Vladimir Putin’s Leadership Trait Analysis in Russia’s Responses
towards China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative
Bara Bhiswara
Universitas Airlangga
Keywords: OBOR, EEU, Vladmir Putin, Foreign Policy, Leadership Characterictic
Abstract: The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative initiated by Xi Jinping in 2013 is not only interesting because of
its great vision, but also because of the international responses towards it. Russia, as a country that has traces
of fluctuating relations with China and then shows a positive response on the initiative. Russia’s response
then mainly associated with the interests of Russia in the 20th century to reappear as a great country. The
Chinese idea was answered with an ambitious notion: the integration of the OBOR framework with the
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) framework. The characteristic of the case makes the Russian leader,
Vladimir Putin, the focus of the individual who is important to be analyzed in both the cognitive and
psychological aspects, in which Putin is the central actor of the formulation of Russia’s foreign policy. The
data sources from this research are Putin's prepared statements from press, conferences, and international
events, and Putin’s spontaneous comments in interviews with Putin on television, press, to direct lines.
Through Leadership Traits Analysis method, this article analyzes Putin’s leadership characteristics through
seven main components: individual beliefs in controlling the situation, the need for power and influence,
conceptual complexity, self-confidence, task orientation versus interpersonal, suspicion or individual distrust
of the other party's motives, and the bias level in the group. From the research that has been done, found that
in this case, Putin classified as a reactive leader, where he focuses on assessing the possibilities of what is in
a situation and what factors can make that possibility possible, and accommodative leader, where he focuses
on reconciling differences and consensus building, empowering others, and sharing accountability in the
process.
1 INTRODUCTION
“The state has to be strong, but it has become weak”
(Putin, 2000).The above statement declared by
Vladmir Putin when he occupied the presidential
bench in 2000. Russia's foreign policy has been
driven by the orientation to be recognized as great
power. As is known, the condition of Russian
geography does not provide a form of natural fortress.
As a result, to ensure the safety of the state while
protecting its national interests, Russia needs a strong
hard drive. Consequently, the regime of the Russian
government is personalistic and its institutional
strength weakens, in which political power is
centralized to one individual (Kotkin, 2016).
Guaranteed by Articles 80 and 85 in the Constitution
of the Russian Federation, the centrality of authority
can be seen from the design of government under
Romanov, Lenin, Stalin, to Putin. Putin himself is
committed to ending the chaos and corruption that
rife in Yeltsin era while restoring Russia's position as
great power (Hutcherson and Petersson, 2016). This
led to a contract with the public, that the absolute
authority of the president must be paid with security
for the security and welfare of Russian society
(Braithwaite in Baldoni, 2016).
The initiative of One Belt One Road (OBOR)
initiated by the President of China in boosting
connectivity and cooperation between Eurasian
countries, especially China, the state Silk Road
Economic Belt (SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road
(MSR) state then raises the opportunity to Putin
utilize the project to fulfill its commitment. Russia
itself has a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) project,
which is the economic union of countries dominated
by Northern Eurasia, Russia, Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Cooperation between
China and Russia has been dominated by energy
aspect. Both Russia and China have a great influence
in Central Asia. The presence of OBOR especially
SREB brings the idea to integrate it with EEU project.
Russia's positive response was shown through Putin's
Bhiswara, B.
Vladimir Putin’s Leadership Trait Analysis in Russia’s Responses towards China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative.
DOI: 10.5220/0010274400002309
In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Pacific Region, pages 143-150
ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0
Copyright
c
2022 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
143
visits to China, his speech at the OBOR forum, as
well as in interviews he conducted with the media.
The centralistic nature of Russia's foreign policy
makes analysis of Putin's leadership characteristics
important. This paper will review what leadership
characteristics Putin has shown in its responses to the
OBOR initiative.
2 INDIVIDUAL LEVEL OF
ANALYSIS: LEADERSHIP
TRAIT ANALYSIS
An important point of approach in the level of
individual analysis lies in the fact that foreign policy
is not always taken in vacuum conditions, and always
involves the psychological and emotional influences
of individuals in the policy-making process. The
psychological aspect, according to Herman (1980)
comes from social and environmental factors.
