Intermodal Containers Transportation: How to Deal with Threats?

Sergej Jakovlev

1,3 a

, Arunas Andziulis

2 b

, Audrius Senulis

1 c

and Miroslav Voznak

3 d

Marine Research Institute, Klaipeda University, Bijunu str. 17, Klaipeda, Lithuania

Department of Informatics and Statistics, Klaipeda University, Bijunu str. 17, Klaipeda, Lithuania

IT4Innovations National Supercomputing Center, VSB-Ostrava Technical University,

Studentska 6231/1B, Ostrava, Czech Republic

Keywords: Security, Transportation, CSI.

Abstract: This paper provides an overview of the port container inspection techniques and procedures (standardized

security procedures) relating to the detection of illicit material in containers. These procedures affect the

duration of the containers transportation periods in different parts of the transport chain, according to the 2002

Container Security Initiative (CSI) regulations. The main object of this work – to demonstrate the inability of

standard systems and associated technologies to deal with current threats and to propose solutions that are in

line with the “intelligent containers” worldwide initiative.

1 INTRODUCTION

Intermodal container monitoring is considered a

major security issue in many major logistic

companies and countries worldwide (Scholliers et al.

2016). Current representation of the problem, we face

today, originated in 2002, right after the 9/11 attacks.

Then, a new worldwide Container Security Initiative

(CSI, 2002) was considered that shaped the

perception of the transportation operations, including

sea, air and land transport. CSI consists of four core

elements (inspection efforts):

1. Establish security criteria to identify high-risk

containers based on advance information;

2. Pre-screen containers at the earliest possible

point;

3. Use ICT to quickly pre-screen high-risk

containers;

4. Develop secure and “smart” containers.

Now major ports all over the world contribute to

CSI further development and integration into

everyday transportation operations and improve the

transport regulations for the developing regions

(Carlo et al. 2014; Mark, 2019). Although, these new

improvements allow us to feel safer and more secure,

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1440-8221

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1735-8901

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4759-2707

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5135-7980

constant management of transportation operations

has become a very difficult problem for conventional

data analysis methods and information systems.

With the constant geopolitical and terrorism

threats risks related to security violations grow at a

rapid pace. The threat of a Chemical, Biological,

Radiological or Nuclear Weapon (CBRN) being

delivered using shipping containers has risen above

other terrorist-linked threats to containerised

transport all over the world and has become a single

unifying driver of international transport security

policy since 2001 (OECD, 2013). CBRN weapons

handling requires much greater expertise and their

development and deployment during container

tampering is both a complicated and time-consuming

process. It should be noted, that in many cases, the

development of these weapons requires acquiring

components and materials not through theft, but

through official commercial transactions and in most

cases using containerised shipments. This highlights

the need to act not only to discover CBRN weapons

in containerised shipments, but to also intercept

CBRN weapon precursors (demonstration of the

CBRN turn-around procedures in the transport chain

presented in figure 1).

Jakovlev, S., Andziulis, A., Senulis, A. and Voznak, M.

Intermodal Containers Transportation: How to Deal with Threats?.

DOI: 10.5220/0007739805050512

In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems (VEHITS 2019), pages 505-512

ISBN: 978-989-758-374-2

505

Figure 1: CBRN turn-around in the transport chain

[Container transport security across modes, „European

conference of ministers of transport. OECD 2013].

This has had a direct impact on Transport

authorities in many leading countries of the world, as

they are constantly charged with ensuring both the

flow of goods and ensuring the container transport

chain security. In fact, there is no single information

system governing the international movement of

containers in the world, due to low level of

cooperation between individual shipping companies,

governments and even engineering working in this

research area. No unifying security regulation is

responsible for the entire process. Container

transportation is done using multiple actors,

industries, regulatory agencies, modes, operating

information and management systems (IMS), liability

regimes, legal frameworks, technological standards,

ISO and etc., not to mention the standardization

issues of documentation.

To combat illicit trafﬁcking in maritime container

transport, a good level of detection is essential, and

should be approached with advanced data-driven or

process-driven technologies. Although the process-

driven technologies are done now with a large range

of surveillance and active interrogation techniques,

active sensors that register the threats during the

transportation route and onsite might be an interesting

supplement to the battle the rising threats. Data-

driven characteristics will allow instantaneous

recombination of all possible scenarios with a high

certainty of risk detection under normal working

conditions.

