Opportunistic Behavior Budgeting In Regional Approach To Agency
Theory
Empirical Study On Regency / City In East Java
Soegeng Soetedjo, Iswajuni, and Dinanda Nur Fitri
Department of Accounting-Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia
Keywords: PAD, DAU, SiLPA, Opportunistic Behavior.
Abstract: The establishment of a Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD) process is a political process
that creates a relationship between the legislative and executive and legislative and public since the Regional
Autonomy Act No. 22 in 1999 was assigned. Those relationships are able to explain the budget framers’
opportunistic behavior to achieve their own group interests in certain sectors’ expenditure allocation. This
phenomenon becomes interesting to study from the perspective of agency theory. This study aimed to get
empirical evidence of the effect of PAD, DAU and SiLPA on the budget framers’ opportunistic behavior in
the district/city in East Java. The study was conducted in 38 districts/cities in East Java by using secondary
data from the budget of each district/city from 2011 to 2015. Based on a census sampling method, 186
samples of the data were obtained. Hypothesis testing is done by multiple linear regression using SPSS
software version 20.0. Research shows that the PAD, DAU and SiLPA have a significant positive effect on
the budget framers’ opportunistic behavior. The results of this study can be used as a recommendation for
local governments to improve the budget establishment process.
1 INTRODUCTION
There have been a number of corruption cases in
Indonesia, particularly in the government sector.
Corruption cases occur mostly in the local budgeting
process involving local funds. The phenomenon of
corruption of APBD funds has often occurred since
the enactment of the Law on Regional Autonomy
No. 22 of 1999, which creates an agency
relationship between the budgeting party, i.e the
executive, the legislature and the people.
Opportunistic behavior is a behavior that tends to
benefit certain parties. An expenditure budget is
allocated, obtained from local revenue sources. PAD
(local revenue), the DAU (General Allocation Fund)
and SiLPA (the remaining budget) are some of the
components of local revenue sources. Consequently,
PAD, DAU and SiLPA can become an access to
budget compiler to do opportunistic. Based on the
preliminary description, the problem can be
formulated as follows:
1. Does PAD affect the opportunistic behavior in
local budgeting in any Regency / City in East
Java?
2. Do DAU effect on opportunistic behavior in
local budgeting in any Regency / City in East
Java?
3. Does SiLPA have an effect on opportunistic
behavior in local budgeting in any Regency /
City in East Java?
The purpose of this study is to test empirically
and to answer questions to such problems.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Agency Theory
According to Scott (2003, p.305), through home
visits, agency is the development of a theory that
explains a design contract in which the agents work
or carry out a duty on behalf of the principal; when
the desire or purpose is contrary, there will be
conflicts.
84
Soetedjo, S., Iswajuni, . and Fitri, D.
Opportunistic Behavior Budgeting In Regional Approach To Agency Theory - Empirical Study On Regency / City In East Java.
In Proceedings of the Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium 2018 on Special Session for Indonesian Study (JCAE 2018) - Contemporary Accounting Studies in
Indonesia, pages 84-90
ISBN: 978-989-758-339-1
Copyright © 2018 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved

The government agency relationships in local
budgeting occur between the three parties, namely,
the executive, the legislative, and the people. With
the amendment of the Law on Regional Autonomy
of Law No. 32 of 2004, the regional head is no
longer elected by DPRD but directly by the people.
So the implication is the executive and legislative
act as agents and the people act as principal. Johnson
(1994, p.5) also mentions the executive or
bureaucratic relationship with the legislature or
congress with the name of self-interest models.
2.2 Opportunistic Behavior
Opportunistic behavior is an implication of the
agency relationship between the executive,
legislative, and the people, in which the agents can
take advantage of this information to carry out moral
hazards due to the asymmetry of information
between principal and agent (Latifah, 2010).
Opportunistic behavior that executives carry out is to
allocate existing resources for budgets that can
provide political advantages and advantages for
individuals, such as the infrastructure budget (Keefer
& Khemani, 2003), and capital (Arslan & Saglam,
2011), grants and social aid (Ritonga & Nature,
2010).
