Hypocritical Policy Viktor Orbán in Crimean Annexation 2014

Damar Kusumawardani and Radityo Dharmaputra

International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: Viktor Orbán, Annexation of Crimea, Visegrad Group, hypocrisy, Putin

Abstract: The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 tempted various reactions from another countries and

international communities, including Hungary. Hungary which is part of Visegrad Group (V4) signed joint

statement about its respect and commitment for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Yet, this statement was

the opposite from Orbán behavior itself which from time to time seems get closer to Putin. Orbán consent

hypocrisy in the joint statement of V4 and his behavior can be motivated by rational and cognitive factors of

Orbán himself as an individual. Personal character, life experiences, background, up to Orbán's perspective

can influence his leadership style alsohis decision-making process.

1 INTRODUCTION

Since becoming a sovereign country in 1991,

Ukraine must face economic, social, and serious

legal problems. As a new country, Ukraine must find

a way out of the shadow of the “big brother” of

Russia and begin to develop its own national

identity. On the other hand, Russia is also actually

still difficult to release Ukraine into a sovereign and

independent country because of its strategic

interests. The condition then causes tension in the

relationship between the two countries that fluctuate

and not infrequently cause conflict. One of the

Russian-Ukrainian feuds can be seen in the dispute

of the Crimean Peninsula that reached its crisis in

2014. The Crimean Peninsula crisis in fact can be a

symbol of the difficult situation facing Ukraine on

the ‘East’ and ‘West’ mainly for economic problems

that are basically caused because of the difficulty of

transformation, more and more of the problems that

arise from the apparatus of his own country such as

corruption and mis-management (Wydra, 2003:

111). The Crimean crisis also illustrates the

problems between different ethnic groups and their

desire for self-determination.

Since 1920, the Crimean territory belonged to the

Russian Federation before it was finally transferred

to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine in 1954

without a referendum but only through a decree

approved by Krushchev. In 1991-after Ukraine

became a sovereign state, the Crimea automatically

became part of the independent state of Ukraine with

its own autonomy-obtained through a referendum-

named the Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic of

Crimea which was the restoration of the first and last

Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic supported by

the people (Bebler, 2015: 38-9). Based on the 2001

Ukrainian census, the Crimean Peninsula is

inhabited by a majority of Russian ethnicities- about

58,3%-so not a few of the pro-Russian-oriented

Crimean population as a result of their national

consciousness. The demographic condition of the

Crimea can also serve as a symbol of Russia’s

ambitions in the region. In other words, however, the

Crimea is still considered a part of history and an

integral area for Russia (Wydra, 2003: 113).

The annexation of Russia to Crimea Peninsula in

March 2014 caused a new crisis in the European

region since the end of the Cold War. This

annexation is fundamentally driven by the Crimean

strategic values for Russia itself-especially for the

Black Sea fleet, as well as Putin’s strong desire to

show his confrontation with the West (Wydra, 2003:

116). The annexation of Russia received responses

from the international community such as the UN

and other countries, not least Hungary. Hungary

belongs to the Visegrad Group (V4) through

representatives of its officials and diplomats to write

a statement in the Visegrad Group Declaration on its

contents about Russia’s annexation to the Crimea

and to support the sovereignty and territorial

integrity of Ukraine. However, basically when

viewed from the Orbán’s Vector perspective as the

prime minister, Hungary is just as likely to be very

moderate in evaluating and reacting to the

Ukrainian-Russian since the beginning of Orbán’s

Kusumawardani, D. and Dharmaputra, R.

Hypocritical Policy Viktor Orbán in Crimean Annexation 2014.

DOI: 10.5220/0010278700002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 455-461

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

455

election as prime minister in 2010. Viktor Orbán has

attempted to emphasize Hungary’s neutrality with

respect to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict to avoid

friction relations with Russia given the increasing

cooperation built between the two countries

especially in the energy sector (Sadecki, 2014: 36).

Even so, the neutrality emphasized by Orbán

increasingly shifts to the Russian side and begins to

turn away from value and dogma from the European

Union. The policies and attitudes of Prime Minister

Viktor Orbán in responding to the Crimean

annexation by Russia and the impetus behind these

actions-both rational and cognitive factors-have been

the focus of the study and will be described further

in this paper.

