Deradicalization from within: Enhancing the Role of Jihadists on

Countering Violence Extremism

Saifudin Asrori

, Muhammad Ismail

, Agus Nilmada Azmi

and Eva Achjani Zulfa

Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia

Indonesia University, Jakarta, Indonesia

Keywords: de-radicalization, Jihadists, community development, Former Terrorist Prisoner, Indonesia

Abstract: This article seeks to explore the role of Jihadists in de-radicalization initiatives programs of a former

terrorist prisoner. The Jihadist established Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian as a forum for social and economic

empowerment as a mutual aid for many disengaged Islamic extremists struggle with the transition back into

society. How do they engage on delimiting of radical ideologies through community and economic

development programs? Employed fieldwork conducted in Lamongan District, the East Java Province

through the in-depth interview with founder and activities of the foundation which all of them are former

extremists. The study concludes that the jihadists engagement in the empowerment initiatives as an alternate

of government de-radicalization programs of a former terrorist prisoner. The existence of the Jihadists as the

peace agents is useful for the countering violent extremism, significant as a counter-narrative extremism

ideology, and bridge of intervention for militant groups aimed at reducing and even eliminating radical

ideology. This foundation, gradually becoming a new community of converted militant and starting a new

life.

1 INTRODUCTION

Considerable effort has been devoted to countering

extremism and eliminating of radical ideologies that

motivated the act of terror. The government

stipulates the National Agency for Combating

Terrorism/Badan Nasional Penanggulangan

Terorisme (BNPT) on coordinating relevant state

agencies to undertake de-radicalization of ex-

extremisms. The processes de-radicalization involve

various programs of rehabilitation, re-education and

social reintegration who involve in the acts of terror

as the suspect, the defendant, the convicts, prisoners,

former prisoners and individual or groups who have

been exposed to radical terrorist ideology. However,

many studies indicated that changing extremists

ideology is an ambitious target of de-radicalization,

the realistic target on countering terrorism is to

disengage individual and group of extremisms

moving away from a terror group or to quit

participation in acts of violence. (Bjorgo & Horgan,

2008) Yet, recent studies indicated that the role of

the government in the disengagement and

deradicalization of disengaged Islamic extremists

only play minor roles, the program has been ad hoc

and inconsistent. (Hwang, Panggabean, & Fauzi,

2013) Many extremists struggle with the transition

back into society without an adequate help.

The current framework and policy on countering

violence and extremism (CVE) suggested the

process and dynamics of de-radicalization involve

two important elements; ‘push and pull factors’. The

traumatic experience as common pathways of

extremist moving away from a terrorist group.

(Garfinkel, 2007; Kruglanski et al., 2014) The push

factors such as negative social sanctions,

disillusionment on the group ideology and

movement, disappointment with group activities,

loss of confidence, a fatigue on status and role of

group activities. While, the pull factors such as age,

career prospects and personal future and family

responsibilities. The push and pull factors interplay

disengage person or group from extremism

organization. (Holmer, 2013). Abuza regards

internal and external pressures specifically on

psychological pressures and the “spiraling of

commitment” and group solidarity and membership

composition. (Abuza, 2008)

However, religion and ideology motivation of as

a basis for terrorism makes radical groups more

Asrori, S., Ismail, M., Azmi, A. and Zulfa, E.

Deradicalization from within: Enhancing the Role of Jihadists on Countering Violence Extremism.

DOI: 10.5220/0009934717451752

In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Recent Innovations (ICRI 2018), pages 1745-1752

ISBN: 978-989-758-458-9

1745



committed than non-religious extremists and

therefore tends not to radicalize. For radical groups

based on Islam, leaving the group means leaving

religious beliefs. This belief is based on the

assumption that the way of salvation is only

implemented through the membership of the

organization which provides eternality as rewards in

the afterlife (Juergensmeyer, 2017). Ideology and

religion play an important role for prisoners,

especially for prisoners who are first in prison.

Ideology giving meaning to one’s behavior and

becomes a mechanism for selecting complex

choices. Religion and ideology give identity,

purpose, and meaning to life, overcome feelings of

shame and wrong, and are useful for self-control in

prisons. Therefore ideology which contains many

values which tend to be intolerant, will lead to an

action which is an expression of the values. (Thomas

& Zaitzow, 2006)

Thus, understanding the intricacy terrorist

decision leaving the group, as Jacobson asserted,

“There are no single, comprehensive and reasonable

arguments why people or groups leave terrorist

networks or organization”. (Jacobson, 2010) How to

offer support or assist disengaged extremist is still

had an incomplete understanding. An understanding

of Jihadist involvement in efforts to empower former

terrorist prisoners as a unique and interesting

phenomenon. What is the motivation Jihadists’

effort to assisting former terrorist prisoners? How do

they engage the individual militants through the

community and economic development programs, in

regard to reintegrate the extremist into society?