Analysis of scientific literature studying the

intermodal terminal activity (Chung-Yee and Dong-

Ping, 2017) revealed that there are many models

helping to improve the terminal’s operational activity,

however there are no models helping to determine

which technology would be the most rational (Rizzo

et al. 2011). Integration of newer Information and

Communication technologies (ICT) and procedures

into the existing cargo handling operations is likely to

be the main solution. As an example, some industrial

applications and international regulations already

consider adopting short range and long range

communication through IEEE 802.11p and/or

Cellular-V2X that are already used in industry, but

with limited applicability (Masini et al. 2018;

Xuerong et al. 2019). The choice of the applied

communication technology often depends on the

allowed control and communication frequency in the

vicinity of the port. Frequency reflects numerous

factors, including not only technical considerations,

but also international availability and economic

considerations. Application of most modern mobile

technologies plays an important role in maximizing

the performance, reducing the costs and risks of

intermodal containers transportation and raises the

efficiency of other transportation services in the

supply chain. There are still many different opinions

regarding the priorities of the supply chain and their

involvement in the border security. One may notice

that safety of the cargo is still the primary objective

to the supply chain. This is due to the direct value

input. Only the primary objective brings direct value

and makes supply chain cost effective. Therefore,

some of the adopted CSI regulations are not taken into

account. In many cases, their expenses do not exceed

the expenses of the possible risks. Nowadays, these

regulations are becoming more obligatorily and

therefore, in many security and safety applications

worldwide, information management during the

control operations is becoming the number one

priority.

In general, most security threats arise mainly in

the first few and last few links of the transport chain.

Sometimes these small actors operate on tight

margins, and pose higher security risks than their

larger counterparts in the transport supply chain.

Secure management of information and operations on

these levels is crucial for the working stability of the

entire transport operation for each container and good

inside. An efficient unified and standardized

information management system is needed to ensure

the working stability of these actors, large and small,

in terms of information retrieval, approval and

forwarding. These systems must be incorporated into

the existing IT infrastructures with less human

interaction probability. Human-machine interaction

VEHITS 2019 - 5th International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems

506

methods and technologies are needed to be adopted

on various levels of process control. IMS must

acquire and retransmit control commands within the

working regulations in an optimal manner. Optimality

must be achieved through constant update and

improvement of local operating conditions at each

separate transport chain position. In terms of terrorist

attacks, terrorists will probably use one of two

approaches:

1. Approach A (they will intercept a container

and tamper with it);

2. Approach B (they will send a tampered

container).

Not all technologies and methods are equally

suited to counter both the A and B approach threats.

Technical measures focusing on the integrity of the

container and its environment are not of much use in

the B threat approach. Constant containers scanning

remain an effective measure to discover both threats.

Intelligent information and communication

technology based measures must be deployed to

battle the B approach. To ensure the security from

these approaches, specific measures are classified:

1. container scanning via X-Ray and etc.;

2. ensuring container integrity via E-Seal

technology and etc.;

3. controlling access to the container via video

surveillance technologies and etc.;

4. tracking containers via GPS and etc.;

5. assessing container risk using probability

estimations, neural network modules for threat

assessment and decision support.

But, what technologies and methods work for one

threat assessment, will not necessarily work for the

other. Generally, technologies put into place fall into

one of the following five groups.

• Measures seeking to scan or otherwise

physically confirm the contents of the container;

• Measures seeking to ensure the physical

integrity of the container;

• Measures aimed at ensuring the security of the

container environment as it moves and is

handled in the container transport chain;

• Measures seeking to track and trace the

container in the supply chain;

• Measures centred on the provision, and use of,

information related to the shipment.

Over the past few decades many securities related

initiatives were proposed. In relation to Lithuania,

they can be classified as International (including EU

countries and US) and many other industry measures.

