Redefinition of National Interest in Indonesian Foreign Policy under

President Joko Widodo

Himawan Bayu Patriadi, Abubakar Eby Hara and Muhammad Iqbal

Centre for Research in Social Sciences and Humanities (C-RiSSH) , University of Jember,

{ hbpatriadi, eby-hara.fisip , muhammadiqbal.fisip }@unej.ac.id

Keywords: Indonesia Foreign Policy, Joko Widodo, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ASEAN, national interest.

Abstract: This paper discusses the foreign policy of Indonesia during President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Although

foreign politics is generally static and has the same principles, every head of government such as the President

often has a new style and approach in foreign policy. Even a country with an established system like the

United States, the President's role in foreign policy is significant because it determines the direction and choice

of relationships with other countries. Indonesia cannot be separated from such a phenomenon. President

Jokowi has different styles and approaches in foreign policy from his predecessor President Susilo Bambang

Yudhoyono (SBY). If SBY was very active with ideas for the regional order and future of the region, then

Jokowi sees the importance of Indonesia to select the choices of foreign policy in accordance with the urgent

matters that have a direct interest for Indonesia. Using interviews with both academics and foreign policy

officials and literature review, we see that this different view is quite convincing that it has redefined the

national interests and practices of Indonesia foreign policies during President Jokowi. Although this kind of

position is not a new one in the course of Indonesian politics and can be traced along the history of Indonesian

foreign policy, Jokowi's foreign policy approach has important consequences in Indonesia's relations with

ASEAN and with the wider region. Indonesia is now seen as less active or in other words less assertive within

ASEAN and does not make a significant contribution to the strengthening relations in the region.

1 INTRODUCTION

After the first period of President Joko Widodo

(hereafter Jokowi) is almost over, it is sufficient to see

the achievements of his foreign policy especially in

view of whether there is a significant difference or

departure from the previous foreign policy of

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). This

discussion of achievement becomes more meaningful

because from the beginning Jokowi's administration

showed a strong desire to abandon the previous SBY

foreign policy and priorities. The preliminary

statements of President Jokowi and his advisors

indicate that he will deal with foreign policy

differently with a stronger emphasis on Indonesian

interests than the previous administration.

The difference in question is the emphasis of

people's diplomacy while the foreign political identity

it fights for is the identity of Indonesia as a maritime

state. Jokowi for example wants a more concrete

output of Indonesian diplomacy. The extent to which

these claims materialize, what the background is, and

what the consequences for Indonesian foreign policy,

are the subject of this paper. In some cases of foreign

policy discussed in this paper, Jokowi's

administration does show different ways of dealing

with foreign policy issues. Jokowi is more persistent

in defining and running what is claimed as Indonesia's

national interest. But in other cases, that persistence

has caused controversy in neighbouring countries of

Indonesia. We argue that Jokowi's claim cannot be

released from the pop1ulist background behind his

emergence with the famous slogan of ‘work, work,

work!’. Having this, he was seemingly trying to

differentiate himself from its the former President as

well as constructing his own image of being a

problem solver for any trouble faced by the common

people, by insisting that under his administration any

adopted foreign policy should have actual impacts on

them.

In discussing the above problem, this paper is

divided into four sections. First, the paper will discuss

the concept of populism and its context related to

Jokowi's foreign policy. Secondly, the paper

discusses Jokowi's approach in his foreign policy.

Third, this paper looks at the implementation of

258

Patriadi, H., Hara, A. and Iqbal, M.

Redeﬁnition of National Interest in Indonesian Foreign Policy under President Joko Widodo.

DOI: 10.5220/0010275802580275

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 258-275

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

Jokowi's initial commitment to the implementation of

foreign policy, particularly focussing on maritime and

ASEAN issues. Fourth, several issues of foreign

policy and its relation to populism.

2 LITERATURES ON JOKOWI’S

FOREIGN POLICY

Before examining how Jokowi redefines and executes

Indonesian foreign policy, it is important to see how

some previous writings address this issue. Departing

from various perspectives, recent studies on

Indonesia foreign policy have highlighted Indonesia's

leadership role in creating orders in Asia Pacific. This

is reasonable considering Indonesia does play an

important position in the Asia Pacific region which is

also referred to as the centre of gravity of the future.

The weakening of the US influence in the region and

the emergence of China as a new force that fills the

US absence have led academics to pay attention to the

reaction of countries in the region, including

Indonesia.

In addition to China and India which are

candidates for major power, Indonesia has also seen

as able to play a leading role in the Asia Pacific

architecture. Vibhanshu, for example, writes about

Indonesia's grand strategy in the region that shows the

ambitions of Indonesian leaders and their foresight

about Indonesia's role. The writings on the role of

Indonesia's leadership in this region with its

ambitions and limitations have received considerable

attention recently due to changes in the Asia Pacific

region. These writings do not specifically highlight

Jokowi's government but they see Indonesia's role

and vision in the context of history and fears of

instability in the Asia-Pacific region due to changes

in the regional political maps. Among the writings,

only the writings of Rosyidin reviewed Jokowi's

government which he criticized as focusing on

domestic issues and ignoring the possibility of

Indonesia raising its status to become a major power

in the region.

The above writings show that Indonesia cannot

escape the responsibility of maintaining peace and

stability in the region. Even the writings reminded

that Indonesia has done some things that make

Southeast Asia stable with the establishment of

ASEAN in the past and Indonesia can still take this

role as it has the potential to do so. Indonesia often

shows intellectual leadership and diplomacy to build

a regional order in the region.

Yet none of the articles captured directly the shifts

that took place in Indonesian foreign policy during

Jokowi's time. After several years running, Jokowi's

government showed that the focus of attention of

Indonesia, as many predicted, shifted from

international oriented in SBY's time to domestic-

oriented. Whether Indonesia will abandon SBY's

foreign policy is an important question. The legacy of

foreign policy that has been pioneered by SBY is

quite significant and leaving all his efforts and

diplomacy can make a big hole in the sustainability of

Indonesian foreign policy. However, that is what

actually Jokowi does. His attention is more on

Indonesia's national interests than any other interests

whether it is the interests of ASEAN or any other

regional interests. How do we explain this shift?

Populism is one possible alternative approach that

may explain the phenomenon. Although the main

purpose of the populist movement originally is to win

electoral votes, the attitude of its leaders in turn has

implications on foreign policy. The position of the

political party and of the populist leaders used to

reflect the anti-immigrant attitude, emphasizes the

sovereignty of the state, and rejects the cultural and

economic globalization. The leftist populist regime

usually refuses neo-liberalism and free markets. Its

elites often play a role in voicing people's concerns

about globalization and foreign control over their

country. They follow the logic and sentiment of

society and not follow to an ideology.

In the case of some countries in Europe and

America, including Latin America; populism is

clearly related to foreign policy. The populist leader

succeeds in raising the voice of people marginalized

in economic matters and the notion that their

country's original identity is being threatened by the

arrival of so many foreign immigrants. Right-wing

figures, such as Marine Le Pen in France and Trump

in America, have captured such situation well. The

success of capturing this issue made them popular and

even made some of the characters, like Trump has,

succeeded in becoming President of the United

States. Trump’s victory raises international concerns

as his emphasis on ‘America First’ slogan has

spawned policies that harm other countries and

accordingly disrupts the existing relationships.

Similarly, in Latin America President Hugo Chaves

of the Venezuela, and in Asia President Rodrigo

Duterte of the Philippines and Prime Minister

Narendra Modi from India also used populist rhetoric

and nationalism to win the elections. Populism works

on the components of society who feel not only

ignored, but also anxious due to being siege by the

threatening globalization.

