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6 DISCUSSION
While our evaluation showed that SELint is consid-
ered a valuable tool for analyzing SEAndroid poli-
cies, there are many areas for future work and im-
provements. The initial setup of SELint would benefit
from an interactive procedure, allowing users to au-
tomatically detect and solve the possible mismatches
between the installed libraries and policy versions.
The parametrized macro plugin could provide an
implementation based on a heuristic solution for the
knapsack problem allowing users to obtain a partial
solution, in order to save time and enable this plugin
to be run as part of a CI infrastructure. More work
is needed in order to polish the default configuration
offered by the risky rules plugin, and to provide
a way for OEMs to easily, and maybe interactively,
add scores for their own domains and types. We also
need to conduct a study on how easy it is for SEAn-
droid experts to write new SELint plugins. Another
future research direction is to investigate the possibil-
ity of using SELint together with a policy decompiler,
in order to analyze OEM policies from available An-
droid devices. This would provide additional input for
SELint evaluation.
We continue to gather feedback from SELint users
and SEAndroid experts to adjust SELint to their needs
and requirements. Since SELint is open source soft-
ware, and builds on existing official SEAndroid tools,
we are planning to work with Google to include
SELint in the set of SEAndroid tools provided with
the AOSP tree.
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