The Systemic Implications of Emergent Strategic Objectives in
Complex Planning Situations
Christine Groβe
Department of Information Systems and Technology, Mid Sweden University, Holmgatan, Sundsvall, Sweden
Keywords: Multi-level Planning, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Strategic Management, Emergency Response
Planning, Decision Support, Styrel.
Abstract: This paper develops a model for analysing systemic implications of strategic objectives in the context of
national emergency response planning for the case of an electrical power shortage. Drawing on evidence
from the Swedish approach, STYREL, the study emphasises the need for a thorough consideration of the
various interests that are involved in such a complex system of national multi-level planning. This model
provides a novel approach for analysing strategic objectives in complex planning environments, thereby
offering a context for a constructive dialogue about strategic objectives, reachable goals and appropriate
means among actors who are involved in such planning as well as the stakeholders it affects. Even beyond
national critical infrastructure protection (CIP), the contribution of this paper is twofold: it outlines a
complex problem for operations research in general and suggests a systematic approach for examining
strategic objectives in complex planning environments in particular. Hence, this paper encourages a
discussion of systemic implications of these various interests and an enhancement of collaboration and
mutual understanding to facilitate decision-making in public and private strategic management.
1 INTRODUCTION
Planning situations are regularly part of day-to-day
business in private and public organisations.
However, these situations can become more
complex if many actors and stakeholders are
involved and affected. The context of critical
infrastructure protection (CIP) involves various
interests, such as the protection of public values and
private and economic concerns as well as political
issues, both nationally and internationally (Boin and
McConnell, 2007; Rinaldi et al., 2001). From a
holistic perspective, such planning environments
entail complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty, which
interrelate to both a potential problem situation and a
particular planning procedure (Renn, 2016). In
addition, the fluid borders between prevention,
mitigation and restoration planning for critical
infrastructure further complicate the systemic
conditions of the planning (Johansson et al., 2014;
Johansson and Hassel, 2014). In such circumstances,
these systemic conditions of the complex planning
environment pose challenges to controlling efforts
due to the specific properties of various strategic
objectives that the interconnected sub-systems
attribute to the planning process and its result.
In order to provide strategic management with
decision aid for determining achievable goals and
allocating appropriate means, this paper investigates
a national emergency response planning approach
that is dedicated to the case of power shortages and
has been implemented in Sweden. The Swedish
approach offers unique characteristics in its almost
non-technical focus and the involvement of an
immense number of actors from national, regional
and local levels during a long-term, collaborative
process. Through a case study of this exceptional
example, this paper provides a twofold contribution.
First, the description and analysis of the planning
procedure explicate a new and currently important
problem in the field of operations research. Second,
the investigation suggests a conceptual model for
assessing strategic objectives in complex planning
environments. This model offers a context for a
constructive dialogue about strategic objectives and
may facilitate an alignment of goals and means
towards them, both nationally and internationally.
The remainder of this paper presents the study as
follows. Section 2 briefly reviews previous research
Große, C.
The Systemic Implications of Emergent Strategic Objectives in Complex Planning Situations.
DOI: 10.5220/0006646302870296
In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems (ICORES 2018), pages 287-296
ISBN: 978-989-758-285-1
Copyright © 2018 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
287
regarding the impact of electrical blackouts on
modern societies and emergency response planning.
Section 3 outlines the case study that yields the
evidence which Section 4 incorporates to develop
the proposed conceptual model. Section 5 discusses
the relevance of this context for a constructive
dialogue in public strategic management and
indicates additional implications of the illustrated
problem for operations research. Section 6 concludes
the paper and identifies issues for future research.
2 PROTECTION OF CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
Because modern societies are critically dependent on
a permanent power supply, this sector is considered
to be central to other sectors of infrastructure which
provide vital services to a nation (Rinaldi et al.,
2001; Yusta et al., 2011). Recent studies have
investigated topics such as measurements to prevent
and restore the power distribution system after a
failure (Negnevitsky et al., 2013; Tortos and Terzija,
2012), cascading effects of a technical failure (Hines
et al., 2009; Vaiman et al., 2013) and resilience in
power distribution systems (Maliszewski and
Perrings, 2012). Apart from research on the
economic costs of power outages (e.g. Küfeoğlu and
Lehtonen, 2013), another study has explored how
societal consequences of a power shortage should
influence decisions regarding measurements to
reduce the technical vulnerability of the Swedish
power grid (Johansson et al., 2014). Other studies
have emphasised the need for advances in societies’
resilience in coping with rare events, such as an
electrical blackout, that have catastrophic potential
(Boin and McConnell, 2007; Wright et al., 2012).