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259

As some phrases say, foreign policy begins at

home; foreign policy can also be used to increase the

popularity and legitimacy of the regime in power. Our

paper further discusses this intermestic linkage and

we will see how 'pro-people diplomacy' or perhaps

more accurately 'Jokowi's populist foreign policy' has

been popularized and what effect it has on the

redefinition of Indonesia's national interests in

international community. In this context, we will use

the concept of populism that is often used in seeing

Jokowi's victory in Presidential election. To some

extent, populism can be used for understanding the

various foreign policy decisions taken by Jokowi’s

government. While Jokowi populism has been

accepted as something natural and necessity in

domestic politics, in foreign relations, populism has

some important consequences in dealing with other

countries.

As many may have known, Jokowi’s populism

has attracted popular supports and brought him to

power. The important question here is whether

populism developing in the many part of the worlds

also colours the Jokowi’s foreign policy, how

significant it is and whether it will develop into

foreign policy that creates worry to other countries,

especially to Indonesian neighbours. We are of the

view that in some respects populism does characterize

the foreign policy of Jokowi's government, especially

in the short term. In his several foreign policies

related issues, such as in the effort to safeguard the

territory of Indonesian sovereignty and commitment

to ASEAN, this populism raises the concerns of some

of Indonesia's neighbours. Some other Jokowi’s

foreign policies can also be said to have populist

elements in it. However, unlike populism in Europe

and America, Jokowi's populism is not ethnocentric

and nativist. It only gives a stronger emphasis on

some existing foreign policies and in other policies

such as marine guard policies through ship sinking

actions; populism requires a securitization process to

make the policy successful.

The policy is taken on the consideration of what

benefits Indonesia most. In the perspective of

populism, if the profit gained from the relations is not

in line with expectations, then it is possible that the

cooperation will be abandoned. According to

Magcamid, a populist government must continue to

maintain its popularity by assuring the supporters and

the people that the actions taken are for the benefit of

the people. The relationship of populism and

Indonesian foreign policy is something that is rarely

discussed until quite recently. As said before,

populism is generally associated with elites’ efforts to

win elections in the country. Populism has its own

appeal because it represents the will of the people

who feel neglected in the political process which is

considered elitist and beneficial to the elite. Populism

can take the form of anti-foreign sentiment that is

considered threatening both national identity and

material sources such as natural resources and

employment opportunity. In other words, populism

related to nationalism, namely the preservation of

national territory from foreign attacks and to people,

particularly the importance of prioritizing the

interests of the people above other interests.

Populist regimes cannot be separated from

politicizing and securitizing efforts, so that their

political performance is always good in the eyes of

their supporters. Politicization is related to foreign

policy actions that require greater attention and

responsibility. While securitization relates to the

efforts of the populist regime to gain greater support

in its policy towards controversial issues in foreign

policy, in the securitization process the regime wants

to convince people that their actions are not only

necessary but urgent to save the country. Magcamid

elaborates it as follows:

“By presenting domestic issues as existential

threats not only to the state’s national interests but

also to the survival of the state itself, populist leaders

(the securitizing actors) are, in effect, taking these

issues outside the jurisdiction of ordinary politics into

the sphere of emergency politics, where they can be

dealt without the democratic rules and procedures of

foreign policy making. Once successful in labelling

these issues as existential threats, populist leaders are

then able to claim rights to extraordinary measures,

which under the normal realm of politics would not

have been allowed”.

In the case of Indonesia, as part of the populist

action, such a kind of existential threat to national

interest seemed to be deliberately bolstered. Amongst

Jokowi’s foreign policies, the sinking of foreign

vessels violating the Indonesia’s maritime territory

was an example. This required the process of

securitization to become an urgent matter as it is

related to both national interest and state’s

sovereignty, and it thus needed to be seriously

managed. It apparently even becomes one of the most

widely applauded policies in Jokowi’s foreign

policies, although it created concerns and even

protests from the affected neighbouring states.

In terms of foreign policy analysis, the uses of

foreign policy for domestic purposes actually are not

new in the Indonesia case. Based on his study on

Indonesia’s foreign policy elites, Fanklin B.

Weinstein found that that Indonesia’s foreign policy

had been used for three purposes involving to

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

260

maintain independence, to mobilize overseas sources

for national development, and to win domestic

political competition. Among these purposes, the last

one was very political compared to the other purposes

and in terms of the linkage between foreign policy

and domestic politics, it to a large extent fits with the

relationship between populism and the recent

Indonesian foreign policy though Weinstein did not

use the term populism. For him, foreign policy can be

used to increase the legitimacy and popularity of

government in a country. His paper is relevant in

examining how foreign politics is actually a part or

extension of domestic political struggles. He used the

concept of the uses of foreign policy, among others,

to explain how Sukarno for example confronted

Malaysia to overcome internal political differences.

In other words, Sukarno used foreign policy to

strengthen his position and, at the same time, to solve

the political divisions within the country.

In Indonesian politics today, especially in

Jokowi's government, there is no political struggle as

it was during Soekarno's time. But under the current

adopted democratic system, every single politician

including the President always wants to increase its

legitimacy, trust and power. He always wants to be

seen by the audience doing something that adds to his

popularity. Jokowi emerged as a ruler because of the

nature of populism attached to him. Populist

government is a government that is considered to

represent the interests of the people directly. In this

respect, Jokowi can be regarded as a populist leader

because he meets the above requirements. With his

jargon of ‘work, work and work’, Jokowi wants to

show that he will indeed work hard for the people,

including to issues that relate to foreign policy.

The populist assumption becomes the main basis

for the formulation and implementation of the

program both at home and abroad. Every step or

decision in this context is measured from its concrete

results for the practical interests of the people and the

state and also for the regime's popularity and

legitimacy. In some cases, such as decisions relating

to ASEAN, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA),

Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM – Papua

Liberation Movement) and bilateral relations,

populism therefore play significant role. In some

other cases, the relationship of populism to the

national interest has been taken through a process of

securitization.

The emphasis on Indonesia's national interest (or

“Indonesia First” - borrowing Trump’s ‘American

First’ slogan) should take precedence, and came

strongly at the beginning of Jokowi's reign. The

President issued several statements about the virtue of

preserving Indonesia's interests. He said "Indonesia

under my administration is open to business. But

Indonesia, like other sovereign nations, must ensure

that no harm comes to our national interests’.

3 JOKOWI’S DIFFERENT

APPROACH IN FOREIGN

POLICY

At the beginning of his reign, the sign that Jokowi will

distance himself and shift from the style of prior

government diplomacy is quite clear. Jokowi stressed

the importance of grounded diplomacy relevant to the

interests of the people. In a certain degree if President

SBY seeks to create a system of new norms of

international relations that fit the perspective critical

theory in international relations, then, President

Jokowi on the contrary tries to show that Indonesia

still needs theories called problem solving theories.

Implicitly his views criticized the previous

government's diplomacy which was thought to run

some diplomacy that was not directly related to the

interests of the people. For Jokowi, relations with

other countries must be seen from the direct benefits

to Indonesia's national interests. In relation to other

countries if that is not profitable, then Jokowi says he

will not do that. He said "Our [foreign] policy is free

and active, befriend all countries but [we will put

first] those who give the most benefits to the people."

He said, "What's the point of having many friends but

we only get the disadvantages? many friends should

bring many benefits."

Jokowi called his diplomacy as pro-people

diplomacy which was considered a departure from the

internationalist approach of SBY. Economically,

more emphasis is placed on increasing trade,

promoting Indonesian products and increasing

investment. He said 'the roles of our diplomats are

crucial in the efforts to turn our negative trade balance

into a surplus one. Ambassadors must be able to

promote our product. In interpreting this vision,

Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno LP Marsudi said,

Indonesia would focus on people-oriented diplomacy

that provides actual benefits for the people. She said

that "foreign policy must be grounded, so diplomacy

that will be done is pro-people diplomacy, for people.