The infrastructure budget is considered to be the
right target for opportunistism because infrastructure
is the right sector to fulfill people’s promise. The
capital budget can be an appropriate target for
corruption because people tend not to know the
special items and high-tech aspects (Arslan &
Saglam, 2011; Haque & Kneller, 2008) and it is
difficult to be monitored (Mauro, 1998). Grants and
social assistance budgets can also be opportunistic
targets on the eve of general elections, as the funds
can be misused for campaign purposes (Ritonga &
Alam, 2010). While the budget for education and
health are likely to be reduced, education and health
is an important sector and fundamental to be met by
the executive and legislative (Ablo & Reinikka,
1998), so education and health cannot be targeted for
corruption (Mauro, 1998).
It can be concluded that the mode of
opportunistic behavior is often done as set
allocations modified to meet individual political
interests and the interests of both the executive and
legislative branches.
2.3 Hypothesis Development
2.3.1 The Effect of PAD on Opportunity
Budgeting
Increasing PAD is an increase in local resources that
the executive can allocate to allocations that support
its interests. Increased revenue may increase
Opportunistic Budget Compiler. Rochmatullah and
Probohudono (2014). Amran et al. (2015), Hendaris
and Rahayu (2012), Sholikhah and Wahyudin
(2014), Maimunah (2006), Sularso et al. (2014) and
Abdullah and Asmara (2006) showed that the larger
the PAD then the greater the opportunistic behavior.
However, Megasari (2015) did not find that PAD
has a positive effect on opportunistic budget
compilers. Based on the empirical study above, the
researcher formulated the research hypothesis as
follows:
H1: PAD has a positive effect on the
opportunistic behavior of budget compilers.
2.3.2 The Effect of DAU on Opportunity
Budgeting
Based on agency theory, the legislature and the
executive as an agent of the people can allocate
DAU for budget allocations for projects that are
profitable.
Hendaris and Rahayu (2012), Bungkes et al.
(2016), Maimunah (2006) and Sularso et al. (2014)
found that DAU has a positive effect on
opportunistic budget compilers. Based on the
empirical study above, the researcher formulated the
research hypothesis as follows:
H2: DAU has a positive effect on the
opportunistic behavior of budget compilers
.
2.3.3 SiLPA’s Influence on Opportunity
Budget Opportunities
Based on agency theory, the legislature and the
executive as an agent of the shelf at SiLPA can
reallocate funds to the budget allocation in financing
profitable projects.
Rochmatullah and Probohudono (2014), Amran
et al. (2015), Bungkes et al. (2016), Sularso et al.
(2014) and Megasari (2015) show that SiLPA has a
positive influence on the opportunistic behavior of
the budget. Based on the empirical study above, the
researcher formulated the research hypothesis as
follows:
H3: SiLPA has a positive effect on the
opportunistic behavior of budget compilers.
Opportunistic Behavior Budgeting In Regional Approach To Agency Theory - Empirical Study On Regency / City In East Java
85

3 RESEARCH METHODS
Based on existing problems, this research uses an
explanatory approach. The explanatory approach in
this study aims to get an explanation of the
relationship (causality) between variables through
hypothesis testing (Sugiyono, 2012, p.21).
3.1 Population and Sample
The population in this study is the districts and cities
of East Java, with details of 29 districts and nine
cities, from 2011 to 2015. Selection of the sample
was done using the census sampling technique.
Sensus sampling is all the population to be sampled
(Anshori & Iswati, 2009, p.106). Characteristics that
the researchers used in the selection of the
population are as follows:
1. Districts and cities that have published APBD
on the website of the Directorate General for the
Fiscal Years 2011-2015.
2. The published APBD contains the data used in
the full study during the period 2011-2015.
3.2 Source Type and Data Collection
The data collected is the data cross (cross section).
The data source used is secondary data with
documentation method, written documents of
regency/city government in East Java. Secondary
data that is needed in this research is APBD for each
regency/city in East Java from 2011-2015.
