The Failure of International Community to Implement Responsibility

to Protect in Darfur

Ahmad Alfajri

Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia

Keywords: Responsibility, intervention, sovereignty, national interests, motivational deficiency, prevention

Abstract: This article wants to explore the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)as a binding

international norm in Darfur, Sudan. The R2P commands every state to protect its citizen from any violation

of human right, and if the state is unable or unwilling to do so, then the international community should take

action of intervention. Darfur is a test case of whether states have adopted the norm or state’s interest is still

privileged over the norm. This article argues that R2P has not been adopted in Darfur due to the failure of

the international community to prevent conflict while there was a great opportunity to prevent the conflict to

escalate. Prevention is the core tenet of the R2P. In addition, national interests are great obstacles to enforce

the norm in practice.

1 INTRODUCTION

The International Commission on Intervention and

State Sovereign (ICISS) promoted a new norm

called the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P). Before

the norm emerged, humanitarian intervention and

sovereignty were seen as two contradictory

concepts. Nevertheless, the R2P has located those

two as complementary to each other. It asserts

sovereignty should be understood as a responsibility

to protect, not as the right to control, and if a state

fails to perform the responsibility, either due to

state's weakness or motivational deficiency, the

international community has moral obligation to

intervene (Evans & Sahnoun, The Responsibility to

Protect, 2002).

The UN General Assembly Summit had

endorsed the norm in 2005; therefore it has officially

become a new binding norm in international

relations. This implies, if the humanitarian crisis

emerges, the international community will intervene

if the local government were unable or unwilling to

solve the issue. This article intends to assess the

implementation of R2P in practice. The

humanitarian crisis in Darfur will be the test case.

This article argues that the "responsibility to protect"

has not been yet implemented as how it should be in

practice. Preventing is the most important step in the

norm, but in fact, the international community was

reluctant to intervene and ignored the early warning

of the crisis which eventually allows the crisis to

escalate. The R2P has become a norm in

international relation and should be implemented

indiscriminately, but in fact, national interest is still

the main concern of every country (particularly

permanent Security Council states).

This article will be divided into four sections.

The first section will discuss the R2P concept. This

writing will not focus on the debate of whether the

responsibility to protect is legitimate or not, but

rather to describe the contents of the concept as well

as the timing and the way it should be implemented.

The second section will highlight the Darfur case

which includes its history and why this case should

obtain international responses. The third section will

discuss the failure of the R2P's application in Darfur.

The last section will explore some options to enforce

the application of the R2P in the future.

2 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT

The birth of the R2P concept is closely related to the

historical events of the 1990s. During these years,

many humanitarian tragedies happened and claimed

casualties in large numbers. In 1994 for example, the

Rwandan army and Hutu militias conducted massive

1558

Alfajri, A.

The Failure of International Community to Implement Responsibility to Protect in Darfur.

DOI: 10.5220/0009931815581565

In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Recent Innovations (ICRI 2018), pages 1558-1565

ISBN: 978-989-758-458-9

killing on Tutsi and Hutu people who reach one

million casualties(Bellamy, The Responsibility to

Protect, 2008). In 1999, the Yugoslav government

was doing ethnic cleansing against Kosovo's

Albanian population (Bellamy, The Responsibility

to protect and the problem of military intervention,

2008). Responses to those cases are diverse; some of

those responses got permission from the UN

Security Council, and some did not. There has been

no consensus on how the humanitarian intervention

should be carried out because there is still a problem

in positioning intervention for human rights in the

context of respecting sovereignty.

According to the Westphalia agreement in 1648,

it is clear that every country has rights to organize

and run the government in whatever way deemed fit

by the state and another countries do not have right

to intervene (ICISS, 2011). The UN Charter Article

2 (7) also states that the United Nations prohibits

countries to interfere in the domestic affairs of other

countries. Non-intervention norm has become the

foundation of international order for years. Weak

states also believed that the non-intervention norm is

one of their main defenses against threats and

pressures from more powerful international actors

that seek to promote their own economic and

political interests (Weiss, 2004). Therefore,

sovereignty and intervention are then seen as

contradictory concepts. This condition has created a

problem.