Nevertheless, one of the main criticisms came from
Simon (1957 in Baldoni, 2016) that basically not all
individual policy-makers are rational. More
precisely, their rationality is bounded in the sense that
there is a tendency for individuals to simplify the
choices made due to the limited information
processed, cognitive ability, and time. Greenstein
(2004) also explains that human characteristics are
strongly influenced by the existing political
environment, both at the national and international
levels. That is why Breuning (2007) says that the
significance of individuals in shaping foreign policy
patterns is not equivalent in every situation.
Breuning (2007) explains there are at least three
approaches in analyzing how the influence of
individual characters in policy making, namely
Operational Code, Presidential Character, and
Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA). In this paper, the
influence of Putin's characteristics on Russian foreign
policy analyzed by the author through the LTA
approach. There are seven indicators that need to be
analyzed: individual beliefs in controlling the
situation, the need for power and influence,
conceptual complexity, self-confidence, task
orientation versus interpersonal, suspicion or
individual distrust of the other party's motives, and
lastly the bias level in the group (Breuning , 2007). Of
the seven indicators can then be used to draw
understanding of individual characters more macro,
such as motivation in overcoming problems and in
relational activities (Breuning, 2007). The LTA
method is chosen because the author assess this
approach can draw a comprehensive understanding of
the different types of leadership traits in various
aspects of Putin's influence in policy-making or in
acting on behalf of Russia.
In understanding Putin's character in these
aspects, the author analyzes two types of data sources,
namely prepared statements and spontaneous
comments. The first type of data the author gets
through Putin's official statement in other press,
conferences and international meetings. Types of data
sources of both author get from interviews to Putin by
television, press, until the direct line. The difference
between spontaneous and prepared statements is
significant. Prepared statements are valid for analysis
in assessing cognitive characteristics when policy-
making is involved in making such questions.
Hermann (2002) also revealed that spontaneous
commentary, which emerged from interviews and
abrupt questions, showed more valid results due to
less control and less constraint. But in the case of the
author, Putin is certainly not only involved, but may
be a responsible actor full reply to each question, due
to the centrality of authority possessed in Russia's
foreign policy making. That is why the author
collaborates both data derived from prepared
statements and spontaneous statements in future
analysis.
3 ANALYSIS
3.1 Belief in Controlling Situation
This character reviews how policy makers perceive
their control over the situation. Putin has an
expectation that participating countries can uphold
the values of equality, openness, and consideration of
their respective national interests and each other. That
is, Putin understands exactly which program can
provide benefits for Russia, as Putin said in a working
visit in China on May 15, 2017
“Russia is not the country to fear anything. And there
is no danger at all of China’s actions being aimed
at someday swallowing others.” (Putin, 2017)
“We agree only to those proposals that benefit us,
and if something benefits us and our economy, what
is there to fear? It would be a shame not to make use
of the opportunities this cooperation creates.” (Putin,
2017).
Implicitly the statement above shows that Putin
understands the possibility of a swallowing motif
from China behind the OBOR initiative. But the
assertion that Russia is not afraid and there is nothing
to fear suggests that Putin believes it can control the
direction of OBOR's development to keep it in line
ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations
144
with Russian interests, although it is not explicitly
explained by what.
3.2 The Need for Power and Influence
Karakteristik kedua meninjau apakah suatu
pemimpin memiliki perhatian dalam The second
characteristic examines whether a leader has an
interest in establishing, maintaining or restoring its
influence on others. Putin's need for power or
influence on others in which this case refers to Xi
Jinping is demonstrated through Putin's dialogue
efforts to collaborate on the idea of OBOR with an
EEU project based on universal values and
consideration of the developmental conditions of
each of the countries involved.
“It is important that all of the existing integration
structures in Eurasia and any initiatives be based on
universal and generally recognised foundations. They
must also take into accounts the spesifics of the
member states national development models and be
developed openly and transparently.” (Putin, 2017
dalam pertemuan meja bundar pemimpin Forum
Internasional Belt and Road tanggal 15 Mei.)
While the need for power, the author refer to the
political power is something natural for Putin,
because to be able to control the situation, Putin need
to survive a predominant leader. Putin's centrality of
authority requires a less constraint situation from
domestic. For that, Putin needs to get support from
the Russian community to stay in his regime.