According to the her, pro-people diplomacy includes

emphasis on 4 (four) foreign priorities of Indonesia,

namely Indonesian unity, protection of Indonesian

citizens overseas, economic diplomacy and

increasing the role of Indonesia in regional and global

scale. In terms of the last priority, Indonesia will

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261

encourage the creation of peace and stability in the

region, one of them by realizing Vision 4000

Peacekeepers in 2019.

4 POPULISM IN MARITIME

POLICY

Maritime axis is the main doctrine of Jokowi's foreign

policy. This is actually not something new because

Indonesia has long been familiar with the concept of

the maritime country. Indeed, every single presidency

had contribution in it. This can be traced from the

declaration of Juanda doctrine in December 1957

during the period of Soekarno presidency, the first

President of Indonesia. The doctrine, which then was

stipulated into a statutory law in the ACT no. 4 in

1960, was declared aiming to grab international

attention that Indonesia is an ‘archipelagic state’ with

its all consequences. It proclaimed that ‘all waters,

surrounding, between and connecting the islands

constituting the Indonesia state, regardless of their

extension or breath’. By this, Indonesia essentially is

a maritime country, in which geographically the

doctrine had significantly expanded Indonesia’s sea

water from 2.8 to 5.8 million square kilometres. The

strategic value of the concept was even underlined by

Soekarno himself. In his famous opening speech in

front of the first National Maritime Consultation

meeting in 28 September 1963, he cogently urged the

audiences to have good maritime awareness by

saying:

“We now, every single of us, have to be

convinced that Indonesia cannot become a

strong, tranquil and prosperous country if we

do not go back to also mastering the ocean,

if we do not go back to be an oceanic nation,

if we do not go back to be a nautical nation,

a nation of sailors as we have known it

during the ocean age”.

During Suharto’s New Order regime another

milestone was achieved. The concept of Indonesia as

a maritime country went a step ahead in 1973 by the

incorporation of Wawasan Nusantara (archipelagic

outlook) into Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara

(GBHN – the Board Guidelines of the State Policy).

This outlook confirmed that Indonesia is as a

quintessence of social, economic and political unity

as well as the unity pf defence and security in which

all elements supposed to be Indonesia’s national

development goals. Having all these, both Sukarno

and Suharto basically have laid the foundation of the

concept of Indonesia as being a maritime country,

both in character and legal-constitutional basis.

Yet, the contribution of Yudhoyono presidency

should not be underrated. During the period a further

development found its result by the release of a

comprehensive ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Policy Book

II’, which identifies five pillars of Indonesia’s

maritime policy involving: ocean culture, ocean

governance, ocean economy, maritime security and

marine environment. Having such all-encompassing

elements involved, to be a maritime country any

government of Indonesia would be the agent in

charge to doing a nation building project.

Interestingly, however, although the real

developments went on during the three former

presidencies, their real impacts had been limited. It

seemed that none of them was able to effectively

resonate it into national and international public,

because they ‘could not generate enough political

momentum’.

It was President Joko Widodo who championed

the moment by echoing the discourse nationally and

internationally. Through his presidential campaign

and during his presidency, by using the populist

rhetoric, the maritime state doctrine became more

pursed and formally the basis of policy. Therefore,

how this view of the maritime axis has been

constructed and belongs to the present government is

of paramount importance.

There are two important discourses that surfaced

in the construction of this maritime fulcrum. First, it

relates to the sea area utilization and how to connect

the vast territories of Indonesia so that the character

of Indonesian maritime can become stronger. For

example, it says the Indonesian marine territory is so

wide but the main relationship is on land. We must

make use of that sea connection. Second, maritime

axis is a matter of Indonesia sovereignty. Outside

countries are considered to have violated the

sovereignty, especially by stealing Indonesian fish.

This has cost the State trillions of rupiah. If Indonesia

can overcome the theft of the fish by keeping the sea

border then, as will be shown below, the profits will

return and the Indonesian fishermen will be more

profitable.

Jokowi's government tries to solve both problems.

However, the second issue seems to be more

important to overcome to satisfy the already believing

audience that this government will rebuild

Indonesia’s maritime glory. Therefore, this paper will

first address the issue of maritime sovereignty and

then discuss the construction of the maritime fulcrum.

Violations of Indonesian sovereignty by foreign

fishermen who stole Indonesian fish became a very

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

262

shocking issue in the context of the Indonesian

maritime fulcrum. Fish theft and border violations are

long-standing issues, but in Jokowi's time it is a very

urgent issue to overcome. This is also followed by the

appearance of the maritime minister who is a woman,

brave, firm and communicative with the people.

Handling the issue of marine sovereignty is then

indeed the most important populist policy Jokowi

government so far.

Some people view this issue as a domestic

problem, but it has big ramifications abroad

especially in relationships and solidarity with

neighbouring countries. This last thing has become

the consideration of the previous President SBY not

to drown the fishing boats of neighbouring countries

that cross the sovereignty of the Republic of

Indonesia. During SBY, there were certainly patrols

to guard Indonesia maritime territory and the arrests

to the violator of RI territory. Yet the SBY

administration resolved the issue following common

practice with negotiations and courts. Following the

principle of ‘million friends zero enemy’, friendship

with the neighbouring states whose fishing vessels

were captured, was of paramount importance.

On the contrary, Jokowi's government has taken a

firm different position early on this issue. Since the

campaign and before being inaugurated, Jokowi

insisted that he would take decisive action including

drowning the ships and supervising the sea areas by

using drones. Problems which were initially resolved

following normal practice need to be determined

urgently and need public support. In other words,

during his Presidential campaigns and the early days

of his administration, there were efforts to securitize

the threat of the Indonesian Ocean sovereignty. The

existential threats encountered are the sovereignty

and richness of the Indonesian seas that need urgent

action to protect them.

Before reviewing how populism and

securitization relate to this case, it is important to see

how the previous administration dealt with this issue.

The SBY administration also concerned with the

problem of fish theft and sea border crossers in

Indonesia. This issue has been a long-standing issue

and a real threat that has become a public concern in

general. Indonesia's losses due to the theft of this fish

are very large and not counted with certainty because

of the vast performances. Jokowi's campaign team,

followed by ministers and presidential statements,

claimed that the losses were around 300 trillion

rupiah. However, the actual figure according to Sharif

C. Sutardjo's Minister of Maritime Affairs and

Fisheries (KKP) is not that large and is estimated to

be only US $ 3.5 million or Rp 42 billion (with an

estimated exchange rate of Rp 12 thousand). In this

respect, whatever the different figures do not really

matter, because the most important is its message of

how Jokowi’s administration made populist narrative

on it.

According to Sharif, to keep the scale of fish theft

does not continue to increase the government needs

cooperation from all parties and not just the

responsibility of the ministry. Previous step taken to

overcome this was to take care and catch the ships

crossing the border. Indonesia has an institution

called Badan Kemanan Laut (Bakamla – Maritime

Security Board of Indonesia) to inspect and to catch

fish thieves. The Indonesian policies were common

practices that are also taken by other Indonesian

neighbours. Once Indonesia captured the crew of the

violating vessels and it brought them to justice. In

addition, negotiations are also made when the

government of the State concerned defends its

citizens. This policy is considered a normal step in

accordance with Indonesia's abilities and prevailing

practices. This practice was also taken considering

the fact that Indonesian fishermen have also crossed

the perimeter boundary of Indonesia to other state sea

territories. Therefore, the government is also

considering the impact of relations with other

countries when crackdown is taken.

The shooting and sinking action of the ship,

against the background above, is thus a new act that

exceeds the limits agreed upon so far. How this action

can be done, cannot be separated from the presence

of Jokowi's government that offers a decisive action

in guarding the border. Since the emergence of

Jokowi and in the campaign, Jokowi and his team

popularized the view of the need for firm action to

overcome the theft of fish in RI waters. As President,

the new government with this pro-people slogan

needs to take more concrete steps to address the

problem of maritime border violations and the theft

of this fish thoroughly. They need to show that in

contrast to the previous government, they will address

this issue better. Jokowi for example says he will

check the reports of violations and people who feast

on stealing fish. He also said he would buy and install

a drone to monitor the theft of the fish. The

moratorium on the granting of fishing vessels and

ship bombing looted even before Jokowi was

inaugurated as President and created hopes for society

that the theft and border violations will be resolved

soon. On various occasions Jokowi said he regrets the

stealing of large Indonesian fish and will order the

shooting of the thief's ship so they will be deterred.

