Structural Change on East Asia: Hegemonic Stability Theory
Asih Purwanti
National Sun Yat-sen University
Keywords : Hegemonic Stability Theory, East Asia, structural change
Abstract : Looking at East Asia today can be seen that there is a structural change happens in this region. During the
Cold War time, people believed that the U.S. and Japan are acting as a hegemonic power served in the
region. But today, people may see several important phenomena occurred in the region: (1) the rising power
of the PRC both in economy and military in the region, (2) the growing threat from the North Korea, (3) the
decline economy strength of Japan, (4) the reluctant U.S. under Trump administration towards East Asia’s
intra-region problem. These conditions had left both South Korea and Taiwan at the most vulnerable
position. Therefore it is easy to argue that there is a structural change occurs in East Asia region. But using
Hegemonic Stability Theory as a lens, I argue that there are no structural changes in East Asia. It can be
argued that although Trump is trying to convince the world that the U.S. will be no longer to serve as a
hegemon in the world, the U.S. is still serving as a leader in East Asia. Japan is also still having their
economic power as the major power in the region. South Korea and Taiwan are maintaining their traditional
relations with the U.S. and Japan. And for the PRC, although its growing economic and military power is
clear, but PRC is not acting as a hegemon who sacrifice their attributes to serve as a leader in the region. At
last, even though North Korea is now acting unexpectedly with their nuclear weapons, East Asia region
remains stable because the U.S. still performs as one hegemonic actor who is willing to maintain the stable
relations among actors in the region.
1 INTRODUCTION
International relations according to Hegemonic
Stability Theory (HST) is a structural system.
Although there are no hierarchical manners in the
relationship among states, the international system
somewhat remains stable because of the structure in
international sphere where one or two states are
willing to be the leader among others. In this
situation, the proponents of HST argues that when
the international system changes, so will the
incentives and behaviour among actors. So it is the
‘structure’ which is determined by a hegemonic
major power who will be the main influencer on the
international system. And whenever the structural
scheme is changed, it will definitely change the
international system.
This paper aims to look at whether HST is still
relevant to study the actors’ behaviour in
International Relations. East Asia today can be
argued as one dynamic region in the world because
of the composition of the actors and the structure of
power in the region. We can ignore the fact that the
agenda of the world politics today must have words
such as China, North Korea, the US, nuclear
weapons, and security. I want to look at how HST
can be one good tool to explain the dynamic in East
Asia. First, I present how HST explains the world
works. How this perspective has a strong position in
International Relations. Second, I compare HST to
other perspectives, the Defensive and Offensive
Realism in analyzing actors’ behaviour in
International Relations. Third, how HST explain the
interactions among actors in East Asia.
2 HEGEMONIC STABILITY
THEORY (HST)
My work will be quite similar to Liu and Hung’s
paper in 2011 as they also support that HST is still
applicable in explaining international politics in East
Asia. However, Liu and Hungs present their
argument in the context of transformations brought
by globalization and focus in world’ realm that the
US has declined and China has arisen. Following
Purwanti, A.
Structural Change on East Asia: Hegemonic Stability Theory.
DOI: 10.5220/0010274300002309
In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Pacific Region, pages 139-142
ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0
Copyright
c
2022 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
139
Samuel Kim’s words (2004): “With the Korean
peninsula as its strategic pivot, it is the one and only
international region or subregion where the world’s
four major powers China, Japan, Russia and the
US uneasily meet and interact and where their
respective interests coalesce, compete, or clash in a
situation-specific way” (Liu and Hung, 2011).
The hegemonic stability argues that whenever a
world order dominated by a single power
(hegemony) will be most stable order and will have
the most open economic order among actors. HST’s
argument is based on Charles Kindelberger
proposition that is an open and liberal world
economy requires the existence of a hegemonic and
dominant power. It is further held that greater
aggregate wealth will be produced under such a
world order (Kindleberger,1973). According to
Kindleberger, “a liberal economic order needs
leadership, a country which is prepared, consciously
or unconsciously, under some system of rules it has
internationalized, to set standards of conduct for
other countries; and to seek to get others to follow
them...” (Kindleberger, 1973). Robert Gilpin
suggests that “a liberal international economy can
only be formed and maintained through the support
of the most powerful state or states in the system”
(Gilpin,1975).
Keohane mentions that Underlying this statement
is one of the two central propositions of the theory
of hegemonic stability: 1) that order in world
politics is typically created by a single dominant
power. Since regimes constitute elements of an
international order, this implies that the formation of
international regimes normally depends on
hegemony. 2) The other major tenet of the theory of
hegemonic stability is that the maintenance of order
requires continued hegemony (Keohane, 1984).