On the one hand, there is an intention to save

individuals from genocide, ethnic cleansing and

other massive violence, while on the other hand

there is no consensus on how to solve the

sovereignty issue. Therefore, responses to those

humanitarian cases seem inconsistence. Sometimes

an intervention allowed by the UN, as taken place in

Rwanda, and sometimes it has no permission from

the UN such as NATO's bomb attack on Yugoslavia

(Bellamy, The Responsibility to protect and the

problem of military intervention, 2008).

Responsibility to Protect presents to solve that

problem. The R2P reframes the debate away from

one setting humanitarian intervention against

sovereignty. This concept positions intervention and

sovereignty as complementary, not contradictory.

This is through re-interpreting the meaning of

sovereignty. Before the concept emerged,

sovereignty mainly understood as the right to

control, but R2P defines sovereignty as the

obligation to protect (International Commission on

Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). The state

has a responsibility to protect its citizen, and this

responsibility is paramount. As Francis Deng said,

sovereignty required demonstration of responsibility

(Deng et.all, 1996). That represents the first main

tenet of the R2P.

However, not all countries are able or willing to

implement the obligation. In many cases, the state

itself has committed violence to its citizens. As

argued by Barry Buzan that state can also become

the source of threat for human security (Buzan,

1991). Data has proved, 262 million people died

because of crimes committed by states. That figure

is six times greater than the number of people killed

in the battle by the foreign government during the

same period (Bellamy, The Responsibility to protect

and the problem of military intervention, 2008). In

that condition, the international community has to

protect those citizens. That is the second tenet of the

R2P.

In 2005, the R2P concept was endorsed by the

UN General Assembly Summit, implying that the

R2P had officially become a new norm in

international politics. However, it is important to

note that responsibility to protect differs from

"humanitarian intervention." The R2P is broader and

more binding than humanitarian intervention.

Broader in a sense it does not only include reaction

but also incorporate prevention and rebuilding, while

humanitarian intervention only focuses on reaction

(International Commission on Intervention and State

Sovereignty, 2001).

Moreover, the R2P is an obligation, not just a

right to intervene. It implies, when humanitarian

tragedy takes place, the international community has

to involve if the set-criteria have been fulfilled.

Furthermore, the R2P addresses the intervention

from the perspective of the needs of those who seek

rather than from the interests and perspectives of

those who carry out such action.

It is also important to emphasize that the R2P is

theoretically more about prevention rather than

reaction and rebuilding. As argued by Gareth Evans,

responsibility to protect is mainly about prevention

(Evans G. , From Humanitarian Intervention to the

Responsibility to Protect, 2006). Prevention includes

responding to early warning and tackling the root

causes. Prevention is more important because

referring back to Rwanda and other humanitarian

issues before R2P emerges; those cases became

worse because the international community failed to

respond earlier.

Some people might worry about abusement of

this concept. Therefore standards and rules have

been set out. It can only be conducted under the

Security Council mandate. Moreover, it should meet

certain thresholds. The UN set four standards

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namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and

crimes against humanity (Grono, 2006).

Again, the R2P is a breakthrough in international

politics; it mitigates the debate between intervention

and sovereignty. Moreover, the R2P can be seen as

lifeline facilitator for the growing concern of human

security issue as stressed by Kofi Annan in the UN

Summit 2005. However, how to turn it into practice?

Has it been applied properly? This will be assessed

by using the experience of the R2P in Darfur, Sudan.

3 DARFUN CASE

Since 2003 there was a war between the central

government and rebellion groups -- Sudan

Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality

Movement (JEM). Some say this war is a war

between ethnic groups -- the central government

represents Arab, while Darfur rebels represent non-

Arabs-- and some writers mention this war is a war

between Muslim and Non-Muslim(Waal, 2007).

However, the majority of writers argue that the real

motive behind the war is injustice in which the

central government treated Darfur discriminately

both in politics and economy. The war started in

early 2003 when JEM and the SLA carried out

attacks on Sudan's military posts, burned several

government-owned aircraft and caught one of the air

force generals, El Fasher.

To respond to these attacks, the government

conducted a "proxy" war by arming the Arab group

known as Janjaweed. The government through the

Janjaweed attacked indiscriminately, killing

thousands of Darfur residents who are non-Arabs in

the majority and forced millions more out of Darfur.

