Address-bit Differential Power Analysis on Boolean Split Exponent Counter-measure

Christophe Negre

2020

Abstract

Current public key cryptographic algorithms (RSA, DSA, ECDSA) can be threaten by side channel analyses. The main approach to counter-act such attacks consists in randomizing sensitive data and address bits used in loads and stores of an exponentiation algorithm. In this paper we study a recent counter-measure ”Boolean split exponent” (Tunstall et al. 2018) preventing differential power analysis on address bits. We show that one of their proposed protections has a flaw. We derive an attack exploiting this flaw and we successfully apply it on a simulated power consumption of an RSA modular exponentiation.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Negre C. (2020). Address-bit Differential Power Analysis on Boolean Split Exponent Counter-measure.In Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 3: SECRYPT, ISBN 978-989-758-446-6, pages 632-637. DOI: 10.5220/0009891306320637

in Bibtex Style

@conference{secrypt20,
author={Christophe Negre},
title={Address-bit Differential Power Analysis on Boolean Split Exponent Counter-measure},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 3: SECRYPT,},
year={2020},
pages={632-637},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0009891306320637},
isbn={978-989-758-446-6},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 3: SECRYPT,
TI - Address-bit Differential Power Analysis on Boolean Split Exponent Counter-measure
SN - 978-989-758-446-6
AU - Negre C.
PY - 2020
SP - 632
EP - 637
DO - 10.5220/0009891306320637