Rethinking Forest Management: A Participatory Blockchain-based

Governance Approach

Sven Willrich

, Felix Melcher

and Christof Weinhardt

FZI Forschungszentrum Informatik, Haid-und-Neu-Straße 10-14, 76131, Karlsruhe, Germany

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany

Keywords: Blockchain, Governance, Forest, Participation, Business.

Abstract: The forest is a high-potential area for many stakeholders, provides valuable contributions to the climate, is

profoundly important for sustainability with respect to resources, biodiversity, and so forth. In contrast,

today’s forest is frequently managed in a top-down organizational flow where some stakeholders are involved

in decision-making whilst others remain uninvolved but still affected. Meanwhile, the process of digital

transformation takes place in almost any realm and shows up new ways of participation and of how people

can secure their interests. Against this background, we rest on scientific literature and the current forest

management situation in Germany and introduce the blockchain technology as a potential enabler for a

participatory management (PM) of forest. At the end, we discuss economic potential and incentives for forest

owners since adoption is closely linked to acceptance of such models.

1 INTRODUCTION

The forest is a complex system with several functions

for different stakeholders as it has a high importance

in the endeavor of reaching climate goals, e.g., it

absorbs billions of CO

globally every year (Canadell

and Raupach, 2008) and plays an important role for

the preservation of biodiversity. Meanwhile, the

forest is a place for leisure and recreation for people

(a recreational function). Furthermore, it provides

additional services, e.g., timber supply (productive

function). While recreational and productive

functions increase the intensity of intervention

(because exploiting the forest’s productive function is

in conflict to nature protection), the protection

function focuses on maintenance of, for example,

biodiversity, tree species composition, nature

protection measures and so forth (Herbert and Kant,

2010). Overall, these functions address crucial

economic, ecologic, and social value (Ní Dhubháin et

al., 2007), (Karppinen, 1998).

Next, precisely these functions are those that are

requested by different stakeholders – depending on

her interest and their appropriate power of self-

assertion. This is why forest management can be

modeled as a multi-objective optimization problem

where the weights are set depending on the individual

utility functions for the participating stakeholders. In

this process, stakeholders are involved in and affected

by forest decisions. In the end the forest is a source of

natural resources to deliver raw wood, otherwise the

society should benefit by its health – therefore a

sustainable forest management is in everyone's

interest (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),

2006). Hence, a balanced management is of

importance.

Consequently, we argue that especially the forest

as a public good might be a suitable candidate of

being governed in a participatory manner instead of a

single person or institution (for more reasoning, see

section 2). From this point of view, our aim is to

sketch a forest management vision for the future

where stakeholders have the ability to participate in

co-decision-making. In order to achieve this, we first

introduce our use case where we describe the current

situation in Germany (section 2). Following this, we

introduce blockchain (here synonymously used to

distributed ledger technologies, short DLT) in general

and related concepts of decentralized governance.

Especially as candidates that might be able to tackle

such challenges arising when participatory-driven

governance across multiple stakeholders is sought-

after. To support our blockchain approach, we argue

with the aid of a process (Wust and Gervais, 2018)

helping us to answer the question if a blockchain

Willrich, S., Melcher, F. and Weinhardt, C.

Rethinking Forest Management: A Participatory Blockchain-based Governance Approach.

DOI: 10.5220/0007949101390146

In Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications (ICETE 2019), pages 139-146

ISBN: 978-989-758-378-0

139

makes sense or not (section 3). In section 4, we

present a participatory and blockchain-based forest

management approach and in section 5, we highlight

managerial / business opportunities and incentives to

adopt such a blockchain-driven approach.

