![](bg6.png)
can see the final configuration of the business process
selection process in figure 3.
Figure 3: Final Transmission Configuration.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we attempted to approach the collabo-
ration between business processes in order to accom-
plish tasks of a business plan. To that end, business
processes either connect directly with the business
process they require to finish the task or they form
coalitions by finding a relay business process to con-
nect to, depending on the business process completion
time.
Subsequently, the business processes establish a
cooperative network in a game theoretic manner. Our
model is based on combinatorial optimisation, which
target the maximisation of the completion time en-
hancement when a relay and a source business pro-
cess cooperate. We derived the characteristic function
used in our game, the coalition core and the credit that
each business process has for playing the relay selec-
tion game. We evaluated a simple and a more com-
plicated scenario, which indicated the fact that using
cooperative business process cooperation the process
network exhibits a better completion time. This is due
to the fact that each source business process gets as-
signed to the relay business process that has the best
completion time enhancement.
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