Effort Allocation in Taxation Task: An Effort Experiment
Alfa Rahmiati
Departemen Akuntansi, Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia
alfa@feb.unair.ac.id
Keywords: Effort Allocation, Task Performance, Taxation Experiment.
Abstract: As the AEC (Asean Economic Community) starts to be applied in the ASEAN region, there are changes in
the domestic and global tax landscape. Domestic tax issues suddenly become global and addressed by many
countries in the ASEAN. Particularly, Indonesia is challenged to be competitive and to improve the capacity
of its tax administrative officers and employees because, during the AEC era, the ASEAN market will be
looking for tax experts who are ready to work and apply their tax knowledge directly. We argue in this
paper that the method of effort allocation in doing taxation clerical tasks can influence one’s task
performance. We perform an experiment that focuses on two questions. First, does effort allocation
influence task performance in taxation? Second, how can we explain this influence? We conduct the
experiment on accounting students as a surrogate for tax experts. We report a result that shows there are no
significant differences between the subjectsperformance under both effort allocation methods to do some
taxation tasks. Overall, this result could contribute to many companies mainly for strategic or policy
formulation in doing taxation clerical tasks. Some suggestions about avenues for future research are also
presented.
1 INTRODUCTION
Globalization is not a new phenomenon. The
“boundaries” between countries began to disappear.
The business environment demands more disclosure
of information as trading volume increases and this
is largely performed by the taxpayer and
multinational agencies. There are changes in the
domestic and global tax landscape. Domestic tax
issues suddenly become global and are addressed by
many countries.
Moreover in the ASEAN community, by the end
of 2015, AEC starts to be applied. This means five
pillars, namely that the flow of goods, services,
capital, investment and skilled labor will be freely
moving around the ASEAN region. As a
consequence, this will influence the taxation aspect
among the ASEAN. Sulistyo (2014) states that
withholding tax and double taxation issues between
ASEAN countries should be considered carefully
because of certain reasons.
For the Indonesian government, particularly the
Directorate General of Tax and Fiscal Policy
Agency (the tax authoritiry in Indonesia), it is a
challenge to harmonize the rules and the expansion
of the avoidance of double taxation. AEC policy is
also of increasing attention to stakeholders, mainly
in managing their corporate taxation policy
appropriately according to state and international tax
stipulations. The objective is to avoid the risk of bad
reputation due to tax penalty. Governments also
reform their tax policies. Some countries in the
ASEAN community have started to have lower tax
rates and more tax incentives. This is a form of tax
competition, to improve the competitiveness of a
country.
Meanwhile, Indonesia is challenged to increase
its tax ratio. In order to do this, the capacity of tax
administration should be improved. In fact,
currently, tax experts who work in some government
institutions are people who do not always understand
accounting and tax law sufficiently. During the AEC
era, the ASEAN market will be looking for tax
experts who are ready to work and apply their tax
knowledge directly. As international taxation
regulations are dynamic, it will not be easy to obtain
such a tax expert because such experts are currently
scarce and there will even be a shortage in the labor
market. This means organizations must spend more
in having a tax expert in their human resources;
moreover, a tax expert (tax accountant) is one of
Rahmiati, A.
Effort Allocation in Taxation Task: An Effort Experiment.
In Proceedings of the Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium 2018 on Special Session for Indonesian Study (JCAE 2018) - Contemporary Accounting Studies in
Indonesia, pages 31-36
ISBN: 978-989-758-339-1
Copyright © 2018 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All r ights reserved
31
eight professions that will compete more during the
AEC era (Idris, 2016).
Evidence on tax performance from experimental
research is still limited and has been criticized for
low generalizability (Gangl et al., 2014). However,
the experimental method allows deeper analysis of
the causal relationship as the researcher could
control variables being researched and picture the
real process of taxation clerical tasks. This is one of
the reasons why this research is important.
Moreover, to our knowledge, taxation researches in
Indonesia using an experimental design are still very
rare.
The literature of the resource-based view (RBV)
theory was addressed to account for this
phenomenon. An organization was described as a set
of resources, including its human resources, such as
the tax experts. From the variety of activities and
services of these resources, an organization was able
to create uniqueness. A tax expert possesses specific
tax skills, including managerial and entrepreneurial
skills. Competition occurs due to differences in such
ownership and resource profiles that exist within
organizations. This profile will determine the
organizations ability to achieve competitive
advantage in running its business strategy (Brahma
& Chakraborty, 2011).
This paper considers the response to a subject
from an experiment designed to investigate the
performance under various effort allocation policies.