2 PARTICIPATORY

MANAGEMENT

Participatory management (Guyot, 2012) is not new

and already broadly examined in the context of

natural resource management (Reed et al., 2009),

including the way how stakeholders are to be

identified (Reed, 2008). This reasoning is also

supported by the principle 10 of the Rio declaration

on environment and development (McAllister, 1992):

“Environmental issues are best handled with the

participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant

level. At the national level, each individual shall have

appropriate access to information concerning the

environment that is held by public authorities,

including information on hazardous materials and

activities in their communities, and the opportunity to

participate in decision-making processes. States

shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and

participation by making information widely

available. Effective access to judicial and

administrative proceedings, including redress and

remedy, shall be provided.”

Furthermore, participatory management is closely

linked to participative decision-making and the

relationship to satisfaction and performance of

decisions are examined (Black and Gregersen, 1997).

Nevertheless, participatory management is frequently

discussed in terms of an organization instead of a

public good or a natural resource, although it is

further objective of research. For example, the

Tanzanian government had applied participatory

management for a long time and researched

participatory and non-participatory forest

management in over three case studies where

community involvement seemed to be correlated with

improving forest conditions (Blomley et al., 2008).

2.1 The Forest in Germany

We describe the situation in Germany and want to

motivate the suitability and importance for this

approach, since current stakeholders are involved in

and partly affected by contemporary forestry

decisions. Therefore, the situation in Germany is the

starting point and might be applicable to other

country’s situations.

To illustrate this use case, we focus on small

private forest owners in Germany and support our

reasoning by relevant facts (UNIQUE forestry and

land use GmbH, 2018): In Germany are 1.1 million

people employed within the field forest and wood.

The annual revenue is 180 billion Euro. In contrast to

other countries, Germany is one of the largest

exporting nation for wood and wood-products. A

detailed report of the forest inventory of Germany is

updated every ten years. The data from 2012 are

showing that about 1/3 of Germany is filled by forest,

which is equivalent to about 11 billion hectare

(almost the half is held by private owners). The

question of how to farm a forest is highly important.

Next, with the growing awareness of sustainability,

an ecological viewpoint is required. In the

certification of sustainably farmed forest, Germany is

a leading nation worldwide (Bundesministerium für

Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (BMEL), 2008).

Although this seems quite good, it is frequently

highlighted that numerous potentials are not yet

exploited to its maximum. As already mentioned

above, there are many private forest owners. The

number of small forest owners (less than 20 hectares)

is estimated at 2 billion (UNIQUE forestry and land

use GmbH, 2018). In this context, potentials relating

raw wood or wood reserve within small forests are

assumed to be existing. Utilizing potentials allow for

a more sustainable usage of a forest; consequently

and among others, this may reduce dependencies on

import wood, reduction of atomic power or to slow

down climate change. These potentials are based, for

instance, on unused wood caused by absent

mobilization of wood or other objectives private

forest owners are pursuing. This includes that forest

owners have their own ambitions, which might

contradict with the common good(UNIQUE forestry

and land use GmbH, 2018). Thus, on the one hand,

forest owners have main jobs apart the forest domain

and the forest potentials are not utilized completely

(Bundesministerium für Ernährung und

Landwirtschaft (BMEL), 2008). On the other hand, a

multitude of stakeholders such as hikers or

environmentalists have desires that are not met.

2.2 Towards Participatory Governance

While such conflicting interests exist, we do not

propose an approach to dissolve such conflicts but

rather to allow participation and give the ability to

exercise one's voting right. Following a set of

participation requirements (Shepherd and Bowler,

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140

1997), we derived a subset of those required to be

satisfied when participation should happen in a fair

manner (Innes and Booher, 2004):

Requirement 1: Since every stakeholder needs

voice in order to co-decide, the entrance must be open

for everyone. No access restrictions for everyone.

Requirement 2: Since every stakeholder must

rely on the condition that his or her voice will be

given a fair consideration, the voice aggregation

procedure must be tamper-proof and in accordance

with the stakeholder preferences.

Requirement 3: Since every stakeholder has to

be able to see any activity, transparency across all

proposals and decisions need to be guaranteed.

Requirement 4: Since every participating

stakeholder has own interests and the activities and

decisions are made with respect to a public good (the

forest) with social and ecological implications, the

overall process should be conducted in a transparent

and secured manner.