1.1 Presidential Character as

Theoretical Consequence

Research that examines the international relations’

phenomenon basically requires a focus in the

analysis so that the explanation in the study is more

targeted and tangible. This is still related to the wide

scope of international relations and can’t be

thoroughly researched. Researchers need to reduce

and manage the problem of the study, one of which

is to use a level of analysis that can serve as a focus

and/or tool in international relations research. The

level of analysis is defined by David Singer (1961:

77) as a focus taken by researchers with a view to

sorting out the studied phenomena to produce more

specific and more systemic analysis. Mohtar

Mas’oed (1990: 35-6) mentions several points to

consider in the use of analytical ratings. The

researcher should know the unit of explanation and

the unit of analysis in the problem or phenomenon

being studied. The explanation unit is an

independent variable that will be the focus of the

research. After knowing the expansion unit, the

researcher should select the appropriate analytical

unit as a tool to assess the phenomenon. The

analytical rank as a tool was first proposed by

Kenneth Waltz in Man, State, and War (1960) to

examine the causes of warring states. Waltz then

suggested aspects that are considered to contribute in

the occurrence of a war, namely; (1) individuals; (2)

the state, and (3) the international system (Watlz,

1960 in Singer, 1961: 78). These three aspects then

developed and used as a unit of analysis and a tool in

understanding the causes of the international

relations’ phenomenon. The analysis of the

Hungarian response to the Russian policy to annex

Crimea uses individual analysis ratings with more

emphasis on the analysis of Viktor Orbán as

individual prime minister.

The individual level of analysis includes the

factors within an individual to make a policy

(decision-making). In this case, the individual who

acts as a decision maker-usually represented by

leaders, such as presidents or prime ministers-has a

significant influence on what the country does.

Marijke Breuning (2007: 38-45) proposes three

methods that can be used as methods in the

individual level of analysis, namely (1) the

presidential character, which emphasizes the attitude

or character of the leader such as active-passive or

positive-negative in performing his role as a decision

maker; (2) operational code, by looking at the

fundamental beliefs such as norms, perspectives, and

standards believed by the leader as a consideration

in decision-making, and; (3) leadership trait

analysis, emphasizing the personal characteristic of a

leader in determining foreign policy and controlling

the situation influenced by political life, including

his political party. In this paper, the unit of analysis

emphasizes Viktor Orbán as the head of government

that made the policy, including in determining

Hungarian attitudes toward the Crimean annexation

by Russia. The method used in Orbán’s analysis as

an individual is the presidential character. The

reason for choosing this method is to look at the

complexity of Viktor Orbán’s background as an

individual, shift his political view of Europe, to the

long journey and long history of political

participation from Viktor Orbán thus contributing to

the formation of Orbán’s character as prime minister

who can influence his policy-making. That is why

the presidential character method was chosen as the

theoretical basis in the analysis of Viktor Orbáns in

his position against the Crimean annexation by

Russia in 2014.

According to Breuning (2007: 40), the method of

presidential character focuses on two things; (1) how

active or passive the leader is, determined by the

efforts mobilized in to shape his political policies;

and (2) whether the leader assesses his current

position as a task to assume or assumes that his

current position is the goal of his politics. This is

still related to people’s perception and support for

the leader’s policy. From these two questions, will

be produced one of the four types of leaders are; (a)

a positive, active leader, a leader who exerts much

energy and gains satisfaction from his people against

the policies taken; (b) an active, negative leader, a

leader who puts much effort into his policy but does

not get a supportive response from his people. This

type of leader tends to focus on trying to establish

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

456

his influence and power; (c) passive-positive, the

type of leader who has little to do with policy but

gets support from his people; and (d) passive-

negative, the type of leader with little contribution

and no support or satisfaction from the people. Both

of these can be a theoretical study to know Viktor

Orbán’s reasons for Hungary’s foreign policy

making in response to the Crimean annexation issue.

Judging from the lens of Realism, the personal

character of Viktor Orbán as a dependent variable

can be seen as a reflection of Hungarian foreign

policy itself. In other words, the thinking and

knowledge of Viktor Orbán will be regarded as an

act of thought from Hungary in the international

system.