“I think that people are able to see that I am working
hard, that I am striving openly, honestly
and sincerely to achieve the results the results our
country needs. I think that they are also able to see
that not all goes well. Our people are smart
and sharp-sighted.” (Putin, 2016).
In an interview from Nippon TV and the Yomiuri
Newspaper on December 23, 2016 over Putin's
expectations in the 2018 election, Putin responded
with emphasis that Putin knew what Russia needed,
and Putin worked hard for it. Putin himself confirmed
it will advance in the 2018 general election on
December 6, 2017 (Pinchuk and Osborn, 2017).
3.3 Conceptual Complexity
This character looks at the way individuals describe
or discuss a person, a place, a policy, and an idea.
Putin demonstrated consistency in describing the
initiative both in revelations prepared for high-level
meetings and in media interviews with both positive
and optimistic verbal gestures. An example is an
interview from Cai Mingzhao, Xinhua news agency,
June 23, 2016, Putin said that Xi Jinping's initiative
in the OBOR project is believed to be something
appropriate, interesting and also promising.
“....President Xi Jinping has launched an initiative
to revitalize the very idea of the Great Silk Road. We
believe it is a very timely, interesting and promising
initiative aimed at increasing cooperation with all
countries of the world, but primarily with
neighbours, because wherever the road goes, it first
runs through neighbouring territories.”(Putin, 2016).
In answering media questions at the APEC Economic
Leaders' meeting on November 21, 2016, Putin also
brought the idea of a possibility with a clear
determination and vision of its implications for the
future of APEC and Eurasia.
“...we are discussing the possibility of aligning
the EAEU and China’s Silk Road Economic Belt
initiative based on the ideas of the Chinese
leadership and President Xi Jinping. This could be
the first step”(Putin, 2016).
“A second step could be the development
of cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation and other Asian associations. By acting
in this manner, we can create a broad Eurasian
cooperation association.(Putin, 2016).
“If we opt for this path, our organisation will be
comparable to what is being created within
the framework or in the zone of Pacific partnership.”
(Putin, 2016).
“However, I believe that if we want to effectively
influence global economic processes there should be
no closed associations. If such associations are
created, they will not boost the development
of international trade or the global economy
as a whole.”
Putin's low complexity gap and deterministic
expectations have been basically built by Putin since
the first meeting of the Supreme Economic Citi-
lanisation Council (SEEC) on May 8, 2015 since the
EEU began, saying that the integration arrangements
between the Eurasian economy and OBOR are
important to conserve. The co-operation between
China and EEU for Putin will increase investment
flows, create jobs, and make Eurasian transportation
more effective.
“...I think that in the future, we should also consider
the possibility of a harmonious alignment
of the Eurasian economic integration process and,
as I already said, the Chinese Silk Road Economic
Belt initiative.”(Putin, 2015).
“I am sure that close cooperation with Chinese
partners will facilitate the flow of investments into
Eurasian Economic Union, help create new jobs,
Vladimir Putin’s Leadership Trait Analysis in Russia’s Responses towards China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative
145
and allow us to develop the Eurasian transport
potential more effectively.” (Putin, 2015).
“I am confident that these large-scale projects will
result in intensive trade, modern production and jobs
and the rapid development of Russian and Chinese
regions.”(Putin, 2017).
“I have already mentioned Russia’s proposal
to create an Asian Energy Ring. What could be bad
about China, South Korea, by the way, and Japan all
working together on a single major project? There is
no doubt that this would benefit all these countries
from both an economic and a political point of view.”
(Putin, 2017).
In a journalist's direct line on July 15, 2017, Putin
again emphasized his expectation that OBOR will not
stop at the koporasi level within Eurasia, but also
integrate it with the EEU framework.
“....I expect it to usher in a new stage of cooperation
in Eurasia, and not only there. The main thing for us
to do is to join our efforts within the framework of the
Eurasian Economic Union and China’s Silk Road
initiative. Can this be done or not? I am confident it
can...”. (Putin, 2017)
“Greater Eurasia is not an abstract geopolitical
arrangement, but, without exaggeration, a truly
civilization-wide project looking toward the
future." (Putin, 2017 in International Belt and Road
Forum, 14 May).