In this securitization process, conventional

measures are deemed insufficient to enforce

Redeﬁnition of National Interest in Indonesian Foreign Policy under President Joko Widodo

263

Indonesian sovereignty at the sea border. Nationalist

groups want to see concrete steps. For example, the

Minister of Politics and Security, Luhut B. Panjaitan,

said that Indonesia will protect their sovereignty in

Natuna islands and its surrounding sea by any means.

He also said the sinking of the vessels was carried out

against foreign ships entering Indonesian territory.

This action should be done because previous ways

such as dialogue, arrests and trials against those who

committed this territorial violation are ineffective.

President Jokowi himself says this is a shock therapy

act. Director General supervision on marine sources

and fishery, Ministry of Marine and Fishery, Syahrin

Abdulrohman, said that the activities of foreign ships

that steal the wealth of Indonesia's sea not only

brought economic losses, but also ecological and

social fatalities. While being quoted losses of about

hundreds trillion rupiah per year, the illegal fishing

also significantly decreased stock of fish in which it

made many fishermen lose their jobs and a lot of

domestic fishery industries stopped their production.

Minister of Marine Affairs Susi continues to issue a

statement to carry out the bombing of the ships.

President Jokowi on November 18, 2014 said that the

government will sink 10-20 ships and later those who

violate it will think and believe. The policy attracted

international attention and received support

internationally. The reputable international NGOs,

such as the Greenpeace, even demanded the

government to fulfil that promise. The intensive

campaign was finally held from 5 December 2014

signalled by the execution of three Vietnamese ship

which were detonated with a bomb. The amount, as

mentioned above, is not important anymore, the

important thing is that governments take quick action,

which conveyed a message that any illegal fishing

would face harsh response.

This action received mix-reaction. Negative

response came from Vietnam which launched a

protest against the execution of their fishermen’s

ships, while China asked for clarification to Indonesia

about the execution relation to Chinese ships that had

been captured. Facing these protests, Jokowi

continued to firmly defence his policy by insiting that

‘the sinking [policy] of the illegal fishing ships is

criminal not neighbouring issue’. By describing it as

the action against thief’s fish, he seemed wanted to

attract positive response from the community.

Interestingly, support came from the former Minister

of fishery of the SBY cabinet, Freddy Numbery, who

praised Jokowi's actions as so supposed indeed. He

once suggested similar action but President SBY

objected because it would disrupt relations with

neighbours. This wide greeting and support provides

legitimacy for subsequent sinking actions. As

reported, the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries has

drowned as many as 236 ships of 781 arrested, from

2014 until the end of 2016. Throughout 2016 alone

there are 236 foreign vessels drowned. The number

even increased at the following year. At the Our

Ocean Conference held in Malta on 5 July 2017,

Minister of Marine and Fishery, Susi Pudjiastuti,

testified that from July 2014 to July 2017, 317 foreign

fish-theft ships had been executed to sink, in which

most of them came from the neighbouring countries,

such as Vietnam (142) followed by Philippine (70)

and Malaysia (58). At many occasions, President

Jokowi also often reveals the losses incurred by the

theft. He said that the amount of loss due to theft is

for example mentioned reached US$ 20 billion

annually. It was also reported that fishermen were

often harmed by the presence of foreign ships stealing

fish with sophisticated tools, such as trawlers, fish

thefts were also often displayed visually where

hundreds of thousands of fish were caught by ships

with sophisticated equipment at Indonesian waters.

The ships' experience would also have a deterrent

effect on foreign ships. But, more importantly, the

result of the policy has claimed to be concrete,

particularly for domestic fishermen. Minister Susi

Pujiastuti vividly said that since the assertive policy

came in effect there had been many changes in marine

and fishery industries, ranging from fishermen’s

value-exchange to the increasing amount of fish stock

in the sea and export. Statistics seemed to confirm the

positive changes. Over three years of Jokowi’s

administration she claimed that from the end of 2014

up to March 2017 she had drowned 663 fish theft

ships, and the impact of the policy was significant.

The fish stock increased from 6,52 million ton in

2011 to 12,54 million ton 1n 2016, fishermen’s

exchange value rose from 104,63 in 2014 to 111,53

in 2016, and fish export also boosted from US$ 3,94

billion to US$ 4,17 billion.

The securitization of the threat of fish theft is

getting stronger because it is associated with the issue

of sovereignty. This action received stronger approval

in the community when Jokowi visited the Natuna

marine area after a clash between Indonesian vessels

and Chinese vessels that were deemed to violate the

territory of Indonesian sovereignty at the end of June

2016. To react against this, only less than a week after

the incidence President Jokowi reacted by chairing a

cabinet meeting on a warship in the waters offs

Natuna Islands to show that Indonesia is not playing

games in guarding its borders. He cogently said ‘I

want the Indonesian Defence Force and the Sea

Security Agency to improve security (in Natuna sea),

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including with the use of radar technology’, while

Coordinating minister for Political, Legal and

Security Affairs, Luhut B. Panjaitan, who

accompanied the President added a warning ‘We

don’t anyone disturbing stability in the region’. The

cohesion, according to Jokowi, is fruitful. Since

Jokowi ordered to sink a fishing thief ship, the Satuan

tugas (taskforce) 115 has drowned as many as 176

ships across the Indonesian waters. This figure,

according to Jokowi, is very big compared to other

countries. Because of the cohesiveness, the number of

foreign ships that fish thieves 'paced' in the waters of

Indonesia was much less than before. "We must dare

to fight the theft of our marine resources," said

President Jokowi in the State of the Republic of

Indonesia President's Speech in Joint Meeting of

Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD – Senate

Assembly) and Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR-

House of Representatives) in Jakarta, Wednesday

(16/08/2017). According to President Jokowi, various

parties should not hesitate to maintain sovereignty,

safeguard the sea, maintain borders, and safeguard the

natural resources owned by Indonesia. On that

occasion, President Jokowi also reminded that the

government must dare to drown the illegal fishing

boats to protect the domestic fishermen.

The action to catch a Chinese fishing boat that had

caused the clash was well supported by both friends

and opponents Jokowi. Members of the Houses who

vocal anti Jokowi appreciate Jokowi's actions.

Jokowi's actions received tremendous sympathy not

only from supporters but also from a figure who

always criticized him. So, the symbolic action and

speech act done thus ensures that Jokowi has done a

legitimate and correct action according to the interests

of the people of Indonesia.

A series of massive campaigns and actions Jokowi

this makes the policy to sink the ship becomes not

only possible and even should be done. Not only the

Minister of Marine and Fishery, Susi Pujiastuti, who

enthusiastically took action firmly, but the minister of

the Yudhoyono era who supports even claim that the

policy is also the policy of SBY. The policy of

drowning became one of the most popular traits

among the people. The fact that at the time of SBY

there was such a policy but was not done indicated

that at that time there was no mutually strong

agreement to implement the policy. Thus, after going

through the securitization process initiated by the

Jokowi government, and supported by the media and

academics, the issue is seen as an urgent problem that

must be resolved firmly.

With this securitization process the ship's sinking

policy becomes part of the Jokowi populist

government's actions. It strengthens the legitimacy

and popularity of his government. However, this

policy is not long lasting. There have been protest

among neighbouring countries to this policy. After

taking place for over three years there is considerable

effort among governments to resolve the issue of

border area violations to be resumed in the

conventional manner. In other words, there is a

process of de-securitization of the policy. Although

the President still supports the sinking policy, the

Coordinating Minister for the Economy and Vice

President Jusuf Kalla, for example, wants the ship's

sinking policy to be terminated due to counter-

productive results such as relations with neighbouring

countries.

