Anti-money Laundering by Restricting Financial Transactions
Yuri Truntsevsky
1 a
and Stanislav Dolganov
2 b
1
Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia
2
Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia
Keywords: Criminal law, operational-search activities, banking, crime, money laundering, banking.
Abstract: The goal of this research is to study the methods of money laundering with the development of science-based
measures to identify committed and prevent planned unlawful acts by competent units of law enforcement
authorities performing operational-search activities. To achieve this goal, the following research methods
were used: analysis, abstraction, description, comparison, generalization, inquest, dialectics. Analysis of the
current situation shows that, despite the awareness of the money laundering problem at the global level and a
significant improvement in the legal framework, the number of annually registered crimes in this category
does not decrease. The research of methods of money laundering and the determination of their features, made
it possible to determine the directions for improving the system of measures for detecting and preventing
crimes, as well as to develop recommendations for the inclusion in the current legislation of legal norms aimed
at temporarily limiting (prohibiting) transactions with monetary funds and other assets. The practical
significance of the research lies in the fact that the proposals presented in the article can contribute to the
development of an effective mechanism for combating money laundering.
1 INTRODUCTION
The seriousness of the money laundering problem
throughout the world is evidenced by the fact that the
fight against this negative phenomenon is relevant for
many international organizations. For example, the
UN Security Council resolutions provide for
measures to restrict (prohibit) financial transactions
with a certain circle of individuals and organizations
in order to combat the financing of terrorism.
According to the official statistics of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, 950
crimes were registered in 2020 in Russia,
responsibility for which is provided for by Articles
174 and 174.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation, an increase was 0.4% in comparison with
the previous reporting period (FKU "GIATs Ministry
of Internal Affairs of Russia", 2021). What can also
signal about the lack of measures taken to reduce the
level of money laundering?
As a result of effective interaction between
banking organizations and authorities performing
operational-search activities (hereinafter - OSA), it is
a
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9906-0585
b
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6165-3916
possible to identify committed and prevent planned
unlawful acts (Alaeddin et al, 2019; Sartor, Beamish,
2020). Accordingly, in order to fulfill the tasks
assigned to law enforcement authorities, it is
necessary to study the main features of money
laundering, methods of committing crimes, since
without this knowledge it is rather difficult to fully
implement the entire range of necessary measures
aimed at countering crimes of this category (Singh,
Best, 2019).
The money laundering issue is anyway addressed
in the researches of domestic and foreign experts of
criminal law and operational-search activities.
However, currently, there are many unresolved issues
related to the provision of information by banking
organizations to law enforcement authorities about
possible suspicious activities of banking entities
related to the need to improve legislation on
restricting (prohibiting) illegal financial transactions
in order to effectively respond in real time.
Wherefore, this research, in addition to studying the
methods of money laundering, pays attention to the
development of science-based measures to identify
and prevent this category of crimes by law
Truntsevsky, Y. and Dolganov, S.
Anti-Money Laundering by Restricting Financial Transactions.
DOI: 10.5220/0010625100003152
In Proceedings of the VII International Scientific-Practical Conference “Criminal Law and Operative Search Activities: Problems of Legislation, Science and Practice” (CLOSA 2021), pages
5-9
ISBN: 978-989-758-532-6; ISSN: 2184-9854
Copyright
c
2021 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
5
enforcement units performing operational-search
activities, taking into account the specifics of
domestic legislation, and formulated proposals for its
improvement.
2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
In the course of the research and data collection,
attention was drawn to both the global and domestic
state of the money laundering problem. Various
methods were used to obtain up-to-date and reliable
data.
An analysis of scientific literature and research on
the selected topic was performed for the period from
2015 to 2020, using search databases. Keywords
included a combination of analytical concepts and
types of criminal activity. Then secondary selection
criteria were added to the search queries, the search
included only peer-reviewed sources. The following
resources were mainly used: Elibrary, ProQuest
Scopus, Web of Science. All query results were
processed manually to determine their relevance to
the research issue. As a result of the work done, many
sources that are directly related to the researched
issue were excluded from the initial list. Empirical
research was focused on. Such criteria made it
possible to significantly narrow the range of
researches relevant for the data analysis in terms of
their methodological significance, as well as an
assessment of empirical conclusions that were
significant for the research.
In course of the research, surveys and interviews
were conducted among law enforcement officers,
state supervisory authorities of banking, managers
and employees of banking and credit organizations,
specialists of criminal law and the theory of
operational-search activities in Moscow, the Russian
Federation, where most banking and credit
organizations are registered and operate (208 of 406
(Bank of Russia)). In total, 30 people of each category
were interviewed, with a total of 120 respondents for
October - December 2020. All surveys and interviews
were analyzed, the results were compared with data
from publications of other researchers.