3.3 Operational definition
3.3.1 Opportunity Budget Opportunity
(OPA)
Opportunistic behavior, behavior-budgeting is done
by the compiler good budget Parliament as the
legislature and the executive as the local government
to be influenced by the strength and ability to
allocate resources in the budgets of expenditure in
order to achieve even a desire by all means nor the
illegal act.
Important issues in the allocation of resources
into public spending are the selection of goods or
services for programs that are difficult for others to
monitor (Mauro, 1998). For example, shopping for
specialty items and high-tech items (capital
expenditures) are examples of expenditure that is
corrupted because few people understand the goods.
That is, the tendency of executives to prefer the
capital expenditure is a realization of their self-
interest. Capital expenditure is likely to increase
(Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997).
Moreover, spending on grants and social
assistance at the time of legislative elections also
showed indications of opportunistic behavior
budgeting, evidenced by grants and social aid at the
time of elections in the region being greater than the
local incumbent non-incumbent (Ritonga & Nature,
2010).
Therefore, the OPA score indicates the change
(spread) of a certain budget allocation from the
previous year’s APBD to the current year’s APBD.
Spread occurs due to differences in preference in
resource allocation between principal and agents.
There are two stages of OPA measurement
developed from Abdullah and Asmara (2006),
namely:
1. Calculating spread education budget (ΔPdk),
spread the health budget (ΔKes), spread public
works budget (ΔPU), spread the budget grants
(ΔHibah), spread the social assistance budget
(ΔBansos) and spread the capital budget
(ΔModal). Spread (Δ) = the budget of the
current year (t) - the budget the previous year (t-
1).
2. Accumulate spread education budget (ΔPdk),
spread the health budget (ΔKes), spread public
works budget (ΔPU), spread the budget grants
(ΔHibah) and spread the social assistance
budget (ΔBansos) and spread the capital budget
(ΔModal) . Calculation of OPA = ΔPdk + ΔKes
+ ΔPU + ΔHibah + ΔBansos + ΔModal
Information:
ΔPdk : decreased education budget
Δkes : decreased health budget
ΔPU : increased public works budget (infrastructure)
ΔGrants : increased budget for grants
Δ
Bansos : increased spending on social assistance
ΔCapital : increased budget for capital expenditure
If the education and health budget does not go
down, or the public works budget, grants, social
assistance and capital do not go up, then there is a
score of 0 (zero). The score for OPA is a positive
number.
3.3.2 Local Original Revenue (PAD)
PAD is revenues consisting of the results of regional
taxes, levies, income from profitable local
companies, and others. How to measure these is by
using a spread PAD (ΔPAD), the change in increase
or decrease in revenue from the budget of the current
JCAE Symposium 2018 – Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium 2018 on Special Session for Indonesian Study
86

year (t) to the budget the previous year (t-1)
(Abdullah & Asmara, 2006; Sularso et al., 2014).
PAD = ΔPAD
= PAD
Budgets (t)
- PAD
Budgets (t-1)
3.3.3 General Allocation Fund (DAU)
General Allocation Funds (DAU) are funds derived
from APBN, allocated for the purpose of equitable
inter-regional financial capacity to finance their
expenditure needs in the context of decentralization.
The total amount of DAU is set to at least 26% of
the Net Domestic Revenue (NOP) set forth in the
APBN. DAU is measured by the DAU (ΔDAU)
spread from the APBD of the current year (t) to the
previous year’s budget (t-1) (Sularso et al., 2014).
DAU = Δ DAU
= DAU
Budgets (t)
- DAU
Budgets (t-1)
3.3.4 Over Time Budget Calculation
(SiLPA)
According to Permendagri No. 13 of 2006, SiLPA
includes exceedances of reception PAD, exceedance
of acceptance of balancing funds, exceedance of
acceptance of other valid regional revenues,
exceedance of financing receipts, expenditure
savings, liabilities to third parties with end of year
resolved and the rest fund kegiata n Advanced,
which is borne out in the budget change. SiLPA is
measured by the spread SiLPA (ΔSiLPA) from the
budget of the current year (t) to the budget of the
previous year (t-1) (Sularso et al., 2014).