Since the beginning of 2018, there has been a

process of de-securitization of the ship's sinking

policy. De-securitization is an attempt to bring back

the issue of urgency to the realm of political and legal

settlement. Coordinating Minister for the Economy

Luhut supported by the Vice President requested the

sinking to be terminated immediately and the

settlement of violation issues was done within the

framework of the legal process. The government

began to lay the issue not in the context of urgency

but in the context of law enforcement. According to

Jokowi "So, the drowning is a form of law

enforcement that we show that we are not kidding

against illegal fishing, against the theft of fish, not

playing games," said President Jokowi. "Because of

the most drowning of the most intimidating thing, for

the deterrent effect," he added.

In the context of populism, this policy has gained

the goal it wants to achieve where the people consider

this government has the courage and firmness in

defending the sovereignty of Indonesia and also

maintain the Indonesian sea richness. But this policy

does not seem as simple as imagined. Resolving

maritime issues requires the cooperation of many

parties. The government is now even pushing the

need for sea management cooperation through

investment. During his visit to Beijing attending the

2014 annual APEC summit, as his first stop in visiting

several countries, Jokowi met with several world

leaders, what Rizal Sukma described as ‘the trip will

showcase Jokowi’s maritime axis to the world’. And,

Andi Wijajanto, the Cabinet Secretary insisted that

when met with President of China, Xi Jin Ping,

‘President Jokowi will try to incorporate our [nation]

idea of the world maritime axis with China’s 21

century [maritime] Silk Road concept’. Interestingly,

though he was actively promoted Indonesia Global

maritime Fulcrum, in his speech in the 2014 East Asia

Summit Jokowi introduced the five pillars of

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265

Indonesia’s maritime policy formulated during the

SBY presidency. In other words, the policy is

ultimately back on the original settlement process as

in SBY period, but Jokowi was nicely able to give

narrative on it for his own favour and benefits.

The world maritime axis is basically a strategic

idea that affirms oceanic as the nation's main focus.

To make it happen, that is by setting a development

agenda that focuses on the five main pillars. These

five pillars include the rebuilding of Indonesia's

maritime culture, safeguarding marine resources and

creating sovereignty of sea food, giving priority to

infrastructure development and maritime

connectivity, such as sea tolls, deep seaport, and

logistics.

However, the limitation of financial ability causes

the government to find alternative funding. As such,

one main aspect of the maritime axis is to make effort

to have international cooperation to build the ideal of

the axis. Its realization thus requires a large fund so

that Indonesia thinks about how to overcome them.

Jokowi must have liked what he heard today, as the

joint statement with Xi noted that "the 21st Century

Maritime Silk Road, proposed by President Xi

Jinping, and the Strategy of the Global Maritime

Fulcrum initiated by President Joko Widodo are

complementary.” Indonesia, China Seal 'Maritime

Partnership' During President Jokowi’s visit to China,

he and Xi Jinping pledged increased maritime

cooperation. The statement also said that the two

countries would develop a “maritime partnership.

One of these is to associate this with Chinese silk

roads. There is an effort to exploit this opportunity.

Indonesia is touched what opportunities can be

entered in the modern inter-country silk route, known

as the One Belt One Road (OBOR). Therefore,

President Joko Widodo will be present in Beijing,

China in order to meet with countries that participate

in the new trade pattern initiated by China. "We want

to know the direction of where this OBOR is, so we

come to see what the big concept of OBOR is like,"

said Jokowi at Halim Perdanakusuma airport, shortly

before flying to Beijing on Saturday (13/05/2017).

"Later after we see the big concept, then we will be

able to enter from which side," he continued. Jokowi

mentions, there are 50 countries who attended the

meeting that was held on 14 to 15 May 2017.

However, there were only 29 heads of state

participating. The Head of Badan Koordinasi

Penanaman Modal (BKPM-Investment Coordinating

Board), Thomas Lembong, added that the potential

investment that can be expected from the OBOR

summit is quite large. Understandably, Indonesia is

currently only getting an investment of about US $ 5

billion from the OBOR program. In fact, Pakistan has

currently received investment of US $ 55 billion from

OBOR program, while Malaysia has been ranked in

an investment of about US $ 30 billion from this new

silk line program; "so Indonesia is still far behind," he

said.

Yet, Indonesia seems to be critical on the OBOR

concept. Arief Havas Oegroseno, the Deputy of

Maritime Sovereignty, Ministry of Marine and

Fishery, insisted that ‘we are not very stupid, there

should not be ‘One Belt One Road [OBOR], there

must be many roads’. One main possible reason for

this is related to independency. In terms of financing

the maritime infrastructures Indonesia does not want

to be dependent on China alone, concept seems not to

only have an economic dimension but also

geostrategic aspects namely political and military

aspects. Hence, in getting of investments for

construction of maritime infrastructures, Jokowi’s

administration thus not merely reliant on the China,

but also made bilateral cooperation with several

countries. Some of them are cooperation with USA

for civil products and shipyard development, with the

Dutch focused on port and surrounding economic

zones, hinterland management was done together

with Germany and with South Korea focused on

marine defence. All the projects are closely related to

sea toll project in a sense that overcoming

development gaps and prices are of major concern.

With the sea toll it is expected that the sea connections

will be faster. The goods will also come sooner so that

the border areas no longer need to buy goods from

other countries that are geographically closer to them.

Maritime state becomes an important obsession of

Jokowi's government and the people give great hope

that this will be realized. Therefore, those above

measures are the important effort to overcome

difficulties in realizing the concept of the maritime

world. The link with OBOR China and IORA shows

that optimism and hope are still there. The most

important thing is that the government needs to show

that Indonesia is still in the right path in realizing the

doctrine of the maritime world. Leadership that

became inheritance of Indonesia in the Indian Ocean

cannot be separated from the idea of a maritime axis

of the world which brought by President Jokowi.

Indonesia Foreign Minister, Retno LP Marsudi, said

that: ‘IORA is the embodiment of Indonesian

maritime diplomacy to support the vision of

Indonesian maritime axis’.

In the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)

summit held on March 2017 at Jakarta, President

Jokowi in his speech insisted that the world's trade

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traffic through the oceans in the south of Indonesia.

"Half the container travels through the Indian Ocean,

two-thirds of the shipment of energy tankers is also

through the Indian Ocean and 2.7 billion people live

in the IORA region ... [t]herefore the Indian Ocean is

the ocean of the future and the future of the world

economy exists in this region," he said. The condition

of the Indian Ocean is strategic, according to Jokowi,

in line with the ideals of the government who want to

make Indonesia as the maritime axis of the world.

Jokowi wants the program to be in line with the

condition of the Indian Ocean. "Indonesia wants to

strengthen the maritime axis to be linked with IORA’,

said Jokowi who was then greeted applause from

invited guests.

So, it can be said that the IORA Summit is in line

with the idea of a maritime axis desired by President

Joko Widodo. Maritime axis manifested through

inter-island connectivity, shipping and fisheries

industry development, improvement of marine

transportation and maritime security. This is the

strategic idea of Jokowi’s government that is in line

with the condition of this country as an archipelagic

country.

One way that has been done to realize the

maritime axis is the development of sea toll which is

the vision of Jokowi government's especially

concerning with the development of maritime

infrastructures. Through the development of

integrated and connected marine infrastructure,

efficiency will be achieved, especially faster travel

time and lower cost. Through IORA, inter-state

connectivity becomes more realizable to open trade,

fisheries, and industry cooperation. Indonesia

officially holds the position of IORA Chairman for

the period 2015 - 2017 with South Africa as Vice

Chairman at the 15th Ministerial Meeting (PTM) in

Padang, and, fascinatingly, Indonesia is so far the

only IORA chairman which determines itself the

theme of the meeting, namely ‘Strengthening

Maritime Cooperation in a Peaceful and Stable Indian

Ocean’. The theme showed, or at least symbolically

indicated, that Indonesia was serious to implement its

maritime vision, including in the newly IORA

geographical architecture.

