Coalitional Power Indices Applied to Voting Systems

Xavier Molinero, Joan Blasco

2020

Abstract

We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple games just consider parties, players or voters. Here, we also consider games with a priori unions, i.e., coalitions among parties, players or voters. We measure the power of each party, player or voter when there are coalitions among them. In particular, we study real situations of voting systems using extended Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices, the so-called coalitional power indices. We also introduce a dynamic programming to compute them.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Molinero X. and Blasco J. (2020). Coalitional Power Indices Applied to Voting Systems. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - Volume 1: ICORES, ISBN 978-989-758-396-4, pages 372-376. DOI: 10.5220/0009166803720376

in Bibtex Style

@conference{icores20,
author={Xavier Molinero and Joan Blasco},
title={Coalitional Power Indices Applied to Voting Systems},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - Volume 1: ICORES,},
year={2020},
pages={372-376},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0009166803720376},
isbn={978-989-758-396-4},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - Volume 1: ICORES,
TI - Coalitional Power Indices Applied to Voting Systems
SN - 978-989-758-396-4
AU - Molinero X.
AU - Blasco J.
PY - 2020
SP - 372
EP - 376
DO - 10.5220/0009166803720376