However, experiences from local power outages in
the aftermath of two storms in Sweden have
revealed that actors at municipalities and power grid
providers expected households to be prepared;
however, households did not recognise this
responsibility to establish such preparedness (Palm,
2009). Nevertheless, the absence of severe large-
scale power shortages or outages in the past has
resulted in a lack of experience with such crisis
events among people who are responsible for such
preparedness planning at municipalities (Enander et
al., 2015). Moreover, further research in Sweden has
questioned the decision-making capacities of the
regional board which is responsible for civil
defence. (Wimelius and Engberg, 2015). Despite a
repeated call for collaboration and co-ordination
during crises, studies have revealed that this cross-
functional co-operation results in frustration and
several problems due to inadequate information
paths, organisational biases and a lack of mutual
understanding (Powley, 2009; Pramanik et al., 2015;
Ödlund, 2010). In view of this, the present paper
argues that analysing strategic objectives in complex
planning environments can assist actors and
stakeholders with creating a shared understanding,
developing helpful decision aid and establishing
appropriate and secure information paths.
3 CASE STUDY
3.1 The Swedish STYREL Planning
The blackout in southern Sweden in September 2003
may have been the catalyst for the development of
the national STYREL planning approach (Elkraft
System, 2003; Larsson and Danell, 2006; Larsson
and Ek, 2004; SvK, 2003). The national process was
developed between 2004 and 2011 and currently
involves many actors, as Table 3 illustrates. The
procedure was executed in 2010/11 and 2014/15; the
proceedings are suggested as follows (SEA, 2014):
As the governmentally entrusted actor, the
Swedish Energy Agency (SEA) starts the iteration of
the procedure. Subsequently, all national agencies
make an inventory of critical infrastructure that they
individually operate across the country and attribute
a priority class to each asset. This priority class is
selected from an eight-point scale, which is provided
by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and
displayed in Table 1, in order to determine the
importance of each asset’s functionality for the
national society. Then, the agencies distribute a
separate list of these classified assets to each county
administrative board (CAB) in which the assets are
physically located. Simultaneously, the SEA informs
the CABs about the current proceeding and imparts
some guidance. The CABs in turn encourage the
municipalities within their areas of responsibility to
perform the planning and assist with guidance to
some extent. In addition, the list from the agencies is
divided into parts which correspond with each
municipality’s geographical area of responsibility.
These assets are then included in the further local
proceedings at the municipalities. For this purpose,
individuals who are responsible at municipalities
investigate local infrastructure in order to find and
classify electricity-dependent critical infrastructure
and services. The local ranking also applies the
eight-point scale in Table 1.
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Table 1: Priority Classes of Critical Infrastructure (MSB,
2010, p. 10).
N
Description
1
Power consumers that have a large impact on life and
health in a short time frame (hours)
2
Power consumers that have a large impact on vital
societal functions in a short time frame (hours)
3
Power consumers that have a large impact on life and
health in a longer time frame (days)
4
Power consumers that have a large impact on vital
societal functions in a longer time frame (days)
5
Power consumers that represent large economic values
6
Power consumers with major importance for the
environment
7
Power consumers with importance for societal and
cultural values
8
All other power consumers
During the course of the local ranking, local
power grid providers are encouraged to assist with
information regarding the relation of the critical
infrastructure assets, as power consumers, to
controllable power lines. As a result, the operational
support system, which takes the form of a
spreadsheet that applies an additive calculation,
merges the ranked list of assets into a ranked list of
controllable power lines. The municipalities check
their consequential list of power lines and return it to
their CAB. The CAB merges the lists from their
municipalities in a manner similar to that indicated
above, with attention to critical infrastructure of
regional importance. Local interests in particular
demand consideration against regional and national
requirements, and vice versa. The CABs thus have a
key role in the collaborative approach because they
compile their part of the final list by incorporating
local, regional and national information, which is
then forwarded to the national power grid provider
and the local operators. Whereas the national power
grid provider only stores this information, the local
providers are legally obligated to use the received
lists in their contingency planning for manual load
shedding (MLS) in case of a power shortage.
