Policy Consistency of Poland Responding to Russia’s Annexation

Policy of 2014: In the Group Level of Analysis

Achmad Romadon Mubarok and Siti Rokhmawati Susanto

International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: Poland, Ukraine, foreign policy, small groups

Abstract: The annexation of Russia to the territory of the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine in 2014 opens opportunities for

greater open conflict. The use of military instruments approved by the Upper House of Russia triggered the

protests of several neighboring countries, especially Poland. Polish-Russian attempts to normalize relations

but ultimately fail, due to the rejection of Russian action against the will of Poland before the annexation

took place, helped the post-reform reform process of Ukraine in 1991. One of the efforts to reduce the

widespread conflict perpetrated by the European Union is through sanctions on economic embargoes. While

from the beginning, Poland's attitude consistently supports EU sanctions policy against Russia. Through the

use of group analytics ratings, the author will identify the decision units and structures within them and look

for relationships on the influence of small group involvement in the Polish government in the process of

foreign policy making. The dominance of cadres comes from the Civic Platform Party as the government-

era coalition party of President Komorowski, further simplifying the policy-making process without any

outside or opposition intervention. The design of the cabinet making basically refers to the party cadre

portion. The hypothesis of this paper mentions the process of making foreign policy produces an integrative

solution.

1 INTRODUCTION

As members of NATO and the EU, Polish foreign

policy is focusing on further integration into

European political and security structures including

escalating the crisis in Ukraine and helping Ukraine

gain a stable, prosperous and democratic future for

all its citizens. After President Putin's request to the

Upper House of Russia regarding the permission of

military forces in the territory of Ukraine was

granted, the situation was dramatic. The President of

Poland immediately held a meeting with Prime

Minister Donald Tusk, Foreign Minister Radoslaw

Sikorski and Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak

on March 1, 2014 discussed the peace activities of

Ukraine. As a result, the Polish government urged

NATO to hold a meeting of the North Atlantic

Council to immediately prepare itself to respond to

Russia's provocative actions in the Crimea

(president.pl, 2014). At its peak, Russia finally

annexed Ukraine on March 21, 2014 which was

unilaterally held in the autonomous region of the

Crimea, further exacerbating diplomatic relations

between Poland and Russia. The Polish government

criticized Russia's unilateral action of annexing the

region on the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine as it had

done similar things when the Georgia crisis of 2008.

Poland declared itself that it would never recognize

the annexation of the Crimea by Russia. Later

Poland also stated that its support to Ukraine

consistently includes becoming one of the countries

supporting the imposition of economic embargo on

Russia by the European Union as agreed Minsk and

recognize the appointment of Arseniy Yatsenyuk as

interim president of Ukraine.

In the explanation of Polish foreign policy

priority report 2014-2015 presented by Polish

Foreign Minister Grzegorz Schetyna said the

conflict in Ukraine has made Polish relations with

the Russian Federation worse (Schetyna in Polish

Foreign Policy Priorities, 2014). He considered

Russian policy to be against the will of Poland in

politics and economy that Poland has built in

Ukraine. With the imposition of four months

(March-July 2014) economic embargo against

Russia is expected to provide a deterrent effect for

Russia to immediately stop its annexation action in

the Crimea. On the other hand, the economic

embargo can’t prevent Russia's intention to annex

the Crimea so that the EU is forced to repeatedly

416

Mubarok, A. and Susanto, S.

Policy Consistency of Poland Responding to Russia’s Annexation Policy of 2014: In the Group Level of Analysis.

DOI: 10.5220/0010278100002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 416-421

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

extend the embargo. For Poland, which makes

Russia into the ranks of geographical concentric

circles, the EU economic embargo affects Poland's

exports to Russia. So far, Poland is supplying

agricultural commodities to Russia, which has been

the main destination of Polish food exports, due to

the imposition of sanctions Poland is willing to lose

500 million Euros only from agriculture by 2014

(Kraatz, 2014). Nevertheless, material losses earned

by Poland are not underlying it to withdraw its

support of EU sanctions.

Based on this background, this paper will use

group level of analysis that is used as a preference

for analytical tools to identify the decisions unit in

Polish foreign policy consistency related to Crimean

issue of the ultimate decisions unit, the structure of

the unit itself and understand Polish foreign policy

making process. The Republic of Poland is a

multiparty parliamentary democracy, with the

concept of checks and balances consisting of

executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In

Poland, the prime minister has more political power

than the president of Poland Republic of Poland

Country Report, t.t). The last branch is the

legislative of the Senate and the Sejm (Polish

Parliament). In a case study of Poland's response to

Crimean righteousness policy, this paper will

emphasize the role of small groups compiled by

author namely prime ministers, foreign ministers,

defense ministers, presidential advisory councils,

and government parties.

