly it focuses on human factors. Problems are
documented using for instance a storytelling
approach detailing user experience, its failures and
its possible improvement points (other methods are
available in the literature). Problem documentation
is based on learning and operational feedback about
any other kind of incidents dealing with these risks.
4.3 Stage #3: Define Solutions
In the final stage, we resort to user experience in
order to define the solutions that solve the points
highlighted during the second stage. Actually, we
look for the best improvement of user experience
that underlies these identified points. The significant
question addressed here is what makes the solution
seen as a better – or worse – design concept, from a
usable security perspective. Thus, how to detect a
bad design in order to correct it?
We base the actions of this step on various
experiments both in industry and academic research.
As mentioned in section 3.3, Goudalo defined seven
security acts constituting the engineering of
information security (Goudalo, 2011). Although
several researchers have discussed usable security
design, Kai-Ping Yee has proposed a list of guidelines
for addressing valid and nontrivial problems specific
to usable security design (Yee, 2002): path of least
resistance, active authorization, revocability,
visibility, self-awareness, trusted path, expressiveness,
relevant boundaries, identifiability and foresight.
This stage consists also in documenting each
pattern using the format:
Name of the design pattern;
Description of the problem (or class of problems);
Description of the solution;
Consequences of applying the design solution;
Validity of the solution. Qualitatively, each
pattern should improve the user experience, e.g.
according to one of the guidelines given by Kai-
Ping Yee. Quantitatively, patterns should
enhance in a measurable way the compromise
between usability and security.
The design patterns for resilient built-in socio-
technical systems must integrate both usability and
security concerns in order to design efficient and
usable security systems. These design patterns have
to complete other works dealing with security
architecture of systems (Ruault, 2015).
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5 CASE STUDY
The case study, called FI MedLab, is related to the
information system in a medical laboratory, also called
clinical laboratory. Credibility of medical laboratories
is paramount to the health and safety of the patients
relying on the testing services provided by these labs.
The international standard in use today for the
accreditation of medical laboratories is ISO 15189
Medical laboratories – particular requirements for
quality and competence. A laboratory conducts tests on
clinical specimens in order to get information about
the health of a patient as pertaining to the diagnosis,
treatment, and prevention of disease. Such information
is highly security-sensitive, any error may have a direct
impact on patient safety, privacy and the reputation of
the laboratory.
An information system is in use in most
laboratories today. It allows collecting data about
patients, test records and the interpretation of test
results. Information security and privacy risks have
grown with the rapid growth in the number and
types of people who have a legitimate role to
provide access, use and transform the information
and medical records. Tension often exists between
security, privacy controls and usability needs. For
example, access to the information system can be
delayed by the need to first authenticate to ensure
he/she is legitimate, and is provided with the right
level of system access he or she requested. Some
information has to be quickly available to a
physician in the case of an emergency situation, but
has not to be communicated broadly, since it deals
with health and privacy. On the other hand,
disclosing such information is a punishable offence,
in many countries, for instance the article 226-22 of
the French Penal Code.
The same can be said about anyone who wants to
enter data in the system. Data entry errors because of
a usability issue have fatal impact on the integrity of
data, which is a key measure of security and privacy.
5.1 Stage #1: Identifying the
Boundaries
FI MedLab is a socio-technical system which
involves patients, internal and external operators,
laboratories or medical partners, medical equipment
suppliers, regulatory agency as well as IT services
and applications providers, sometimes datacenters.
The socio-technical system comprises various
operational business processes (BP) that are grouped
into three categories: pre-analytical, analytical and
post-analytical processes (see Table 1).
Some operators have to access to certain kinds of
information, but not to other ones. This depends
upon the level of authorization and the user
authentication. So, within the organizations, groups
of users with respective roles and responsibilities
have to be defined. Figure 4 shows a simplified
model of these business processes using BPMN
(Business Process Modeling Notation).
Figure 4: Modelling Business Processes (with focus on
tasks with potential problems).