Putin's article entitled "The 25th APEC Economic
Leaders' Meeting in Danang: The Together Towards
Prosperity and Harmonious Development on
November 8, 2018 above then confirms the
importance of OBOR and EEU collaboration through
the Greater Eurasian Partnership idea. GEP integrates
the development of infrastructure, including
transport, telecommunications, and energy. Russia
considers that the future of Eurasian cooperation is
not just limited to the relationship between the state
and the economy, but also on the political aspects,
including peace, stability, and well-being of Eurasia.
3.4 Self Confidence
This character looks at the self-importance of an
individual in a situation. China itself is an economic
giant that shows an ambitious vision through OBOR.
In a question posed by journalists to Putin in Putin's
working visit in China on May 15, 2017 concerning
whether or not there was any concern about Russia's
domination of China, Putin said Russia was not at all
worried about the possibility of Chinese domination.
During this time, Putin said that the relations between
China and Russia were built by the considers of their
respective national interests.
“Russia is not the country to fear anything. And there
is no danger at all of China’s actions being aimed
at someday swallowing others.”
“We agree only to those proposals that benefit us,
and if something benefits us and our economy, what
is there to fear? It would be a shame not to make use
of the opportunities this cooperation creates.”(Putin,
2017).
Departing from these beliefs, Putin believes that
OBOR will bring benefits to both Russia and China.
The act of not taking a chance, even with full
understanding of the possible negative possibilities, is
considered a shame. Assessment of Putin's
confidence in its policy towards OBOR can also be
reviewed in the statement summarized in conceptual
complexity, where the delivery of a statement uses
words like i believe, no doubt, what could be bad, and
i am confident. The author did not find any sentence
like might, maybe, hope. probably, and the like. This
demonstrates Putin's high level of confidence in his
judgment behind OBOR's foreign policy process.
3.5 Task Orientation vs Interpersonal
This characteristic focuses the individual's focus on
the policy in comparison to the individual's focus on
interpersonal relationships in cooperation. In short,
leaders with task characteristics indicate the leader's
focus in policy-oriented achievement of specific
objectives. While the pemimipin with interpersonal
orientation focuses on achieving satisfaction from
team members.
“Establishing closer ties with the People’s Republic
of China, our trusted friends, is Russia’s
unconditional foreign policy priority” (Putin, 2014
dalam wawancara dengan Media Tiongkok tanggal
19 Mei.)
“It is important that all of the existing integration
structures in Eurasia and any initiatives be based on
universal and generally recognised foundations. They
must also take into accountsthe spesifics of the
member states national development models and be
developed openly and transparently.” (Putin, 2017 in
leaders roundtable meeting of International Belt and
Road Forum, 15 May.)
“For Russia, the development of our Far East is a
national priority for the 21st century.” (Putin, 2017
in his article “25th APEC Economic Leaders
“Together Towards Prosperity and Harmonius
Development”).
Basically, the OBOR project itself has several
constraints, one of which is the uncertainty in the
investment and the required material. In Putin's
working visit in China on May 15, 2017, Putin
ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations
146
stressed that the collaboration between Russia and
China would not only benefit the two countries, but
also implicate global competition.
”... I do not have any doubt that we will work together
and that this work will yield benefits for both the
Chinese and Russian peoples. But not just us two, it
will also impact global competitiveness.” (Putin,
2017).
“The initiative of the Chinese leader deserves
the closest attention and will be supported by Russia
in every possible way.” (Putin, 2017 in press
statetement regarding Russia-China dialogue, 4 July).
In Russian responses to OBOR above, it is
understood that Putin demonstrates an interpersonal
orientation, with bilateral and Chinese bilateral well-
being emphases, the development of Asia and
Eurasia, and the importance of inter-state
collaboration to succeed OBOR's initiative by
prioritizing the aspect of negotiation and diplomacy
as base relationship. In addition, there is consistency
between Putin's interpersonal orientations both in
prepared statements, personalized articles, and in
interviews with foreign media. In this case, it also
shows that Putin is a leader of respect towards
contrain, demonstrating readiness to support in any
way to China's initiative.
3.6 Level of Personal Distrust
These characters review the tendency of individuals
to suspect or doubt the motives of others. So far, the
relations between Putin and China have been built on
the value of equality, trust, openness, and
consideration of their respective national interests as
well as each other. The author did not find any idea
from Putin that portrayed any doubt about Chinese
motives and initiatives, either explicitly or implicitly.
