1.1 Agency Theory
In agency theory, the parties involved are the
management of a company, acting as agents, and the
investors, acting as principals. The agent and the
principals have different interests, and the principal
relies on the agent to protect those interests (Godfrey
et al., 2010). Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that
the separation between the owners and managers of
a company may cause agency problems or conflicts.
Because the agent and the principal have different
interests, the principal have to spend on the costs of
agency, including: (1) the monitoring expenses
incurred by the principal to supervise the behavior of
agents, (2) the bonding expenses incurred by the
agent to ensure that the agent will not act in a way
that harms the principals interests, and (3) the
residual loss in the form of decreased levels of well-
being, for both parties.
1.2 Tax Planning and Firm Value
According to Pohan (2013) tax planning is the
process of organizing personal and corporate
taxpayer businesses by utilizing loopholes that can
be taken by companies in the corridor of the
provisions of taxation regulations. Thus, the
company can pay taxes in the minimum amount.
According to Zemzem and Ftouhi (2016), Oyeyemi
and Babatunde (2016), Zemzem and Ftouhi (2013),
Fajrin et al., (2018) stated that tax planning
negatively affect firm value. This shows that the
smaller the payment of corporate taxes the higher
the value of the firm. If a company is able to reduce
tax payments it will make the profits generated by
the company greater so investors will be interested
in buying company shares.
Based on the explanation
above, the hypothesis built is:
H
1
: Tax planning negatively affects firm value
1.3 Institutional Ownership and Firm
Value
Institutional ownership is the ownership of company
shares by institutions (pension funds, investment
companies, banks and others). According to Parrino
et al., (2003), Ferreira and Matos (2008), Alfaraih et
al., (2012), Fazlzadeh et al., (2011) and Uwuigbe
dan Olusanmi (2012), institutional ownership
positively affects firm value. The greater the
institutional ownership, the higher the value of the
company will be. According to Chung et al., (2002),
institutional ownership has an important role in
monitoring management so as not to take
opportunistic actions for personal interests so the
value of the company will increase. Based on the
explanation above, the hypothesis built is:
H
2:
Institutional ownership positively affects firm
value
1.4 Board of Director and Firm Value
In this study the board of directors is a supervisor in
the company or also called the board of
commissioners, where the board of commissioners is
an organ in corporate governance that oversees
management in managing the company. According
to Andres and Vallelado (2008), the board of
directors has a positive effect on firm value. This
shows that the more the number of board of directors
in the company the higher the value of the company
because it will improve supervision, governance,
and increase returns (Andres and Vallelado 2008).
Based on the explanation above, the hypothesis built
is:
H
3:
Board of director positively affects firm value
1.5 Independent Board and Firm Value
The independent board is a member of the Board of
Commissioners who has no relationship with the
company. According to Trisnantari (2010) and
Amyulianthy (2012), the independent board has a
positive effect on firm value. This shows that the
greater the number of independent boards, the higher
the value of the company, because the independent
board is able to carry out the monitoring function to
oversee the policies and activities carried out by the
directors. The existence of an independent board in
the company can provide an effective contribution in
the process of preparing more high quality financial
statements (Muryati and Suardika 2014). Based on
the explanation above, the hypothesis built is:
H
4:
Independent board positively affects firm value
1.6 Corporate Governance Moderates
the Relationship between Tax
Planning and Firm Value
In this study, we also wanted to test whether
corporate governance moderates the influence of tax
planning with firm value. Based on the results of
Zemzem and Ftouhi (2013), Nike et al., (2014),
Wahab and Holland (2012) and Winanto and Utoyo
(2013), corporate governance is able to strengthen
the negative influence of tax planning on firm value.
This is because companies that have good