Since we follow a requirement-driven approach

and to satisfy these requirements, we propose an

approach based on blockchain that is justified by a

comparison between mentioned requirements and

blockchain features.

3 BLOCKCHAIN-BASED

GOVERNANCE

Blockchain is no longer just a cryptocurrency but

nowadays applicable to so much more use cases, e.g.

governance is gaining more and more attention in the

Information Systems (IS) literature (Beck et al.,

2016) (Böhme et al., 2015).

With requirements R1, R2, R3, R4 at hand, we

propose a blockchain-driven approach for

decentralized governance (Jentzsch, 2016) where

participatory features (Ølnes, Ubacht and Janssen,

2017) are implemented.

For this purpose, we briefly introduce the rise and

today’s use of blockchain-based governance (Reijers,

O’Brolcháin and Haynes, 2016). We argue that this

approach can be a promising candidate for satisfying

participatory requirement while taking into account

the concept of decentralized autonomous

organizations (DAO) – for instance implemented

within the Ethereum protocol (Jentzsch, 2016). The

main purpose of a DAO is the decentralized

governance of “computerized rules and contracts”

(Chohan, 2017) in a transparent manner. Since DAOs

are essentially based on a blockchain, we use an

a person or a group of people

understanding of blockchain that gives necessary

preliminaries for our approach.

The rise of blockchain, often referred to as an

expression of Distributed Ledger Technologies

(DLT), has most probably begun when Satoshi

Nakamoto

had published his understanding of the

blockchain technology in 2008 (Nakamoto, 2008).

Therein, blockchain can be understood as one

potential implementation of DLT (Cachin, 2016). As

conceptualized, the blockchain potentials come from

its distributed structure – resulting in the missing

necessity of intermediaries. Where the trust in

platforms can become a problem, blockchain

provides an alternative way to interact without the

need of trust (Hawlitschek, Notheisen and Teubner,

2018). Hence, intermediaries, such as lawyers,

brokers, or bankers, cease to be a vital or

indispensable part of transactions. Through its shared

ledger and its consensus mechanisms, transactions are

persistent in a transparent, immutable, and traceable

way (Nakamoto, 2008) and consequently protected

from deletion, tampering, and revision (Iansiti and

Lakhani, 2017). Furthermore, a blockchain may offer

the ability to trigger transactions automatically. This

automation is possible by smart contracts. With this

feature at hand, a blockchain is empowered to execute

Turing complete programs that are able to react when

certain conditions are met (based on the implemented

contract logic) and then trigger events (Buterin and

others, 2014).

With those smart contracts, it is possible to write

DAOs as a digital and decentralized autonomous

company (Swan, 2015). This concept raises

popularity as it was added by the Ethereum

Foundation to their public blockchain protocol

(Jentzsch, 2016). It is strongly aligned to blockchain-

driven governance that is decentralized and trust-less.

To setup a decentralized governance on a blockchain,

there might be rules that describe how the

organization handles different situations when certain

conditions are met (if we focus on the concept of a

DAO, it definitely belongs to it). Beside the technical

specifications of decentralized governance, there are

also social-economic impacts on how organizations

are steered and managed. Because there is no central

authority on top of the organization, it is possible to

create a distributed, self-organized, and non-

hierarchical social structure (Reijers, O’Brolcháin

and Haynes, 2016).

Furthermore, it is common sense that today’s

organizations are usually coordinated and controlled

in a centralized way – in this case, a classical top-

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141

down flow is applied. In contrast, a DAO follows a

bottom-up approach. In the start-up phase of a DAO,

an initial coin offering (ICO) takes place. That way,

tokens (used synonymously to coins) are offered and

can be bought by shareholders who then participate in

a group / co-decision decision process where different

voting systems can be used (Pilkington, 2016).

3.1 How Our Requirements Justify a

Blockchain

The topic around can be regarded as a hype (Carson

et al., 2018), this is why we argue very carefully.