Putin's approach is more constructive by engaging in
dialogue with Xi Jinping in developing the OBOR
project. Putin’s approach is m
In answering the question of Russia's fear of
possible Chinese ambitions to dominate, Putin also
replied that Russia is not afraid of anything, even
including the possibility of Chinese motives in
dominating other countries through OBOR. The
foundation of trust between Putin and Xi Jinping is
framed by a second agreement expressed by Xi
Jinping in conferring the Order of St. Andrew the
Apostle on 4 July 2017, namely:
“...Mr Putin and I fully agree that Chinese-Russian
relations must remain free of external influence
despite any changes on the international stage.”
This is in line with a message Putin delivered at
the St Petersburg International Economic Forum on
May 23, 2014:
“...Think about the benefits and possible dividends
you would derive from working in Russia. Don’t let
the pressure and blackmailing prevent you from
going your way, and you will succeed. And we will
help you with that.
The above message is a form of proccess advice,
whereby an individual internalizes the value owned to
the other as a form of advice in addressing the
situation (Andersen and Handelsman, 2010). From
Putin's suggestion through the above statement it can
be understood that that's what Putin values: high
determination in achieving a goal without being
affected by outside pressure or intimidation from
blackmail. This is evidenced through Putin's
statement in an interview conducted with the TASS
news agency on September 1, 2015.
“I would not agree that the illegitimate restrictions
imposed by certain Western countries against Russia
have a negative impact on Russian-Chinese
economic cooperation. On the contrary, this
encourages our domestic business to develop stable
business ties with China.” (Putin, 2015).
Putin also showed the same attitude in the direct
line with Channel One, Rossiya 1, Rossiya 24,
Mayak, Vesti FM, and Radio Rossii on June 15, 2017.
“They (perpanjangan sangsi oleh negara Uni Eropa)
have had an impact. Has this been fundamental
in nature? I do not think so.” (Putin, 2017)
“Strange though it might sound, however, there have
been advantages too. What are they? For a start, we
were forced to concentrate our intelligence, talent
and resources on key areas and not simply rely on oil
and gas revenue. What result has this brought? We
have seen real production growth in important
and complex economic sectors.” (Putin, 2017).
Putin confidently assumes that the economic
sanctions afforded by Western and European
countries to Russia are illegitimate and will not affect
their projects or bilateral relations with China over the
OBOR project. Although there is a perceived impact,
but the restrictions are precisely Putin became an
encouragement to constantly develop business ties
with China. It also shows that Putin is a challanges to
constraint leader character, in which case the
constraint in this case refers to the external constraint.
3.7 Bias Level in Group
This character examines the significance of an
individual group in influencing the individual's
perception of the world. Trenin (2015 in Baldoni,
Vladimir Putin’s Leadership Trait Analysis in Russia’s Responses towards China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative
147
2016) explains that Putin is the only actor behind
Russia's foreign policy and security policy. Trenin
said that Putin's decisions were based on what he
believed to be Russia's national interest and that his
philosophical interpretations would be true and false.
In essence, Russia's foreign policy orientation is not
always harmonious when viewed in the inner circle
level. In the period of Medvedev's presidency where
Putin became Prime Minister, there was a
contradiction of interest. Medvedev is oriented to
using political and economic measures such as
liberalizing the political system and privatization, to
curb the power of powerholders as well as to expand
Medvedev's space to maneuver. Another implication
is that Medvedev's coalition has strengthened and
opposition coalitions such as Gazprom have
weakened (Kaczmarski, 2014).
When Putin took office in 2012, Putin reshuffled this
design and disempowered power holders such as
Kudrin, Serdyukov, Surkov, and Medvedev was no
exception. This movement then gives Putin full
authority and also negates the significance of the role
of inner circle, although the relationship between the
two is always maintained (Kaczmarski, 2014). In
Russia's response to the Chinese initiative, there is no
indication of a group bias in the president's successful
presidential documents. Kaczmarski (2014) states,
that Putin's agenda to re-establish good relations with
China post 9/11 did not experience significant
domestic opposition. In contrast, OBOR is seen as a
strategic opportunity for Russia to improve the
welfare of Eurasia.
