of 15 minute s. Also, in order to cope with instabi-
lity, it is also possible to deal with by placing a trans-
mission network. In Eu rope, as a Cong estion Ma-
nagement, cooperation lines with neighboring coun-
tries exist, power trading is flexibly carried out, and
imbalance due to power gene ration with large fluc-
tuations like renewable energy is being handled(see
ETSO(2006) (3)). Although basic transmission po-
wer plan is decided the previous day, it responds to
the last cha nge through transaction.
Besides instability, there is a problem of how to secure
capacity. Renewab le energy is u nstable, but since
marginal costs are hardly applied, once fixed costs
are paid, it is possible to supply ele ctricity at a very
cheap price. As a result, it is co nceivable that electric
power having a high marginal cost in the electric po-
wer market, for example, fire power, is driven out of
the market.
Severa l mechanism are implemented in Capacity Pro-
blem. In normal microeconomics, entr y and exit from
the market through such price is essential to achieve
efficiency. However, electricity like thermal power
has advantages as a flexible power source tha t c an ea-
sily control the amou nt of power generation as neces-
sary. Renewable energy is unstable, so it is not always
possible to supply sufficient power. There is a possi-
bility that the electric power supply must always b e
consistent with the demand, so there is a possibility
that a system for preparing for a situation of power
tightness m a y be necessary(Joskow(2008) (4 ),Cram-
ton(2013) (5)).
It is difficult to achieve efficient allocation even if the
ordinary comp e titive market is applied as it is. There
are co ncerns abo ut how to secure electricity capacity
in Europe a n countries that are actually proceeding,
and how to deal with negative electricity prices due
to oversupp ly. On the other hand, focusing on sys-
tems far from the market against such problems. For
example, to solve the problem of pushing out thermal
power generation, policies such as separately prepa-
ring a standby power supply are taken. However, it is
undesirable for the government to intervene inadver-
tently in economics as it c auses inefficiency.
If we take advantage of the k nowledge of economic s
from now on, it will be necessary to take two view-
point of mechanism design and finance.
Mechanism Design is one of the most powerful tool
in economics. The goal is find ing the system or rule
which bring the efficient allocation.
For example, in auction theory, we can get the effi-
cient allocation by secon d-price or first price auction.
In these auction , bid ders have incentives to tell the
true value about the goo ds and the efficient allocation,
in which the m ost high est bidder win, is achieved by
these information.
For example, several capacity mechanisms such as
Strategic Reserve, Capac ity Payment, Capacity Obli-
gation, Reliability Option are implemented. In any
mechanism, the government or the capacity market
measure the vlaue of c apacity and determine the pay-
ment to the supplier of cap acity.
In eac h mechanism, increasing the capacity is incen-
tive compatible for the suppliers. In the libe ralization
of electricity, efficient allocation is achieved only if
consumers and suppliers’ inc entive are satisfied. In
the the ory of mechanism design, we can find th e effi-
cient allocation with th e incentive of players. Mecha-
nism design is a nece ssary theory basis in electr ic ity
market.
There is also a stro ng persistence of the idea that capa-
city should be secured through the electricity market
(Energy Only Market, EOM). For example, Texsus
state’s policy is based on EOM and th e reserve power
rate decrease in recent years.
For the instability problem, financial economics is
useful tool. In financial economics, we can treat in-
stability of asset re turn as a risk. Currently electri-
city is trimmed in approximately 1 hour o r 30 minutes
blocks. So, electriccities can be trad ed as time depen-
dent goods. We can denote the time t electricity as x
t
.
If renewable energies increase, x
t
varies. Let x
t j
be
the electricity at time t and state of enviroment j. j ex-
press the daylight hours, the rainfall, wind speed etc.
For covering the risk, we need more various trade. In
econom ic theory, efficient a llocation can be achieved
if we can trade every x
t j
(Arrow-Debreu Economy).
However, it’s impossible to create all state electricity
market. There are infinite envir onmental conditions
j.
Financial economics have many tool for treating x
t j
As for assets such as stocks, land, corporate bonds
and government bonds, the profit varies greatly. The
problems like how to cope with such fluctu ations or
how to reduce the risk or who is responsible for the
risk is the fundamental consciousness of finance.
Since electricity is not simp ly a tradable item, it is also
necessary to think in the field of mechanism design.
Mechanism design is a field that considers efficient
resource allocation methods that are not only in the
market, as represented by a uction theory. There are
still many field s in economics th at can be applied to
research on electricity markets and renewable energy,
such as fin ance a nd mech a nism d esign.
It is desirable for society to build a theory to compre -
hensively analyze not only theories as current com-
plementary tools but also the electric power market
and ren ewable energy itself right.