XACML for Building Access Control Policies in Internet of Things

Hany F. Atlam

1, 2

, Madini O. Alassafi

, Ahmed Alenezi

, Robert J. Walters

and Gary B. Wills

Electronic and Computer Science Dept., University of Southampton, University Road, SO17 1BJ, Southampton, U.K.

Computer Science and Engineering Dept., Faculty of Electronic Engineering, Menoufia University, 32952, Menouf, Egypt

Keywords: Internet of Things, Access Control, XACML, Policy Language, Adrbac, Access Policies.

Abstract: Although the Internet of things (IoT) brought unlimited benefits, it also brought many security issues. The

access control is one of the main elements to address these issues. It provides the access to system resources

only to authorized users and ensures that they behave in an authorized manner during their access sessions.

One of the significant components of any access control model is access policies. They are used to build the

criteria to permit or deny any access request. Building an efficient access control model for the IoT require

selecting an appropriate access policy language to implement access policies. Therefore, this paper presents

an overview of most common access policy languages. It starts with discussing different access control models

and features of the access policy. After reviewing different access policy languages, we proposed XACML as

the most efficient and appropriate policy language for the IoT as it compatible with different platforms,

provides a distributed and flexible approach to work with different access control scenarios of the IoT system.

In addition, we proposed an XACML model for an Adaptive Risk-Based Access Control (AdRBAC) for the

IoT and showed how the access decision will be made using XACML.

1 INTRODUCTION

The Internet of Things (IoT) is currently a hot area

that attracts the attention of both academia and

commercial organizations. It has the ability to

dramatically change our lives and businesses for the

better especially with its integration with Cloud

computing (Atlam et al., 2017a).

The IoT brought unlimited benefits, however, it

also brought many security issues. One of the main

elements to address IoT security issues is the access

control. The main purpose of the access control is to

reject unauthorized users and limit operations of

authorized users using a certain device (Atlam et al.,

2017c). One of the essential elements of any access

control model is access control policies. These

policies are implemented using an access policy

language.

This paper provides an overview of common

access policy languages. It starts with showing

different access control models, then providing a

review of access policy languages to select the most

appropriate one to implement access control policies

in the IoT. After reviewing existing policy languages,

eXtensible Access Control Markup Language

(XACML) is proposed to the best choice to build

access control policies for the IoT as it is flexible and

powerful policy language. In addition, we proposed

an XACML model for an Adaptive Risk-Based Access

Control (AdRBAC) for the IoT and have shown how the

access decision will be made using XACML.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows:

Section 2 presents access control; Section 3 provides

an overview of different access control models;

Section 4 introduces access control policies; Section

5 presents access control policy language for IoT;

Section 6 discusses XACML model and its structure,

Section 7 presented proposed XACML model, and

finally Section 8 is the conclusion.

2 ACCESS CONTROL

Access control is one of the security technologies to

protect system resources by preventing unauthorized

access to resources and restricting legitimate user’s

access according to their privileges (Hu et al., 2006).

The access control model is implemented at

different levels in many areas such as operating

system and database management system. Any access

control is consisting of five factors as follows:

Atlam, H., Alassaﬁ, M., Alenezi, A., Walters, R. and Wills, G.

XACML for Building Access Control Policies in Internet of Things.

DOI: 10.5220/0006725102530260

In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Internet of Things, Big Data and Security (IoTBDS 2018), pages 253-260

ISBN: 978-989-758-296-7

253

1. Subjects: Active entities in the form of users

and processes that request the access to

objects.

2. Objects: passive entities containing

information being accessed by subjects.

3. Actions: An operation to be performed on a

certain object (read, write, execute, etc.).

4. Privileges: Authorizations permissions to

perform certain actions on certain objects.

5. Access policies: The set of rules that

determine the access decision whether

accepted or denied.

Figure 1: Main elements of an access control model.

Figure 1 shows the flow of an access control

operation. It starts when a subject/user send an access

request to the access control manager to access a

certain object. The access control manager uses the

user details such as username, password, identity

card, and Biomatrices then compares it against the

access control policies to determine the access

decision. The decision will be either accepted or

rejected (Suhendra, 2011). If the access is accepted,

the access control manager will allow the user to

access the object, while if the access is rejected, the

access control manager will terminate the session

after sending warning message regarding insufficient

credentials (Liu et al., 2012).

