Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks on Masked Implementations of AES

Luk Bettale, Emmanuelle Dottax, Mailody Ramphort

2018

Abstract

Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks allow an attacker to exploit single trace leakages in an automated way. The literature mentions the fact that these attacks have the potential to defeat the masking countermeasure. Though, this context has not been explored a lot and the lack of experiments makes it difficult to evaluate the feasibility of these attacks in practice. We set-up a framework to perform such attacks and made new experiments on state-of-the-art masking schemes. We focused on the number of leakages required for an attack, and considered realistic leakage points. Our experiments and analyses allow to precisely estimate the minimal number of leakages required for a successful key recovery.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Bettale L., Dottax E. and Ramphort M. (2018). Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks on Masked Implementations of AES.In Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 1: SECRYPT, ISBN 978-989-758-319-3, pages 258-269. DOI: 10.5220/0006869502580269

in Bibtex Style

@conference{secrypt18,
author={Luk Bettale and Emmanuelle Dottax and Mailody Ramphort},
title={Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks on Masked Implementations of AES},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 1: SECRYPT,},
year={2018},
pages={258-269},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0006869502580269},
isbn={978-989-758-319-3},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 1: SECRYPT,
TI - Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks on Masked Implementations of AES
SN - 978-989-758-319-3
AU - Bettale L.
AU - Dottax E.
AU - Ramphort M.
PY - 2018
SP - 258
EP - 269
DO - 10.5220/0006869502580269