Some of the most noticeable measures that that

impact on the security and safety of the containers

transportation process and the maritime sector are

(see also table 1):

 International Maritime Organisation (IMO);

 International Labour Organisation (ILO);

 World Customs Organisation (WCO);

 International Standards Organisation (ISO)-

ISO guidelines ISO/PAS 17712:2003 Freight

containers – Mechanical seals; Radio Frequency

Identification Tags (RFID) in conjunction with

freight containers (ISO/WD 17363) as well as a

draft standard outlining common

communication protocols for RFID-enabled e-

seals (ISO/DIS 18185);

 European Union (EU)- Maritime and port

security;

 Secure Trade in APEC Region (STAR);

 United Nations Economic Commission for

Europe (UN-ECE);

 Container Security Initiative (CSI);

 Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism

(C-TPAT);

 24 Hour Advance Manifest Rule;

 Bio-Terrorism Act;

 IEEE 802.11p and/or Cellular-V2X.

Table 1: Summary of current container security measures.

Container

scanning

Container

integrity

Container

environme

Container

tracking

Container

doc. and

intelligenc

International (EU, US)

IMO

ILO

WCO

ISO

APEC

/STA

UN-

ECE/

TIR

UN-

ECE

CSI

C-trap

hour

rule

Bio-

terrori

sm act

Today many new and innovative technologies are

not ready for commercial international deployment

Intermodal Containers Transportation: How to Deal with Threats?

507

throughout the transport chain, although some steps

are being made in that direction (Masini et al. 2018).

Generally, because of the incompatible operating

standards and limited operational experience. In

general terms, 100% of all containers can be scanned

and screened in any given point (container terminals)

using current policies and regulations.

2 OVERVIEW OF THE

OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES

Similar security systems have already proven their

direct value in many fields of operation. At present,

companies all over the world are contemplating using

it to benefit their business and overall processes to

produce direct value for their customers while also

improving operational performance in terms of cost,

quality, security, speed, flexibility and optimal

resource management (figure 2). Some of the new

adoptions include e-seals and etc. An additional

strategy element of operations was taken into account

to improve the main strategy objectives by optimally

utilizing the vast amount of direct and indirect

resources that scattered within the transportation

chain from the initial cargo to business processes.

Optimality is ensured by operations strategies

elements that include descriptors with inner resources

reallocations. The additional benefit of the new

developing key elements will use the known limited

resources (e.g. time constraints, labour force) in

advance to the IMS and control system by initial

cargo transportation route planning in safer manner.

Therefore, an additional operations strategy objective

includes unnecessary business processes

management and deals with the uncertainty about the

effectiveness of basic operations strategy elements

and their optimal usage. This optimum resource

management mainly depends on availability of

intermodal containers. It also ensures that once they

are returned, they are redeployed as quickly as

possible and never put to mixed use. This includes

fast container turn around and ensures that containers

are assigned to specific cargos are never put to mixed

use. The additional optimum usage of quality

elements will minimize the risks involved in data

transfer within the security system. Additionally,

currently applied Wireless sensor network (WSN)

technology using active RFID tags include a variety

of environmental monitoring capabilities such as the

ability to track ambient temperature, vibration,

radiation, to wirelessly collect information about

containers inner environmental conditions. This

could possibly introduce new opportunities to

increase the intelligent container concept firstly

proposed in the CSI. Concerning the legal framework

to combat illicit nuclear trafﬁcking, several major

strategies exist. The legal deﬁnition of the acts

committed during nuclear trafﬁcking can be taken

from the Conventions on the Physical Protection of

Nuclear Material and for the Suppression of Acts of

Nuclear Terrorism and include the unauthorized

presence and unlawful possession and illegal disposal

of nuclear material including the violation of the

regulations for its obtainment, handling, and

transportation.

Figure 2: Proposed methods operations strategy framework.

VEHITS 2019 - 5th International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems

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The US favoured surveillance and monitoring

techniques and advocated even a 100% scanning of

shipments, but the EU took a data driven approach

and fostered information exchange. A combination of

both should guarantee continuity of knowledge, in

particular of containers used in cargoes with

suspicious routes. Since 2001-2002 inspections were

made on a constant basis using various revisions,

screening and monitoring technologies according to

CSI, taking into account the 24-hour rule. Before any

physical security inspection of the container, all the

necessary information about the cargo is collected for

containers targeting procedures during the unloading

process. This is the first step of the security

inspection. As an example, in the US the Automated

Manifest System (AMS) offers information

concerning the contents of the imported containers.

