Coordination Mechanisms with Misinformation
Constantinos Varsos, Constantinos Varsos, Michail Fasoulakis, Giorgos Flouris, Marina Bitsaki
2022
Abstract
We introduce a novel approach for coordination mechanisms in games, based on the idea of misinforming players about the game formulation in order to steer them towards a behaviour that leads to an improved outcome in terms of social welfare. As a use case, we study single-commodity non-atomic congestion games with parallel links and affine cost functions. We propose a simple mechanism that provides to the players the right incentives to adopt a socially optimal behaviour by misinforming them with regards to the latency functions of the links, under various assumptions. We use a metric called the Price of Misinformation to quantify the effect of misinformation on social welfare (compared to the optimum of the actual game), and show that our mechanism can minimise this metric, resulting in values that are better than the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the social outcome without any intervention from the designer).
DownloadPaper Citation
in Harvard Style
Varsos C., Fasoulakis M., Flouris G. and Bitsaki M. (2022). Coordination Mechanisms with Misinformation. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 1: ICAART, ISBN 978-989-758-547-0, pages 237-244. DOI: 10.5220/0010836100003116
in Bibtex Style
@conference{icaart22,
author={Constantinos Varsos and Michail Fasoulakis and Giorgos Flouris and Marina Bitsaki},
title={Coordination Mechanisms with Misinformation},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 1: ICAART,},
year={2022},
pages={237-244},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0010836100003116},
isbn={978-989-758-547-0},
}
in EndNote Style
TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 1: ICAART,
TI - Coordination Mechanisms with Misinformation
SN - 978-989-758-547-0
AU - Varsos C.
AU - Fasoulakis M.
AU - Flouris G.
AU - Bitsaki M.
PY - 2022
SP - 237
EP - 244
DO - 10.5220/0010836100003116