1.2 Character Analysis of Viktor

Orbán’s on Hungarian Policy in

Crimean Crisis 2014

If drawn back, history remains a heavy burden for

Hungary, a country located in the heart of Central

Europe and as a place for the division of the great

powers of the West and the East, so it is very

familiar with the geopolitical dynamics. Under

current conditions, which Western Europe is

preoccupied with its own existential crisis, and

Russia increasingly demonstrates its strength,

making Hungary inevitably have to position itself

between the two sides, one of which is when Russia

annexed the Crimea in March 2014. In a statement

issued on March 1, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

expressed its concern about the situation on the

Crimean Peninsula. The ministry noted that the

Foreign Minister of the Visegrad Group had asked

the leaders of the Kiev government and the Donetsk

region’s political leaders to distance themselves

from provocative measures that could increase

tensions and lead to violence (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, 2014). The position taken by Hungary in the

case of annexation Crimea by Russia one of them

can be seen in the joint statement made by Visegrad

Group (V4) -Hungarian, Poland, Czechoslovakia

and Slovakia- with Ukraine on March 4, 2014.

Hungary agreed to the contents of this joint

statement, V4 countries reaffirm their strong support

for Ukraine and ensure that the V4 countries are in

solidarity with the people and the Government of

Ukraine and are willing to maintain their strong

commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial

integrity of the Ukrainian state (Prime Minister’s

Office, 2014).

In contrast to the statements of the country

contained in the joint statement, Orbán individually

precisely initially chose a moderate attitude in

response to the annexation case. Having chosen to

remain silent for several days and start raising public

criticism, Orbán’s first short comment on this issue

was finally made on March 3, 2014-the day before

the joint V4 and Ukraine statements were made-as

quoted from the MTI news agency, “Hungary is not

part of the conflict” (Mergit, 2014). The statement

gives a picture to the public that Orbán as an

individual and prime minister seeks to be neutral

against the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. In fact, as a

member of the V4 tied to the EU, Orbán may openly

favor Ukraine-either bilaterally or within the

framework of the EU-with regard to its sovereignty

over its territory and denounced Russia against

annexation on the Crimean peninsula. Statements

from Orbán related to the Crimean case focus more

on the security of the minority of 156,000

Hungarians-especially in the Transcarpatia region

that inhabited by many Hungarians-in Ukraine rather

than the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation itself

(Racz, 2014: 4). The policy chosen by Orbán can be

encouraged for reasons or considerations embodied

in the development of bilateral relations -particularly

in the nuclear power plant- with Russia that

approved in early 2014 (Racz, 2014: 3). Orbán

signed a contract with Russian President Vladimir

Putin in January 2014, asking the Russian company

to expand its Hungarian nuclear plant in the city of

Paks. In this case Moscow is willing to provide large

loans (about USD 13.33 billion) to Hungary that can

be used to finance about 80 percent of its energy

expansion (Mergit, 2014).

The difference in Orbán’s attitude compared with

the statement Hungary has poured out in this joint

statement is basically still related to the character or

type of Orbán leadership which, when analyzed

using a presidential character, is included in an

active-negative type. The active type of Viktor

Orbán as a policy maker can be seen from the

beginning of Orbán’s political career itself. Viktor

Orbán has served as the Hungarian Prime Minister

since 2010. This is the second time Orbán has served

as the Hungarian Prime Minister after previously

also been elected for the period 1998-2002, which at

that time made Orbán the youngest prime minister of

the 20th century at the age of 35 year (Waller,

2015). His political career began when Orbán

became one of the pioneers of the Federation of

Young Democratics (Fidesz) on March 30, 1988 as

well as acting as a spokesperson. In October 1988, at

the first Fidesz congress, Orbán was elected a

member of the Fidesz national presidency until

October 1989. His speech intelligibility was

Hypocritical Policy Viktor Orbán in Crimean Annexation 2014

457

increasingly recognized publicly when Orbán gave a

radical speech on June 16, 1989 to urge Hungary’s

democratic transition from Soviet communist

influence and to call for withdrawal Soviet troops

from Hungary. Orbán was elected to Parliament

since 1990, before finally serving as Fidesz factional

leader in the period May 1990-1993. Orbán also

served as President of Fidesz for three periods,

1993-1995. Under the direction of Orbán, Fidesz,

which tended to be a radical student movement, was

slowly transformed into a moderate liberal party and

renamed Fidesz to the Hungarian Civic Party in

1995 (Waller, 2015). From his early experience in

politics this was the embryo of Orbán’s active

character as a leader begins to form.