3 ACCESS CONTROL MODELS

The main purpose of the access control is to

determine if a user is authorized to access a resource,

data, service and determine the access decision

whether accepted or denied. Access control model is

an essential part of any information management

system to protects system resources from

unauthorized access and ensures achieving

confidentiality, integrity, and availability to system

users (Atlam et al., 2017b). This section provides an

overview of common access control models.

3.1 Access Control List

Access control was traditionally implemented with a

matrix table called Access Control Matrix (ACM),

where each row and column is composed of a subject

and object respectively. Each record represents a set

of access rights for the corresponding subject

(N.Mahalle et al., 2013).

After that, the Access Control List (ACL)

appeared. ACL is a list of a certain object which

contains legitimate subjects along with their access

rights (Hu et al., 2006).

3.2 Discretionary Access Control

Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model was

designed for multi-user databases and systems with a

few previously known users.

DAC grants access depending on the user identity

and authorization, which is defined for open policies.

The owner of the resource can grant the access to any

user. It is called discretionary as it provides the

flexibility to allow the users to pass their access

permissions freely to other users. Therefore, all the

system resources are under full control from the user

(Atlam et al., 2017b; Janak et al., 2012).

Figure 2: DAC access control model (Janak et al., 2012).

3.3 Mandatory Access Control

In the Mandatory Access Control (MAC), each object

is assigned a label which specifies security privileges

of the object based on the sensitivity of the

information in the object, and each subject is assigned

a label that specifies which object the requester can

access (Bugiel et al., 2013; Hulsebosch et al., 2005).

DAC model provides security measures where a user

can only perform tasks related to its privileges.

The MAC model is concerned with confidentiality

and integrity of information, so it mainly used in

military and government applications. In MAC, the

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security policy is controlled by a security policy

administrator and the user does not have the

capability to override it (Zhu and Jin, 2007).

3.4 Role-based Access Control

Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a widely

accepted model in almost all large enterprises (Bijon

et al., 2013). RBAC model is consists of three elements:

users (subjects requesting access), roles (collection of

permission) and operations (actions on target resource).

Access permissions are related to roles and the

appropriate role is granted to the user. A single user can

be associated with one or more roles, and a single role

can include one or more user. RBAC provides a

classification of users based on their roles (Atlam et al.,

2017c; Kumar et al., 2002).

The RBAC model restricts access to objects based

on the subject’s role rather than their identifications.

Roles are allocated to subjects according to their

clearance, qualification, and responsibilities inside

the organization. A set of permissions are grouped

together to form a role. A user can be allocated to

different roles and the role can be assigned to

different users. The RBAC model might have many

users, each user will be assigned to a specific role or

may be assigned to multiple roles and each role

consists of a set of permissions/rights. An example of

RBAC in a hospital, where doctors can both read and

write prescriptions, whereas pharmacists are limited

to read prescriptions only.

3.5 Attribute-based Access Control

Attribute-Based Access control (ABAC) is a dynamic

access control model incorporating key factors that

called attributes that belong to the entities of subjects,

objects, actions, and environment conditions (Jin et

al., 2012).

ABAC is an access control model that grants or

denies access to objects based on the assigned

attributes of the subject, object, environmental

conditions and the set of access control policies

specified based on those attributes and conditions.

Therefore, access policies are created without the

need for direct reference to subjects or objects (Liu et

al., 2016).

The use of attributes has a remarkable capacity for

dealing with an unlimited number of subjects without

any modifications to existing policies. Therefore,

achieving less maintenance and overhead (Atlam et

al., 2017d).

3.6 Cryptographic RBAC

Cryptographic RBAC model is presented to provide

secure data outsourcing and an effective resource

management in RRBAC systems. With the presence

of the cloud computing which provides unlimited

benefits to users and applications. Cloud data centres

are distributed geographically and anonymously,

therefore, once the user uploads their data to the

cloud, users lose control of their data (Zhu et al.,

2010a).

In addition, the cloud service providers can access

user’s data even if it’s not allowed to do so. Therefore,

access control policies should be implemented to

allow only actual data owners to access their data

(Zhou et al., 2014a). The Cryptographic RBAC

comes into play.

