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The feasibility of this approach was demonstrated
by specifying and formally analysing a variant of
the Internet security protocol TLS, which is a typ-
ical example from the domain of crypto-based sys-
tems. We analysed the protocol using both paper-and-
pencil proofs and the automated verification with Is-
abelle/HOL. The analysis revealed a security flaw in
the initial version of TLS specification. The proto-
col specification was harden according the proposed
approach.
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