On the one hand, we have our mentioned

requirement for a participatory forest management

vision. On the other hand, we have blockchain

features that might be required. Anyway, if they are

held to be required, they definitely yield a higher

system complexity. To support our argument for the

application of a blockchain approach, we gradually

go through a process that helps answer if a blockchain

is advisable for getting applied. This process is

conducted and closely linked to our requirements R1

– R4 and takes blockchain properties into account

such as public verifiability, transparency, privacy,

integrity, redundancy, and trust anchor. The

following questions are part of the decision process

(Wust and Gervais, 2018).

The first question is: (1) Do you need to store

state? Since the blockchain stores both, the forest

state data and the history of participatory-driven

decisions, we answer the question with yes (satisfying

requirement 3). (2) Are there multiple writers? Since

multiple stakeholders are involved in taking part in

co-decision-making, we answer this question with

yes. (3) Can you use an always online TTP? TTP

means trust third party, i.e., a party that has trust of

those involved. Indeed, this question is hard to

answer. Our first assumption is that the participants

(the stakeholder) have own interests and objectives –

hence at least incentives exist to manipulate or tamper

upcoming data in an (un)intentionally way. Our

second assumption is that a participatory-driven

forest management system of a public good should

not be assigned to the responsibility of one single

party (satisfying requirement 2 and 4). Therefore,

the answer to this question is no; no always online

TTP can be used. The next question is: (4) Are all

writers known? Due to the openness of the forest and,

consequently, the system, the answer is no.

Potentially every stakeholder can decide to become

part of the system and henceforth in the co-decision-

making (satisfying requirement 1). The structure can

be designed in such a way that every stakeholder is

able to participate and access is not restricted to

anybody.

According the proposed process, the

recommendation is that a permissionless blockchain

can be a technical solution. Taking this into

consideration, we sketch a participatory and

blockchain-based governance approach for a

visionary forest management alternative in section 4.

4 A PARTICIPATORY FOREST

MANAGEMENT

We describe a forest management approach enabling

stakeholders to co-decide while the forest owner

dispenses from its right to decide solely. At this, a

stakeholder can put his preference into a

superordinated co-decision-making process, which is

embedded in a participatory forest management

(PFM), see Figure 1.

4.1 The Life Cycle Process

The PFM is modeled according to the Business

Process Model and Notation (BPMN), where we

differentiate between three stages: (1) a construction

phase that acts as long as the start-up continues and

which embraces all nodes until the state Tokens

emitted. Afterwards, (2) an operational phase that acts

while the system is running and spans until the

shareholders decide against its further existence (after

the event Voting finished). For the sake of

completeness, the life cycle (3) ends with a

deconstruction phase.

First, the PFM is non-initialized. The process

starts with the willingness of the forest owner to adopt

a PFM. Hereafter, the construction phase (1)

initializes the state of the forest by inserting the forest

inventory data into the blockchain (database Forest

State Data (DB) in Figure 1). Next, a forest invariant

(FI) is derived. We use the FI to describe a desired

state of the forest. The data stored in the (blockchain)

DB has to fulfil the conditions of the FI. The forest

invariant is satisfied as long as the described state is

fulfilled by the forest. The real data is stored and

maintained in the DB, i.e., while the DB contains

specific values representing the state of the forest, the

FI describes the valid value ranges which DB data has

to fulfil. The invariant is a describing ruleset that, for

instance, consists of basal area (a factor indicating the

timber stocks) or the amount of timber for energy

purposes. Those condition attributes describe the

desired real-word state of the forest and have to be

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Figure 1: Life Cycle Process of a Forest Management System.

compared periodically. In the participatory process,

the shareholders have to exercise their voting right to

agree on conditions. The initial value for the FI is

derived by the current state of the forest. After the

construction phase has finished, the FI is satisfied.

However, as time passes, the forest is changing by

deforestation, forestation or other natural and non-

natural affecting activities.