Cryptographic RBAC, as stated by its name,

integrate two concepts, which are the RBAC and

Cryptographic mechanism. This access control model

allows the users to encrypt the data before storing it

in the cloud so that only data owners will have the

decryption key to decrypt the data. The encrypted

data is specific to roles, therefore only users who are

part of these roles can decrypt the data with their own

secret key (Zhou et al., 2014b; Zhu et al., 2010b).

4 ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES

The access control is used to manage every access to

the system resources to ensure that all and only

authorized users are allowed to access. To do so,

access control is based on access rules which define

accesses to be allowed or to denied. An administrative

policy is therefore needed to regulate the specification

of such rules to specify who can add, delete, or

modify system resources. Administrative policies are

one of the most important aspects of access control.

According to IBM, the access control policies are

defined as “a set of conditions that, after they have

been evaluated, determine access decisions. The

conditions are a combination of attributes,

obligations, authentication policies, and a risk

profile” (Molloy et al., 2011).

According to VimercatiS et al. (2007), An access

control policy should have these features:

 Efficiency: The efficiency of the access policy

is always a serious issue. Therefore, providing

an efficient and simple approach to allow or

deny the access is a key point in any access

control model.

 Simplicity: One of the main issues in defining a

policy language is the ability to enable

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expressiveness and flexibility with guaranteeing

easiness of use and applicability. An access

control language should be based on a high-

level formulation of the access control rules,

possibly close to natural language formulation.

 Expressibility: The language used to implement

the policy should be expressive so that it can suit

all the data owner's needs. To do so, many of

new language designs depend on perceptions

and methods from logic, specifically from logic

programming.

 Policy combination and conflict-resolution:

with the existence of multiple modules of

different authorities or different domains for the

specification of access control rules, the access

control system should provide a means for users

to specify how the different modules should

interact.

4.1 Privacy Policy Languages

Access policy languages provide many advantages in

several stages of implementing access control

policies. It is called privacy policy languages; these

languages are designed to express the privacy

controls that both organizations and users want to

express. Most of the privacy policy languages were

designed for specific purposes with specific features

and characteristics (Kumaraguru et al., 2007).

There are serval access control languages. This

section provides an overview of most common

languages.

4.1.1 XACML

XACML is an access control policy language that

provides two-way communication for the request and

response of an access request (Oasis, 2005). It is the

most popular policy language that can work with

different access control models. It comprises of a

group of standard XML components and specifies

standard extension points for individual rules, data

types and procedures. XACML is created by OASIS

standard, there are many implementations and

versions for XACML (Rissanen, 2010).

4.1.2 XACL

The XML Access control language (XACL) was

established by the IBM Tokyo Research Laboratory

in 2000 (Bauer et al., 2004). It based on XML and

used to provide access control policies that could be

enforced on the access to XML documents. XACL is

used primarily for specifying object-subject-

condition policies in which a subject can have an

identity, or a rule and Objects can address single

elements in an XML document. Actions can include

read, write, create and delete. The right to carry out

an action can be bound to provisions like auditing,

verification of a digital signature, encryption, XSL

transformations, or simple additional actions (Hada

and Michiharu Kudo, 2000).

4.1.3 APPEL

The Adaptable and Programmable Policy

Environment and Language (APPEL) has been

established in the ACCENT project at the University

of Stirling in 2013 (Turner et al., 2014). It originally

used as means of providing policies for automatic

telephone call control. Due to its extensibility and

domain-independency, it can be used in different

domains. APPEL provides a simple but expressive

syntax that is intended to be usable by unprofessional

users while providing means for experts to describe

of complex details of a system. A policy rule contains

triggers, conditions and actions. The specific names

used in the rule contents are defined according to the

domain of each use case (Bugiel et al., 2013).

4.1.4 P3P

The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) has been

developed as a W3C standard for the expression of

web user’s privacy preferences and data collection

policies of a service provider (W3C, 2006). A

preference or policy is used to specify the purpose of

collecting certain data items, who will receive the

data when will the collected data be reserved. Agents

could be used by users to automatically extract the

information of the data collection policies of a service

provider and match it against her preference. Based

on the outcome of a preferences/policy match, they

may proceed in using a service, and hence, share the

information mentioned in the policy. Or the user

decides not to use a service. P3P is used to help users

to understand and be mindful of the process of

collecting privacy-relevant data (Bugiel et al., 2013).

