acted and conducted the project in accordance to the
approved drainage plan, the disaster would be able to
be avoided. The approved drainage plan was found to
be implemented up to only 10% out of the whole plan,
despite the defendants reported to the authorities that
the approved drainage plan was complied with and
implemented entirely.
It is obvious from the case and the judgment of the
Court that the defendants, inclusive of the contractor,
architect and engineer, failed to achieve the relevant
standard of workmanship of the construction project.
The sole motivation for the defendant to disregard the
approved plan and the subsequent false notice of
compliance was for prospective financial gains. In
this regard, it prompted the then Justice James Foong
to hold as follows:
I have reiterated my strong sentiments against this
type of attitude of professionals whose only
considerations is to guard and secure their own
interest rather than their duties and obligations to
those closely affected and the public on which much
faith and reliance are placed on them to carry out
their professional duties. I need not elaborate further
except to remind this defendant that he has to live out
the rest of his life knowing truly well that he
contributed to the tragedy of Highland Towers (Steven
Phoa Cheng Loon v Highland Properties, 2000).
In the Highland Towers, it is important to note that
the High Court was very displeased as to the direct
involvement of the defendants to the defects in the
project. For example, there was evidence that the
second defendant, as the engineer, did not exercised
care in relation to the design and construct of the
foundational structure as to accommodate lateral load
while taking steps to guarantee the stability of the
slope adjacent to the towers. Failure of the second
defendant to do as required as the engineer and to
exercise care not only was an obvious breach of duty,
but proof of the fact that the defendant failed to
achieve a proper standard of workmanship as required
by the contract.
Furthermore, in the Highland Towers case, the
actions raised mainly from the basis of tort of
negligence whereby the plaintiffs sued various
parties, which contributed, either directly or
indirectly, to the defective works. Contrastingly, in
the High Court case of KC Leong Holdings Sdn Bhd
v Datin Moh Lee Bing (2015), it features a contractual
relationship between the parties, and consequently
claims under torts, despite were briefly discussed,
were dismissed. Damage suffered by the defendant in
this case is in the nature of pure economic loss where
the building is allegedly built defectively but caused
no damage other than to the building itself. The
defendant alleged that the buildings were constructed
negligently and were not fit for the purposes of
occupation. However, it is to be noted that the High
Court has taken the view that the proper cause of
action in this case should be premised under breach
of contract instead of breach of tortious duty of care
as alleged by the defendant. This is also supported by
the fact that the defendant’s concluding submission
featured a claim under s.74 of the Contracts Act and
not one under tort of pure economic loss. The trend in
this case is that there is an indication in the judgement
of the court that it is recommended for claims on
defective works to be based on breach of contract
despite the convincing nature of tortious duty of care.
It is refreshing to have a simple case like this which
serves as a reminder that the first avenue of which the
Court will scrutinize in the event of construction
dispute involving defective work is the duty arisen in
the contract between the parties and not the duty
which may arise under tort.
KC Leong Holdings Sdn Bhd v Datin Moh Lee
Bing (2015) also touched on an important issue with
regard to defective works. What happened if the
defects are discovered after the defect liability period
has lapsed? Firstly, is there a defects liability period
clause? If not, then the Court will not ordinarily imply
such a clause in the contract between the parties.
Secondly, referring to a Court of Appeal case of Toh
Ang Poo (t/a Poo Wah Enterprise) v Jasin
Construction Development (M) Sdn Bhd (2014), the
Court ruled that the right to claim under defects
liability period clause do not supplant the right to
claim for damages. They are, in fact, an addition to
the right to claim for damages. Hence, Toh Ang Poo
(t/a Poo Wah Enterprise) v Jasin Construction
Development (M) Sdn Bhd (2014) did not generally
establish that once defects liability period has lapsed,
contractor’s liability for defective works would cease,
and should there be defective works attributable to the
contractor, the principal would still reserve the right
to claim for damages within the limitation period
prescribed by the Limitation Act 1953.
In Toh Ang Poo (t/a Poo Wah Enterprise) v Jasin
Construction Development (M) Sdn Bhd (2014), the
Plaintiff in this case claimed for rectification costs for
defective works which were discovered within the
defects liability period. Defendant, on the other hand,
claimed that there were no defects and even if there
were any, it had been made good during the defects
liability period. This is because the Plaintiff had
certified all the Defendant’s works and made full
payment. There were grave discrepancies in the
allegation of defective works. For example the
Plaintiff alleged in November 2007 that the manholes