In the last activity of the construction phase, with

Start ICO the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is

conducted, i.e., every stakeholder has the opportunity

to buy or sell shares (tokens in a blockchain meaning)

and hence to gain voice to co-decide. Once a certain

amount of shares has been emitted, the construction

phase ends with the event Tokens emitted.

The next nodes focus on the running system, the

operational phase (2). The first node is an event and

indicates that the forest satisfies the FI condition.

Whenever an event occurs, the Receive event activity

catches the signal and propagates the flow further. An

event can be stimulated by shareholders endeavors or

by forest changes. Shareholders might express wishes

towards the forest and trigger polls by proposing a

topic to which every shareholder can vote - a voting

phase is conducted and finished by the Voting

finished event. In the Invariant change co-decided

flow, every voting has a result possibly affecting the

FI, i.e., that means the shareholders can collectively

co-decide on the FI. Afterwards, the flow goes back

to the gateway and follows the Forest or invariant has

changed flow. Since the invariant has changed by the

FI update and whenever the shareholders conduct a

voting, the next activity is to check if the invariant is

still valid. That activity takes the invariant and

ensures that the current forest values satisfy the FI.

While satisfying, the flow goes back to the Invariant

satisfied event. Otherwise, there are any deviation

from the wished forest state and the FI condition is

violated. Consequently, the system automatically

triggers compensating activities leading to forest state

changes again (the Time has passed event indicates

that time is needed and should elapse after activities

have been triggered). This is a loop starting from

Receive event to the Time has passed. The exit

condition is met whenever the forest state satisfies the

FI.

After a voting for deconstruction has finished, the

branch PFM deconstruction co-decided will be taken,

that means the shareholders have to co-decide against

the further existence of the participatory forest

management system. At this point, the outcome is the

deconstruction phase (3) via the activity

Deconstruct PFM and ends with the event PFM

destroyed.

4.2 Special Characteristics

Beyond the life cycle process discussed beforehand,

there are further explanations worth considering to

provide a comprehensive understanding.

Data Insertion. The immediate action is to insert the

forest inventory data into the blockchain database.

Attention should be paid to this point, as both storage

capacity and authenticity of data being inserted are

critical. First, large amounts of data may usually be

stored in distributed cloud file storages instead of

multiplying them across all blockchain nodes

(Wilkinson, Lowry and Boshevski, 2014). This way,

data aggregations can be used to reduce the amount

of data. Second, ensuring data correctness is

Rethinking Forest Management: A Participatory Blockchain-based Governance Approach

143

challenging. While blockchain let contracts and data

become solid and tamper-proof, that the data are

correct and represent the reality can not be

guaranteed. To tackle this problem in the forest

domain, it might be mentionable that the forest is

publicly visitable and everyone is able to verify the

data. Lastly, in a participatory forest management, we

could also argue that the data insertion process might

work in a participatory manner.

Token / Shares. Tokens are part of the incentive

schema on blockchain (Catalini and Gans, 2016).

Typically, tokens are shares held by shareholders

where every stakeholder might become a shareholder.

A decentralized organization such as a PFM has

assigned a token that, in turn, has a demand-driven

course. That way, every shareholder has an interest to

behave according to the interests of stake- and

shareholders since they all affect supply & demand.

Voice to Co-decide. Voting systems are established

to coordinate among participating members (Osgood,

2016). The voice gives someone the right to co-decide

or to propose topics. Every stakeholder has that right

as he or she has become a shareholder by buying

tokens. An example for a co-decision might be the

voting question whether the amount of timber for

energy purposes should be increased (to apply the

example mentioned above). In this regard, the

existence of a multi-stage voting system could be

discussed where veto power is given. A forester or an

environmentalist might have veto power to pursue

legal purposes or higher interests.