Janjaweed also used sexual violence, destroyed the

resident's crops, and important cultural and religious

sites. Nobody knows exactly how many people have

died because of this counter-rebellion war. Some

writers estimate that between 300,000 and 400,000

people died. In mid-2004, the World Health

Organization estimates that between 240 to 440

people died each day in Darfur. USAID added, from

October to December 2004 that number rose to 2400

people every. The total population of Darfur is six

million and 2.4 million among them are directly

affected by this war. Among that number, 1.8

million have left their homes but remained in Darfur,

and about 200 thousand people have fled

permanently to Chad.

That war shifted from a mere counter-rebellion

into a mass slaughter and ethnic cleansing. As

reported by International Criminal Court, in Darfur

there is much evidence of large-scale massacres and

thousands of "slow deaths" from forced

displacement and destruction of food-stocks and

hundreds of rapes with many more going unreported

(Grono, 2006). That is the first reason why this case

should get the international community's response.

Another reason is that the government knew what

exactly happened in the field, but the government

did not do anything. The government even still

launched a ground and air offensive in early 2004.

At the same time, it gave the Janjaweed a free hand

to kill, terrorize and displace the civilian population

of Darfur (Belloni, 2006).

Back to the thresholds that set by UN and ICISS,

it is clear that Darfur has met those criteria. There

was mass killing, and ethnic cleansing and the

government had a motivational deficiency to solve

the problem. Therefore, the R2P should be adopted

because it is not a choice, but a duty to protect. Since

it has become a norm in international relations, the

international community should commit to enforcing

this agreed-norm. Darfur provides an important test

case of the international community's commitment

to an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention

and the ideas set out in the Responsibility to protect.

4 HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT APPLIED AS HOW

IT SHOULD BE?

It is argued by some people that “responsibility to

protect” has been applied properly in Darfur. The

international community, through the African Union,

has responded by forming a monitoring mission

which composed of 60 monitors and 300 troops in

2004 (Grono, 2006). Security Council also had

issued several resolutions on Darfur such as

resolutions number 1547 and 1556. In the first

resolution (June 2004), the Security Council called

on all involved parties to stop the war as quickly as

possible and make an agreement without delay. In

July, the second resolution came out which becomes

a reason to impose arms embargo to the region.

Through this resolution, Security Council also

supports the deploying of African Union protection

force. This resolution also contains an order for the

Sudan government to disarm the Janjaweed within

30 days. Compared to previous resolution, resolution

1556 was more decisive, and it emphasized more on

sanction rather that urging for negotiation. On 31

August 2006, the UN Security Council adopted

Resolution 1706, which invited Sudan's consent to

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the UN force – implying that if consent was not

forthcoming, such a force might be dispatched

without it(Waal, 2007).

Security Council also established an

International Commission of Inquiry to investigate

the crisis. Security Council had asked the

International Criminal Court to conduct further

research on genocide issue in the country. Besides

Security Council, other parties also provided

response and help to Darfur. The European Union

(EU) responded by providing funding assistance to

the Africa Union (AU) peacekeeping force. In 2004,

EU allocated €92 million for humanitarian

assistance in Darfur.

However, despite offering some technical and

financial support, EU left the AU to take the lead in

conflict resolution and effort to achieve a political

settlement. EU believes in "African solutions for

African problems." NATO also provided help in the

form of logistics support for the African Union

troops. America also responds to Darfur by

providing assistance to the rescue mission. The US

has been generous in its aid contributions, supplying

much of the food supplies to the displaced

Darfurians.

However, those reasons are not strong

foundations to conclude that the responsibility to

protect has been carried out properly in Darfur. The

R2P document clearly says that prevention is the

most important part of the mission. As Gareth Evan

said, prevention --which includes responding to an

early warning -- is the most important part (Evans G.

, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass

Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, 2008). However,

in fact, the international community failed to fulfill

this mandate which eventually allowed conflict to

grow. The international community did not prevent

that crisis from becoming worse when it is still

possible to be prevented.

True, international community made various

efforts. In 2004, African Union established an

investigation team, in the same year the UN issued

resolutions 1547 and 1556, and in 2005 the UN

began providing supports. However, those responses

were late. The "tragedy" began in the early 2003 and

since the time massacre had occurred and took many

lives, while the international responses just started in

the mid-2004. Between early 2003 and mid-2004

almost there was no response to Darfur tragedy. Due

to this late response, hundreds of thousands of

people died.