Then the Automated Targeting System (ATS)

computes the threat assessment of each container and

makes decision support for the agencies and

operators. Decision is done based on 300 weighted

rules developed from the actual experience of

Customs agents from screening and targeting

containers. Identification of possible threat is done

when a container is still on route. This is an „in

advance security” method that provides the first

general security measure before the actual container

arrives to its final destination. Its information is used

as a threat assessment tool for the IMS. When

identification of containers with and without possible

threats is finished, physical inspections are done.

They are started with passive inspections followed by

active inspections and manual inspections. In relation

to current and proposed operations strategy elements

improvement via optimisation, it is necessary to

increase the effectiveness of operations speed in term

of time of inspection. However, it must not have

negative impact on the quality of operations via

general security level and flexibility of procedures.

Resources optimal dispersion over the transport chain

should not be omitted as well, due to future autonomy

increase.

3 ANALYSIS OF SECURITY

ASSURANCE PROCEDURES

The baseline container flow within the transport chain

is presented in figure 3. It is presented from the

process view perspective. Such procedure was

prevailing in most parts of the world, eliminating

most security procedures. This container flow

example is a general representation for most container

flows in the world and up to 95% of containers

arriving to the US borders. In reality, however, much

lower container scanning and inspections are

provided. In US, by the year 2002, of the more than 7

million containers, approximately 10% was inspected

and scanned. In general in EU roughly 5% of all

import containers are subject to an inspection (Risk

Analysis of Container Import Processes, Virtuele

Haven; “Seacurity” Improving the Security of the

Global Sea-Container Shipping System, Rand

Europe

)

Figure 3: Baseline container flow without inspection

procedures.

Intermodal Containers Transportation: How to Deal with Threats?

509

For the rest of the 5%, expensive security

measures are applied, using technologies like huge X-

Ray machines. However, they are very costly and

their maintenance requires a certain degree of

knowledge and certification and operator experience.

Thus is not considered in many port of the world. This

may also be due to lack of firm regulations from the

local customs and other regulatory services. In

general, such regulations are mostly omitted and only

basic visual inspection policy is applied. In most

cases, terrorist threat is considered relevant only

when something happens in that region. In all other

times, omission of some general rules is constantly

present. It should be mentioned that all the decision

are done manually transporting a 5% risk container to

the inspection site and performing the inspection:

non-intrusive (visual) and intrusive.

The following figure 4 presents the whole process

of container turn-around in a container yard with all

inspection policies and procedures currently used for

incoming containers in the US (as an example). Final

decision based on scan photography’s is performed

by a single operator. Therefore, its accuracy may

prove to be faulty in some of the cases. In the case of

radiation monitoring, same principle is applied. A top

lifter is used to transport a pre-determined container

to a check location and then same procedures using

emission monitoring equipment. Operator is also

responsible for the accurate perception of the received

parameters. Many other regions of the world use same

principles and from a near future perspective EU

strategy will also include the application of the CSI

objectives on a mandatory basis for all ports.

Figure 4: Casual inspection procedure according to CSI.

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In figure 5 data acquisition algorithm is presented

for the casual inspection procedure when all

procedures are done.

Figure 5: Security procedures.

As one may notice, during these procedures, vital

information retrieval is done only after the final visual

inspection procedure. Algorithm loop is made

beginning with the initial screening of the container

to demonstrate the containers rearrangement cycle.

IMS is used only after the final revision procedures

and its expert support functionality is not adopted at

full scale. In many cases, data introduction to the

information management system is done manually

using human operators’ onsite when a 100%

screening policy is applied. ATS then collects this

data for further container management. Was that data

correct? It depends on the human experience level.

Therefore, this link between external decision support

systems and operators working onsite must be

adopted in a new technological solution via intelligent

container concept, previously proposed by the CSI.

Only then, IMS and the supporting systems will bring

the highly anticipated security level to the transport

whole transport chain and will utilize the ATS at full

scale.