4.1.5 EPAL

The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language

(EPAL) has been developed by IBM to specify

enterprise privacy policies on collected data in an

enterprise (Ashley et al., 2003). It provides means of

administrating data handling practices in an

enterprises’ IT systems. It allows forming positive

and negative authorization rights. EPAL policies

specify hierarchical data classes of the collected data,

data user classes, data usage purposes, sets of

(privacy) actions on the collected data, obligations,

and conditions (Ashley et al., 2003).

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5 ACCESS POLICY LANGUAGE

FOR IoT

Like all new technologies, The IoT has many security

issues. Authentication and access control models are

the essential elements to address these security issues.

The main purpose of the access control is to reject

unauthorized users and limit operations of authorized

users using a certain device (Atlam et al., 2017c,

2013).

One of the major points in creating an efficient

access control model for the IoT is to build a flexible

and distributed access control policies. This can be

done by choosing the most appropriate policy

language to implement access control policies.

After providing the summary of most common

policy languages in the previous section, we believe

that XACML is the most appropriate policy language

to implement access control policies in the IoT

environment. This is because XACML has many

advantages over other access control policy

languages. Advantages of XACML are as follows:

 Standardized: XACML is a standard policy

language, that has been revised and reviewed by

many experts and users. In addition, XACML is

the most popular policy language and widely

deployed in many access control models,

therefore, it will be easier to interoperate with

other applications using the same standard

language.

 Generic: XACML policy can be deployed on

different platforms. One policy can be written to

be used by many different applications, and

when one common language is used, policy

management becomes much easier.

 Distributed: XACML policy can be written to

refers to other policies kept in remote locations.

therefore, different users or groups can manage

policies and XACML can properly integrate the

results from these different policies into one

decision.

 Powerful: XACML supports a wide diversity of

data types, functions, and rules about combining

the results of different policies. In addition,

there are already standards groups working on

extensions and profiles that will hook XACML

into other standards like SAML and LDAP,

which will increase the number of ways that

XACML can be used.

 Flexibility: XACML is based on ABAC model

which is a dynamic model which will be good

for the IoT which is characterized as a dynamic

system. XACML can adapt to different changes,

situations, and conditions in the IoT

environment.

Since we selected XACML to be the policy language

to build access control policies in IoT systems, the

next section will provide more details about XACML

components and how it works.

6 XACML

XACML is a popular standard for specifying access

control policies which determine the access decision

whether to permit or deny the access. XACML is

considered one of the most promising policy language

dealing with dynamic and complex systems. It is

broadly accepted by a vast of majority of experts,

communities and organizations since it is compatible

with most access control models such as ACL,

RBAC, and ABAC (Rissanen, 2010).

6.1 XACML Architecture

The basic components of XACML architecture are as

follows:

 Policy Administration Point (PAP): is an

interface for searching policies. It retrieves the

policies applicable to a given access request and

returns them to the PDP module (Oasis, 2005).

 Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): receives the

access request in a simple format and moves it

to the Context Handler. Likewise, when a

decision has been made by the decision point,

PEP applies the access decision that it receives

from the Context Handler (Liang Chen, Luca

Gasparini, 2013).

 Policy Decision Point (PDP): takes an access

request and interacts with the PAP that

encapsulates the information needed to identify

the applicable policies. It then evaluates the

request against the applicable policies and

returns the authorization decision to the Context

Handler (Oasis, 2005).

 Policy Information Point (PIP): provides

attribute values about the subject, resource, and

action. It interacts directly with the Context

Handler (OASIS, 2003).

 Context Handler: translates access requests into

a simple format. Basically, it acts as a bridge

between PDP and PEP and it is responsible for

retrieving attribute values needed for policy

evaluation (Gasparini, 2013).

 Environment: provides a set of attributes that

are relevant to make an authorization decision

XACML for Building Access Control Policies in Internet of Things

257

and are independent of a particular subject,

resource, and actions (Oasis, 2005).

Figure 3: XACML architecture.

As shown in Figure 3, the data follow diagram of

all 13 steps is as follows:

1. Policies used by PDP are established by PAP.

2. The access requester sends an access request

to PEP, which in turn passes it in its native

form to context handler together with

attributes when necessary, as shown in step

4. Context handler makes an XACML request

to PDP with required attributes.