Table 1: Three business processes of FI MEDLAB.
1- Prepare the medical tests
1.1- Manage the patient file (Create, Update, or
Archive) (see Table 2)
1.2- Register a request for medical tests
1.3- Charge the demand for medical tests
1.4- Collect and sample the blood of a patient,
1.5- Receive the blood sample extracted elsewhere
1.6- Process and store the blood samples prior to
analysis
2- Realize the medical tests
2.1- Switch on and calibrate the devices (see Table 2)
2.2- Pass a series of tests (technical analysis)
2.3- Validate the technical tests
2.4- Maintain the equipments
3- Conclude the medical tests
3.1- Interpret the biological validation tests
3.2- Archive the blood samples
3.3- Communicate the results (see Table 2)
3.4- Archive the results
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The activities (sub-processes) consist of tasks.
We will detail some activities, that illustrate Stage#2
“Analyzing risks” (see Figure 2).
5.2 Stage #2: Analyzing Risks
Table 2 is a detailed description of three of the sub-
processes detailed in the previous section. We will
use this description to explain how we have been
analyzing risks of usability, privacy and security in
the socio-technical system of FI MedLab.
Such risks are due to the interdependence
between usability and security. Users need to access
to information, function of their role and their task.
But the modality to access this information depends
upon the context of the task (indoor/outdoor, time
pressure…), the quality of the security device, its
adequacy to the task and its context.
Table 2: Three detailed activities.
1.1- Manage the patient file (Create, Update, or
Archive)
Input : Identity document of patient or his
representative
Output: Updated patient record
Tasks:
1.1.a- The patient or his representative indicates the
required information to the administrative
operator of FI MedLab, including address for
sending medical analysis results.
1.1.b- The administrative operator of FI MedLab
enters information in the FI MedLab socio-
technical system, for creation and/or update of
the patient’s record.
1.1.c- A scheduled event triggers and alerts the
administrative operator to archive records of
some patients.
1.1.d- The administrative operator carries out the
administrative processing and archives the
corresponding patients’ records.
2.1- Switch on and calibrate the devices
Input: Identity document of the manager of
technical operators.
Output: Devices switched on and calibrated for
operating medical tests.
Tasks:
2.1.a- The manager performs biometric authentication
(retinal scan and scan of the identity
document).
2.1.b- The authenticated manager starts and calibrates
the devices.
2.1.c- The devices initialize and load the signatures of
the biologists’ managers (who interpret the
biological validation of tests).
3.3- Communicate the results
Input : Results validated and interpreted.
Output: Results communicated by three ways
(sent to the physician, sent to the patient by
mail, made available on the secure website of
FI MeddLab).
Tasks:
3.3.a- Administrative operator sends the results to the
physician.
3.3.b- Administrative operator sends the results to the
patient address by mail.
3.3.c- Administrative operator puts the results on the
secure website of FI MedLab.
As a matter of example, we have investigated
more deeply the following scenarios.
Scenario T1: The patient gives his business address.
He does not notice that the results of his medical tests
will be sent to this address and the administrative
operator does not indicate this helpful clarification to
the patient. When results reach the patient, he is absent
and his assistant handles the mail, like any business
mail. This is a serious problem in terms of privacy and
confidentiality that we detect during this phase. This
scenario deals with the confusion between professional
and personal information, within the professional email
box. The assistant can open the email box and read the
emails in this box, since these emails are supposed to
be professional.
Scenario T2: The manager of technical operations
faces serious difficulties in being accepted by the
biometric authentication system. The camera system
is not well positioned for this manager sportsman who
measures 1.92m (for information, the average height
of his colleagues is 1.76m). The manager is not
comfortable in such a situation; he can no longer find
his good inclination to be authenticated. In this
context, he runs the backup procedure; he logs into
the system and activates the devices. The devices are
initialized, but do not load the signatures of the
biologists’ managers (who interpret the biological
validation of tests). There is no alert. The manager
does not notice the error. We are faced with a problem
of usability and ergonomics (first on the internal
procedures of the system and secondly, on the
communication user interfaces). This problem creates
security vulnerability on all the medical tests that will
be performed during the day (no traceability and no
respect for integrity on the interpretation and
validation of medical test results).