1.2 Elaboration of Group Level of

Analysis

Hudson (2014) assesse that leaders can’t create and

implement their foreign policy by themselves. Most

of the foreign policy always made in a group setting.

These groups contribute to the formulation of a

country's foreign policy. The term group decision

making best describes the group, using a group level

of analysis that makes the unit as an object for

analyzing foreign policy. The group LoA according

to Breuning (2007) is understood to be a group of

people or a group of individuals who not only focus

on the formulation of foreign policy but to prevent

any misuse of policies by other entities in the

government. The existence of this group can be said

as a protector of a leader in implementing its policy.

The groups referred to by Breuning (2007) may be

coalition parties, advisory boards and groups

residing in government or ministerial institutions.

Group arrangements framed in group decision

making have a major contribution when foreign

policy is formulated. Regardless of the political

orientation they derive from, they are in charge of

professionally accommodating existing national

interests.

Members in the small groups of the unit decision

according to Neack's (2008) interpretation do not

represent the institution, they are likely to remain

open to external influences, including information

relevant to the group's decisions. Sometimes small

groups act independently, not open to confidential

outside information about tactics and diplomacy

strategies, in order to quickly reach consensus. In the

use of this group level of analysis, the author argue

that the role of group decision making actually only

supplies information, options and policies, where

policy makers remain in the hands of the president

(ultimate decision). The dominance of a dominant

group or actor other than the leader behind this

decision making, the author's assumption is in line

with Breuning's (2007) assumption about the

assumption of the first group that the leader is

inactive or has no capability in taking foreign policy,

will hear and obtain varied information from some

group perspective behind him (supporters). In the

case of the Crimea in 2014, the government did not

undergo a change of leadership, President

Komorowski at that time served since 2010-2015.

The author highlight the consistency of Polish policy

toward EU sanctions given to Russia in 2014. This

paper, the author chose to use the group level of

analysis. The author identifies Polish decision units

as small groups whose composition consists of

ministry officials, advisory boards up to Prime

Minister. While other actors who seem to show the

existence of its influence is the Sejm or the Polish

Parliament. According to Neack (2008) small groups

are defined by a set of individuals who can be two or

more persons from the same government or

government agency or ministry, which are

collectively involved in the process of policy

formulation through direct interaction. The output

produced later is a collective and interactive decision

in which all members are required to participate to

make government commitments.

Furthermore the author then shifted the focus of

the analysis of the identification decision switch unit

using a tree approach formulated by Hermann et. al,

(in Neack, 2008). The author uses the tree approach

presented in the Neack material shown there are

several branches which then produce four types of

decision type: adoption of dominant solution,

deadlock solution, integrative solution, and subset

solution. Although the elites identified by the author

in the final paragraph are individuals who have the

Policy Consistency of Poland Responding to Russia’s Annexation Policy of 2014: In the Group Level of Analysis

417

same party affiliation. The author uses the concept

of management style of group ranking, collegial.

Actually the style of management expressed by

Breuning depends on the leader's tendency, how the

leader organizes the system in the executive.

Collegial, the leader attempts to mediate between

groups, and reduces group disputes by opening

dialog or open discussions, a key feature of collegial

management is open debates between advisors,

emphasize teamwork and the problem of mutual

agreement (Breuning, 2007). From the Polish

president's management style the author can

interpret the use of the theory of policy convergence,

because the loyalty of small groups to him is

guaranteed. The policy of President Komorowski is

the result of reflection on the consideration of the

Civic Platform Party that can be analyzed from its

identity and role in the Polish government.

1.2 Unit Decision Identification

The selection of small groups is selected through

several authors' considerations, as follows: 1) they

are from one political party in Poland, the similarity

of a political view minimizes the potential for cross-

pollination in the government because the

parliamentary forces have gained support and

interest in the party their politics is ensured one vote.

2) Their task is directly related to the ongoing

problems in Eastern Europe, which are related to the

stability of the region and the future of Ukraine.