Hwang finds that a intricacy of factors and

networks led some individual to disengage and

abandon the struggle of jihad. (Hwang et al., 2013)

Chalmers evaluates official efforts on de-

radicalization divides into four typologies;

committed jihadists, disengaged provisionally,

provisionally de-radicalization and fully de-

radicalization. (Chalmers, 2017) The involvement of

jihadists in the deradicalization program for former

prisoners as a mutual aid in regard to reintegration

assistance in the community. This engagement

provides an advantage for their experience and

expertise in terrorist organizations. Their existence is

useful to fight violent extremism and prevent the

spread of extremist ideology.

Three related terms should be clarified related to this

article; Jihadist, de-radicalization and terrorist

prisoners. The term Jihadist come from the same

root in Arabic (jhd means to strive or struggle and

Mujahidin means as holy warriors. De-

radicalization refer to Law number 5/2018 on the

Eradication of Terrorism Crimes, in the article

number 43 D, is the process of eliminating,

reducing, and changing the terrorism ideology

undertake with carefully planned, integrated,

systematic and continuously. This a concept denotes

changing ‘radical and extremist ideology to

moderate and abandoning criminal and violent act.

Thus, the focuses on motives and spirit of behavior,

strongly differentiated from disengagement indicates

that an individual is no longer a member of a

terrorist organization. Meanwhile, terrorist

prisoners refer to individuals committing acts of

terror and violence that are punished by the Court

for serving sentences in prisons under anti-terrorism

laws.

2 DERADICALIZATION

PROGRAM IN INDONESIA

De-radicalization is a method widely discussed in

counter-terrorism discourses. Rabassa et al define

de-radicalization is the process of changing an

individual beliefs system, rejecting the extremist

ideology, and embracing mainstream values.

(Rabasa, 2010) The process of deradicalization aims

to change individuals or groups behavior related to

violence--especially violence against civilians.

Changing ideology is seen from the individual’s

perspective from radical to more moderate, while

behavioral change is seen in aspects of the

individual action. The seminal, definition by Davis,

deradicalization is an attempt to change the

ideology, thoughts, and understanding of someone

who was originally radical to no longer be radical.

(Davis, 2009) The decision to de-radicalize is

usually an individual decision, which is then isolated

from the social group. Relationships with role

models are seen as important in alienating

individuals from a radical perspective. One thing in

common with the process of deradicalization with

the process of radicalization is the traumatic

experience of the individual before making a

decision to do disengagement. Trauma acts as an

event that triggers the transformation of individual

beliefs.

John Horgan distinguishes the terms de-

radicalization and disengagement. Deradicalization

is a combination of two terms that have different

meanings, but the end goal is the same, which is to

make terrorists want to leave or release acts of

terrorism in the form of violence. Horgan wrote his

thoughts as follows: “while deradicalization has

become the latest keyword in counter-terrorism, it is

important that we distinguish it from the release and

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pressure that is not only different, but it is only

because one leaves terrorism; it rarely implies (or

even requires) that someone becomes

deradicalized.” Garfinkel argued that

deradicalization has something in common with

spiritual experience, similar to religious conversion,

as happened in the process of radicalization. In

contrast to the experience of radicalization,

individuals who are de-radicalized do not adopt new

ideologies as a function of their participation in

supportive groups. (Garfinkel, 2007)

The process of deradicalization is one of the

methods in handling terrorism cases where

rehabilitation and reintegration of a terrorist broader

community become its main goal. This process is an

important tool in the model of law enforcement in

handling terrorism. The perpetrators of terrorism in

this approach are seen as human beings as a whole

so that the process of law enforcement, detention,

coaching covered in disengagement and

deradicalization is expected to return to making a

terrorist to abandon radical ideology and return to

having a normal life in society. Deradicalization is

done so that individual terrorists can change their

radical views and actions to be more moderate and

not radical.