The empirical basis of the research was the
official information of law enforcement authorities on
the registered facts of committing unlawful acts in
this category and the number of criminal cases
initiated, as well as sentences passed by Russian
courts of various levels.
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Money laundering always acts as an additional
criminal act that takes place after the commission of
a predicate offense. Based on the data obtained as a
result of the analysis of criminal cases and court
sentences conducted in the course of the surveys and
interviews, it was established that among the main
predicate offenses are corruption crimes against
property and of economic activity, committed in
banking, real estate and construction, foreign
economic activity, consumer market, fuel and energy,
timber and agro-industrial complexes.
Despite that the money laundering facts can be
detected by almost any authority that conducts OSA,
the overwhelming majority of crimes in this category
are detected and disclosed by specialized divisions of
the Internal Affairs Directorate and the Federal
Security Service (FSB).
The most popular method of money laundering is
the acquisition of high-value assets owned, according
to the results of expert research, by 94% of persons
who have committed predicate offenses (Rodichev,
2016). In this case, criminals do not always register
property in their own name, asking for help in rights
registration to persons who are in trust with them
(Demetis, 2018). According to the survey results, in
most cases, such persons are close relatives of the
lawbreakers (parents, children, spouses).
Considering that low official incomes of
nominees (Ravenda et al, 2019), as well as payments
for transactions from settlement accounts of “fly-by-
night companies” (Bahoo, 2020), can act as signs of
money laundering through the acquisition of high-
value assets, in this case, not only the task of the OSA
related to the detection, prevention, suppression and
disclosure of crimes can be performed, but also the
task of identifying the property subject to confiscation
(Federal Law № 144-FZ, Article 2, 1995). Also, one
of the most common ways of money laundering is the
conversion of funds from the national currency into
other types of currencies. This method feature is that
the criminals receive a large amount of cash into the
account, and immediately acquire another currency
with it, usually freely convertible (Asteriou et al,
2021).
To acquire currency, criminals, as a rule, select
people with low income (students, pensioners,
migrants) who are ready to take part in such schemes
for a small fee. Nominee buyers are used in the
scheme in order to avoid fixing the personal data of
real buyers of foreign currency at the credit
institution. Immediately after the transaction, the
currency is transferred by nominee buyers to
CLOSA 2021 - VII INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC-PRACTICAL CONFERENCE “CRIMINAL LAW AND OPERATIVE SEARCH
ACTIVITIES: PROBLEMS OF LEGISLATION, SCIENCE AND PRACTICE”
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criminals. According to the results of a survey of law
enforcement and government officials on banking
supervision, 86% of criminals using this method of
legalization prefer US dollars and EURO.
The considered method of legalization often has
the following features:
1. the contacts of persons purchasing the currency
with persons who have committed a crime
preceding the money laundering from such an
offense. Often, visits to credit institutions and the
purchase of foreign currency by nominee buyers
take place under the control of the beneficiaries;
2. purchase of foreign currency in large amounts by
persons aged 18 to 23 and over 60;
3. purchase of foreign currency in large amounts by
foreign citizens, as a rule, of the CIS member
states, without further transfer to the countries of
which they are residents.
It should be noted that crime documentation,
during operational-search activities, is facilitated by
the availability of video recording equipment with
which credit institutions and ATMs are equipped. In
this case, the joint visits to credit institutions by
nominal buyers and offenders, assistance to dummies
in filling out documents for the purchase of currency,
as well as its transfer to offenders after purchase can
be confirmed.
In accordance with the OSA tasks, in this case, it
is advisable to send relevant inquiries to credit
institutions within the OSA “Inquiry”, in compliance
with the requirements established by law (Federal
Law № 144-FZ, Article 6, 1995).
As a rule, lawbreakers resort to another method
when it is necessary to legitimize the funds received
by them of criminal schemes related to embezzlement
of public funds in the execution of state and municipal
orders, business activities. In this case, the offenders
include the money and property obtained in a criminal
way into legal activity by paying for the purchased
goods, services rendered, fulfillment of credit
obligations and other reasons.
The transfer of funds to the settlement accounts of
legal entities and individual entrepreneurs is
performed by criminals, as a rule, shortly after the
commission of the predicate offense. The fancy
financial transactions will be evidenced by the
documents that served as the basis for their
commission (contracts, payment orders, etc.), copies
and originals of which can be obtained by the bodies
authorized to perform OSA by inquiries.