Automatic, foreign ministers and defense ministers

often make intense communication with the

president following the development of the situation

on the Crimean Peninsula. Predictably, the average

intensity of their communications responds to

peaceful efforts in Ukraine above the average of

other Komorowski ministers. 3) Although the

Minister for Foreign Affairs Radoslaw has retired,

the author state the role of Foreign Minister

Grzegorz Schetyna who replaced him as of

September 22, 2014 because it is still his responsible

for the implementation of Polish foreign policy

priorities in 2014-2015 (Schetyna in Polish Foreign

Policy Priorities, 2014). 4) The parties that sit in the

government elite in small groups are president’s

confidant whose have high loyalty. Some analysts

have analyzed the relationship of group influence to

decision-making by the leaders, some of them are

US government policy related to war on terror, deal

with nuclear Iran and Putin in its policy annexation

of Crimea in 2014.

The author will use the first decision tree

approach by Hermann et al. (1978 in Neack, 2008)

which explains the group decision making process.

Regarding group decision management, do not cover

the possibility of cross opinion that can develop into

internal conflict, this is usual because in group

decision making is not always harmonious as US

foreign policy in the current era of President Trump.

Internal Polish government is relatively good, one

voice addressing the Crimean issue. The actors who

play the roles in the formulation of Polish foreign

policy consists of the names of government elites

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk (2007-2014),

Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz (2014-2015 ),

Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw

Sikorski (2007-2014), Polish Minister of Defense

Tomasz Siemoniak (2011-2015), Polish Minister of

Foreign Affaris Grzegorf Schetya (2014-2015),

Sejm (Polish Parliament), and six members of the

Advisory Council for President Bronislaw

Komorowski. Both Radoslaw, Tomasz, Grzegorz,

and Ewa are affiliated with the Civic Platform

political party, meaning the dominance of the Civic

Platform Party demonstrates policy convergence

among Polish government elites. Despite serving

after the Crimean annexation ended, the author

includes PM Ewa Kopacz and Foreign Minister

Grzegorf because both of them still serve at the same

period of this issue in Polish government. Polish

foreign policy also remains consistent in favor of the

how EU encounter Russia to prevent escalating

tensions in Eastern Europe. The state officials whose

appointed by President Komorowski who ruled for

five years showed the same loyalty and perception

among the government to address the issue of the

Crimea.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who is currently

president of the EU Council, is a politician and

historian who also served as Polish prime minister

for 7 years (2007-2014). Professionally as a

politician, Donald Tusk was noted to have entered

the membership of the Liberal Democratic Congress

and Freedom Union in 1994-2001, before joining the

Civic Platform Party to date. In his era of leadership,

he was renowned for his foreign policy of trying to

improve relations with Germany and Russia, which

in the Kaczynski era was problematic (Der Spiegel,

2009). The annexation of Russia then changed

Tusk’s perceptions who consider that the biggest

challenge today is Russia's movement, not only for

Ukraine but also for the EU, and urging the EU to

meet Russia to end this conflict (Euractiv.com ,

2014). PM Donald Tusk, who has a greater political

power than the president, has a tolerance bounded by

the Polish constitution’s rules of duty, subject and

function. However strategic the position of Prime

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

418

Minister Donald Tusk, who at that time assumed

three roles among them as head of government, the

head of the Civic Platform Party and the head of the

Cabinet Council did not close the indication of his

considerable contribution to Poland’s foreign policy.

The next identified actor is Minister of Foreign

Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski, experienced in strategic

position in Poland, former Deputy Minister of

Defense for Jan Olszewski and then a career as a

senator, and elected as Minister of Defense in 2005.

His profession as a high-ranking Polish official,

shows his ability in the formulation of foreign policy

especially in the field of defense. Currently he is

affiliated with the Civic Platform Party. Sikorski

was involved in the events of the winter of 2014

which was a wave of protests by Euromaidan at the

international level. Sikorski alongside Ukrainian

president Viktor Yanukovich and opposition leader

Vitalu Kitchiko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Oleg

Tyagnibok signed the MoU to promote peace in

Ukrainian power (Guradian.com, 2014). It is an

acceptable move because as the Polish Foreign

Minister, Sikorksi is a strong supporters of EU’s

close relationship with Eastern Neighbors. He chose

the integration of these countries into the structure of

the European Union, and advocated Ukraine to enter

the EU. Sikorski is more in favor of Ukraine which

has been Poland’s strategic partner in Eastern

Europe.