In this case, a 3 stage container check is done to

ensure the security at 100%. In other words, in order

to obtain the vital security information in due time,

statistical data introduction to the information

management system must be done prior to the

operator intervention to ensure security of the

personnel in the vicinity of the stack and to minimize

the response time, if such needed. Container risk

group assignment procedure for the ATS is done at a

new terminal after the previous container security

check was performed and data was collected. Stack

assignment procedure is casual for every case. It

depends on the security threat and transportation

timetable. Casualty must be changed with the new

initiatives to stack each container accordingly with its

level of security. As one may notice, many decisions,

physical activities and procedures are still done by the

operators on-site. This means that human errors are

still likely to occur on a daily basis due to fatigue,

concentration loss, harmful intentions and etc.

In case of the future terminal autonomy and

shipping autonomy, these procedures must be

eliminated and ATS system must be reconfigured.

Nonintrusive inspection may vary between the

applied systems for screening. Despite the fact that

physical inspection of the contents of a container

remains the most effective security measure, it is also

one of the costliest and unsafe measures available to

authorities. Although 100% physical inspection

would be ideal in all situations, this remains an

impossible goal given current trade volume and used

standardised technologies. Information update rule

applies to all incoming containers. Detection of

threats and specific cargos is done in advance to

eliminate unnecessary time for container introduction

to the general inspection procedures to save

transportation time. This could benefit the

overflowing data streams within the organizations

and minimize the risks of faulty information

acquisition by the information management system

when working without human interference. It must be

done before the introduction to the stack, during the

unloading procedure. On the other hand, intrusive

inspection can only be performed by operators and

the problem of false data interpretation and

introduction to the containers management system

Container unloading process

Container risk

group assignment

Stack

assignment

procedure

Initial screening of

container

Secondary

screening

Container placement

in stack

Visual

inspection

Visual

inspection

Container physical

transportation

Container physical

transportation

Container physical

transportation

Data introduction to the

Information

management system

Intermodal Containers Transportation: How to Deal with Threats?

511

still exists. Both scenarios are ended in the same

manner when each container is stored in terminal in a

stack. Human interaction elimination and sufficient

time resource optimisation can be achieved using

remote and autonomous monitoring of the

environment by each container individually. This

security measure eliminates human visual inspection

procedure from the process and transforms it into

system inspection. It is safe to assume, that each

container interaction with a human operator increases

the risk level of the procedure in the whole conception

of intelligent and autonomous container initiative.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Analytical research of resources and other study

opportunities in container terminals all around

Europe showed that existing container security

screening equipment and procedures for intermodal

cargo terminals does not assess the available ICT

resources and their higher efficiency in solving the

problems of terrorism. Attention is drawn to the lack

of embedded cargo detection systems in the key parts

of the transport chain. Particularly in the

transportation of containers between several ports. It

implies the presumption that only new technological

components integration into a single ITC

infrastructure is the only solution to achieve higher

security level and to ensure the competitive position

in the global market for separate larger and even

smaller logistics companies. New containers revision

and screening intelligent mechanisms must be

developed for container terminals and can be

integrated into the existing CSI concept.

Additional regulations, procedures and legal

measures must be placed in case of possible detection

with a high probability level. Therefore, a suggestion

is made, that the adoption of new methods and their

full integration, up to the working standards, is

possible only when there is a certain degree of trust in

the new technologies from all actors of the transport

chain. For instance, new systems integration must be

done in a step-by-step manner. It could be done

locally in a single port for experimental reasons using

single company’s IT infrastructure for containers

security investigation up to the working standards.

This mixture could present practioners’ with all the

relevant adoption information that is now so crucial

to the working environment of the entire transport

chain operation. Disregarding the probability of

ineffective usage of new methods may result in

further stagnation in the area of new standard

development within the CSI objective and could

cause even further stagnation in the development of

the intelligent container concept.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Authors acknowledge that there is no financial

interest or benefit arising from the direct applications

of this research.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research is/was funded by the European

Regional Development Fund according to the

supported activity ‘Research Projects Implemented

by World-class Researcher Groups’ under Measure

No. 01.2.2-LMT-K-718-01-0081.

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