![](bg6.png)
amount of neutralization time in random attack sce-
narios is up to 5 times compared to multiple path
scenarios. This is because the number of neighbors
in the random attack scenario is greater than multi-
ple path scenarios. From the five adversarial prefixes
sent, the average number of attacks on the random
scenario reaches 10.08 attacks, compared to 4.52 at-
tacks received by BlockJack routers in multiple path
attack scenarios. If we take a sample of random attack
scenario with 50 routers, on average BlockJack needs
0.957 seconds to neutralize 12.04 attacks of five ex-
periment attempts. That record is equal to 0.08 sec-
onds to neutralize a single attack.
The standard deviation of prepending and neu-
tralization time is also seen constant in single path
and multiple path scenarios with an average range
of 8.2488 seconds to 11.6154 seconds for prepending
time and 0.0162 seconds to 0.0188 seconds for neu-
tralization time. While the average standard deviation
of prepending and neutralization time in the random
attack scenario was recorded at 20.3712 seconds and
0.8998 seconds, respectively.
4 RELATED WORK
The closest work to our research is the work proposed
by Sfirakis et al., (Sfirakis and Kotronis, 2019). In
the paper Sfirakis et al., introduced the concept of
a Blockchain-based prefix hijacking prevention us-
ing Bitcoin. The proposed system has been tested
in Quagga router software. However, this system re-
quired the AS owner to provide share coins for every
prefix authorization or prefix verification requests, as
the blockchain need miners to attach new blocks to
the blockchain.
5 CONCLUSION
Although the Prefix Authorization and Prefix Ver-
ification processes can ideally be handled in one
BGP Update message, several conditions will cause
a race condition between processes that occur on
the Blockchain and processes that occur in BGP. In
this paper we presented how Blockjack addresses this
specific issue. BlockJack also manages dynamic-
multiple hijacking scenarios due to changes in the
BGP attribute values which cause dynamic changes
in determining the best-valid path in the BGP routing
table.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The first Author is a Scholarship Awardee of the
Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP)
of the Republic of Indonesia, with the LPDP ID
20193221014024. This research is partially funded
by the Optus Macquarie University Cyber Security
Hub.
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