3.2 Methodical Proceedings
The evidence collected in this case study derives
from several sources, such as publicly available
documents, interviews and observations during the
investigation.
First, Swedish documentation of the case was
examined; this included legal regulations, guidelines
and various reports. The previous section has
described the proceedings as they are communicated
through these documents. This document study
provided a further basis for the interview study.
Second, a selection was made of three counties
with distinctly different properties, for example
relating to size, inhabitants and proximity to larger
cities, to ensure a representative sample for
obtaining data from interviews. Interviews were
conducted with 57 individuals who act on behalf of
several actors in this planning. Table 2 details the
participant sample. The interview study included the
three CABs of the counties and similarly invited all
of the 50 interrelated municipalities, of which only
three were not accessible. Interviews with the
national power grid provider and a few local
providers completed the data collection and
represented the technical perspective in the planning.
Table 2: Current Participation in the Case Study.
Number of
Interviewees
Affiliation
4
County Administrative Board (CAB)
46
Municipality
5
Local Power Grid Provider
2
National Power Grid Provider (SvK)
All informants participated in face-to-face
interviews within their particular working
environments, with the exception of two that took
place via telephone. The interviews were semi-
structured in nature and consisted of predetermined,
open-ended questions, which allowed for a similar
structure in each interview while still enabling
participants to address any particularly relevant issue
with regard to their own understandings of the
STYREL planning. Twenty-eight of the respondents
discussed the questions individually with the
interviewer, and 14 interviews were performed in
groups, with 13 of those involving two participants
and one of them involving three. The interviews
lasted for an average of one hour and were recorded
and transcribed.
Third, an analysis of the data collected through
the document and interview studies, which were
enriched by observations in the field, yielded
insights that inform the composition of the
conceptual model in the following section. These
insights emerged from evidence regarding the
involvement and participation of actors and
stakeholders, including their interconnectedness and
contexts. These system elements highlighted various
strategic objectives, which the analysis addresses by
identifying relevant properties and combinations of
objectives that can potentially challenge controlling
and governance efforts for Swedish CIP.
The Systemic Implications of Emergent Strategic Objectives in Complex Planning Situations
289
4 MODEL COMPOSITION
4.1 System Elements
When applying system thinking to planning for CIP,
the resultant planning environment is a rather open
system with fluid borders and which consists of
system components and their interconnections
within a system context (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 141).
The actors and stakeholders in the Swedish case can
therefore be viewed not only as sub-systems within a
broader planning space but also as belonging to their
respective sub-context. Within these environments,
the sub-systems maintain various interrelations.
Table 3: Actors in the Swedish STYREL Planning.
N
Actor
Area of Responsibility
1
SEA
Process development and initiation
of process execution (national),
direction and guidance
>
300
National
Agencies
Identification and prioritisation of
critical infrastructure that the
particular agency operates,
distribution of planning documents
to the CABs where objects are
physically located
21
CABs
Process execution (regional),
distribution and compilation of
planning documents, direction and
guidance
291
Municipalities
Process execution (local),
identification of critical
infrastructure, collaboration with
power grid providers (operating
locally) as well as public and
private operators of critical
infrastructure (located locally),
prioritisation of critical
infrastructure assets and
controllable power lines
Ca.
160
Power Grid
Providers
Assisting municipalities with
information how critical
infrastructure relate to power lines,
planning for MLS
1
National Power
Grid Provider
Supervision of planning for and
execution of MLS (which uses the
results of STYREL)
First, the Swedish STYREL planning involves and
affects a large number of sub-systems (Große,
2017). Table 3 specifies which actors the official
documentation and guidelines identify as directly
involved in the Swedish planning process. During a
power shortage, the results of the planning can also
affect other sub-systems in addition to these
identified actors. For example, the execution of the
process has hardly involved larger parts of civic
society, neither non-governmental nor private
organisations. The interviews indicated that such
proceeding stipulates a workload that had surpassed
the capabilities of the municipalities. Accordingly,
most respondents indicated that critical
infrastructure assets were mainly identified within
municipal properties and enterprises.
Second, the identified sub-systems establish and
maintain various formal and informal
interconnections between them. The process
guideline does address the role of the sub-systems in
these interconnections, but it does not specify any
formalities of these relations. This is instead
delegated to the particular organisations and
individuals, who must build a reasonably reliable
network of co-operation and collaboration. Figure 1
demonstrates the intended formal relations between
the actors in the planning process. It particularly
illustrates that the multi-level planning lacks
interconnections that are dedicated to feedback and
collective learning, which raises questions regarding
options for evaluation and further improvement.
