All the developers of the publicly available ran-
somware prototypes states that their main motivation
was educational. However, a well documented ran-
somware code would also help to-be-cyber-criminals
to enter the ransomware business. Since ransomware
prototypes remain available on the Internet, the ethi-
cal question here is whether security researchers need
to publish and share full ransomware codes without
feeling accountable of the consequences, a recognized
ethical issue.
4 RANSOMWARE
INTELLIGENCE
Herr and Rosenzweig suggest that a piece of code
is cyber-weapon when it combines “propagation, ex-
ploitation, and payload [i.e., damaging] capabilities”
(Herr and Rosenzweig, 2015). Each components,
despite innocuous in separation, carry the potential-
ity to be combined with the missing others into a
weapon. However, to have a military use, a software
‘ must create or tangibly support the deployment of
destructive effects. These could be short term, where
deleted data is restored from backup, or near perma-
nent, where a payload is designed to damage a de-
vice’s firmware” (Herr and Rosenzweig, 2015).
Ransomware may have such a destructive effect.
For sake of an example, at the time of the writing,
June 2019, the major electricity supplier in South
Africa’s city of Johannesburg was attached, leaving
more than a quarter of a million people in the dark.
Another attack forced a shutdown of its websites and
billing systems as a precautionary measure.
Ransomware variants, called wipeware, can wipe
data clean. Allegedly deployed to attack Saudi en-
ergy companies and Iranian oil companies, they had
destructive consequences. One variant of it, Shamoon
wiper, has been released to attack Sony Pictures En-
tertainment, succeeding to avoid the outing of ‘The
Interview’, a documentary mocking the North Ko-
rean dictator, Kim Jong-un. If we adhere to Schmid’s
claims that “terrorist violence is predominantly polit-
ical” (Schmid, 2011), such events can be considered
also “terrorist attack” .
If ransomware are to be regarded as cyber-
weapons, as we claim, could it be conceivable to ap-
ply intelligence and counter-intelligence strategies to
mitigate the threats and control the consequences of
an attack? And, if yes, how?
Cyber-Intelligence has been defined as “the pro-
cess by which specific types of information important
to national security are requested, collected, analyzed,
and provided to policymakers, the products of that
process”(Lowenthal, 2016). Duvenage et al. (Duve-
nage et al., 2015), call this positive intelligence, to
distinguish it from counter-intelligence, which is the
countering of an hostile intelligence activity.
Ransomware Positive Intelligence. For ran-
somware threat, positive intelligence could consist in
gathering information about modalities of working.
It should be about how the ransomware propagates,
exploits vulnerabilities, and executes it payload. In
the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), several initia-
tives exist aiming to collect and analyse information
gathered from public or open sources. An example
is the NoMoreRansom project
1
. It aims to inform the
public and to collect incidents reports, including to
gather the information from public platforms that can
be potentially utilized by ransomware authors. Other
platforms, although not specifically dedicated to ran-
somware, such as the Malware Information Sharing
Platform (MISP)
2
—a free and open source software
helping information sharing of threat intelligence,
including cyber-security indicators—can offer tools
that enable intelligence analysis. Such platforms can
be employed to control the information flow during
an attack, spreading alerts following a Warning and
Coordination action, and to help potential victims
“raise their shields” as soon as possible.
Ransomware Counter-intelligence. According
to (Coleman, 2009), Counter Cyber Intelligence
(CCI) is the ensemble of “all efforts made by one
intelligence organization to prevent adversaries,
enemy intelligence organizations or criminal orga-
nizations from gathering and collecting sensitive
digital information or intelligence about them via
computers, networks and associated equipment”. It
can be implemented using strategies that, according
to Panda Security, a cyber-security company, either
consists of “leaving doors open” (i.e., left access
points unprotected on purpose), “inject fake infor-
mation” (i.e., fake confidential information), and
“keeping them busy while stealing” (i.e., watching
and obtaining information about the attacker).
Looking into the internet and searching for
“counter-intelligence for ransomware”, we have
found that the majority of the initiatives to pro-
tect from ransomware attacks focuses on rais-
ing awareness. For instance, the US National
Counter-intelligence and Security Center (NCSC) has
launched in January 2019 a campaign “Know the
Risk, Raise Your Shield”. The Cybersecurity and In-
1
https://www.nomoreransom.org/en/
2
https://www.misp-project.org/.
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