5 RELATIONS WITH ASEAN

Over the last four decades ASEAN used to be

important for Indonesia. Since its inception in 1967

the regional organization had become the focus and

the main priority of Indonesia’s foreign policy. It was

the former Foreign Minister Adam Malik himself,

also one of the founding fathers of ASEAN, who said

that ASEAN is the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign

policy. During the period, Indonesia, as the largest

member in terms of the population and geographical

area, had traditionally played a leading role in the

ASEAN development. One prominent contribution,

among others, was its intellectual leadership in

establishing the pillar of ASEAN Political and

Security Community in 2005. The acknowledgment

of Indonesia leadership in ASEAN was nicely

described by the former ASEAN Secretary General,

Rudolfo C. Severino, who said ‘Indonesia, in its

wisdom, allowed itself to wield its already

considerable weight in the world in the context of

ASEAN’.

Notwithstanding with the privilege status, some

Indonesian experts and foreign policy elites were

dissatisfied, or at least sceptical, with the benefit got

by Indonesia of being ASEAN member. Since 1980s,

indeed, there has been a view that ASEAN basically

is ‘a golden cage’ for Indonesia arguing that ASEAN

was too small for Indonesia’s international play

ground and it might be functioned to control

Indonesia as the biggest country in the region. This

was aggravated by the fact that ASEAN was hardly

united and its cohesion was empirically weak in

which it make Indonesia serious efforts in

establishing cooperation often received somewhat

unsatisfactory responses from other members such as

lately with the clash of Cambodia with Thailand and

ASEAN's split in the face of conflict in the South

China Sea. Adjacent to the reality, Djauhari

Oratmangun, Director-General of ASEAN Affairs,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said:

‘Our involvement in ASEAN is not optional. We

want to establish relations with both ASEAN and

other countries. It is important for us to make sure that

we establish good relations with our own neighbours

before we embark on new co-operations [sic] with

countries beyond the region.’

But, Rizal Sukma, a foreign policy expert, even

showed his impatient and critical expression by

vividly insisted that:

‘If other ASEAN countries do not share Indonesia’s

passion for and commitment to ASEAN, then it is

indeed time for us to start another round of debate on

the merits of a post-ASEAN foreign policy. We have

many other important foreign policy agendas to

attend to other than just whining and agonizing over

ASEAN’s failures.’

Such above disappointed expressions seemed to

have indicated that there had been hope that Indonesia

should be more assertive in its relation with ASEAN,

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267

in a sense that Indonesia should get more benefits

from the regional body otherwise it would search

other prioritized foreign policy.

However, there is an alternative view against the

above opinion. Until quite recently ASEAN had been

still very mosaic in character coupled with lack of

cohesion and divergent views often emerged among

its members accordingly. It would be hard and

unrealistic, therefore, to hope that ASEAN would be

unified in the near future because diplomacy is

merely an end, but also a process. Moreover, distrust

and suspicion among the existing members are also

still embedded in this organization. When being

interviewed by Elisia Yeo in 2003, the former

Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda,

frankly said ‘When we talk about the perception of

threat, [if] you ask Singapore what it thinks of [as a]

threat ... it’s immediate neighbours. ... [until now,

within ASEAN] there are more elements of

competition rather than cohesion’. Given the fact,

such a kind of condition arguably gave Indonesia a

chance to creatively make its own distinct approach

in diplomacy. The former Foreign Minister under the

SBY’s cabinet, Marty Natalegawa, said that the

fragmented ASEAN had enabled Indonesia to make a

nuanced diplomacy. In an interview he said as

follows:

As being the largest country in this region, Indonesia

is still the determining factor in the region. But,

different from other region with the same condition,

the biggest country was unfavoured due to it often put

in force its own desire. Indonesia has become a

unifier and balancer ... The Indonesia’s position and

behaviour is rare ... it is very rare a big country can be

influential due to its diplomatic strength and ability.

If we want, we can enforce our own desire. But, by

managing its self-restraint Indonesia can instead

show its [diplomatic] quality and even be able to

umbrella the world. In the context of ASEAN, we had

become the unifying factor. In a wider context,

Indonesia wants to play a role as the determining

factor of dynamic equilibrium as a concept which is

now we are trying to develop ... [thus] as a metaphor,

Indonesia is just like a conductor of an orchestra.

Nevertheless, the view to put Indonesian interest

first above other interests is most clearly stated in

relation to the regional body. Rizal Sukma, one of the

prominent Jokowi's advisors, for example, said

ASEAN is only one among many cornerstones of

Indonesian foreign policy. This has spawned

numerous controversies and concern from

neighbouring countries. One of the concerns related

to the worry that Indonesia will leave ASEAN. This

view has become a widespread spotlight in ASEAN

and shows that Indonesia will limit too many

meetings but seen not give concrete results for

Indonesia. Previously Sukma said that “Indonesia

should free itself from any under serving obligation

to follow the wishes of any state or a grouping of

states, including ASEAN, if by doing so we sacrifice

our own national interests” and that it “no longer

hesitant about taking a different track from other

ASEAN member countries.” Gone are the days of the

naïve “millions friends zero enemies” foreign policy.

Interestingly, however, Jokowi was in line with

the above idea favouring different approach on

ASEAN. Indonesia's relationship with ASEAN is one

of the important issues which has been highlighted

during the Jokowi's presidency. In the context of

populism, Jokowi does not use open rhetoric like

Donald Trump's populism. Different from Trump

who decisively declared no interest in the

international environmental regime, and cancelled the

previously ratified Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

agreement, Jokowi instead just said that he would not

do anything that the benefits are not clear to the

people. On various occasions, Jokowi in fact

mentioned that the interest of the people is always

considered more important than other interests; or,

borrowing Trump’s slogan, can also be called

‘Indonesia First’. In terms of economy, for example,

Jokowi sent a warning to other ASEAN countries that

Indonesia will secure its national interest first instead

of its prestige in ASEAN by saying that “Indonesia

will not allow itself to become merely a market,”

which in some cases is viewed as referring to the fact

that Singapore and Malaysia banks are free to operate

in Indonesia but not vice versa; and Indonesia is also

seen as no longer need to be a big brother in ASEAN.

However, despite some preliminary statements

that ASEAN is no longer the main focus of

Indonesian policing, over time, cooperation within

ASEAN is normal and routine, President Jokowi

always attending the ASEAN Summit and ASEAN

Summit with partner countries such as India and

Australia. On the other hand bilateral or trilateral sub-

regional cooperation with ASEAN countries is also

given attention. However, in many ways Indonesia

may be more critical of ASEAN for example by

requesting ASEAN to resolve differences especially

in the face of China.

Another example that shows that Jokowi's

government is still concerned about ASEAN is

Jokowi's statement that approves the view that

Australia can become an ASEAN member that will

make ASEAN more dynamic. The offer is certainly

only a unilateral statement from Indonesia that has

not been discussed with other members and the

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268

possibility to agree on this proposal is very difficult

in ASEAN. However, the proposal shows that it is

important for ASEAN to make breakthroughs. The

proposal itself creates a negative and positive

reaction. The expansion of ASEAN is unlikely to

include Australia that is geographically and culturally

different from that of Southeast Asia. But for

Australia, this is seen to be quite positive as it is a sign

that ASEAN considers Australia to be part of Asia, an

issue that has continued to be controversial

throughout Australia. Jokowi's statement shows that

ASEAN is no longer like the era of Suharto.