Figure 1: Formal Relations between Actors in the Swedish
Multi-level Planning.
Evidence from the interviews suggests that apart
from these intended formal relations, various
informal relations have also been established,
especially at the local level. For example, some
planners have been in contact with local crisis
management personnel, with individuals performing
similar tasks in other municipalities or with private
companies of local importance. Such contacts may
influence the conduct of the planning as well as the
potential re-application of insights from this
planning to other local contexts.
Third, the sub-systems and interconnections are
embedded in a system context. Although the
planning environment of STYREL encompasses the
sub-systems, the particular conditions of one sub-
County
Administrative Board
Municipality
SvK
Regional Grid
Operator
Local Grid Operator
SEA
National
Agencies
Document
Documents
Guidance
MLS
G
D
Documents
Documents
MLS
National LevelRegional LevelLocal Level
Actors in Swedish Emergency Planning - STYREL
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290
system can differ from another because of specific
local circumstances, such as the planner’s placement
in organisational structures or office environments.
In addition, the interviews reveal substantial variety
in individual levels of knowledge and experiences.
Moreover, the four-year interval between planning
iterations implies that planners concentrate on other
tasks in the meantime, which can involve changes to
working tasks, mind settings and belonging context
of the individuals who conduct the STYREL planning.
The extension of these sub-system contexts further
embeds even the planning environment of STYREL
into larger contexts, such as national security and
European planning for CIP.
Considering these systemic conditions, there is
the need for a structured dialogue about strategic
objectives in such complex planning environments.
This dialogue may support the development of
constructive decision aid for local responsible
planners to enable them to identify infrastructure
assets and their criticality in accordance with
common understandings.
4.2 Properties of Strategic Objectives
Departing from the description of the Swedish
planning case and the systemic conditions that have
been identified above, this study identifies ambiguity
in several steps of the process. For example,
specification of responsibilities, expected efforts and
information paths remains unclear. Although a
particular instantiation of the planning process may
require adaptation to local conditions, the variety of
local processes indicates that different
interpretations of vague and implicit objectives
result in different proceedings. Thus, concretising
the tacit content and its significance can assist with
converting these implicit objectives into explicit
ones (Śliwa and Patalas-Maliszewska, 2015), which
in turn can facilitate both the development and
execution of the process.
From a process management perspective,
strategic objectives can be decomposed into
achievable goals, and preferably in a sequential
order. However, in the context of complex planning,
such goals must fulfil the meaning as intermediate
objectives towards more extensive or long-term
goals, here labelled ‘advanced objectives’ (Watzka,
2017). In the STYREL case, the identification of
critical infrastructure can be considered one such
intermediate objective in pursuit of the advanced
objective of obtaining a list of categorised power
consumers.
The ambiguity and uncertainty that are involved
in complex planning condense into strategic
objectives that are identical in content and meaning
but uniquely expressed and labelled. To reduce the
portfolio of relevant objectives, an in-depth analysis
must address and dissolve such identical strategic
objectives, which could additionally enhance clarity
in the complex environment. Similarly, antinomic
objectives present insurmountable discrepancies
with one another and must be considered carefully
before deciding between them (Thommen et al.
2017). In consequence, the remaining objectives are
basically compatible.
However, the means to reach these compatible
strategic objectives can further impact the
simultaneous achievement. Such an impact can
emerge as a beneficial, neutral or conflicting side
effect between the applied means. For instance, the
interviews with individuals responsible for STYREL at
municipalities reveal that some planners had contact
with local crisis management, and in certain cases
even shared a position with them. This enables the
valuable reuse of results from the STYREL process for
next-level planning, such as preparedness or
continuity planning. Nevertheless, due to constraints
regarding aspects such as time, budget, staff and
knowledge, the means that have been applicable
during the planning iterations have differed
significantly. This implies that the conflict between
the means for achieving the process objective, ‘a
plan that power-grid providers can use as basis for
their response planning’ (SEA, 2014, p. 25), and the
planning objective to ‘alleviate consequences for
society that emerge when manual load shedding
must be executed’ (SEA, 2014, p. 7) is delegated to
the respective local regional instantiation of the
planning process. Therefore, the planning may result
in considerably varied results due to individual
interpretations regarding the expected granularity of
infrastructure identification, the concrete application
of the classification scheme, and adequate goals and
means in pursuing objectives.