The security device does not fit to the task and to
the users. The user bypasses the security device,
using a backup procedure. Moreover, there is no
alarm alerting this barrier bypassing. This kind of
behavior deals with barriers bypassing rules, it is a
critical security issue.
Scenario T3: The patient is on vacation when
medical analysis results are ready. From his vacation
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location (Cayman Islands), he decides to access the
secure website of FI MedLab. He receives a message
asking to enter the code that has just been sent to his
phone via SMS. This may lead to three problems: a
privacy problem (the vacation location could be a
“non-public information”, but is found out by the
web site security system of FI MedLab, leading to
potential rumor about the reputation of the patient);
a trust and confidence problem (one category of
patients could say: “I have too much confidence in
the FI MedLab system, as I feel that my data is
protected”, another category of patients could say: “I
do not have any trust in the FI MedLab system, I feel
spied”); a problem of comfort and simplicity (due to
the additional verification).
This scenario deals with the context of the task,
namely, vacation. Moreover, it deals with the low
level of the security device that can open to fraudulent
access to information with bad consequences such as
identity usurpation or blackmail (“I feel spied”).
5.3 Stage #3: Developing Solutions
The previous three scenarios describe a user
experience; each one of them highlights a usability
security or privacy problem.
Scenario T1, for example, details a typical
problem of privacy and confidentiality, due to
misunderstanding of the use made of the information
requested to the user (the patient or responsible).
Table 3 details possible solutions of this problem.
Table 3: Design Pattern Solution for Trouble T1.
Name
Awareness
Description of
the problem
Misunderstanding and poor
knowledge of the use made with the
information requested from the user.
Description of
the Design
Pattern solution
Provide users with the explanation,
understanding and analysis of any of
the information indicated in the
socio-technical system. This will
require an individualized support
and pedagogy. Operationally, we
can put flyers and (interactive)
information terminals in the lobby
of FI MedLab. An alternative
solution should be to “send all mail
of the results via letters”.
Another solution consists to add a
tag “confidential personal
information” in the object of the
message, and a note presenting the
law inside the text of the message, in
order to alert the assistant and “to
increase” its awareness.
Consequences The alternative solution has the
direct benefit of avoiding another
person in handling mail
(recommended letter). But in the era
of service industry, of socio-
technical systems and of Big Data,
the main solution should address the
fundamental problem of our time in
accompanying users in improving
their vigilance skills.
In Scenario T2, it is a more complex problem
with several interrelated dimensions: T2.1- Bad
usability of the biometric authentication system;
T2.2- Non-effectiveness of the emergency
procedure; T2.3- Difficulties in understanding the
emergency procedure by the manager; T2.4-
Detecting barrier bypassing by the manager. Table 4,
Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 describe four possible
solutions.
Table 4: Design Pattern Solution for Trouble T2.1.
Name Anticipation
Description of
the problem
Bad usability of biometric
authentication system.
Description of
the Design
Pattern solution
Repositioning the camera and
reconfiguring the biometric
authentication system to account
for all employees of the team.
People need to use secure solution,
in simple and efficient way.
Consequences Simple and efficient usage of
secure solution is an important step,
for ensuring the security in the
context of a socio-technical system.
Table 5: Design Pattern Solution for Trouble T2.2.
Design pattern solution for Trouble T2.2
Name Regular test of the procedures
Description of
the problem
Non-effectiveness of the
emergency procedure.
Description of
the Design
Pattern solution
The repetition frequency of the
tests and their results should be
integrated into the systems of
controlling and auditing.
Consequences This problem is well-known in
safety issues of critical systems.
The repetition of exercises
develops more confidence of
operators, and in case of failure
they still trust the procedures.
