Side-channel Analysis and Countermeasure for Implementation of Lattice-based Signature

Kazuhide Fukushima, Hiroki Okada, Sofiane Takarabt, Amina Korchi, Meziane Hamoud, Khaled Karray, Youssef Souissy, Sylvain Guilley

2022

Abstract

Lattice-based cryptography is believed to be a promising candidate for post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The NIST announced that the third-round finalists in the standardization project of PQC (NIST-PQC) and four out of seven finalists are lattice-based cryptography. An implementation is desired that is resistant to side-channel analysis for the widespread use of lattice-based cryptography. This paper studies possible side-channel analysis on the signature scheme MLWRSign, a lattice-based signature scheme. We apply differential power analysis to the implementation of MLWRSign to specify all the sensitive parts. The experimental results show that only Karatsuba and Toom-Cook multiplications can be vulnerable to DPA with the Hamming weight power consumption model. Furthermore, we propose masking countermeasures for multiplication: inter-functional and intra-functional masking. Our lightweight countermeasure is beneficial to further enhance the security of post-quantum cryptography, which is naturally resistant to side-channel attacks.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Fukushima K., Okada H., Takarabt S., Korchi A., Hamoud M., Karray K., Souissy Y. and Guilley S. (2022). Side-channel Analysis and Countermeasure for Implementation of Lattice-based Signature. In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, ISBN 978-989-758-590-6, pages 701-706. DOI: 10.5220/0011328400003283

in Bibtex Style

@conference{secrypt22,
author={Kazuhide Fukushima and Hiroki Okada and Sofiane Takarabt and Amina Korchi and Meziane Hamoud and Khaled Karray and Youssef Souissy and Sylvain Guilley},
title={Side-channel Analysis and Countermeasure for Implementation of Lattice-based Signature},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT,},
year={2022},
pages={701-706},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0011328400003283},
isbn={978-989-758-590-6},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT,
TI - Side-channel Analysis and Countermeasure for Implementation of Lattice-based Signature
SN - 978-989-758-590-6
AU - Fukushima K.
AU - Okada H.
AU - Takarabt S.
AU - Korchi A.
AU - Hamoud M.
AU - Karray K.
AU - Souissy Y.
AU - Guilley S.
PY - 2022
SP - 701
EP - 706
DO - 10.5220/0011328400003283