That was not because of lack of information. The

evidence and facts of massive killing have existed

since the beginning of 2003. The evidence was

collected not only by the mass media but also by

credible investigative agencies. Amnesty

International, the International Crisis Group, Justice

Africa, and Medecins Sans Frontieres warned the

world about the emerging crisis in Darfur from the

very start of 2003, but the international community

did not respond. Even, the International Commission

on Inquiry formed by the UN has clearly stated that

there was a mass killing in Darfur. Those warnings

were not taken seriously. Those organizations were

even criticized for exposing this case.It can be said

that policymakers and leaders around the world have

known exactly what was taking place in Sudan.

Moreover, even when Darfur turned into a clear

humanitarian emergency, no attempt was made to

stop the disaster at an early stage. The UN Security

Council, for example, only began debating the most

appropriate international response in mid-2004,

when the worst atrocities against civilians had

already been committed. The international

community should have learned from the previous

humanitarian crises. In Rwanda for instance,

because of ignoring the early warning, within three

months 800.000 people died.

This R2P is actually construed in order to

prevent the same tragedy to happen; therefore it

emphasizes more on prevention rather than reaction.

However, it failed to be implemented in Darfur. As

senior of UN official bitterly said that “the

international community is keeping people alive

with our humanitarian assistance until they are

massacred”. The slow response has allowed the

crisis to grow, and a larger crisis requires stronger,

more intrusive, intervention.

Moreover, prevention in the R2P document also

includes tackling the root cause of the crisis. In

Darfur, the root cause is injustice. However, the

international community did not do anything to

solve the very root cause of the problem. The

international community focused only on logistics

and financial assistance. Darfur did not only need

food and shelter but more than that, it needs

protectors and saviors which can protect them from

crime and injustice conducted by its own

government. That is the reason why JEM and the

SLA intentionally continue to wage war against the

government despite the loss of many lives because

those groups believe that the international

community will come to rescue them and help to

solve the injustice problem. However, the

international community was preoccupied with the

debate of whether they should intervene or not. If

the R2P is truly believed as a norm, that debate

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should not happen, because it is clear that Darfur has

fulfilled the requirements for intervening.

Those imply that the international community

was reluctant to implement the R2P

comprehensively in practice. They failed to fulfill

the most fundamental aspect of the R2P namely

prevention. This reluctance was also obvious from

the number of authorized-personnel who was sent to

Darfur. Compared to other humanitarian cases, the

number of international personnel in Darfur is very

small. In Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina crisis

there were 38,599 personnel deployed, in Sierra

Leone there were 17.500 personnel, in Democratic

Republic of Congo crisis there were 16,700 troops,

in Somalia crisis there were 28,000 personnel, while

in Darfur only 300 troops involved in 2004 and

gradually increased to 7000 (Grono, 2006).

In fact, Darfur is the worse humanitarian crisis in

the era which needed more skilled personnel in the

field. As Lieutenant General RoméoDallaire, the

commander of UN forces in Rwanda in 1994 has

estimated that 44,000 troops are required to bring

peace to Darfur. However, it did not take place in

Darfur.

Moreover, the UN resolutions were also not firm.

Resolution 1547, for instance, is merely a

persuasion. Persuasion was not the proper decision

because the level of violence has been very

alarming. Resolution 1556 also did not give a

significant output. Although China and Russia

assumed this resolution is too hard for Sudan,

actually this resolution did not go far enough. That

resolution failed to ensure the appalling human

rights situation, and it abandoned people of Darfur

and an abdication of the Security Council's role as

human rights enforcing agent. The UN Security

Council failed to put concerted pressure on the

Sudanese government to allow humanitarian access;

and failed to make the government take its

responsibilities seriously for protecting the people of

Darfur and for complying with its ceasefire

commitments and legal obligations.

The R2P concept also suggests that protecting

people is a paramount obligation. Therefore no other

norms could stop this obligation to be performed.

However, in fact, Darfur clearly portrays that every

country still positioned national interest as the

highest concern as well as become a measure of

whether to intervene or not. National interests still

de facto become the main concern of every state.

This is the main obstacle to implementing this norm.

When the R2P is in line with the national interest,

the international community will respond quickly

even without clear evidence such as in Iraq case.

Otherwise, when the moral obligation is not in line

with national interest, the international community

will be reluctant to involve, and this is what

happened in Darfur.