The third actor is Minister of Defense Tomasz

Siemoniak who is a trust person of Donald Tusk.

When the cabinet was overhauled, Tusk retained

Tomasz Siemoniak as Polish Minister of Defense.

Tomasz is among Polish politicians affiliated with

the Civic Platform Party. In 2012, Siemoniak

declared Poland’s plan to build its missile defense

system with an estimated cost of US$6 billion and

expressed the desire of Poland to build a missile

defense system with Germany and France (Benites,

2012). Increased tensions caused by the annexation

of Russia led to Poland increasing its attention in the

field of defense. Russia is a major force in eastern

Poland, if not wary of all possible potentialities,

Poland could suffer the same fate as Ukraine. The

third actor is the Advisory Board of Polish President

Komorowski, there are 6 members named Tadeusz

Mazowiecki, Maciej Prog, Krzysztof Jakub Kroil,

Tomasz Borecki, Aleksander Sosna, and Jerzy

Pruski (President.pl, 2014).

There are few sources reviewed or reported

Komorowski’s Advisory Board activities two years

ago post-retirement. But the authors found

diplomatic efforts by Mazowiecki regarding

Ukraine, between Mazowiecki and former Ukrainian

Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko who advised

Ukraine to hold a fair elections. Mazowiecki often

held diplomatic visit in the era of President

Bronislaw Komorowski including seeking a meeting

between President Komorowski with the Ukrainian

opposition in Warsaw in 2014. After Donald Tusk

retired from the prime minister’s seat and chose to

take the position of EU President Council, his

position replaced by Ewa Kopacz. Ewa Kopacz is

equally under the auspices of the Civic Platform

Party. On his first day in office, Kopacz publicly

stated that as prime minister he would pledge to

continue Polish foreign policy. He added that his

government would not support the split in Ukraine

and urged the US military presence as a bluff if

Russia made possible sudden aggression. Then, the

fifth actor is Grzegorz Schetyna who was appointed

by Kopacz to become foreign minister to replace

Sikorski. Grzegorz is also a politician of the Civic

Platform Party. Most of the time Grzegorz’s career

outside Poland, but his presentation of Polish foreign

policy priority reports helped to refresh Polish

domestic politics, he presented a constructive

solution to address the Crimean (Polish Foreign

Policy Priorities, 2014) issue.

Ukraine has been used by Poland as region for

the development of cooperation between the two

countries, which intends to bring the reform process

of Ukraine runs as expected. The Civic Platform

Party is successfully putting its cadres in the seat of

government, in coalition with the government. The

Civic Platform (PO) is a liberal-conservative and

Christian-Democratic party, whose voters are highly

educated, professional, academic, manager,

businessman and so on. In line with the Civic

Platform Party, the Sejm or the Polish Parliament

has an effect on the Polish government’s policy and

attitude. Within 7 years (2007-2014), PO

incorporated into the Polish government coalition

and after that period, PO became government’s

opposition. During the coalition with the Polish

government, small groups in President Komorowski

tended to be convergent in concentration. That is,

they are one vote and remain restored according to

Komorowski's mechanism acts as ultimate decision.

In group decision making, unless the president, there

is prime minister who has a dominant power in

decision making process. From the political aspect,

indeed the prime minister has a political position

higher than the president. Appointed Ministry

Councils also became part of prime minister

authority.

Policy Consistency of Poland Responding to Russia’s Annexation Policy of 2014: In the Group Level of Analysis

419

1.3 Neack’s Tree Decision Approach

The Primary identities lies in the role of prime

ministers, minister of foreign affairs, minister of

defense, and advisory council as described earlier.

The second question is, does the leader emphasize

dissent? This is not found, as the author state that

their statements about Polish foreign policy are the

same, there is no difference in perceptions or views

Poland continues to support EU imposing sanctions

on economic embargoes towards Russian

government to reduce regional tensions. The loss

that Poland receives economically from the EU

economic blockade leads to the export of

agricultural produce that typically supplies Russia

into a halt. Not to mention of gas dependency and

even Russia decision to breaks down the gas

pipeline that linking Ukraine and Poland as Russia’s

impact or counterattack of EU sanctions.

The next question alludes to the norm, does it

impede dissent? Looking at the reality in Poland,

from the unit that the author has tried to identify that

the most influential (minister) are from the same

party, they automatically embrace the same

understanding or ideology. Disagreements among

Polish internals exist but are insignificant because

they prioritize collective cooperation rather than

favor individual roles. The next question from the

decision tree approach is about did the group

evaluating many choices about the problem at hand?