The de-radicalization program in Indonesia is

part of efforts to eradicate acts of terrorism which

are carried out through two approaches, “hard” and

“soft” approaches. Based on Law No. 5/2018

concerning the eradication of terrorism crimes the

de-radicalization program was carried out under the

coordination of BNPT. this institution serves as a

center for combating terrorism through; (1)

formulating national policies, strategies and

programs on counter-terrorism; (2) monitoring,

analyzing and evaluating counter-terrorism; (3)

coordination on the implementation of prevention

and combating radical ideological propaganda about

counter-terrorism; and (4) coordination of the

implementation of deradicalization.

According to the Law of Terrorism, the de-

radicalization program in Indonesia has four

approaches, namely: Reeducation, Rehabilitation,

Resocialization, and Reintegration. Re-education is

deterrence by teaching enlightenment to the public

about radical understanding, so there is no omission

of the development of this understanding. As for

terrorism inmates, re-education is done by giving

enlightenment related to deviant doctrines that teach

violence so that they are aware that committing

violence such as suicide bombings is not jihad

identified with terrorism. The rehabilitation has two

meanings, namely the development of independence

and personality coaching, independence building is

training and fostering ex-prisoners to prepare skills

and an expertise, the point is that after they leave the

prison, they already have expertise and can open

jobs. While personality coaching is approaching

dialogue with terrorist prisoners so that their mindset

can be straightened out and have a comprehensive

understanding and can accept different parties from

them. The rehabilitation process is carried out in

collaboration with various parties such as the police,

Correctional Institution, Ministry of Religion,

Ministry of Welfare, mass organizations, and so on.

It is expected that this program will provide

provisions for them in living their lives after leaving

the penitentiary. In addition to the program, to

facilitate terrorist ex-prisoners and prisoners return

and mingle into the community. The concrete form

of soft approach carried out by BNPT is building

trust with individuals or groups that are affiliated

with terrorist activities. This institution cooperates

with convert terrorists to influence members of other

terrorist members to abandon violence. BNPT

assisted in the establishment of educational

institutions and Islamic boarding schools established

by former terrorists.

However, Several studies assess that

deradicalization programs have weaknesses in

achieving rehabilitation goals (Istiqomah, 2011;

Sarwono, 2012). According to Sukabdi the

deradicalization approach in Indonesia tends to

focus on four elements: (1) isolating prisoners

involved in deradicalization programs from other

terrorist prisoners; (2) provide practical incentives

for prisoners to get involved, including holding them

in better condition and by providing economic

assistance to them and their families; (3) using

former militants to argue with detainees today

ideology, reasons and justification for violence; and

(4) organizing workshops to address problems such

as anger management but also to develop practical

skills for future work and provide new social

relations outside terrorist networks (Zora, 2015).

Meanwhile, Abuza the deradicalization program is

lacking in costs, inadequate resources, and less

institutionalized (Abuza, 2010).

Andrie points out that deradicalization is carried

out and regulated independently by the prison

manager in accordance with the capabilities and

capacity possessed. most of these prisons do not

have special programs to rehabilitate or de-radicalize

terrorist prisoners. locally developed and managed

by prison directors according to prison conditions

and capabilities Only two prisons are considered to

have adequate programs: Porong Prison (Surabaya)

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and Semarang Prison (Andrie, 2011). The

deradicalization program in Indonesian prisons can

be identified by several activities, such as providing

conflict management training or inviting an ulama

from the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) to

deliver speeches and discussions with terrorist

prisoners. An interesting finding is that most

participants refused to be involved in the program.

These conditions have an impact on the

effectiveness of deradicalization programs.

Unfortunately, several recent attacks in several

police stations in Poso and Solo and suicide

bombings in three churches in Surabaya were carried

out by self-radicalized lone wolves and were part of

terrorist cells which is more disorganized and

hierarchical than in the past. These developments

also at the same time show a number of weaknesses

in the approach to prevention and eradication of

terrorism and radicalism that have been prevailing.

3 THE ROLE OF JIHADISTS IN

DE-RADICALIZATION

INITIATIVES

The Lamongan jihadist community is formed based

on the intricacies of social relations through the

Pesantren al-Islam, Tengulun, Lamongan. The social

relation as the family of the founders, teacher-

students, and sympathizers. This Pesantren is an

allied with Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki, Solo. The

relationship between the two was built since the first

al-Islam was founded. Ust. Chozin points out: “After

seeing a lot of pesantren the only pesantren that in

my opinion was just al-Mukmin, Ngruki Solo. “We

see the discipline of the students as well as the

discipline of management,” Pesantren al-Islam later

became one of the pesantren involved in special

operations units Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI). Many JI

bombing operations--Christmas Eve 2000 bombings,

attacks on the Philippine ambassador in Jakarta and

Bali bombings--some planned or started from al-

Islam. As disclosed by Ali Fauzi “This village was

once hit by a Bali bomb that was assembled in our

house.”