Emphasizing on Kindleberger words, "for the world
economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer,
one stabilizer" (Kindleberger, 1973). This implies
that cooperation, which we define in the next chapter
as mutual adjustment of state policies to one another,
also depends on the perpetuation of hegemony
(Keohane, 1984)
To some extent, it is easy to categorize HST as a
variant theory of international politics, this is
because of their arguments that it is the attributes of
the system which will affect the actors’ behaviour.
However, Keohane rejects the idea that a
deterministic version of the theory of hegemonic
stability, relying only on the Realist concepts of
interest and power is indeed incorrect (Keohane,
1984). As Keohane notes, There is some validity in
a modest version of the first proposition of the
theory of hegemonic stability—that hegemony can
facilitate a certain type of cooperation—but there is
little reason to believe that hegemony is either a
necessary or a sufficient condition for the emergence
of cooperative relationships. Furthermore, and even
more important for the argument presented here, the
second major proposition of the theory is erroneous:
cooperation does not necessarily require the
existence of a hegemonic leader after international
regimes have been established. Post-hegemonic
cooperation is also possible” (Keohane, 1984).
Therefore according to HST, an international
cooperation will be well developed whenever one
hegemonic power is present. The hegemonic power
will be the only actor who is able to sacrifice itself to
maintain the cooperation among states in the world.
HST also suggests that a stable cooperation will only
happen in a liberal society which will lead to a free
market international economy where there will be
openness and non-discrimination. For a hegemon, it
is important to be able to maintain its role as a leader
in the system, the hegemon should be committed to
the values of liberalism or its social purpose and
domestic distribution of power must be favorably
disposed toward a liberal international order. For
HST, cooperations most likely will develop in the
economic area, but the leader should provide also a
condition of military security to ensure the
development of a free-market international
cooperation.
3 HEGEMONIC STABILITY
THEORY, DEFENSIVE
REALISM, AND OFFENSIVE
REALISM
Meanwhile, defensive realism sees that cooperation
as a tool to survive within the anarchical world.
Therefore defensive realist like Stephen M Walt
suggests that states in order to survive, states need to
cooperate in the form of alliance. Walt suggests that
in an anarchy situation, states form alliances to
protect themselves (Walt, 1987). This behavior is
influenced by a perception of threats, the state
eventually will be likely to choose to create an
alliance with other actors to balance the hegemonic
power. The perceptions of the threat and the
intentions of other actors determine the one state’s
action. Defensive realists suggest that the policy
makers should make policies that deescalate the
threats. Cooperation, according to defensive realism,
will be most likely to occur in the area of economic
ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations
140
and security where foreign aid will be closely related
to the alliance formation. Foreign aid will be
important in a balancing behaviour because aid is
usually a manifestation of political alignment, not a
cause of alignment. So according to defensive
realism, security cooperation will be conducted prior
to the economic cooperation.
In contrast to defensive realism, offensive
realism departs from a view that the anarchical
structure of an international system is defined by
major powers. To offensive structural realists like
John Mearsheimer, states likely try to be the
hegemon in the system. In this kind of situation,
major powers will be the most important actors in
the systems while the weaker actors will follow the
behaviaour of the major power (Mearsheimer,
2001). Under this circumstances, cooperation is
assumed to be difficult. But, Mearsheimer argues
that cooperation still can be developed where
cooperation takes place in a competition at its core
so that states will take advantage of other states. In
contrast of defensive realism, offensive realist will
suggest that state needs to pursue power so therefore
states should be offensive. Offensive realism will be
most likely to suggest that states need to develop
foreign policy in order to secure their survival.
Cooperation according to offensive realism will be
part of the states’ ultimate goal to gain the absolute
power as hegemony. Therefore, for offensive
realism, states should project their attributes
economically and military to gain the power, in
other words, states should use all strategies for
survival to shift the balance of power in their favour
and to prevent other states from shifting against
them.
The three perspectives offer a different view on
cooperation, based on the ‘realistic’ pictures of the
international relations, where cooperation and non-
cooperation schemes are occuring frequently. To
borrow Keohane’s words, “cooperation then is not
simply a situation without conflicts, but more as a
process that involves the use of means to stimulate
mutual adjustment” (Keohane, 1984). Another critic
for HST comes from Peet (1992). Peet argues that
although HST currently dominates the field of
contemporary political explanations of international
trade operating within the theoretical context of
political realism. As Peet notes, the world trade has
continued to grow, in contradiction to the theory's
predictions, numerous ad hoc explanations have
surfaced which offer an account for the rise in trade
while attempting to bolster hegemonic stability
theory. Peet suggests that HST should include the
domestic and international variables which are
related to the practices of some democratic industrial
states to continue to increase their influence in the
world trade in spite of a decline in the hegemonic
status of the United States.
