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Figure 7: Download Overhead.
sibility of achieving a secure key management fully
controlled by the end cloud customer. Accordingly,
transitive trust is established between the key Man-
agement System on-premise and the SGX appliance
hosted in the cloud. Hence, the suggested KMSGX
allows executing on-premise software key manage-
ment system securely in cloud providers side through
accessible hardware facilities to control sensitive keys
at low cost directly by the end-user.
We strengthen this work by formally proving the
security properties of the protocol using the Applied
Pi Calculus. Thus, we formally proved that the sug-
gested scheme provides authentication of the SGX ap-
pliance, and the secret keys confidentiality of the se-
cret keys. As a future direction, we plan to extend
this work by considering a distributed setting where
multiple nodes or clouds are involved. The aim is to
design a system that operates in an untrusted multi-
cloud environment.
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