The Lamongan jihadist community as a terrorist

organization based on some basic elements that

characterize a group to commit acts of terrorism or

are considered a terrorist organization. James Lutz

and Brenda Lutz (2004) described terrorist

organization involves political aims and motives. It

is violent or threatens violence. It is designed to

generate fear in a target audience that extends

beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The

violence is conducted by an identifiable

organization. The violence involves a non-state actor

or actors as either the perpetrator, the victim of the

violence, or both. Finally, the acts of violence are

designed to create power in situations in which

power previously had been lacking.

Thus terrorist organizations have the main

characteristics in the terrorist movement, namely: (1)

that certain actions or movements that use violence

and threats to create public fear; (2) this movement

is aimed at one or several countries, or communities,

or certain groups of people or individuals; (3) this

movement regulates its members with terror too; and

that these individuals or movements commit

violence with a view to gaining systematic and

organized support.

The cultivation of radical ideologies through

formal education and extracurricular activities in

Pesantren al-Islam. The process of radical ideology

indoctrination was carried out through al-Islam

affiliation with the advisors of al-Mukmin Ngruki.

Abuza (2008), who examined the motives of

Islamist groups in the path of violence in Indonesia,

said there were four main factors, namely; (1)

among JI, motivation is based on applying Islamic

law holistically by undermining secular power and

replacing it with the Southeast Asian caliphate, (2)

purification or purification of Islamic teachings,

including cleansing of Western and secular values

into a foundation that facilitates formation. Islam

country; (3) the perception that Islam is currently

under attack by anti-Islamic forces, especially

America and its allies and Christians; (4) the reason

is that there is a global conspiracy to weaken the

power of Islam.

Generally, terrorist organizations provide

material and non-material support to recruit and bind

their members. Material supports, such as providing

soft loans, venture capital assistance, providing

school fees for children, health assistance. While,

non-material supports provided in various forms,

such as ideology and brotherhood. Cultivating

radical ideologies through formal and informal

institutions (dauroh, i’dad, rihlah and

mukhoyyamah). The interplay of both supports as a

barrier of Jihadist to disengage from a terrorist

organization. Therefore, the engagement of Jihadists

in de-radicalization has the advantage to form a new

community that provides similar support in the same

style but with different content. The mutual aid of

jihadist in de-radicalize former terrorist prisoners

based on the view that the ability in using weapons,

agitation, propaganda, and make bombs as the

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barrier in obtaining jobs and reintegrate to society.

However, they have individually responsible such as

children and spouse. Ali Fauzi points out: “so far we

are always confused when former terrorism

prisoners out of jail and could not find a suitable job,

but there are children and wives”.

The relevance of Jihadist empowerment

programs based a difficulty of getting a decent job

because of a mismatch of expertise and negative

views on former terrorists. Ali Fauzi feels compelled

to involved in the efforts of empowering former

Terrorist Prisoners and hoped that this group will

build a ‘new community’, which can gradually defy

the extremist beliefs of their imprisoned families.

The empowerment efforts begin by identifying a

dozen families of the ex-terrorist prisoner, “I have

profiling more than 40 friends and students, why

they join the old group,” and not being able to return

to the community is due to terrorist activities as a

barrier to getting a job. The establishment of

Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian as a mutual aid to

begin a new life. This our understanding of de-

radicalization, Ali Fauzi revealed:

“theorizing de-radicalization it is too difficult. Here

we implement practical de-radicalization, if they speak

violence, we speak peace. Similar method whit

different content. For example, currently they have a

project to Yemen, yes we are also to Yemen but the

charge is different. They like to ride the mountain is

the same, but the cargo is different. That’s more ideal

of this foundation.”

Furthermore, this foundation gives an ample to the

ex-terrorist prisoner to communicate with other

without being scrutinized. They freely express the

views of jihad without needing to be

excommunicated from their group, as they gain

strength from the friends of the community. This

process often involves reading, discussing, debating

within oneself and among friends, and making

dozens of small incremental choices. This process

gradually delegitimates radical ideologies.