5 HOW ECONOMICAL

INCENTIVES MAKE NEW

BUSINESS MODELS POSSIBLE

We believe that our PFM vision will both target

inequalities among affected stakeholders and offer

new business opportunities to create economic

values. Here, we discuss a business model innovation

disrupting established forest business models by

utilization of blockchain benefits. The main

disrupting fields can be described alongside the

Business Model Canvas (Osterwalder and Pigneur,

2013) where we have innovations especially in the

sectors of Value Propositions, Customer

Relationships/Segments and Revenue Streams. The

newly items of the value proposition are the

transparent state and activities concerning forest as

well as the participation process itself. Moreover, the

opportunity to generate additional income through

new revenue streams by novel services offered in the

context of forest is limited to the wealth of ideas of

the shareholders; a completely new set of services

based in the forest is imaginable. These services in

turn generate new income opportunities. For

example, the monetarization of ecosystem services is

expected in the future. Ecosystem services describe

ecosystems that influence human well-being. The

underlying economic value was estimated by the EU

at 200 to 300 billion euros. This high economic value

is hardly used (Knoke, 2017). The decentralized

participation of new stakeholders could make use of

these ecosystem services and create additional

income streams, especially for forestry enterprises.

In order to make these innovations possible, it is

necessary to set incentives for forest owners so they

have an interest and increased willingness in handing

over the freedom to decide to others. The benefits for

a forest owner are, on the one hand, the increased

liquidity after (s)he has sold shares (of a well-

managed forest) and, on the other hand, the accruing

income by margins of additional services. Another

factor is the relief provided by a participatory forest

management, i.e., since participation steers the forest

management, the forest is managed without active

further intervention by the forest owner. This is in line

with the above introduced fact that small forests are

often not well managed because small forest owner’s

main jobs are possibly apart from the domain of forest

and its management (UNIQUE forestry and land use

GmbH, 2018). From shareholder’s point of view, the

incentive to buy shares is justified by getting co-

decision voice to be able to co-decide. Moreover,

there is an economic incentive to act in common

interests and on behalf of the forest since the

attractiveness of forest shares is reflected in the price

of tokens. Share-based returns on services could also

be expected from economic effective forest

management.

Beyond the possibilities of an innovative business

model, the legal aspects of DAOs and the Smart

Contracts on which they are based must be taken into

account. Since a permissonless blockchain knows no

borders, it must be secured by law internationally.

Contract law varies widely from country to country,

so it is difficult to make a general statement about the

legal enforceability of smart contracts. In order to

create a framework that, like the current legal system,

regulates conventional contracts, the following points

must be clarified: contractual capacity, loss of

contract due to errors, identification of an offer and

acceptance, follow-on contractual relationship,

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security of conditions and interpretation of the

contents of judges and lawyers (Giancaspro, 2017).

6 CONCLUSION

With our work, we have proposed a participatory

forest management by applying benefits of the

blockchain technology. To use blockchain for

governance purposes is not new (Reijers,

O’Brolcháin and Haynes, 2016), but it seems still not

be examined intensively so far. With respect to

participation and forest management, there is – to the

best of our knowledge – no contribution so far.

Hence, we have sketched a visionary participatory

forest management aiming at a reduction of

inequalities between stakeholders, to set economic

incentives for the benefit of the forest owner to reach

a better common good by incorporating claims of

different stakeholders. Limitations of this system are

numerous, i.e., from the specific design of the

mentioned life cycle activities, the legal aspects, the

complexity, acceptance, usability of the system, and

so forth. Potentials, on the other hand, are possible in

ecological, economical, and social areas by inherent

blockchain features, for example transparency,

immutability, openness and automation of technical

processes. Following this, further research might

focus on the feasibility of those potentials and the

question of how to treat the mentioned limitations,

e.g., to address the power structure for decision-

makers: distribution constraints of tokens to

shareholders, number of shares per shareholders to

prevent too much control per stakeholder. Overall,

blockchain is a promising candidate to disrupt

business models (Hwang et al., 2017), (Oh and

Shong, 2017), to change the way people take part in

co-decision processes (Lafarre and Van der Elst,

2018), and – in our opinion – to allow participation in

the forest management for the future.

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