Mahmud v PP (2010) 7 MLJ 789, where the court
found the accused guilty, as he criminally intimidated
the complainant with injury when he threatened her
with a parang and was sentenced to a fine of RM7000,
which in default, would result in six months
imprisonment. In PP v Kenneth Francisco (2000)
MLJU 102, the defendant was charged with putting
the victim in fear of injury by threatening to stab the
latter. The court however acquitted and discharged
the accused without his defence being called, as the
prosecution had wrongly drafted the charge against
him.
Apart from Section 503 on criminal intimidation,
Section 351 on criminal assault and Section 354 on
assault or using criminal force to a person with intent
to outrage her modesty may also be applicable in
prosecuting stalkers and cyberstalkers. If found guilty
under Section 354, the offender shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to
ten years or fine or whipping or with any two such
punishments. To date, there are about forty-seven
cases reported under Section 354. An example of such
cases is Sha’Aribin A. Samat v PP (2017) MLJU 5
which is concerned with the outrage of modesty of a
schoolgirl by her teacher. The Sessions court found
the defendant guilty and sentenced the defendant to
three years of imprisonment. In another case of PP v
Mohd Rosli bin Ishak (2017) 1 LNS 1390, the
defendant was charged with Section 354 for outraging
the modesty of his daughter by putting his hands in
her underwear. The court sentenced the defendant for
nine years and eleven months imprisonment and
twenty-one strokes of rotan. However, there has been
no prosecution for stalking or cyberstalking in both
cases.
Section 233 of the CMA 1998 may be available to
prosecute cyberstalking cases. Such section is
concerned with acts and behaviours, whether
continuous or repeated or otherwise, which are
carried out through any network facilities, network
services or applications to make, solicit or initiate the
transmission of any comments, suggestions or other
communication, which is obscene, indecent, false,
menacing or offensive with the intent to annoy, abuse,
threaten or harass another person (233(1)(a) CMA
1998). Section 233(1) (b) further provided that a
person who initiates communication by using
application services whether continuously or
repeatedly, without disclosing his identity with the
intention to annoy, abuse, threaten and harass any
person at any number or electronic address may be
found guilty under the said section. The penalty
under Section 233 (3) of the CMA is a fine not
exceeding fifty thousand ringgit or imprisonment for
a term not exceeding one year or both. A person can
also be further fined for one thousand ringgit for
every day during which the offence continued after
the conviction (Section 233(3) CMA 1998).
Despite the availability of Section 233 to
prosecute the perpetrators of cyberstalking, up until
today, no prosecution has been brought before the
court for such cases. To date, there are only three
cases that have been prosecuted under the said
section. In the case of Rutinin b. Suhaimin v PP
(2014) 5 MLJ 282 the defendant was found guilty
after he had published a comment via his Internet
account that states, “Sultan Perak Sudah Gila.”
However, the decision was overturned as there was
evidence that anyone can access the defendant's
account as his computer and his Internet account was
accessible by other persons and on the day mentioned
in the charge. In a recent case of Nik Adib bin Nik Mat
v PP (2017) MLJU 1831, the accused was charged
under Section 233(1)(a) of the CMA 1998 for posting
pictures and comments regarding certain leaders on a
website, which were offensive and false. The judge
found the accused guilty and sentenced him to 1-week
imprisonment term and a fine of RM3000. Another
recent case is Mohd Fahmi Redza bin Mohd Zarin v
PP (2017) MLJU 516 where the accused was charged
for sending a false communication for the purpose of
annoying others by using his Instagram account.
However, the accused challenged Section 233 as
unconstitutional, and the matter was postponed until
the constitutional question was settled in the Federal
Court
.
Despite the utility of Section 233 in governing
cyberstalking, it does not provide the necessary
protections for the victims such as the protection
order, restraining order, injunction, or any civil
remedies, which are currently provided by the
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA1997) in
England and Wales. Also, this section does not
identify or define the acts and behaviours that
constitute cyberstalking or provide any instances of
the impact of the stalkers’ behaviour on the victim
such as that provided under Sections 2A and 4A of
the PHA 1997. In a Singaporean case of PP v Colin
Mak Yew Loong (2013, Unreported), the defendant
who had been sending threatening e-mails and voice
messages for more than 6 years to the victim,
including threats of violence by using an Ak-47 rifle
and a lead pipe, was charged with criminal
intimidation under Section 503 of the Singapore
Penal Code and was sentenced to three years of
imprisonment and SGD5000 fine under Section 506
of the Penal Code. This case had happened before the