5. PDP requests additional attributes to be

retrieved in the 5-10 steps from context

handler.

11. PDP evaluates the policies and then returns

the response context including the

authorization decision to context handler.

12. Context handler sends to the context

converted into the native response format for

PEP.

13. PEP conduct obligations and if the

authorization is granted, the access requester

will be permitted to access the resource,

otherwise, PEP will deny the access.

6.2 XACML Policy Structure

A policy has prevention and detection capabilities

which are used to make the access decision. The main

components of the policy are Rule, Policy, and Policy

set. Rules are the minimum components of a policy

which is consists of three elements: target, effect, and

condition (Westphall and Schmitt, 2016).

The target is a set of decision requests, which plays

an important role in narrowing down multiple policies

in place into only applicable ones through target

match with its inner components. The effect is the

intended result (permit or deny) to be provided when

a rule is satisfied. The condition is the function to be

performed when a rule target is applicable, leading to

a result of ‘True’ or ‘False’. The policy is a set of rules

grouped together using a rule-combing algorithm

with its selective combining parameters (Liang Chen,

Luca Gasparini, 2013; Oasis, 2005).

6.3 XACML Policy Evaluation

The XACML engine evaluates a given XACML

request against multiple policies independently. The

XACML engine is a software component in XACML

which require two inputs and return one output. The

two inputs are XACML policies and access request,

while the output is the access decision (Jayasekara,

2011), as shown in Figure 4.

According to (Jayasekara, 2011), the output of a

given access request is one of the following:

 Permit: Request is authorized to carry out

operation/actions on system resources.

 Deny: Request is not authorized to perform

operations requested.

 Not Applicable: XACML engine could not find

any applicable policies regarding the access

request and the requester.

Figure 4: Policy evaluation (Jayasekara, 2011).

6.4 XACML Target Evaluation

To provide more efficiency and ease of evaluation,

the target element in each policy plays an important

role in narrowing down multiple policies into only

applicable ones to a given XACML request

(Jayasekara, 2011).

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The XACML engine does not necessarily evaluate

all stored policies. It is done by comparing four sub-

elements attributes (subject, resource, action, and

environment) in the target element of a policy with

the corresponding attributes in an XACML request,

as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Target evaluation.

7 PROPOSED XACML MODEL

We proposed an Adaptive Risk-Based Access

Control (AdRBAC) model for the IoT (Atlam et al.,

2018, 2017c). The proposed AdRBAC model has four

inputs; user/agent context, resource sensitivity, action

severity and risk history. These inputs/risk factors are

used to estimate the security risk associated with each

access request. The estimated risk value is then

compared against the risk policies to make the access

decision (Atlam et al., 2018, 2017c).

Specifying the appropriate risk policy that will be

used with the proposed risk model was done using

XACML. We proposed XACML model to build

Access policies of the Proposed AdRBAC, as shown

in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Proposed XACML model for the proposed Risk-

based access control model.

The flow of the access decision process can be

tracked in Figure 6, that starts with the user (subject)

who sent an access request. This access request is

processed through the system and the risk value

regarding values of user context, resource sensitivity,

action severity, and risk history is estimated and the

access decision is made whether granting or denying

the access.

8 CONCLUSION

The proliferation of interconnected IoT devices and

applications brought various security and privacy

challenges. The access control is one of the main

element to address these issues. One of the key

elements of access control model is access control

policies. Building an efficient access control model

for the IoT require choosing the most appropriate

access policy language that can provide scalability

and flexibility for the IoT system. This paper has

presented a review of common privacy policy

languages to determine the most efficient language to

be used for the IoT. XACML, XACL, APPEL, P3P,

and EPAL policy languages have presented with

discussing main structure and components of

XACML. We conclude that XACML is the best

choice for the IoT as it compatible with different

platforms, provides a distributed and flexible

approach to work with different scenarios of IoT. In

addition, we have proposed an XACML model for an

Adaptive Risk-Based Access Control (AdRBAC) for the

IoT and have shown how the access decision will be made

using XACML

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We acknowledge Egyptian cultural affairs and

mission sector and Menoufia University for their

scholarship to Hany Atlam that allows the research to

be funded and undertaken.

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