The subject consists of students who have taken a
taxation course. This course is aimed to provide
them with knowledge and competency in taxation
clerical work (i.e. calculating, paying and reporting
tax liable). This paper will report the result of the
subject in different experimental treatments. The
first setting investigates the effects on the corporate
effort allocation method in which the subject must
perform a taxation clerical task while the second
setting introduces the self-effort allocation method.
Section 2 presents theoretical considerations and
hypotheses about the effect of the effort allocation
method on taxation task performance. Section 3
introduces the design of the experiment, while the
results are explained in section 4. This paper ends
with some discussion and conclusions in section 5.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The Resource Based-View theory was developed by
Penrose in 1959. There are two basic assumptions in
this theory, namely: 1) the resources and capabilities
of an organization are distributed heterogeneously;
2) resources and capabilities cannot be mobilized
easily. The resources and capabilities basically will
be worth more to produce a competitive advantage.
Factors that can make a resource have high value are
their demand, scarcity and appropriability. These
factors are important but not sufficient for
organizations to gain a sustainable competitive
advantage. Therefore, from a strategic perspective,
RBV theory suggests that organizations should
identify the resources and capabilities that are
relevant to the exercise of the strategy by taking into
account various factors that cause a resource, and
organizational abilities have more value (Collis &
Montgomery, 2005).
Prior researches have reported that effort
allocation influences task performance. Ward (1992)
argues that the fitness of effort allocation will create
competitive advantages, thus helping an
organization to retain its competitive position, i.e.
the best performance. Bhargava et al. (2001)
evaluated the equity managers performance in the
international market. When the manager allocates
their effort using asset as the proxy, it increases their
performance. This means effort allocation can
positively influence performance.
On the other hand, Lee et al. (2015) explored
how individuals with high and low intelligence
allocate their cognitive resources when they are
presented with various task difficulties. The result
shows that the allocation strategy is influenced by
the type and difficulty of the task. In the case of
mathematical tasks (e.g. taxation calculation in this
research), it found that all level of intelligent
individuals had no significant differences in
allocating their effort compared to the case of a
visuo-spatial task.
Despite a large amount of research on the topic
of effort allocation, few empirical studies on effort
allocation have been conducted in the taxation field.
The effort allocation in taxation is a particularly
important topic of research, as mentioned earlier, as
the effort of tax experts has become more valuable.
We hypothesize that the self-effort allocation
method will improve a tax expert’s performance
better than will the corporate effort allocation
method, and the null hypothesis is that the
performance would be equal under both allocation
methods. The explanation is as follows. The effort
allocation method is one form of corporate strategy
implemented on an individual level in an
organization. Many studies have proven that strategy
will influence performance. The self-effort
allocation method is a strategy formulated by the tax
expert him or herself, while the corporate effort
JCAE Symposium 2018 Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium 2018 on Special Session for Indonesian Study
32
allocation method is formulated by a corporate
entity. If someone is involved in formulating a
strategy, he or she would have better understanding
and be more motivated to execute it, and thus have a
higher probability to achieve the objective, for
example, to make best job performance.
3 METHODOLOGY
To test the hypotheses, an experiment was set up in
2017. The advantages of an experiment design are
the possibility to create certain situations from
experiment procedures, observe and then make an
interpretation of the result (Nahartyo, 2012). The
experiment was conducted in the Faculty of
Economics & Business, and 40 subjects participated
in it.
Subjects were students as a surrogate for tax
clerks. They are undergraduate accounting students
(Strata 1, bachelor degree) who possess taxation
competency from the subject Taxations. According
to Chang et al. (2002), competency or knowledge
obtained from the academic environment will give
more influence to task performance. Thus, students
are also appropriate to be elected as the subjects in
this experiment.
We conducted a between subject experiment to
address the first question, which is to identify the
effect of different effort allocation methods on
individual performance in taxation tasks. Firstly, the
subject will be presented with three rounds of
taxation tasks. Some subjects were given specific
times to finish tasking. We call this treatment the
corporate allocation method. They should comply
with the timing policy as the proxy of effort
allocation. The other subjects can decide how much
time they will consume to do the taxation tasks. We
call this treatment the self-allocation method.
3.1 Material and Instrument
Each subject in the experiment is playing role as a
tax expert. Every tax expert is assigned to do three
rounds of taxation clerical tasks. These consist of
calculating tax liable, paying the amount of tax, and
tax reporting to tax authority. This setting
implements the fundamental elements of self-
assessment of most tax collection systems in
Indonesia. All tasks are given in paper-based case
material. A hypothetical company profile named PT
ABQ is presented. This company has three branches,
ABQ1, ABQ2, and ABQ3. Each branch has a certain
amount of monthly sales revenue.