Based on national interest calculation, the Sudan

Government is far more important than Darfur for

every member of the Security Council. For the

United States, Sudan is a strategic ally in the war on

terror. Sudan is the country where Osama bin Laden

hid before moving to Afghanistan. The US assumed

that Sudan could be one of the important sources of

intelligence to destroy terrorist's network. Therefore,

in 2005, the US flew the Sudanese chief of

intelligence and one of the architects of the Darfur

atrocities, out of Virginia to meet with the CIA

(Grono, 2006). By pressing the Sudan government,

the U.S will lose the important information that it

could get from Sudan.

For China and Russia, Sudan is important

because Sudan purchased the weapon from those

two countries. There was a big wariness of China

and Russia if the intervention is conducted, there

would be an economic instability in Sudan which

eventually will affect Sudan's ability to pay its debt

to China and Russia, as well as decreasing Sudan's

purchasing power toward China and Russia

weaponry products. Moreover, China and Russia

were also suspicious that their involvement in Darfur

would drag international attention to violence

committed by Russia in Chechnya and China in

Xinjiang and Tibet. Therefore, getting involved in

the Darfur case was not a good choice for their

national interests.

For the international community in general,

Sudan is important because of its oil production.

Sudan oil production started since the 1950s. It has 1

percent of total world oil reserves. Although it's not

a huge number, it's crucial in the mid of international

effort to find alternative oil sources. Therefore,

many countries have invested and run oil production

in Sudan. There are six oil production blocks in

Sudan. The first and second block belongs to

Canada, China, and Malaysia, the third block is

owned by China and Qatar, the fourth block belongs

to GNPOC, the fifth block is for French, Sweden,

Austria and Sudan and the last block mastered by

China. Therefore, if the intervention is carried out,

Sudan would nationalize those oil productions or

stop cooperating with foreign companies which will

have an impact on oil price and disadvantage those

who own oil production companies.

The clash between national interest and moral

obligation has resulted in the inability to respond

Darfur case properly. To cover this reluctance, the

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international community tries to use several reasons.

The first reason is the issue of sovereignty.

Sovereignty is always used as the bastion for not

taking firm action in Darfur. However, if

sovereignty really matters, why sovereignty has not

become the major impediment to council mandated

armed intervention to prevent gross violence of

human rights? It also did not stop the Security

Council from authorizing intervention in Northern

Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti or Somalia.

The second reason is the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement (CPA) between the central government

and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLMA). Many

people worry that by involving in Darfur, the peace

process between North (central government) and

South (SLMA) would fail. True, civil war between

North and South is the longest war ever happened in

Africa and has killed millions of people. However,

the reason to prioritize CPA over Darfur is not really

reasonable. International community argues that by

resolving North and South conflict, it will be easier

to solve Darfur (William and Ballemy, 2005, p. 38).

The peace agreement between north and south will

become prototype to create peace between the Sudan

and Darfur.

However, this is misguided and unnecessary and

had predictable, deadly, consequences for Darfur.

The international community has downplayed the

fact that the process remains based on a simplified

north-south dichotomy that assumes the SPLM/A

speak for all southerners and does not accurately

reflect the complex reality of political forces in

Sudan. A more holistic approach to the problems of

Sudan was possible, preferable, and would have

provided a more secure basis for building a

sustainable country-wide peace.

The international community could have pushed

harder on Darfur without risking the CPA

negotiations. A more holistic approach would not

have prevented the signing of the CPA (it may have

delayed it by a few months, but as the North-South

peace had already been established, this would have

been at no great practical cost, and it would certainly

have prevented the crisis in Darfur getting as bad as

it did. In the simple terms of balancing likely costs

and benefits, prioritizing the CPA was misguided.A

more holistic approach was possible, and, in terms

of likely impact, was preferable.

Moreover, the promotion of "African solution for

African problems" could also be seen as a strategy to

tolerate the international community's reluctance

from involving directly in Darfur. Actually, if the

African Union (AU) has the required-capabilities

(material, finance, mandate, and skilled-personnel),

the international community could leave the problem

to African Union. However, in fact, AU lacks those

fundamental capabilities. Moreover, Sudan is

surrounded by Chad, Central African Republic,

Republic of Congo, Niger, Ethiopia, which are

included as the poorest countries in the world.

Rather than helping Sudan, they barely help

themselves. The international community was aware

of the problem, but it kept relying on AU without

initiating to involve directly in the field. This

attitude leaves the R2P to become an inconsistent

concept. There is still a distinction between "our"

problem and "their" problem. This principle is

certainly not in accordance with the spirit of the

R2P.