SiLPA = Δ SiLPA
= SiLPA
Budgets
(t) - SiLPA
Budgets
(t-1)
4 RESULTS
The analysis technique used in this research is
multiple linear regression analysis considering that
this tool can be used as a model for the prediction of
the dependent variable opportunistic behavior
budgeting (OPA) with several independent variables
are: PAD, DAU, and SiLPA. The hypothesis test is
done by using SPSS 20.0 program. Regression
models were used to test the hypothesis to be
formulated as follows:
Β1X1 Y = α + + + + β2X2 β3X3 + e (1)
Information:
Y : Opportunity Budgeting Practices (OPA)
a : Constants
β1 .... βn : Regression direction coefficient
X 1 : PAD
X 2 : DAU
X 3 : SiLPA
e : Residual Error
4.1 Data Analysis and Discussion
Table 1: Results of Multiple Linear Regression
Model.
Variables B Sig
PAD .863 0.000
DAU .521 0.000
SiLPA .533 0.000
Based on the results contained in the table above,
it can be composed of a multiple linear regression
equation as follows.
OPA = 37918.044 + 0.863PAD DAU + 0533 + 0521
+ ε SiLPA
Table 2: Coefficient Determination Test Results.
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square
1 .640
a
.410 .400
Results in the table above show the value of
Adjusted R Square of 0.400 (40%). This suggests
that the independent variables used in this study can
predict an opportunistic composer budget by 40%,
while the remaining 60% is predicted by other
variables that are not used in this study.
Table 3: The Effect of PAD on OPA.
Variables
Regression
coefficient
Sig Conclusion
PAD 0.863 0.000
Positive
Significant
Influence
Based on analysis, this study found the
significant value that is equal to 0.0 00 <α = 0,05dan
β value of 0, 863. This shows that the hypothesis
(H1) is accepted and concluded that changes PAD
positive significant effect against opportunistic
behavior budgeting. These results are consistent
Opportunistic Behavior Budgeting In Regional Approach To Agency Theory - Empirical Study On Regency / City In East Java
87

empirically with Rochmatullah and Probohudono
(2014), Amran et al. (2015), Hendaris and Rahayu
(2012), Sholikhah and Wahyudin (2014), Maimunah
(2006), Sularso et al. (2014) and Abdullah and
Asmara (2006) in finding that change income own
positive effect on opportunistic behavior.
In line with the definition of PAD, which is a
regional resource, the increase of existing resources
will increase the opportunistic behavior of budget
compilers. PAD is able to give way for making up
the budget for political corruption in the legal
regulatory framework.
The results of the research indicate that the
increase in PAD from the previous year for the
following year is significant, particularly vulnerable
to use by certain parties to fund programs that can
provide personal benefits, especially for political
purposes, such as keeping promises during the
campaign to be re-elected in the next period.
Table 4: The Effect of DAU on OPA.
Variables
Regression
coefficient
Sig Conclusion
DAU 0.521 0.000
Positive
Significant
Influence
Based on analysis of statistics, this study found
that the significant value that is equal to 0.0 00 <α =
0.05 and the β value of 0.521. This shows that the
hypothesis (H 2) is received and concluded that the
General Allocation Fund perubaha has a positive
significant effect against opportunistic behavior
budgeting. The test results are in line with results
found in the studies by Hendaris and Rahayu (2012),
Bungkes et al. (2016), Maimunah (2006) and
Sularso et al. (2014), who found that the DAU had a
positive effect on the opportunistic budget
constituents.
DAU is a fund sourced from APBN allocated to
regions with the aim of equitable financial capacity
among regions to fund regional needs for
decentralization. DAU has the largest proportion in
the reception area, which is at least 26% of the net
domestic revenue in the state budget. DAU that has
properties Block Grant that grants its use is quite
flexible, in the sense that there are not many binding
rules on the use of funding. In line with the DAU,
which has the largest share of regional revenues and
the flexible nature of the DAU, the DAU is able to
become an object for budget constraints to behave
opportunistically. Such opportunistic behavior is
executed by executives by allocating it to
expenditures that can benefit them.