Many efforts have been conducted in order to

ensure the continuity of Jihadist empowerment

programs. The foundation develops network and

cooperation with various parties; Firstly, The

existence of al-Islam pesantren is very important in

the sustainability of the program. al-Islam is not only

as the hub of Mujahidin, as a teacher, student, and

guardian of santri, but also as a place for the children

of terrorist prisoners to continue the education.

Almost all exponents of Yayasan Lingkar

Perdamaian have links with al-Islam and when the

Jihadist to moderate their view that is in line with the

changes that occurred in pesentren al-Islam. This

condition is similar to the work of Marc Sageman

“Understanding Terror Networks”. Through

profiling of 172 global jihadists who have been

involved in the terorrism from the 1990s to the early

2000s. Sageman denies some of the commonly held

assumptions that those who are potential to join

terrorist are socially and religiously alienated, and

most likely in distress. Through his observations

found that the process of involvement in the terror

movement in general through three branches: (1)

social affiliation with the movement through

friendship, kinship and teacher-student relationships;

(2) progressive intensification of beliefs and

teachings leads to acceptance of the ideology of

salafi-jihadist; (3) formal acceptance of jihad

movement through meetings with global salafy

networks. This teacher-student factor is most evident

in the Southeast Asian jihadist group. They generally

have a relationship, directly or indirectly, with

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’ashir as

mentors or teachers. Sageman asserted that social ties

are a very important element in this radicalization

process.

Secondly, building network and cooperation with

Local Government, Police, Military and the National

Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), although many

de-radicalization activities are the result of

contributions from activists and donations from

sympathizers. This empowerment effort indicates

that when government institutions incapable to

sustain de-radicalization, a civil society has given

concrete form in empowerment. The results of the

interview with Ali Fauzi revealed: “that the acts of

terror committed to jihadists are one critique of the

absence of the state.” Many de-radicalization

activities are the result of contributions from

activists and donations from sympathizers.

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4 DE-RADICALIZATION

PATTERN AND MECHANISMS

In order to de-radicalize ex-terrorist prisoner,

Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian employs cultural

patterns and mechanisms. This approach adds the

Police persuasive approach that seem

counterproductive to the efforts of de-radicalization.

Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) reveals, “when an

individual has internalized the beliefs perceived

identity as true, an attempt to challenge or de-

radicalize attempt to be a failure. Therefore, the first

effort that needs to be done is to encourage

extremists to leave terrorist organizations. Some

important factors in the disengagemant process

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include; disillusion with group strategy, tactics, or

leadership. Similar findings by Barrelle (2015) add

physical or psychological confusion. The process of

disengagement based on Harris-Hogan (2017)

research that the negative dynamics of relationships

between individuals within the terrorist group

encourages individual to re-think their hopes and

desires. Sagemen (2004) agree that intervention

programs against radicalism and extreme extremism

can only be done after the disengagement process

goes well, through the psychological connection

between individuals within terrorist networks.