In the context of ASEAN, Indonesia thus still

regards it as an important pillar of foreign policy, but

Indonesia is more critical to this organization. But as

Poole mentioned Indonesia now considered the

benefits its engagement with ASEAN or, in other

words, Indonesia is critical about what Indonesia is

getting from this organization instead of following the

common international liberal assumption that

regional cooperation will benefit a country.

6 POPULISM AND SOME OTHER

JOKOWI’S POLICIES

Jokowi's approach in some Indonesian foreign policy

cases also has some populist elements in it. The

policy is not necessarily different from the previous

government but what Jokowi wants to emphasize is

that the solution is more precisely oriented and more

prominent. Some of these cases indicate a desire to

solve Indonesian foreign policy problems directly and

quickly. Successes in handling aborted labour

migrants, tackling victims of hostage taking by Abu

Sayyaf groups, adjusting ties with Bali Democracy

Forum (BDF), increasing ties with the Palestinians,

settling the role of mediators in Afghanistan and

OPM settlements are some of the cases to be

addressed in the context of this populism. The

handling of this issue has been done in the previous

government but there is an effort to show more

concrete actions put forward in Jokowi Indonesian

foreign policy.

6.1 Role in Bali Democracy Forum

(BDF)

The notion of what Indonesia obtains in regional

cooperation also applies to explain Indonesia's

diminishing role in the BDF. This forum basically

was another manifestation of Indonesia’s intellectual

leadership in international diplomacy. The purpose

was to hold a dialogue forum which in turn can

strengthen regional or international cooperation in

particular related to encourage democratization. Rizal

Sukma described it as Indonesia’s response to the

lack of a regional mechanism in encouraging

democracy in Asia. In other words, the BDF was

Indonesia’s initiative to promote democracy to be part

of strategic regional discourse.

As Hasan Wirajuda, the former Foreign Minister

under the SBY’s cabinet, said, the idea of the Forum

originated from his contemplation of Indonesia’s

experience during the 1998 monetary crisis. Among

the Asian countries hit by the crisis, it was Indonesia

which suffered most, and Indonesia experienced a

slow recovery compared to its Asia counterparts. For

him, this worse condition was the serious impact of

the previous development which heavily focused on

economy and ignored the social and political

development, particularly related to democracy,

human rights, and conflict resolution. In other words,

any implemented imbalanced development would

threaten the survival of the regime at any time, in

which this, direct or indirectly, would have serious

impacts on the region. He then considered this issue

was then urgent to discuss against the background

that, referring to Freedom House statistics, of 56

Asia-Pacific countries, only 28 % were free, while

32% were partly free, and the rest 40% not free.

Perhaps considering that the issue is crucial and

strategic for regional and international stakeholders to

discuss, President SBY then took an initiative to

develop and make it happen by establishing a forum

to share experiences. In the first BDF meeting held at

10 December 2008, it was agreed to place promotion

of democracy as a strategic agenda in Asia-Pacific

region. In terms of participants the forum is inclusive

for any highest state leaders, not limited to democratic

countries but also those who came from non

democratic countries who were ‘interested to learn

about democracy’, such as China and Myanmar, and

attracted many other countries. Some critics saw this

forum to be sceptical and would ineffective in its

mission because of its informality with no legal

binding agreement. In arguing against the view, SBY

said the BDF is merely ‘an avenue to freely share

experience and exchange minds’. By this, while the

BDF was seen strategic in its mission, it seemed to be

also a forum to raise Indonesia’s international

prestige, given the fact that Indonesia is the third

largest democracy as well as the largest democratic

moslem country in the world.

Under Jokowi’s presidency, the BDF continued to

be held but it seemed to be done half-heartedly. The

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269

BDF has been downgraded to be a ministerial

meeting to discuss issues of peace and

democratization. In the current developed discourse,

the decline in the status of BDF is considered a

reasonable one and so far the co-operation has been

viewed only for prestige and gives no actual result for

Indonesia. Hasan Wirajuda regretted this

development by saying that ‘the Forum is a soft-

power project in which its return is intangible and

cannot be measured’, but he was convinced that

slowly Jokowi wold also need to play a diplomacy

that shows Indonesian prestige.

6.2 Relations with Palestine

More intense engagement is also addressed in the

settlement of the Palestinian issue. Jokowi's

government promised the opening of the Indonesian

embassy in Ramallah Palestine which he had

discussed in his Presidential campaigns. Palestine is

indeed one of the most sensitive issues and has drawn

the attention and concern of the Indonesian people for

a long time. The House also shows Indonesia's

commitment to support Palestine by making various

visits to Palestine. Given this fact, therefore, any

action taken by government to support Palestine

issues and to blame Israel will get strong support in

domestic politics.

After his inauguration, Jokowi attempted to fulfil

his promise to give strong support to Palestine issues.

He said that "As part of the international community,

Israel must immediately stop its illegal activities and

policies in the occupied territories and Indonesia and

the Islamic world are ready to take concrete steps to

press for Israel to end its occupation of Palestine and

stop the arbitrariness in Al Quds Al Sharif, "urged

President Joko Widodo."

Jokowi pushed the effort to open the Embassy of

the Republic of Indonesia in Palestine. The plan to

open the embassy has long been there since the era of

SBY and after the Organization of Islamic Countries

(OIC) made a joint decision for its member countries

to open a representative office in Ramallah in March

2012. But because of the difficulty to realize, the

move was delayed. President Jokowi finally made

breakthrough by realizing that commitment although

finally Indonesia only succeeded in opening the

honorary consul of RI in Ramallah on March 15,

2016, as the most likely done by Indonesia in

supporting the struggle for Palestinian independence.

6.3 Protection of Indonesian Citizens

Overseas

Protection of citizens abroad is one of the main

foreign policy priorities formulated by the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. Citizen protection is the concern of

every government. In this context, the distinction

between Jokowi's Indonesian foreign policy and the

previous government is the attempt to show that the

government is more serious to handle this issue. This

issue has a direct impact on Indonesians staying

abroad and therefore it is in the interest of the populist

regime to declare to its audiences that they can solve

this problem well. In late 2015, the Indonesian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs completed the evacuation

of 2,393 Indonesian citizens from the civil war in

Yemen, which the Ministry claims as ‘the biggest,

most complex and quickest’ evacuation Indonesian

government had ever done in history.

Under the leadership of Foreign Minister Retno,

the government tries to solve the security problems of

the Indonesian citizens quickly and straightforwardly.

The protection of Indonesians trapped in the Syrian

conflict is one example. The Government of

Indonesia opened a 24-hour hotlines, the Foreign

Minister continued to update developments and

ensure all 17 Indonesian citizens survived and can be

evacuated from ISIS stronghold in Raqqa of Syria. In

the release of hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf group

in the southern Philippines, the Jokowi government

also made various diplomatic channels to free them.

The effort of liberation was gained broad media

coverage and details including diplomatic steps both

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported by the

network owned by Indonesia. The seriousness of the

government is also demonstrated by the continuing

statement that Indonesia is ready to send military

forces to free the hostages at any time if necessary.

Then the readiness was followed by conditions when

the Philippine government allowed it. The

deployment of Indonesian troops was in fact a

complicated and almost impossible thing to do. But

this is not an important thing in the perception of the

age because that is an important part is the

government has made a very heroic effort in an effort

to free the hostages. In the end the hostages were

released and President Jokowi made a speech which

among other things said: "Through thorough

diplomacy from various channels, we managed to

free 14 Indonesians held hostage by armed groups in

the Southern Philippines," said Jokowi at the

Parliament Complex on Tuesday (16 / 8/2016).

Through diplomacy also, continued Jokowi, two

Indonesian citizens who were held hostage in Papua

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

270

New Guinea successfully released. By the end of July

2016, 7,555 cases of Indonesian Citizens abroad were

completed, most of which were Indonesian migrant

workers. "At the same time, not less than 23,651

migrant workers facilitated repatriation in various

ways",

said Jokowi.