To realize the importance, the executive must be
approved by the legislature as a fellow agent in a
partnership to approve or reject the proposed
policies of the executive. So legislat ifpun also as an
agent of the people who have the advantage of
information also have different interests than the
increase in the DAU that can be used to propose
allocations on activities or projects that legislati
advantageous.While the people as the principal
expect that DAU is sourced from central to local
financial rate purpose can be allocated on shopping
and programs that can improve people’s welfare.
The results of the study show that the increase of
DAU from the previous year to the next year tends
to be significant; it will impact the more liberal
budgeting parties to utilize DAU as one source of
funding to finance programs in accordance with their
interests and can provide long-term benefits.
Table 5: The Effect of
SiLPA on OPA.
Variables
Regression
coefficient
Sig Conclusion
SiLPA 0.533 0.000
Positive
Significant
Influence
Based on analysis of statistics, this study found
that the significant value that is equal to 0.0 00 <α =
0.05 and the β value of 0.533. This shows that the
hypothesis (H 3) is received and concluded that
changes the remaining budget positive significant
effect against opportunistic behavior budgeting. The
test results are in line with results found in the
studies by Rochmatullah and Probohudono (2014),
Amran et al. (2015), Arslan and Saglam (2011),
Haque and Kneller (2008), Keefer and Khemani
(2003), Bungkes et al. (2016), Sularso et al. (2014)
and Megasari (2015) indicating that SiLPA has a
positive influence on the opportunistic behavior of
the budget.
In line with the understanding of SiLPA, then
SiLPA properties of free cash flow, the free cash
remaining after being used to finance operating
activities. SiLPA is able to create opportunism in
budgeting by reallocating expenditures that support
the interests of budget constituents, such as
infrastructure spending, capital expenditures, grant
spending and Bansos spending. Therefore, from the
results of the research, it can be said that the greater
the SiLPA allocated to APBD districts/cities next
JCAE Symposium 2018 – Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium 2018 on Special Session for Indonesian Study
88

year, the greater the opportunity of the budgeting
parties to use it on programs that can provide
benefits both political and to individuals, which
indicates an opportunistic behavior in the
preparation of the previous year’s budget that will be
used by certain parties to reallocate to the program
in accordance with its preference. It is necessary to
have a policy to improve the quality of budgeting in
order to output the resulting budget in accordance
with what has been budgeted.
5 CONCLUSIONS
1. The results of testing and analysis show that
Pendapatan Asli Daerah (PAD) has a positive
effect on Opportunity Budget Opportunity
(OPA). These results indicate that the increase
in revenue from the previous year to the current
year will increase opportunistic behavior
budgeting.
2. Test results and analysis show that the General
Allocation Fund (DAU) has a positive effect on
Opportunity Budgeting (OPA). These results
indicate that increased DAU from the previous
year to the current year will increase
opportunistic behavior budgeting.
3. Test results and analysis show that the Over
Time Budget Calculation (SiLPA) has a positive
effect on Opportunity Budget Opportunity
(OPA). These results indicate that increased
SiLPA from the previous year to the current
year will increase opportunistic behavior
budgeting.
The suggestion for Local Governments is local
governments should further improve the quality of
the budgetary planning phase to implementation
with emphasis on budget allocations in accordance
with the needs of society and should further enhance
budget transparency and impose controls from
planning to implementation of the budget as a form
of accountability to the public.
REFERENCES
Abdullah, S. and Asmara, J. (2006). Opportunistic
Behavior In Legislative Budgeting: Empirical
Evidence on Agency Theory Applications in the
Public Sector. Journal of Accounting National
Symposium 9. Padang.
Abdullah, S. (2012). Legislative Oportunistic Behavior
and Its Affecting Factors: Empirical Evidence from
Local Government Budgeting in Indonesia.
Dissertation summary. Yogyakarta: Universitas Gajah
Mada.
Ablo, E. and Ritva, R. (1998). Do budget really matter?