Regularly testing the emergency
procedures is a way to improve the
user operator experiences.
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408
Table 6: Design Pattern Solution for Trouble T2.3.
Design pattern solution for Trouble T2.3
Name of the
Design Pattern
solution
Training of operators
Description of
the problem
Lack of mastering the emergency
procedure by the manager.
Description of
the Design
Pattern solution
Training of operators in all the
procedures they will face. These
training activities should be
embedded in the systems of
controlling and auditing.
Consequences This problem is well known in
critical systems. Operator training
helps improve their user experience.
Table 7: Design Pattern Solution for Trouble T2.4.
Design pattern solution for Trouble T2.4
Name of the
Design Pattern
solution
Detection and alert following barrier
bypassing
Description of
the problem
Due to usability problems, the
security device is bypassed, using a
backup procedure.
Description of
the Design
Pattern solution
Usage of security device has to be
monitored in order to detect barrier
bypassing and to alert the system
security administrator. Then, the
security administrator can improve
security device usability and adapt it
to the current usage.
Consequences This problem is also well-known in
critical systems in which such a
pattern is suggested.
In Trouble T3, we are faced with three problems
again: T3.1- Feeling of privacy problem; T3.2-
Feeling of trust and confidence problem; T3.3-
Comfort and simplicity problem. The search for
improved user experience provides an effective
response to all of these three points (Table 7).
Table 8: Design Pattern Solution for Trouble T3.
Design pattern solution for Trouble T3 (T3.1, T3.2,
T3.3)
Name of the
Design Pattern
solution
Sensitization and pedagogy.
Description of
the problem
Eventual stress of the user.
Description of
the Design
Pattern solution
In the early stages, provide users
with the explanation, understanding
of the operating of the socio-
technical systems.
Consequences In the era of service industry,
personalized monitoring and
pedagogy are a good way to
improve user experience.
These representative scenarios illustrate that
usability problems impact security, and conversely.
By identifying business processes, the roles and
tasks of users, as well as their needs for private
information or, on the opposite, the inability to
access to this private information, context of use and
other usability issues, we have elaborated design
patterns. Such design patterns are the keystone of
resilient built-in socio-technical systems, since they
integrate security and usability issues together.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
Various tools have been proposed to provide a more
usable interface for a specific security problem or a
more easy-to-use security technology. However,
there is still a need for engineering approaches to
designing and to ensuring security and usability
trade-offs. We strive to provide an answer to this
lack. We have introduced a socio-technical approach
in order to engineer the compromise between
security and usability that we considered as a sub-
factor of security. The socio-technical system
approach connects the system and its services with
people, users and stakeholders included. We suggest
using BPMN and UML to model and describe the
various interactions in socio-technical systems. Such
a description is used then to identify possible
usability and security problems and their solutions.
We propose to use patterns to document these
solutions and design resilient built-in socio-technical
systems.
One important added value of the proposed
socio-technical systems approach is that the humans
and their experiences are explicitly considered. This
will overcome somehow the lack of training and
experience in security, the lack of security in terms of
corporate strategy (operations, proceedings) and the
difficulties of communicating about security issues.
One of the remaining challenges is to raise
awareness and effectively convey a good sense of
usability as a security attribute, facilitating a
weighted consideration of security in the thoughts,
decisions and activities done. We have proposed to
address this issue in the future while considering the
user experience for all stakeholders of the socio-
technical systems (end users, operators, managers,
etc.). Patterns will be extended also to integrate
explicitly measures of trust, privacy and other
subjective criteria measuring user experiences, user
feeling.
Towards Advanced Enterprise Information Systems Engineering - Solving Resilience, Security and Usability Issues within the Paradigms of
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409
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors thank Prof. Ahmed Seffah
(Lappeenranta University of Technology) for his
numerous relevant remarks and suggestions on
preliminary versions of this paper. They thank also
warmly Dr. Jean-René Ruault for his strong
contribution to the last versions.
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