Why, indeed, should we think about religion?
The answer is that if we were the kind of persons who
does not think much about anything, we probably
shall not much need, to think about religion either.
It is certainly unreasonable to expect to understand
religion without a great deal of mental effort and
without knowing much about it. It is hardly
profitable, if we could not express our ideas of
religion with the clear thinking. And religious
philosophy will help us logically to answer the
question and to solve the problems addressed to the
principles of religion in general.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 The Problem of Evil
The traditional theologians (Jewish, Christian,
and Islamic theologians) agreed that God has some
sense attributes such as infinity (that God is
without limitation), goodness, omnipotence,
omniscience etc. One of the best known of these is the
so-called problem of evil. Its problem, in the sense
which I shall use the phrase, is a problem only for
someone who believes that there is a God who is both
omnipotence and absolutely good.
In its simplest from the problem is this: God is
omnipotence; God is absolutely good; however evil
exists. There seems to be some contradiction between
these three propositions, so that if any two of them
were true, the third would be false. But at the same
time all three are essential parts of most religious
positions. While there is in the world evidence of
much that is orderly, good and rational, there is even
more compelling evidence of all-pervasive evil.
There are physical evil and moral evil.
Physical evils are involved in the very
constitution of the earth and animal kingdom. There
are deserts, icebound areas, scorpions and snakes.
Secondly, there are various natural calamites and
immense human suffering, such as fires, earthquakes,
droughts and famines. Thirdly, there are the evils with
which so many are born, such as blindness, deafness,
mental deficiency and insanity. Most of these evils
contribute toward increasing human pain and
suffering. There are moral evils. Moral evil is simply
immorality evil such as envy, greed, injustice, sin and
the larger scale evils such as wars and atrocities they
involve.
Presently, if God couldn't avert underhanded on
the planet, no doubt He isn't almighty, and in the
event that He won't forestall fiendish, doubtlessly He
isn't all-great. Think about these two choices: (1) God
isn't incredible; (2) God isn't all-great. I require some
extra premises interfacing the terms 'great', 'abhorrent'
and 'transcendent'. These extra standards are that
great is against malice, in, for example, way that
something worth being thankful for dependably
disposes of detestable to the extent it can, and there
are not constrained to what a transcendent thing can
do. From these it pursues that a decent all-powerful
thing wipes out wickedness totally and after that the
recommendations that a decent supreme thing exists,
and that malevolent exists, are exceptional.
2.2 Some Solutions of Evil Problems
In the event that we were getting ready to state
that God isn't totally great, or not exactly all-
powerful, or that abhorrent does not exist, or that
great isn't against the sort of malice that exist, or that
there are cutoff points to what a supreme thing can
do, at that point the issue of insidiousness won't
emerge for us.
There are, at that point, a significant number of
palatable arrangements of the issue of shrewd and a
portion of these have been embraced., or nearly
received, by different scholars.
The Greek philosophers tended to say that, “God
is not powerful”. To them, “matter” is the principle of
limitation and disorder, hence indirectly the source of
all evil. God did not create matter. It coexists with
God from all eternity. God is not an absolute lord
over something outside Himself, which He calls
“necessity. On the other hand, manicheisme taught a
theistic dualism in which two Gods; one of light or
Good, the other of Darkness or Evil eternally
coexisted. The order and harmony of the world was
attributes to the God of Light, the disorder to the God
of Darkness.
St. Augustine suggests that evil is not something
positive, but rather a privation or lack of an order
which “ought to be there”. Thus blindness is an
obscene or derangement of the physiological order
which would normally permit sight. In the moral
realm, sin is the lack of spiritual order proper to the
soul. Now if evil is a privation or lack rather than a
position created thing, then God can not be said to
have created it.
According to Leibniz, God has created the world
according to the best possible plan. But the best plan,
said Leibniz, is not always that which seeks to avoid
evil, since it may happen that the evil is accompanied
by a greater good. Since experience tells us that evil
frequently brings about good (an illness, for example,
may give a man time to reflect on a misspent carrier
and thus lead him to a nobler life), it may be
concluded that all evil serves some higher good of
which we may not have knowledge. Leibniz
reasoning on this problem is the same as the
Mu’tazilah doctrine. The Mu’tazilite said that God –