An experiment instrument is prepared for each
subject, which provides some items to be chosen by
the subject as their responses to the case material.
The first task is calculating company tax liability.
Some tax calculating steps are provided in the
instrument. The subject must choose which step
should be taken in order to derive tax liable. The
second round is paying the tax. The subject must
choose to which place the tax will be paid. Finally,
the last task is reporting the tax to the chosen tax
authority.
3.2 Procedure and Treatment
The experiment was conducted in 2017. This
research analysis is based on data collected from
subjects during that period. These subjects were
invited to perform the experiment on a voluntary
basis. Forty subjects were invited to a classroom.
The experiment is begun by providing them with
some briefing instructions. These instructions
explained the treatment during the experiments.
The experiment procedures can be described as
follows. The subjects were brought into a classroom,
told that they are performing as tax experts in a
company, and they are assigned a tax clerical task.
Each subject was seated individually, and then a
booklet of material and instrument was provided.
The experimenter read the instructions before the
experiment was begun and subjects were given an
opportunity to ask questions to make sure they
understood the process. By the end of the
experiment, subjects had to fill in a paper form with
a pencil concerning their identity and opinion about
the experiment.
There are two treatments of effort allocation in
the experiment: 1) corporate method; and 2) self-
effort method. Under the corporate allocation
method, the task effort is determined by the
corporate entity, while the other method allows
subjects to do self-planning in their task effort. For
treatment of the corporate allocation method,
subjects were assigned to do some taxation tasks
under a certain time allocation to reflect their effort.
They must do the task by filling the answer in the
instrument provided. After they have completed the
task, the experimenter will measure their task
performances. For treatment of the self-allocation
method, firstly each subject is asked to allocate time
based on their judgments to complete the task, and
then after they have completed the task, the
Effort Allocation in Taxation Task: An Effort Experiment
33
experimenter will measure their task performances.
Each subject was asked to state which allocation
method they preferred. Then, they must do the task
according to each allocation method’s description.
4 EXPERIMENT RESULTS
Data are drawn from 40 subjects (students). To
verify that tax performance had been implemented
as expected, a manipulation check is conducted by
using a post-experiment interview. This method is
the best way to ask for a self-performance report
(Foschi, 2014). The result of the manipulation check
is that no participants should be excluded from the
data analysis because all participants know exactly
what tax performance and tax clerical task must be
done.
The data evaluation will be analyzed with a
conventional statistical method, as the number for
observation is only small. Since the hypothesis is to
compare between different subjects tax
performances, we use a t-test as the main statistical
analysis method. However, for robustness in the
result, we also perform ANOVA to reconfirm the
result of the t-test.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of tax performance.
Effort
Allocation
Corporate
Self
N
21
19
Mean
3.6667
3.3684
Std. Deviation
1.0165
1.2565
Std. Error
Mean
0.2218
0.2882
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of
40 subjects performance (total N = 40). The
allocation method column presents both conditions
in the experiment; means of each participant’s
performance, standard deviation and standard error
under both methods are also displayed in other
columns. Twenty-one subjects preferred to do the
task based on the corporate allocation method, while
19 subjects preferred the other method. As we can
see in table 1, subjects under the corporate allocation
method have a higher performance mean (3.667 >
3.368). It seems the strategy of using the self-
allocation method does not create positive
motivation for the subject to accomplish the task.
However, the means difference still must be tested
statistically to confirm the statistical significance of
the experiments conducted in 2017. This research
analysis is based on data collected from subjects
during that period. These subjects were invited to
perform the experiment on a voluntary basis. Forty
subjects were invited to a classroom. The
experiment is begun by providing them with some
briefing instructions. These instructions explained
the treatment during the experiments.
An independent samples test is performed to
compare both means. Data assumes equal variance
because the result of the Levene test for equality of
variance is not statistically significant (p = 0.158).
Therefore, we use the result of the t-test on equal
variance assumed. Table 2 reports the result of the t-
test. The value of p is greater than 0.05. This means
the effect is not significant at 5% level for tax
performance in all task rounds. As the result of the t-
test is not significant, we do not perform ANOVA.
Table 2: Result of t-test (Tax Performance).