The following classification parameters
summarise the above deliberations:
▪ Manifestation: Implicit or explicit
▪ Sequence: Intermediate or advanced
▪ Logic: Identical, compatible or antinomic
▪ Side Effect: Beneficial, neutral or conflicting
4.3 Challenges for Controlling Efforts
Since strategic objectives involved in the Swedish
emergency response planning for CIP are numerous
The Systemic Implications of Emergent Strategic Objectives in Complex Planning Situations
291
and highly diverse as a result of the number of actors
and stakeholders, many of these objectives will
occur simultaneously. Such combinations of
objectives can challenge efforts to control the
planning process. These bundles characterise
challenges as opportunities, risks and indefinites.
First, opportunities emerge from strategic
objectives that are explicitly formulated,
intermediate or advanced, and compatible. In
particular, this type of bundle contains strategic
objectives that utilise means with beneficial side
effects among the objectives. Depending on the
objectives and means that are involved, the benefit
of such bundles can vary. Hence, this utility
maximisation is one relevant task to increase the
efficiency of national planning.
Second, risks arise from combinations of
strategic objectives that are explicitly formulated but
can be advance antinomic or advanced compatible.
The combination of advance-antinomic objectives
warrants particular attention, as under no
circumstances can they be achieved simultaneously,
and they should be treated first. The latter
combination of advanced-compatible objectives
becomes a challenge of the risk type if the means
applied to reach them provide conflicting side
effects. The range of such conflicting side effects
can span from acceptable to disastrous losses; thus,
loss minimisation is the second relevant task in
pursuing effective usage of national resources.
Third, indefinites reside in the neutral middle
ground between the former two challenges. Such
indefinite combinations consist of strategic
objectives that are implicit or explicit, intermediate
or advanced, and basically compatible, and they
apply means with neutral side effects. Strategic
objectives in bundles of this type have no obvious
economic effects on national planning, but they may
still have an influence on the effectiveness of the
planning process. Thus, a regular assessment is a
third task to ensure the effectiveness of national
planning.
4.4 Context for Constructive Dialogue
The previous sections have introduced the aspects of
the conceptual model, which provides a context for a
constructive dialogue about strategic objectives in
complex planning environments. Derived from
insights from the Swedish planning case, the model
applies classification parameters to strategic
objectives that emerge from systemic parameters.
Moreover, their combination results in bundles that
characterise challenges for controlling and national
governance efforts. Figure 2 summarises the
deliberations and represents the model in detail.
Figure 2: Context for Analysis of Strategic Objectives – The CASO Model.
ICORES 2018 - 7th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems
292
To elucidate how the CASO model can assist
with analysing strategic objectives, some examples
illustrate the systemic implications for governance in
the Swedish emergency response planning for power
shortages. The examples below use five strategic
objectives (1) – (5) from STYREL, which in bundles
and by specific means can provide opportunities,
risks or indefinites. Consequently, governance can
address interrelated issues in several ways.
(1) Society protection
(2) List of ranked critical infrastructure assets
(3) Basis for preparedness and crisis management
(4) Power grid stabilisation by load shedding of non-
priority assets
(5) Information security about vulnerabilities
A) Assuming that the bundle of (2) and (3) provides
an opportunity, it implies that governance needs to
focus on the transition of the STYREL-planning results
into a next-level planning, which may involve
considerations on the granularity of the processed
information and on adequate access rights as well. In
STYREL, the municipalities cannot fully rely on the
planning results because it remains uncertain which
effects emerge locally during a power shortage. This
uncertainty stems from the providers’ capability to
control electricity across the power grid, the
situation that actually occurs and the absence of
feedback after a regional aggregation of power lines.
B) If the bundle (A) combined with (5) constitutes a
challenge of the risk-type, it means that conflicting
means are involved. For example, the transition of
information between different levels of crisis
management requires a certain openness, which
provides a risk vector to information security.
Therefore, governance must decide which level of
security is adequate and must thereupon establish
appropriate information paths with specified
responsibilities and access control.