Evidence from public spending on education and
health care in Uganda. World Bank Policy Research
Paper 1926.
Anshori, M. and Sri, I. (2009). Quantitative Research
Methodology. Surabaya: Airlangga University Press
(AUP).
Amran et al. (2015). Effects of Changes in Regional
Income, Changes in Funds for Hasildan Change the
remaining budget on Changes BantuanSosial
Shopping. Journals Master of Accounting Graduate
University of Syiah Kuala. Vol. 4, No. 1, February
2015.
Arslan and Saglam. (2011). The Relationship Between
Corruption and Public Investment: The Case of
Turkey. Ç.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, CILT
20, sayi 2, 2011, Sayfa 365-378.
Asmara, J. (2010). Analysis of Changes in Expenditure
Allocation in Regional Income and Expenditure
Budget (APBA) of Naggroe Aceh Darussalam
Province. Assessing & Accounting Research
Journal.Vol. 3, No. 2. July 2010 Page. 155-172.
Bastian, I. (2003). Public Sector Accounting System:
Concepts for Local Governments. Jakarta: Salemba
Four.
Bungkes et al. (2016). Effect of Balancing Funds, Own
Income and Proceeds of Financing to Capital
Expenditures. Journals Master of Accounting
Graduate University of Syiah Kuala. Vol. 5, No. 3,
August 2016.
Christensen, J. (1992). Hierarchical and contractual
approaches to budgetary reform. Journal of
Theoretical Politics 4 (1): 67-91.
Depdikbud. (1996). Indonesian dictionary. Jakarta: Balai
Pustaka.
Directorate General of Fiscal Balance. (2016). After FY
2006. http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/?page_id=316
(accessed on 15 November 2016).
Garamfalvi, L. (1997). Corruption in The Public
Expenditure Management Process. Paperpresentedat8
th InternationalAnti-Corruption Conference, Peru7 -1
September 1st.
Ghozali, I. (2006). Aplikasi Multivarite Analysis with
SPSS. The fourth printing. Semarang: Diponegoro
University Publishing Agency.
Halim, A. and Abdullah, S. (2006). Relationship and
Agency Problems in Local Government: A Budget
Research and Accounting Opportunity. Journal of
Government Accounting 2 (1): 53-64.
Halim, A. (2007). Regional Financial Accounting. Third
Edition Book. Jakarta: Salemba.
Haque, M. and Kneller, R. (2008). Public Investment and
Growth: The Role of Corruption. Center for Growth
and Business Cycle Research. Number 098, February
2008.
Hendaris et al. (2012). Effect of Local Taxes, Levies of
Regional, General Allocation Fund and Special
Allocation Fund Allocation Of Capital Expenditure.
Opportunistic Behavior Budgeting In Regional Approach To Agency Theory - Empirical Study On Regency / City In East Java
89

Journal of the Faculty of Economics Unjani
Repository. Vol 9, No. 2. November 2012.
Hendriksen, S. and Michael, F. (2002). Accounting
Theory. (Translated by: Wibowo, Herman) Batam:
Interaksara.
Johnson, C. (1994). The Dynamics of Conflict between
Bureaucrats and Legislators. Armonk, New York: ME
Sharpe.
Keefer, P. & Stuti, K. (2003). The political economy of
public expenditures. Background paper for the WDR
2004: Making Services Work for Poor People. The
World Bank.
Latifah, N. (2010). Is there Opportunistic Behavior in the
Application Agency Theory in the Public Sector?.
Economic Focus. Vol. 5 No. December 2nd, 2010: 85-
94.
Maimunah, P. (2006). Flypaper effect on the General
Allocation Fund and Local Revenue Expenditure
Against District / City in Sumatra. Journal of
Accounting National Symposium 9. Padang 23-26
August.
Mauro, P. (1998). Corruption andthecomposition
ofgovernment expenditure. Journal of Public
Economics 69: 263-279.
Mardiasmo. (2009). Public Sector Accounting.
Yogyakarta: Andi
Mardiasmo. (2011). Taxation. Revised Edition.