The approach of Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian

adopted non-material strategies in order to de-

radicalize former terrorist prisoners. This form of

strategy aims to delegitimize and de-eliminate the

radical ideology previously learned. Ideology or

system of thought besides giving meaning to one’s

behavior also becomes a selection mechanism for

complex choices. Ideology defines what is good and

what is bad, what allowed and what is not, what is

morally right and what is wrong, who is the friend

and who is the opponent, and so on. As stated by Ian

Adams (2009), ideology has functions such as maps

and signs that give an idea of what the ideal society

is like and how to make it happen. Therefore the

ideology in which contain intolerant values that tend

to lead of violence. Brachman (2009) identified five

main concepts to doctrine embraced by extremist

groups: tawhid, aqidah, takfir, al wala wal-bara, and

jihad. Particularly the doctrine of Jihad, the trio of

deathly Bali bombed, Imam Samudra, feelings of

discomfort and anger perceived in the frame in

religious logic which calls of violence. The concept

of Jihad. In Salafy groups, the concept of jihad has a

number of different interpretations, including its

praxis square. In the jihadists, the concept of jihad is

always evolution and development over time. The

understanding of Quthb, al-Faraj, Azzam, and al-

Zawahiri has had a very powerful influence on the

interpretation and practice of jihadists of the modern

jihadist Salafist. Quthb and Faraj radicalize the

concept of jihad not only related to the role of

offensive and defensive role but more widely as

restoring the sovereignty of God that has been

seized. In the context of this kind of understanding,

the operation of jihad also means fighting against

and eliminating the system and the rulers that block

the occurrence of all laws and rules of God in all

aspects of life. Replacing the ignorant people

becomes a fully Muslim community. In the hands of

al Faraj, extreme jihad was manifested in a bloody

violent action against the secular “fir’aunis” rulers in

Egypt, including the assassination of President

Anwar Sadat in 1981. Furthermore, Abdullah

Azzam, based on his involvement in jihad in

Afghanistan ‘modifying’ the understanding of jihad

becomes wider, no longer just aiming for anti-

Islamic powers in the country as near enemies), but

also applies to all enemies occupying Muslim states

as far enemies. Abdullah Azzam also stated that the

law of jihad to fight against the enemies of Islam in

Muslim countries became a blessing for every

Muslim to fulfill it. The framework in de-

radicalization efforts at an ideological level carried

out through intellectual reflection with critical

arguments or counter-narratives is the main task in

any deradicalization strategy and program.

The confession of Ali Imran, a perpetrator of

Bomb in Legian Bali 2002, vividly shows how a

number of mixed issues, ranging from

disappointment to government, jihad vocation,

anger, and revenge, into a series of religious

dimensions motivating brutal violence. For all of

them, wherever the region including Bali is also a

jihad field, all non-Muslims and Westerners, are

legitimate enemies. Ideology certainly plays an

important role in constructing such jihadists

thinking. Here are some of the reasons presented

(Imron, 2007): (1) not satisfied with the existing

government. This is due to the absence of Imamat (a

leader who is appointed and inaugurated by Islamic

standards or ways, a kind of caliphate) has led to

widespread disobedience and submission to non-

Islamic leadership; (2) Islamic Shari'a is not applied

thoroughly; (3) the hope of opening jihad fi

sabilillah, where a greater war will occur between

the Muslims against the unbelievers after the

bombing of Bali; (4) the bombing as a form of jihad

obligation as commanded by religion; (5) reply to

abominations and oppression by the infidels against

Muslims as happened in Palestine, Afghanistan,

Chechnya, Somalia, and a number of other

countries. The bombing also served as a form of

retaliation for Christians who fought with Muslims

in Poso and Ambon.

A strong jihadist doctrine can be read in the

articles of Aman Abdurrahman, a radical figure who

has a strong influence in the jihad movement in

Indonesia. Aman calls his followers to support ISIS

and together Ba’ashir declared bai'ah against the

caliphate of Abu Bakar al-Bahgdadi. Aman argues

that the Indonesia state is pagan countries and

government are taghut, The pagan accusations also

apply to Muslims in this country who consciously

believe and follow the democratic system, willing to

sing the national anthem and recognize the basis of

the Pancasila state. Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian in

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order to counter extremist ideology through formal

and non-formal education institutions. Through

formal institutions, changing in Pesantren al-Islam,

implemented through several dimensions; the

curriculum, addition of material of Tahfidzul

Qur’an, vocational education, build new facilities

and orientations from jihad-dakwah-tarbiyah,

become tarbiyah-dakwah-jihad. The effort of

Pesantren al-Islam reduce radical understanding in

the surrounding environment is done by

acculturation with the surrounding environment,

active in social activities such as School Committee

and joining Muhammadiyah organization.

5 CONCLUSIONS

Findings of the study presented that existence of the

former extremists as the peace agents is useful for

the countering violent extremism in the country.

Their involvements are significant as a counter-

narrative of the extremist ideology. It is to intervene

the militant groups in aiming to reduce and to

eliminate radical ideology, to provide practical

assistance such as helping defectors to find

accommodation away from former (jihadist) friends,

help them in moving and possibly financing their

home deposit, helping them find a suitable job or

embarking on education. Such things are hoped can

create the willingness of participants to re-against

violent groups, the reduction in numbers of potential

recruits through media campaigns featuring ex-

participants, and the reduction in the size of violent

groups. In the end, it can have a significant impact

on the low capacity and durability of an extremist or

terrorist movement.

A second element of the program is that it

provides an unthreatening forum in which fami¬lies

of individuals in prison or Syria can express their

aspirations, economic needs and ideo¬logical

convictions without fear. They talk to people from

the same area, with the same accents and often from

similar socioeconomic status. A third element is a

link to al-Islam. It may be problematic at some

point. However, it is clear that the al Islam boarding

school is no longer promoting violence. It is a good

idea to have a school with little fees in an area prone

to extremism that can help families while

strengthening bonds among the parents.

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