In the first period of his reign as a prime minister

in 1998 and 2002, Orbán had in fact been pro-EU

and had widened his country’s access to the regional

container of Europe. But after his re-election in

2010, his outlook on the European Union began to

shift due to the economic recession in Europe in

2008. It also makes Orbán as a Eurosceptic leader

(Mong, 2016). Orbán’s ideology is slowly shifting

and more directed to populism. His liveliness is also

demonstrated through his desire to create “illiberal

democracy”, as expressed in his speech on July 26,

2014 in Băile Tuşnad, Romania:

“systems that are not Western, not liberal, not

liberal democracies and perhaps not even

democracies, can nevertheless make their nations

successful. The stars of the international analysts

today are Singapore, China, India, Russia and

Turkey” “....meaning that, while breaking with the

dogmas and ideologies that have been adopted by

the West and keeping ourselves independent from

them, we are trying to find the form of community

organisation, the new Hungarian state, which is

capable of making our community competitive in the

great global race for decades to come” “...and so in

this sense the new state that we are constructing in

Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state”

(Orbán, 2014).

The speech emphasizes Orbán's activeness to

create policies deviating from Western dogmas and

getting closer to Russia. With its populist principles,

Orbán then adopted policies such as media

restrictions, fence-making to exclude migrants that

considered by society as job-stealers and poison for

their country (Bayer, 2016), to bilateral relations

with Russia with Putin as his “example”.

Orbán that almost never praise other politicians,

has blatantly praised Putin as a strong national

leader who adhered to Western liberalism but

continued to use traditional social values. Contrary

to his thinking when he became a young communist

combat activist, Orbán implicitly put Putin on his

role model list in the famous state speech in Băile

Tuşnad -as above. This gives a “signal” that the

Orbán is increasingly bringing the Hungarian

orientation into the Russian direction and gradually

begins to turn away from the EU. This statement can

be affirmed in his speech:

“The reason a dispute has now developed

between the EU and Hungary is that we have

changed this system and the Government has come

to a decision according to which within this new

state concept, this illiberal state concept, ....”

(Orbán, 2014).

Orbán’s personal interest in Putin has been in

effect visible since the election of Orbán in 2010. He

directly visited Moscow to talk about economic

cooperation and the development of the nuclear

power plant (Bayer, 2017). Implicitly, his allegiance

to Putin in the Crimean annexation than following

the guidelines of the European Union can be seen in

Orbán’s statement in an interview with the Politico

media of November 23, 2015, which states:

“Putin is someone you can cooperate with” “I

would not deny if I would have a good personal

relationship with Putin because I don’t like to follow

the request of the Western approaches” (Orbán,

2015 dalam Kaminski, 2015).

Orbán’s activism with its populist intuition has

pushed him to make the political agenda far beyond

the Hungarian state itself. Even since the start of its

second term as an prime minister, Orbán began to

spread his power to bring change in the EU. This is

certainly related to the background of Orbán who

has understood the inside and outs of Hungarian

politics for nearly three decades by being a part of it.

The radical character since youth has been obtained

from childhood since Orbán himself was born and

grew up in the countryside as the son of a miner with

a disciplined father and a loyal member of the

communist party, which Orbán himself described in

an activist interview in the 1980s:

“I remember when he used to beat me, he would

yell that I should keep my hands down and things

like that, I remember I had some pretty bad

experiences,” “I was never delighted with myself, I

always had a bit of a schizophrenic inclination; I

was able to view myself from the outside” (Orbán,

1989 dalam Waller, 2015).

Starting his political career in the radical party

and feeling for firsthand the demands of Hungary’s

reforms against the Soviet communists, made Orbán

an active political person and a freedom fighter who

was not afraid to take risks. In this regard it can be

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seen in the Hungarian position of being one of the

poorest members of the European Union, but Orbán

has succeeded in shaping the policy in the European

Union especially on migration and refugees,

demands better protection of external borders,

criticized Angela Merkel’s policy towards refugees.