C) The bundle of (2) and (4) can be envisioned as
indefinite. Balancing the power grid during power
shortages does not primarily require a ranking of
critical infrastructure. Otherwise, if (1) joins the
bundle, such ranking can help to reduce the impact
of power disturbances on society. In such case, the
ranking can probably contain limited details because
non-priority assets like households represent a large
consumption that can be powered off to stabilise the
grid. Nevertheless, such a bundle can progress
toward being a type of risk or opportunity. For
example, when a power shortage changes into a
blackout, a detailed list facilitates the restoration of
the current in a prioritised order. Such prioritised
restoration though depends on the ranking list’s
actuality and the provider’s possibilities to control
the power supply through the grid. Hence,
governance must regularly reflect about indefinites
and needs to assess a possible progression to adapt
planning processes to emerging issues, such as the
expansion of infrastructure and new technologies.
These selected examples demonstrate that clarity
about strategic objectives can help to mitigate the
ambiguity in task descriptions and the uncertainty
that is caused by lacks of knowledge. Moreover,
these examples reveal that individual perceptions
about this clarity can differ and even change over
time. The CASO model intends therefore to support
such suggested, regularly assessment.
5 DISCUSSION
5.1 Indications for STYREL Planning
By proposing the CASO model in the section above,
this paper encourages a constructive dialogue among
the actors and stakeholders who are involved in the
Swedish planning approach STYREL for protecting
critical infrastructure from the consequences of
power shortages.
Evidence from the Swedish case particularly
illustrates systemic and classification parameters. As
Section 4.1 has explained, the systemic parameters
consist of the actors and stakeholders as system
components in addition to their interrelations and
particular environments. As indicated, the Swedish
approach does not yet comprehensively include all
strategic objectives which the systemic parameters
pose to the STYREL planning; therefore, greater effort
is needed to identify hidden stakeholders and
objectives that are interconnected with the planning.
Moreover, the study has discovered that the
analysis of the strategic objectives is also
incomplete. Although the interviews indicate that
certain sub-systems follow an internal logic, the
holistic system of governance appears
underdeveloped with regard to the management of
complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty. The
proposed CASO model can assist Swedish
controlling and governance efforts through the
continuous process of identifying strategic
objectives, analysing their properties and
determining the direction of activities. In addition to
dissolving identical objectives and eliminating
antinomic strategic objectives, this also requires
close consideration of the challenges which result
from bundles of strategic objectives and which may
The Systemic Implications of Emergent Strategic Objectives in Complex Planning Situations
293
have consequences for Swedish society in an urban
context, in rural circumstances or in both situations.
A subsequent in-depth analysis of these
challenges could suggest further measurements to
improve, for example, collective learning within and
among sub-systems, decision support for identifying
and prioritising critical infrastructure, public-private
collaboration and preparedness planning, and public
risk governance in Sweden.
5.2 Relevance for Complex Planning
Environments
As the paper has outlined, combinations of strategic
objectives can complicate the operation of complex
planning environments. The classification of these
challenges to controlling and governance efforts
reveals three relevant tasks for system optimisation.
Utility maximisation is suggested as one
significant task. A planner’s perceptions of the
relevance of the performed planning influences his
or her commitment and effort level (Enander et al.,
2015; Penrose, 2000), and resources for national
planning are restricted by a budget, which further
motivates the possible optimal usage. Through its
orientation towards multi-level (national, regional
and local) anchoring, the Swedish case can inspire
similar complex planning in other contexts. Despite
this study revealing shortcomings in co-ordination
and alignment of strategic objectives in the Swedish
planning for CIP, the existing system structures can
serve as stable starting points for improving the
usefulness and use-worthiness of the planning.
Loss minimisation appears to be another relevant
focus which targets conflicting side effects of means
for reaching compatible strategic objectives. The
more negative end of such a portfolio analysis
contains objectives that are antinomic, i.e. mutually
exclusive. Attempts to reach such objectives can
simultaneously result in significant economic losses.
Thus, similarly to those involving conflicts, such
antinomic strategic objectives must be addressed
early in complex planning. However, the number of
actors in the Swedish planning environment can
hamper the identification of such risky strategic
objectives as well as their mitigation. Therefore, the
conceptual model that this study has developed
suggests a context for a constructive dialogue in
order to reduce the waste of national resources.
Although the former two tasks are pertinent for
optimisation, the systemic conditions of the complex
planning in Sweden result in constantly changing
strategic objectives as well. Thus, indefinite bundles
necessitate regular monitoring and assessment in
order to identify further opportunities or risks that
are interrelated with strategic objectives in complex
systems of national planning for CIP. For example,
staff changes can involve further objectives in view
of the knowledge and experience of new employees.