Again, if we look back to the R2P concept,

national interest should not become an obstacle for

the application of R2P. It is not merely a right to

intervene but obligation to protect. Therefore it

should be implemented although it does not

contribute to – or maybe contradicts - the national

interest. This notion is absence in Darfur; every

party tends to play safely and distance themselves

from involving in a more serious way.

5 WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO

MAKE IT APPLICABLE IN

THE FUTURE?

The experience of Darfur suggests that the R2P

concept has failed to be implemented in practice.

This is because the R2P has not yet become an

embedded-norm in international politics and the R2P

itself has substantial weaknesses. However, it does

mean that the R2P concept should be abandoned.

The R2P is the perfect mechanism to facilitate the

growing concern on human security issues. As Kofi

Annan argues that individu deserves freedom from

fear, freedom from want and live in dignity (Annan,

2005, p. 63-74).

International community has an obligation to

enforce the norm unless the problems will grow and

affect not only the country but also the neighboring

countries, the region and even the international

community. In the case of Darfur for instance, the

problem was not only a destabilized Sudan, but also

affecting neighboring countries such as Chad.

Millions of people have moved to Chad, while on

the other hand, Chad also face its own problems and

these refugees will add new burden for Chad.

Based on Darfur case, some options can be

applied in order to make it applicable in the future.

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The first, there should be an independent institution

which replace the role of Security Council (SC) in

giving mandate. In Darfur case, the SC’s response is

devided based on their national interests, therefore it

cannot give proper responses. By establishing a new

independent institution, which comprised on experts

(like ICISS) not countries, it is more unlikely to mix

the moral obligation and national interest, because

those members do not represent certain state’s

interests. However, this institution should still under

the UN observation, because acting without UN-

authorization will be more open to abusement and

will be less responsive to humanitarian need.

However, if the Security Council still want to run

this task and refuse to establish new institution, so

there are two things should be done. First, there

should be punishment when international

community abandons this obligation. When we talk

about collective obligation it could be an obligation

of no one. One party counts on another and when

every party counts on each other, it is likely this

obligation will not be carried out. Therefore, there

should be a punishment when this obligation is

abandoned.

Again, R2P is not a choice, it is an obligation and

it is reasonable to put punishment when the

responsible parties abandon this obligation. This

punishment will control the states from abandoning

moral obligation due to any reason. In addition, the

R2P will have problem if the local government is

unwilling to open its country for international help.

This happened in Darfur. It was clear that the

government has committed violence both directly

and indirectly to the Darfurian, while on the other

hand, only by the government’s permission the

international community could get in to the country.

Rationally, the government will never let other

parties get involved because it did not want other

countries know what was happening in Darfur. This

is another weakness of the R2P. It does not have

mechanism to intervene if the local government does

not give permission. Therefore, the international

community should construct new mechanism to

respond this weakness as well as find strategies to

persuade the local government to accept the help

from outsiders.

5 CONCLUSION

The experience of Darfur clearly suggests that the

R2P is not yet implemented as how it should be in

practice. This is because international community

failed to respond the early warning that announced

by credible investigation agencies while responding

to the early warning is a crucial step in the R2P

concept. Moreover, the international community also

ignored the report from the International

Commission on Inquiry for Darfur, which explains

that mass killing had taken place. Darfur also

reflects that the R2P has not become the embedded-

norm in international politics because every country

particularly the P-5 (US, China, Russia, UK, and

France) still prioritize national interest more than

their moral obligation, while in fact, the R2P has

mandated them to take this responsibility.

However, the R2P is still an important norm,

particularly in the growing concern of human

security issues. After the end of the Cold War, civil

wars or asymmetrical wars between state and its

citizens take place in many countries such as in

Lybia, Syiria, Yamen, Myanmar and so on. The

R2P is the only mechanism as well as legal

justification for international community to save

people affected by mass killing and genocide.

Therefore, the R2P should be strengthened and

enforced so international community aware of its

moral and legal obligation. To make it more

applicable in the future, there should be somekind

like punishment when international community

ignores this obligation, or there should be an

institution that runs this task other than UN Security

Councl in order to distance or prevent the clash

between moral obligation and national interest

which by far make the R2P difficult to apply in

practice.

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Annan, K. 2005. In larger Freedom, Decision Time at the

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