Even Orbán claimed his own victory in a

referendum on the mandate of quota refugees for

European countries (Kidik, 2016). In the case of the

Crimean annexation, although in the joint statement

V4 Orbán also agreed to respect the integrity of

Ukraine, Orbán also did not hesitate to show its

closeness to Russia. Even after the imposition of

economic sanctions for Russia due to annexation

that is considered illegal on the Crimean Peninsula,

Orbán personally objected on the grounds that it

may contribute to his dependent state on Russia in

energy (Sadecki, 2014: 26).

His participation in carrying out policies contrary

to EU values did not get the satisfaction of his pro-

European majority. This confirms that Orbán’s

leadership style belongs to a negative type, which

means it tends to focus on the defense of power and

its influence in Hungarian policy shaping. Based on

the Hungarian 2016 Hungarian survey, Orbán’s

leadership style and political actions by some

Hungarian societies are more of a dictatorial,

autocratic, corrupt, or even a mafia than democracy

(Balogh, 2016). Hungarian public discontent with

Orbán’s style of government is based on Orbán’s

hypocritical actions that are not infrequently

contrary to his statements. Orbán is also considered

often create enemies for himself and his followers

and create scenarios to describe him as if they were

their savior-the followers of Orbán- from the actions

he had prepared (Magyar, 2012). One empirical

example that can be seen in the refugee crisis for

example, Brussels became the main enemy of Orbán

at least for trying to force Hungary to accept 1,294

refugees under the EU quota system (Kulik, 2016).

In the case of the Crimea itself, Hungary discontent

continued when Orbán was unresponsive in

conveying the Hungary position in the Russia-

Ukraine conflict. Unlike other EU leaders who

immediately issued statements about their allegiance

to Ukraine, Orbán precisely preferring not to

comment directly, before Monday, March 3, 2014. It

is immediately criticized by the Hungarian people

who are beginning to assume that it is increasingly

leaning towards Russia and increasingly turning

away from the EU.

From the Crimean crisis in 2014, Orbán showing

an indifference to EU commitments that tend to limit

the relations of its countries to Russia. His

Euroscepticism towards the EU made Orbán no

matter how his government was seen abroad, or the

diminished Hungary diplomatic influence at the EU,

not to mention European Parliamentary (EP)

resolutions that had several times criticized his

government. Orbán personally doesn’t want his

country forced to choose one party or another, which

is a nostalgic stalemate of the Cold War style. In

response to the largely pro-European Hungarian

demands, Orbán with its populist principle argues

that the world today has entered the so-called “new

paradigm” of a world of multiple centers of power.

This new paradigm means that European countries-

including Hungary-should be free to pursue their

own path in their relations with Moscow which may

be considered unreasonable to the EU countries.

This assumption is stated in a statement in his

speech on January 23, 2017 at the Lámfalussy

Conference:

“the era of multilateralism is at an end, and the

era of bilateral relations is upon us. For us this is

good news, because it is an unnatural state of affairs

when, influenced by external pressure, one dare not

state that one’s own country comes first when

governing, making decisions, or considering what

the central bank should do” (Orbán, 2017).

The European economic crisis in 2008 and 2013

and the rules on receiving refugees for EU countries-

contrary to the will of Orbán-are still a trauma to

Orbán so that the Euroscepticism values remain in

its policies. With his euroscepticism background and

the nature of the “rebels” in himself, it becomes

clear that behind its moderation, Orbán’s findings

for more inclination to the Russians in the

annexation of the Crimea in 2014. Approval of the

joint statement with Ukraine on March 4, 2014

which is in the form of a commitment to the

domesticity of the Ukrainian face parliamentary

elections held on April 6, 2014. With style of

government that increasingly similar to Putin,

Orbán’s personal relationship with Putin is getting

closer while his attitude with the EU is increasingly

skeptical. Cooperation in the energy sector in the

Paks region can serve as a claim of Orbán’s interest

in Putin (Sadecki, 2014: 6). While Putin itself

requires Orbán as a “friend” in Europe as well as

ease of the economic sanctions provided by the EU

to Russia due to the annexation of the Crimea. The

proximity of both of them are essentially criticized

by most Hungarians because of the energy

expansion that was once Orbán’s personal ambition

but to exacerbate corruption in his budget and also

increase Hungarian dependence on Russia (Bayer,

2017). The Hungarian opposition also protested

Hypocritical Policy Viktor Orbán in Crimean Annexation 2014

459

against Putin’s bilateral ties amid fears that Orbán is

considered to build a “too close” cooperation with

the Russian leader.