Yogyakarta: Andi.
Megasari, I. (2015). Influence of Regional Income,
Difference Calculation Budget, flypaper against
Opportunistic Behavior Composer Budget. Journal of
Economic Studies Bulletin. Vol. 20, No. 2, August
2015.
Republic of Indonesia. (1999). Law of the Republic of
Indonesia No. 22 of 1999 on Regional Autonomy.
Republic of Indonesia. (1999). Law of the Republic of
Indonesia No. 25 of 1999 on Financial Balance
between Central Government and Local Government.
Republic of Indonesia. (2000). Government Regulation
No. 200 0 .105 year on Regional Financial
Management and Accountability.
Republic of Indonesia. (2000). Government Regulation
No. 200 0 .110 years on the Financial Position of the
Regional Representatives Council.
Republic of Indonesia. (2002). Decree of the Minister of
Home Affairs. 29 2002 T Entang Guidelines for
Management, Accountability and Local Financial
Supervision well as the procedures for making the
Regional Budget, Implementation of Regional Finance
and Administration Budget Calculations Preparation
of Revenue and Expenditure.
Republic of Indonesia. (2003). The Republic of Indonesia
Act 17 of 2003 on State Finance.
Republic of Indonesia. (2004). Law of the Republic of
Indonesia No.32 of 2004 on Regional Government.
Republic of Indonesia. (2004). Law of the Republic of
Indonesia No. 33 of 2004 on Fiscal Balance between
Central Government and Local Government
Republic of Indonesia. (2005). Government Regulation
No. 5 5 2005 regarding Revenue Sharing.
Republic of Indonesia. (2005). Government Regulation
No. 58 of 2005 on Regional PengelolaanKeuangan.
Republic of Indonesia. (2006). Regulation of the Minister
of the Interior No. 13 Years 200 6 tentangPedoman
Financial Management.
Republic of Indonesia. (2009). The Republic of Indonesia
Act 28 of 2009 on Regional Taxes and Levies.
Republic of Indonesia. (2010). Government Regulation
No. 20 10 .71 years of Government Accounting
Standards.
Ritonga et al. (2010). Is the harness Incumbent Local
Budget to run back in the Regional Head General
Election. National Symposium Journal of Accounting
13.Purwokerto.
Rochmatullah, M. and Probohudono, A. (2014). Local
Government Social Assistance Shopping Practices in
Indonesia. National Symposium Journal of
Accounting 17. Mataram.
Sari, M. (2016). Kadin’s Grant Case, La Nyalla Sued Six
Year Prison. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/
(accessed on 10 September 2016).
Scott, William R. 2003. Financial Accounting Theory.
New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc.
Scott, R. (2009). Financial Accounting Theory. Fifth
Edition. Canada Prentice Hall.
Sugiyono. (2012). Qualitative and Quantitative Research
Methods R & B. Bandung: Alfabeta.
Shah, A. (1994). The Reform of Fiscal Relations in
Developing and Emerging Market economics, Policy
and Research Series 23. The World Bank.Washinton
DC.
Sholikhah et al. (2014). Analysis of Capital Expenditure at
Regency / City Government in Java. Accounting
Analysis Journal. Vol. 3, No. 4.
Smith, R. and Bertozzi, M. (1998). Principals and agents:
An explanatory model of public budgeting. Journal of
Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial
Management: 325-353.
Sujarweni, V. (2015). Public Sector Accounting.
Yogyakarta: New Library Press.
Sularso, et al. (2014). Determinant of Opportunistic
Preparation of Budgeting (Study at Regency / City in
Central Java). National Symposium Journal of
Accounting 17. Mataram.
Tanzi, V. and Davoodi, H. (1997). Corruption, public
investment, and growth. International Monetary Fund
Working Paper.
Winoto, et al. (2015). It Discretinoary Fund In Budget
2015 Regional Election Ahead Journal of Accounting
and Finance Indonesia. Vol. 12, No. 1, June 2015.
JCAE Symposium 2018 – Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium 2018 on Special Session for Indonesian Study
90