6.4 The Organisasi Papua Merdeka

(OPM) Completion

Jokowi's government also gave greater attention to

solving the province of Papua problem. In addition to

improving infrastructure development such as roads,

the government is also taking steps to stem the

influence of United Liberation Movement for West

Papua (ULMWP). Although militarily weak and

believed to lack sufficient support, the ULMWP

continues to expand its influence in the South Pacific

nations that share tribal similarities with them. The

Papua Movement for example now has representative

offices in Vanuatu, Solomon, and Wamena in

Jayawijaya, Papua. Diplomatically, Indonesia

actually still has more influence. ULMWP did

manage to become an observer at MSG, but Indonesia

also managed to improve its status in MSG to become

an associate member. In addition, the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs took a more systematic strategy by

representing that in addition to the Malay race,

Indonesia was also a Melanesian race. Indonesia

plays a role as a link for Melanesia with Asia.

However, Jokowi's government wants to show

that they have more commitment to solve this Papua

problem. Indonesia for example takes direct actions

to maintain support from Fiji, the influential state in

South Pacific. Indonesia, for example, brought aid to

Fiji during a visit led by Coordinating Minister for

Politics and Security at the time Luhut B. Panjaitan.

This strengthens the efforts of the Foreign Ministry

which has made a long diplomatic effort in resolving

this problem for example through MSG. Luhut says,

Indonesia's relationship with the countries in the

South Pacific is not too good in the past. "In the

future, we will make better, now we rarely visit there,

how to get better" . This former Chief of Staff of the

Presidency also acknowledged Indonesia's desire to

forge better relations with the South Pacific countries

on the back of a growing awareness that the region is

affecting Papua.

The above step also got supports from a member

of parliament. "I consider this a step forward for the

seriousness of the Indonesian government in

maintaining good relations with countries in the

South Pacific region," Tantowi told CNN Indonesia

on Tuesday (29/3). What's more, Fiji and Papua New

Guinea, he said, are the two countries that have been

most friendly to Indonesia. "The visit is also linked to

the long-delayed provision of relief aid to the

Government of Fiji," he said. Furthermore, Tantowi

believed that in the future the government will send

representatives to several countries in the South

Pacific which has been considered less friendly with

Indonesia.

On other side, Indonesia received a good

response. Fiji's foreign minister, Kubuabola, said he

would propose an upgrade of Indonesia's status on

Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) from associate

member to full member. This status will strengthen

Indonesia's position in the group of Melanesian

countries", said Luhut. Papua New Guinea's Minister

of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, Kimbink Pato,

according to Luhut B. Panjaitan also supports the

increasing membership of Indonesia to become a full

member of MSG. This of course gave an advantage

for Indonesia as the MSG countries previously

claimed Spokesperson of Papua Liberation

Movement, Benny Wenda, supports his organization.

The racial similarity with the majority of Papuans,

Melanesians, encouraged the Papua Liberation

Movement to make the South Pacific and the MSG

their campaign base. Since June 2015, Indonesia has

been a member of the MSG Association, while the

Papua Liberation Movement formed in December

2014 is an observer in the organization. Having this,

Indonesia is now eyeing an increase in membership

status in MSG to block the Papuan Liberation

Movement.

6.5 Populism Mediator in Afghanistan

Conflicts

Indonesia's role in conflict resolution in Afghanistan

is interesting to look at from a populist perspective.

Indonesia from the beginning was not involved in the

settlement of conflicts involving various Islamic

tribes and tribes in the country, but later Indonesia

became involved in the peace process after Jokowi

visited Afghanistan in late January 2018. The arrival

of Jokowi not only indicated the willingness of

Indonesia to be a mediator but an opportunity for

Jokowi to show his concern for the fate of citizens and

the Islamic State.

It is widely known that Jokowi is not from among

the followers of Islam who are obedient but from the

Islamic community mostly in Java. Many people even

doubt his Islam. This Indonesian involvement not

only gives new hope to the peace process but also

gained appreciation from the Muslims who have been

doubting its commitment to the Islamic world. The

Redeﬁnition of National Interest in Indonesian Foreign Policy under President Joko Widodo

271

leader of one of the PKS opposition parties, for

example, thinks this is a remarkable thing since

Indonesia's last visit to this country against

Afghanistan was in 1964 by President Soekarno.

The moment of the visit, therefore, was used by

Jokowi to show the audience that Indonesia is also

active in defending Muslims. On that occasion,

Jokowi even became a prayer imam (leader) who

symbolically showed that he was worthy to lead the

Muslims. The steps of diplomacy and peace were then

passed under the leadership of Vice President Jusuf

Kalla.

7 CONCLUSION

Foreign policy always related to domestic politics.

But how they relate and what domestic impacts on

foreign politics often spark debate. This paper sees

that relationship can be understood through the

concept of populism. Populist regimes claim that the

interests of the people are the main priorities above

other interests. Although not as extreme as the Trump

doctrine in the US with the term America First,

Indonesian foreign policy during Jokowi also has

populist elements in it.

In populism, the important question for foreign

policy is what we get in the engagement of our

country with other countries and it is not what

contribution we can give. Populist foreign policy

becomes controversial if consideration of the

immediate benefits we can get, lead to negative

reaction of the country affected by the policy. Several

Jokowi's foreign policies have caused considerable

controversy. In some other respects, populism arises

in some practical policies taken by the Jokowi’s

government.

Jokowi’s policies, which are to be different from

those of SBY, sometimes spark controversy. The

policy of sinking of foreign ships which managed

illegal fishing, for example, is essentially part of the

effort enforcing Indonesia’s sovereignty over its

maritime territory by accusing them as violating

Indonesia’s border. This policy is very populist and

has been applauded by both people and opposition

though it has led to protests of several affected

neighbouring countries. Indonesia's stance towards

ASEAN and the BDF has also caused controversy

with the emergence of some concerns that Indonesia

would leave ASEAN and not be active in the region.

Dealing with ASEAN, Jokowi in fact does not

abandon the regional body and still active to

participate. But, different from his predecessor who

actively use the leverage of Indonesia’s leadership of

ASEAN to bolster Indonesia’s international prestige,

Jokowi has a more assertive policy and even critical

to the regional organization. In terms of the BDF, he

also continued to held but by lowering it from state-

leader summit down to the ministerial level of

meeting. One possible reason for this is the Forum has

no concrete and direct result for people. In other

cases, the Jokowi government has shown a strong

commitment to sensitive and populist foreign policy

issues such as the establishment of the Consul

General of the Republic of Indonesia in Palestine and

as mediator in Afghanistan conflicts, the protection of

the Indonesians shown in the effort to free hostages

held by the Abu Sayyaf and the strengthening of

Indonesia’s unity and sovereignty against Papua

Movement’s efforts to widen its influence.

Nevertheless, instead of being narrowly, or even

blindly, inward-looking; Jokowi’s administration still

continues to manage Indonesia to be active in

international organizations, such as IORA, OBOR

and G20, with the main mission to seek cooperation

opportunities that can give actual support for

domestic development, especially in maritime and

infrastructure aspects.

Therefore, populism in the Jokowi context seems

only a matter of how to deal with the problems of

Indonesian foreign policy and at some point, in the

course of Indonesian foreign policy, such an attitude

might be needed to do. But, Indonesian foreign policy

under Jokowi’s presidency also does not drastically

redefine the national interests of Indonesia. It can be

said to be an attempt to regulate Indonesian foreign

policy priorities. However, we do not know for sure

the impact of this great concern on Indonesia's

interest on Indonesia's long-standing international

role in the region over the long term. In other words,

we argue, Jokowi does not necessarily seen as

ignoring or even leaving the basic foundation of

Indonesia’s foreign policy, namely free and active, by

abandoning Indonesia’s regional and international

commitments; but, he has just been insisting a new

approach of Indonesia’s foreign policy, by moving

away from the SBY’s ‘normative-ideal’ by

introducing his own ‘practical-populist’ approach.

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