Description
Value
T
0.829
Df
38
Sig. (2-tailed), p value
0.412
Mean difference
0.29825
Std. Error difference
0.35986
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Lower
-0.4303
Upper
1.02675
After the experiment, subjects had to fill in a
paper form in pencil concerning their identity and
opinion about the experiment. There are some
questions to gauge their opinion about the tax
JCAE Symposium 2018 Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium 2018 on Special Session for Indonesian Study
34
clerical task and distrust level of the tax authority in
handling tax revenue. Interestingly, subjects in both
allocation groups have different distrust levels (see
table 3). In the table, the mean of subjects in the
corporate allocation method is higher (2.5714 >
1.6842) and in table 4 we can see the mean
difference is statistically significant (p < 0.05).
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of Distrust Level.
Effort
Allocation
Corporate
Self
N
21
19
Mean
2.5714
1.6842
Std Deviation
1.32557
1.10818
Std. Error
Mean
0.28926
0.25423
Table 4: Result of t-test (Distrust Level).
Description
Value
T
2.283
Df
38
Sig. (2-tailed), p value
0.028
Mean difference
0.88722
Std. Error difference
0.38863
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Lower
0.10048
Upper
1.67395
Table 4 reports the result of t-test for Distrust
Level. The value of p is < 0.05. As the result of the
t-test being significant, we also perform ANOVA for
robustness. The ANOVA test result is presented in
Table 5.
Table 5: ANOVA (Distrust Level).
Description
Corrected
Model
Intercept
TIII Sum of Square
7.852
180.652
Df
1
1
Mean square
7.852
180.652
F
5.212
119.913
Sig.
0.028
0
5 DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this experiment was to test the
hypothesis that the corporate effort allocation
method will improve individual performance in
taxation tasks. In order to do so, this experiment
utilized an effort allocation manipulation to
demonstrate that the effort allocation method affects
the performance of tax experts. To our knowledge,
this is the first study to examine how effort
allocation influences people in doing their taxation
clerical tasks in Indonesia.
Based on preferences, some subjects in the
experiment were asked to obey the corporate timing
policy for completing all taxation tasks or were
given the authority to arrange the time taken
themselves. In this experiment, however, we cannot
find evidence that effort allocation method affects
taxation task performance. The effects we observed
were not consistent with Cheng and Yang (2013),
who found that the self-allocation method improved
the task performance.
Despite a policy implemented by a company,
apparently an effort allocation method does not
influence performance in taxation clerical tasks.
Hence, from the RBV point of view, it is not an
appropriate tool for achieving competitive advantage
(in taxation) because it has no abilities to create
more value or performance to an organization
(Collis & Montgomery, 2005). Therefore, this
experiment is not consistent with Ward (1992) and
Bhargava et al. (2001). As a tax expert is allowed by
the corporation to decide his own effort allocation,
Effort Allocation in Taxation Task: An Effort Experiment
35
he will consider that the company trusts him well to
do the task according to his way. However, taxation
is not just a matter of trust from the employer, but
also the level of trust to the tax authority.
Meanwhile, the step of taxation clerical task has
been regulated by the authority, so it cannot be
modified against the stipulation.
In conclusion, our experiment result suggests
that the effort allocation method could not provide
any effect on taxation task performance. This
experiment provides different evidence that tax
experts do not regard effort allocation as an
important method in doing their taxation tasks,
suggesting that their work effort cannot influence
their performance. According to the result of the
debriefing discussion stage with subjects, most of
them have the opinion that tax is a law, enforced by
the tax authority. It is a forced obligation, which
might bring tax sanctions or fines if one does not
comply. Therefore, people tend to comply with the
tax regulations, and would not make excuses to try
and bargain.
The effort allocation in taxation tasks is
apparently more associated with the level of trust in
the tax authority, mainly on how the tax authority
handles the tax revenue. In this experiment, subjects
who preferred to do taxation clerical tasks under the
corporate allocation method have more expectation
that the government will more effectively manage
the tax revenue.
A limitation of this study is that effort allocation
is regarded as the main factor that affects each
subject’s performance. Thus, the finding of this
experiment cannot fully reflect the real situation in
the taxation division of a company. It is possible that
a further experimental study will analyze the real
taxation situation more deeply by adding other
factors or treatments such as bookkeeping period
(near the end of a month, or beginning of a month),
resource heterogeneity, gender, tax knowledge, tax
training, aspect of tax authority, etc.
In order to strengthen the generalizability level
or external validity, this experiment can be
replicated or even extended to other subjects.
Findings on different opinions about tax from other
subjects in doing taxation clerical tasks would be a
potential and interesting topic for further analysis.
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