Obviously yes, starting from 1994, Poland and

Ukraine establish cooperative cooperation known

Polish-Ukraine Partnership. Close ties between

Poland and Ukraine aim to strengthen democracy

and support Ukraine to closer with Western

countries (Missala, 2016). This close relationship

between Poland and Ukraine continues throughout

the economic sphere between Eastern European

countries.

Emphasized here is an evaluation of the behavior

of Russia that continues to provoke and even

threaten back by military embargo. Russia’s role is

very important in order to maintain the stability of

the region. However, Poland’s (EU-backed) side of

the vote voted in favor of Russia’s actions. These

possibilities are mapped and evaluated by small

groups, such as the Polish defense minister’s plan to

build a defense system in some border areas. That is

the consequence of the mature evaluation by a small

groups. Thus the small groups of Polish

governments of President Komorowski’s era

according to Neack (2008) chose an integrative

solution approved by several parties involving some

shift from initial preference.

2 CONCLUSION

The same identity of each individual in the small

groups of in explanation earlier is all of them

affiliated with the conservative, liberal and religious

(Christian) Civic Platform Party. The government

coalition realized by the PO which is still a

government coalition that categorized as a

government support group. In an attempt to

legitimize the policy of a country, the government

must have the support of several parties. The more

that supports, the stronger the policies are. The

position of Poland is actually a dilemma of

addressing the conflict on the Crimean Peninsula.

One side of Poland was forced to converge with the

EU which approved the imposition of extended

economic sanctions causing some material loss to

Poland. The PO Group understands the origin or

history of rival and sensational issues concerning

sovereignty. They are open to enter and suggest, as

an aspirational political party. The reason geography

stimulates the decision-makers not to ignore all

Russian movements. The Polish region that borders

on conflict areas in Ukraine and Kaliningrad has

been used as a Russian military post. Barry Buzan

and Waever (2003) the situation on the Crimean

Peninsula surrounded by small countries, especially

in Europe, there is a lighter risk of to move or

migrate to a place that is geographically close.

Military officials under the command of Minister

Tomasz, attempted to understand Buzan’s intention

of assuming that the crisis in Ukraine will be a threat

to the region in Poland. The author saw the friction

that occurred between a group of individuals in

Poland when President Ewa Kopacz where the

position of foreign minister was removed by him.

But the problem was solved when Ewa was known

to inaugurate him as a speaker in Poland. The unit

decision without looking back may be skeptical of

the policies they take. The EU has established an

Eastern Partnership aimed at improving integration

between the EU and Eastern Europe (Smith, 2005).

The countries in Eastern Europe have a relatively

high interdependent level and not ready for

independence. Indications of weak supervision and

weakness of the economy are easy to find such as in

Poland which has dependency on oil supplies from

Russia. For that, Poland as the greatest promoter of

cooperation of Eastern European countries made

Western Europe as the newest partner. But keep in

mind that Russia with all its military capabilities is

readily operated on the Crimean Peninsula. Polish

support as his recognition of Ukraine's independence

unforgettable momentum throughout the history of

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

420

the founding of Ukraine. The authors observe that

the economic losses in the context of the Crimean

Crisis, entered into foreign policy preferences before

the policy was taken. Because of the security aspects

that Polish policy priorities are, Poland is forced to

converge with the EU to hold diplomatic relations

with Russia post-annexation of the Crimea.

Based on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Polish

(MFA Polish) report, the increased attention of

Poland towards Ukraine raises the perception that

Poland’s foreign policy focuses on Ukraine rather

than on Russia as previous appeals. Indeed Poland

provides great support for reforms in Ukraine, a

priority area of Polish development and

humanitarian aid. Assistance for Ukraine from MFA

funds increased multiply through PLN 21 million.

Poland then supported and promoted more

transparent local government reforms, subsidized

media freedoms, trained civil servants and assisted

in the reform of military schools. After analyzing

Polish foreign policy in responding to the annexation

of Russia, it can be illustrated from the tree approach

that the discovery of solutions is integrative,

accommodating all the individuals who participated

in the preparation therein plus their loyalty factors

seen in their membership status as the Civic

Platform Party even Donald Tusk and Foreign

Minister Grzgorf had become chairman of the right-

leaning party. Teamwork rather than individuals is

seen in the policy-making process by President

Komorowski.

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