4 ANALYSIS RESULT
Table 1 : Character Analysis of Leadership: Putin in Case
Response to OBOR.
Due to the limited amount of primary data
collected in the analysis, the author use high to low
parameters to describe the level of individual
characteristics. From the analysis that has been done,
it can be concluded that Putin has high confidence in
his ability to control the situation. This is in line with
the confidence they have, seen in the choice of words
used are dominated by verbal who have a gesture of
confidence and optimism. In the aspect of the need for
strength and influence, Putin also pointed to a high
need for strength. The strength of the author here
refers to the political authority, because as it is known
to be able to ensure control over the OBOR project
and its collaboration with the EEU, Putin needs to
return to being a predominant leader of Russia. In
conceptual complexity, Putin demonstrates a rather
good way of processing information in the presence
of elaborative and visionary schemes in the answers
and statements. Motivational orientation from Putin
is interpersonal, through which answers and
statements are given, there is much emphasis on
common interests, welfare and regional development,
and bilateral collaboration. From what was said, Putin
showed no suspicion of any other party, which in the
OBOR study refers to China in general and Xi Jinping
in particular. Due to the centrality and harmonization
of orientation between Putin and the government,
there is not a bias that significantly affects how Putin
is overseas.
Hermann (2005) explains that the leader's belief
in controlling the situation indicates that they will
tend to challenge constraints according to the
arrangements they find most appropriate. Levels of
conceptual complexity and self-confidence illustrate
how their openness to information. Assessment of the
group's bias level, distrust, and task orientation or
interpersonal leaders then concludes what motivates
leaders in policy. Departing from the approach, the
results obtained are listed in table 2 below.
Table 2 :Putin's Leadership Style is related to
Responsiveness, Disclosure to Information, and Motivation
from Hermann's (2002) model.
Attitude
towards
constrain
Belief in one’s
ability to control
events
High
Need for power
and influence
High
Openness to
new
information
Conceptual
Complexity
High
Self Confidence High
Motivation Task vs
inter
p
ersonal
Interpersonal
Distrust of
others
Low
Ingroup Bias Low
Responsivene
ss to
Constrains
Openness
to
Informati
on
Problem
Focus
Motivati
on
Relationship
Focus
Motivation
Respect to
Constraints
Open to
Informati
on
Reactive Accomodati
ve
ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations
148
An open character to information is determined
through an assessment of the level of contextual
complexity and level of confidence (Hermann, 2002).
Departing from Putin's character who respects the
constraint and is open to information shows that Putin
is a reactive leader type that focuses on assessing the
possibilities of what is in a situation and what factors
can make that possibility possible. In OBOR, it is
proved through how Putin through the OBOR
collaboration idea with the EEU through the
integration of railway and highway. In relational
terms, Putin is an accommodative type of leader, in
the sense that Putin focuses on reconciling differences
and consensus building, empowering others, and
sharing accountability in the process. In the case of
OBOR, it is proved how Putin emphasized the use of
diplomacy in problem resolution, bilateral visits,
collective dialogue both in the OBOR and EEU
forums, as well as aspects of pragmatism that
prioritize the consideration of their respective
national interests and each other, not cultural
differences between the two.
5 CONCLUSION
It is understood that Putin in Russia's response to the
OBOR initiative shows a leadership style that can at
least be viewed in two ways: problem focus
motivation and relationship focus motivation. In the
first instance, Putin belongs to a reactive leader, while
in the second side Putin is an accommodative leader.
This conclusion appears based on an analysis of seven
leadership traits used by Hermann. As pointed out in
the introduction, the LTA approach is not intended to
predict what policies individuals will take, but what
leadership traits can be drawn from individual
cognitive and psychological expressions. From the
characteristics obtained then can help provide an
understanding of how the profile of Putin as a leader.
Understanding of leadership profiles is important to
review and test, because the deeper the scope of
individual analysis time is done, the relevance of the
profile can also be proven. Thus, departing from the
analysis that has been done then we can know when
and how far later Putin, using the term Hermann,
modulate his behavior in foreign policy related
characteristics owned leadership, or assumed against
it.
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Online Article
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Pulling no Surprises, Says He’ll Seek Re-Election
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russia-putin-election/russias-putin-pulling-no-
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Accessed on 15 December 2017.
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