Splitting large sums into smaller ones and then
crediting them to one account is another way that
criminals use to legalize illegal funds.
In this case, lawbreakers, as a rule, are aware that
if the amount of monetary funds or property
transaction is greater than or equal to 600,000 rubles
or equivalent to 600,000 rubles (when performing a
transaction in foreign currency), it is subject to
mandatory control in accordance with the legislation
and credit institutions are obliged to submit relevant
information to Rosfinmonitoring (The Federal
Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring)
is a federal executive body of Russia that performs
the functions of countering the money laundering and
the financing of terrorism, as well as on the
development of state policy, legal regulation and
coordination of activities in this area of other federal
executive bodies).
Accordingly, Rosfinmonitoring does not have
information on transactions less than the indicated
amount, if credit institutions themselves do not
provide information on financial transactions in
amounts less than the amount established by law if
there is a suspicion of the legality of their
performance. However, given that such transactions
usually have one beneficiary and are performed in a
relatively short period of time, the use of automated
monitoring and analysis systems of transactions by
credit institutions could have a positive effect on
counteracting this type of activity.
It is worth emphasizing that criminals often use a
combination of several methods to legalize. The
lawbreakers choose the method taking into account
the specifics of the illegal activity, but, as a rule, it
includes transit payments through the accounts of
intermediary firms with the subsequent cashing of
funds.
It is necessary to be conscious of the fact that the
method of legalization is determined by criminals
based on the object features (cash or non-cash funds,
real estate, etc.), the presence of ties with the
executive authorities and organizations performing
banking activities, geographic location and other
circumstances. Although, it is worth noting that
recently criminals are not limited to illegal activities
within the national borders of one state. Criminal
organizations have benefited from a growing global
marketplace and technological advances in
communications and transportation (Lord & Levi,
2017, Bahoo et al, 2020). According to the Europol
Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment
(SOCTA), based on the analysis of collected data on
organized crime, as well as intelligence stored in
Europol databases, seven of ten organized crime
groups operate in more than three countries
(European Police Office (Europol), 2017).
About 1% of GDP within the EU is attributed to
Anti-Money Laundering by Restricting Financial Transactions
7
illegal financial activities such as money laundering.
This corresponds to approximately EUR 160 billion
(Premti et al, 2020) Moreover, the identification and
investigation of transnational crimes is complicated
by the lack of proper interaction between the
authorities of national states, their evasion from
providing legal assistance to other countries (FATF,
2020
).
A negative phenomenon can also be the fact that
banks and credit organizations often report the
implementation of suspicious transactions long after
they were performed (Truntsevsky, 2011). Shortfalls
in the banking sector regulation are revealed in the
course of international studies of mass money
laundering with the participation of large
international banks. For example, the ICIJ report
(International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists) states that only for the period from 1999
to 2017, the internal control employees of financial
institutions identified suspicious transactions that
showed signs of possible money laundering or other
criminal activity totaling over USD 2 trillion,
including USD 514 billion at JPMorgan and USD 1.3
trillion at Deutsche Bank (ICIJ, 2020, Schnauder,
2020).
Remarkably a transaction that is suspicious in
terms of financial transparency is not necessarily
evidence of criminal behavior, but each such
transaction deserves attention and appropriate
scrutiny (Lord, Wingerde & Campbell, 2018, Xie,
Reddy, Liang, 2017). In this regard, it seems logical
to develop and apply legal norms that allow the
competent authorities of OSA to temporarily restrict
(prohibit) the financial and other transactions with
monetary funds in the presence of reliable
information about the crime commission, in cases
where delay may lead to concealment proceeds from
crime (96% of respondents agreed with the feasibility
of this proposal).
4 CONCLUSIONS
Despite the importance of timely response to the
revealed facts of criminal activity and the expediency
of blocking offense-related property, in truth, there is
a problem of the quick decision-making process on
blocking funds and other property. In this case, the
OSA authorities do not have the powers to block
offense-related property. Accordingly, if there is
information about the illegal transactions and
financial transactions, a number of approvals shall be
made to prevent their fulfillment, to prevent the
withdrawal of funds abroad.
The bank accounts blocking shall have a legal
basis, and arbitrariness on the part of employees of
operational units shall also be excluded. It seems
appropriate to allow the competent authorities to
temporarily restrict (prohibit) the financial and other
transactions with monetary funds or assets at the
legislative level for a period of up to three days in the
production of impatient postponements of the OSA.
These norms should be applied in cases where delay
may lead to the concealment of the proceeds of crime.
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