Governance and leadership efforts could address
planners’ perceptions of the significance of the
executed planning, for example by discussing
implicit objectives to reduce ambiguity and
considering articulated doubts. The insights that are
obtained from such efforts can inform a regular
dialogue about strategic objectives in order to
develop a mutual understanding, and not only in the
context of Swedish planning for CIP, for which the
study suggests a systematic and integrative context.
5.3 Implications for Operations
Research
Whereas the latter of the previously presented
challenges for controlling complex planning
environments can be considered a task for proper
monitoring and leadership, the two former
challenges are of particular interest for operations
research. Since the appropriate use of national
resources with optimal outcomes can also be viewed
as a preferred national strategic objective, this
requirement can lead to further investigation of the
potential for optimisation. However, the plethora of
sub-systems, interrelations and conditions that are
involved in the complex planning in addition to the
number of potential objectives, which is expected to
be similarly high, has encouraged the conceptual
representation of the constructed model as discussed
in this study. Nevertheless, the problem that is
presented provides a point of departure for further
operations research. For instance, the outlined
problem situation encourages the development of a
mathematical representation which could enable the
research community to discuss optimisation
possibilities and potential consequences for national
planning and the affected society. For this, two
alternatives seem convenient: utility maximisation
and loss minimisation. The former may address the
usability, usefulness and use-worthiness of the
planning process and the resulting plan, whereas the
latter relates to economic resources, such as working
hours, cognitive capacity, system development costs,
information security measures and education and
training of employees. Both alternatives can be more
attentive to possible consequences of the planning in
the case of an emergency, such as a power shortage
situation like that under consideration by the
Swedish planning. The question of how to optimise
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such planning with regard to potential economic
losses and loss of life in the case of a certain severe
power shortage, or even a full outage, could further
encourage the comparison of similar complex
planning in other national contexts which scientific
literature has not yet described in detail.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This study has closely examined the Swedish
planning environment, the purpose of which is to
plan a response to power shortages with the
intention of protecting national, regional and local
infrastructure that are of key importance for the
respective society. Derived from insights that the
study has obtained from the Swedish STYREL case,
this paper has developed a conceptual model that
provides a context for a constructive dialogue about
the strategic objectives that are involved in the
Swedish planning approach.
Swedish planning for CIP consists of a multitude
of actors and interconnections within particular
environments at the local, regional and national
levels. From such nested circumstances, a significant
need has emerged to examine the challenging
implications of the various strategic objectives for
the governance of the Swedish planning process. As
the evidence in Section 4 has demonstrated,
conflicting side effects among strategic objectives
are ignored similarly to beneficial ones in the STYREL
process. Hence, by proposing the CASO model, this
paper contributes to future systematic development
of the Swedish STYREL planning. Moreover, this
model can further assist with analysis of other
similar complex planning environments.
On the one hand, the CASO model applies a
holistic and integrative perspective of strategic
objectives in such complex planning environments;
therefore, this context presents a tool to analyse and
discuss relevant preferences concerning the future
state which such a multi-level planning process
addresses. A constructive dialogue about the
preferred future state may encompass actors from all
planning levels, regardless of whether they are
involved in process execution or responsible for its
development. In addition, insights from such cross-
level analysis and discussion can foster proper risk
communication to further affected stakeholders,
such as civic society in the Swedish context.
On the other hand, the conceptual model offers a
point of departure for future research that is
associated with operation and development of
complex systems. A particularly interesting problem
definition in the context of operations research
emerges from the utility maximisation and loss
minimisation that are associated with both the
planning process and the result of the planning, i.e.
the emergency response plan. As this paper has
argued, strategic objectives that are involved in
complex planning tasks challenge controlling and
governance efforts in several ways. This paper has
aimed to structure the systemic conditions of the
complex planning environment in terms of sub-
systems of actors, where changes result in variations
in conditions and interconnections over time and
fluid borders of a multifaceted context within and
surrounding the planning environment. This can
ultimately encourage joint efforts within the research
community to examine possible solutions. By
explicating this complex problem, this paper has
thus contributed to dialogue and development in the
field of operations research.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study is supported by the Swedish Energy
Agency alongside the project: ‘Från myndighet till
medborgare och tillbaka: En studie av samverkan
och kommunikation inom ramen för Styrel’, which
is gratefully acknowledged.
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