4 HEGEMONY STABILITY IN
EAST ASIA
Some people argue that there is a structural change
happens in East Asia today. For a long time, people
believe that the U.S. and Japan are acting as a
hegemonic power served in the region. But now,
people may see the rising power of China both in
economy and military, the growing nuclear threats
from North Korea, the decline economy strength of
Japan, the reluctant US under Trump administration.
This situation has left South Korea and Taiwan at
the most vulnerable position.
The above facts lead to an assumption that the
US is no longer the leader or hegemon in East Asia.
The US has lost its leadership position in the
regions structure. But using HST as a lens we can
see that there are no structural changes in East Asia.
Although Trump is acting to take the US out from
East Asia sphere and no longer willing to sacrifice
herself as a hegemon in the world, the U.S. is still
serving as a leader in East Asia. Japan is still having
their economic power, South Korea, and Taiwan
now are more likely seeking support from the US
and Japan. And regarding China. although its
growing economic and military power is clear,
China is not acting as a hegemon who is willing to
sacrifice her attributes to serve as a leader in the
region. Therefore, even though North Korea is now
acting unexpectedly with its nuclear, East Asia
remains stable because there is one hegemonic actor
who is able to maintain status-quo relations among
actors in the region.
While Ikenberry (2004) points out that to study
the interactions among actors in East Asia. Ikenberry
argues that the old American hegemonic order will
remain a critical component of East Asian order in
the future. The cooperation between the US and East
Asian countries create comprehensive relations
between the parties. The US maintains its role in
security provider in the region. As Ikenberry notes,
China may serve well in the economic dimension
and China shows a close relationship to the US, but
China still needs a long way to take over the US
presence in East Asia particularly in strategic terms.
Related to the hegemony stability, Ikenberry
mentions that “The dangers to today’s liberal
Structural Change on East Asia: Hegemonic Stability Theory
141
hegemonic order are twofold. One is the growing
duality and disjunction between where the region
sees its economic and security futures.
Economically, most East Asian countries
increasingly expect their future economic relations
to be tied to China. In terms of security, most of
these countries continue to expect to rely on
American alliance protection”. Ikenberry
emphasizes that the rise of China lead East Asia to
have a more close security link to the US (Ikenberry,
2004). From here, we can see that the US still play
as a significant major power in East Asia.
Beeson (2006) highlights that East Asia still
cannot refuse the US influence in the region and at
the same time the US also needs East Asia because
the context of Asia Pacific is declining. Moreover,
the rise of China as economic competitor leaves the
US to opt for a closer relationship to East Asia.
According to Beeson, “In the multi-layered political
architecture that is emerging across East Asia, intra-
regional ties are likely to become an increasingly
important, functionally necessary, and normatively
preferable part of regional practise and identity, in a
way the Asia-Pacific never has or could” (Beeson,
2006).
The rise of China’s power is indeed a significant
nuance in East Asia. But it is not necessarily that the
region is looking for a dependence scheme with
China. As Ross notes, ‘the region is becoming
increasingly more economically dependent on China
than on the United States. But the rise of Chinese
military power is less uniform; China is balancing
U.S. power, but in distinct theaters, rather than
throughout the region” (Ross, 2006). In this context,
China may offer an appealling economic
performance, but China still cannot draw attention
from countries such as Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan in military strategic terms.
According to Lui and Hung, the HST remains
applicable in the case of US security architecture in
Northeast Asia because the traditional diplomatic
allies still rely on US military presence in the region
to deter aggression from potential belligerents (Liu
and Hung, 2011). Liu and Hung notes that China is
still undergoing rapid economic development,
internal stability remains an important factor in the
maintenance of regional security. Liu and Hung
suggest that the US is still the dominant actor to
maintain the regional order in East Asia while China
is may play in regional stability and remains a tough
bet for other states in maintaining security (Liu and
Hung, 2011).
5 CONCLUSION
To sum up, looking at East Asian regional structure
in international relations realms, I argue that there is
no significant change in the system. Indeed, that
China is rising as an important player with its
economic power. However, in terms of security and
ideology, China has not yet replace the US as the
hegemon. Looking at the very recent event, when
the world has been patiently watching the talk
between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in
Singapore this year, it is obvious that the US still an
important player in East Asia. China and North
Korea do not show attitude to abandon the US.
Moreover, the rest of East Asian coutries; Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan are definitely still holding
on the strong US influence in the region.
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