2 CONCLUSION

The annexation of the Crimea by Russia that took

place in early March 2014 led to various reactions

for countries and international communities around

the world, especially for the European Union

countries. Hungary as a member of Visegrad Group

(V4) approved a joint statement issued on March 4,

2014 as a declaration that the V4 countries are

committed to continue to recognize respect for

Ukrainian independence, sovereignty and territorial

integrity internationally, and to exercise a non-

recognition policy over the illegal annexation of the

Crimean peninsula by Russia. But behind the official

statement, the real action of Viktor Orbán as prime

minister suggests otherwise. Personal relationships

with Putin woven since 2010 became closer and can

be used as an indicator of Orbán’s allegiance to

Russia. Especially the two had recently agreed on

the cooperation of Hungary’s nuclear energy

development in the city of Paks, with the help of

Russia of about US$ 13.33 billion that can be used

to finance about 80 percent of the energy expansion.

Orbán's policies that tend to lean toward Russia

rather than openly favor the EU which is its regional

framework, is inseparable from the character he

possesses as an individual. The result of the

presidential character analysis above shows that

Orbán is an active-negative type leader in carrying

out his policy. Orbán’s activity as the decision

maker can be seen from the beginning of Orbán’s

own political career to be elected for the second time

as Prime Minister of Hungary. Her activism became

more visible when Orbán entered into a partnership

with Putin in 2010 on economic issues and plans for

the construction of the nuclear power plant.

Participation showed by Orbán as a prime minister

tends to be aimed at Hungarian policy shaping in

order to be independent of Western values and

dogmas. The purpose of his action is to create

Hungary with the principle of illiberal democracy

just like his ambition. One of them can be achieved

through the approach to Moscow and European

Union refugees quota referendum which is

considered by Orbán too incriminating

The negative nature of Viktor Orbán can be seen

from the style of radical leadership with its populist

principle, which makes Orbán increasingly skeptical

of the EU and getting closer to Russia. This is a

contrast to the largely Hungarian people that pro to

EU and oppose the closeness of Orbán with Putin

which they consider will only bring Hungary into a

worse condition due to dependency with Russia.

However, the criticism of his people does not

become an obstacle for Orbán to keep up with

policies that are consistent with his ambitions.

Orbán’s remarks on EU skepticism are often made

in official speeches as well as interviews with the

media. Unlike other V4 leaders who responded with

a direct statement that they firmly reaffirmed their

commitment and respect for the integrity of the

Ukrainian territory-and strongly condemned

Russia’s illegal annexation act, Orbán chose to be

moderate without comment for several days before

issuing a statement on March 3, 2014, which became

the indication of Hungary’s neutrality. Whereas as a

country leader committed to the European Union,

Orbán can usually openly favor the Ukrainian-

colleagues in the region-both bilaterally and within

the framework of the European Union.

The active-negative type of Viktor Orbán’s

leadership emphasizes that Orbán’s policies are

deemed necessary only to spread influence and

maintain its power. Orbán’s approval in the joint

statements of the V4 countries to fully support the

territorial integrity of Ukraine in the Crimean Crisis

of 2014 can be said to be a mere motive to gain the

sympathy of the people, given that in the near future

Hungary will hold parliamentary elections on April

6, 2014-which was then won by Fidesz with 2/3

majority votes. His skepticism toward the EU has

brought Orbán-and Hungary- more indifferent to EU

policies, even deepening ties with Putin in order to

realize Orbán’s personal ambitions and interests that

want to build a nuclear power plant with Russian

help. The presidential character analysis above

shows that Orbán’s personal character as an

authoritarian leader as well as the Hungarian prime

minister influences the country’s foreign policy even

more in the case of the Crimean annexation in 2014.

Starting the hypocrisy of Orbán’s actions with what

was agreed in the joint statement with Ukraine in the

Crimean crisis made Hungary increasingly seen as

black sheep and the most controversial country in

Europe; this is of course apart from the growing

opposition or opposition groups of Orbán.

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