National Attributes Analysis on Russia Crimea Annexation

Farras Ghaly and Radityo Dharmaputra

Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: Annexation, Crimea, Russia, foreign policy, national attributes

Abstract: In the last decade, there was a crisis that occurred in Ukraine. The crisis began when the president of Ukraine

Viktor F. Yanukovych withdrew from signing the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU in November

2013 that had been negotiated for several years. The crisis then widened and led to the annexation of the

Crimea conducted by Russia in 2014. The annexation violated Budapest Memorandum of 1994 mentioning

Russia guarantees that Russia will respect the independence and sovereignty in the territory of Ukraine and

refrain from using threats or force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. This

article then tries to explain the reasons behind the Russians’ action. Based on the assumption that the national

attributes such as geographic, military capability, economic capacity and system of government can influence

foreign policy decisions, this article explores how these national attributes affect Russia's decision to annex

Crimea in 2014. In this article, address national attributes such as the geographical location as well as the

national military capabilities possessed by Russia

1 INTRODUCTION

For a long time, the Crimean Peninsula or Crimea was

part of Russia, which in 1954 was officially moved to

the part of the Hryvnia region under the leadership of

Nikita Khrushchev who was First Secretary of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Deliagin,

2015: 4). 2014 has been an important year for the

international political constellation in Europe because

there was an event that could be called 'surprising' for

international actors, especially in Europe, namely the

annexation of Russia to the Crimea on March 18,

2014 (Deliagin 2015: 3). Briefly, the annexation of

Russia began with the crisis in Ukraine. The crisis

began when the then president of Ukraine Viktor F.

Yanukovych resigned from the signing of the

Association Agreement (AA) with the European

Union in November 2013 which has been negotiated

for several years.

There are two opinions in the Ukrainian society

regarding the withdrawal of Ukraine in the signing of

the AA with the EU. On the one hand, the AA is

considered a symbol of hope for the Ukrainian society

that dreams of integration with the EU (which is

represented in the central and western regions of

Ukraine), on the other hand the withdrawal of

Ukraine in the signatories is welcomed by the

Ukrainian people who wish to maintain close ties

with Russia (represented in southern and eastern

regions of Ukraine) (Menon & Rumer, 2015: x). With

differences of opinion within the Ukrainian society,

the stance taken by President Yanukovych then led to

a protest demonstration of the taking of the stance in

the central Kyiv region around the Maidan square.

The protest movement was later known as

Euromaidan who wanted a close relationship between

Ukraine and the European Union (Biersack & O'Lear,

2014: 248). Shortly after the protests, Yanukovych's

president took an assertive and tending toward

violence by deploying riot police and snipers to quell

the protests. Steps taken by the Ukrainian government

at that time even enlarge the action and even until

February at least 100 people died. This then made the

president of Yanukovych on 21 February promising

reforms within Ukraine and the signing of AA with

the European Union (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 248).

Yanukovych also signed a pact with the leaders of

the revolution mediated by EU envoys. The pact

includes forming a "national unity" government

within 10 days, trimming presidential powers,

restoring the 2004 constitution and holding early

elections under new guidance by the end of the year.

The action was welcomed by leaders in the European

Union and America (Menon & Rumer, 2015: x). The

Russian government along with the media in Russia

later saw that Ukraine had become the puppets of the

European Union and America. With the support of

America and the EU in the revolution taking place in

Ghaly, F. and Dharmaputra, R.

National Attributes Analysis on Russia Crimea Annexation.

DOI: 10.5220/0010278900002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 469-476

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

469

Ukraine, making Ukraine a "geopolitical" battlefield

for Russia with the West (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014:

248). The Russian government also mentioned that

neo-Nazi and right-wing groups would commit

violence against ethnic Russians and Russian

speakers in Ukraine because of the revolution as well

as some roles in the Ukrainian government occupied

by members of right-wing groups who could then

threaten Russia(Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 248).

With the internal turmoil of Ukraine, the Russian

government affirms its interest in Ukraine by placing

its troops in the Crimean all-time region of Ukraine

with the largest Russian population and speakers.

Within the Crimean territory itself, with the Russian

military presence, the Crimean republic's parliament

called for wider autonomy to demand independence

from Ukraine (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 251).

Furthermore, Russia's actions in developing such a

succession and annexation attempt violate the

Budapest Memorandum of 1994, an agreement that

ensures that Russia, together with the United States

and Britain, will respect the independence and

sovereignty of the territory of Ukraine and refrain

from using threats or violence against territorial

integrity and political independence of Ukraine in

exchange that Ukraine will stop developing its

nuclear weapons (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 251).

From the background described earlier, the central

question arises in this article, which is why Russia

annexed the Crimea in 2014? Although the action

violated the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 that

ensured that Russia would respect independence and

sovereignty residing in the territory of Ukraine and

refrain from using threats or violence against

territorial integrity and political independence of

Ukraine. What then underlies Russia's foreign policy

making regarding its annexation in the territory of

Ukraine?

1.1 National Attributes in Foreign

Policy Analysis

To answer that question, the author uses some

concepts and theories about foreign policy. Before

discussing further, defining foreign policy is

considered the right step to take at this time. Foreign

policy is defined by Charles Hermann (in Neack,

2008: 9) as actions that have goals derived from

political decisions at the individual level as well as a

group of individuals. Hermann does not see foreign

policy as a decision but as a product of decision.

Deborah Gerner (in Neack, 2008: 9) defines foreign

policy as the intention, statement, and action of an

actor, usually a country, directed to the outside world

and the response of other actors to it. In addition,

George Modelski (1962) defines foreign policy as

"the system of activities evolved by communities for

changing the behavior of other states and for

adjusting their own activities to the international

environment". The author then takes the red thread

from previous opinions that foreign policy can be

interpreted as an intention, statement and action taken

by the state with a particular purpose both in relation

to the state or other actors as well as its adaptation to

the international environment.

In foreign policy, there is the concept of Level

Analysis or Level of Analysis (LoA). LoA is

interpreted as a heuristic tool, like a camera lens in

looking at a case. Each level of analysis gives each of

them a special understanding of a case which then

may provide sufficient understanding for the case

under study but may also not consider or provide

other information that can only be encountered using

another level (Neack, 2008: 11). This means that if a

researcher chooses to use one level in the LoA, then

the researcher will only meet the information given

that level alone without getting information from

other levels.

The LoA has several levels (1) individuals,

focusing on the personality, beliefs, perceptions of

leaders and policymakers; (2) the state, which focuses

on internal factors of the country such as its

institutional framework, interest groups, public

opinion, economic, cultural and historical conditions

of the country; and (3) systems, which pay particular

attention to the intergovernmental interactions in the

international sphere directed by the relative

capabilities of such countries, such as power in

technology and military power and wealth that will

then affect the possibilities of acting on a global stage

(Breuning, 2007: 11-3). In the case of Russia's

annexation of the Crimea in 2014, the author will use

an analysis of how the capabilities or national

attributes held by Russia can influence the taking of

actions chosen by Russia.

The capabilities or attributes of a country provide

restrictions and impetus for the state in its policy,

state behavior can be more accurately predicted

through knowledge of the physical attributes owned

by the state and those of other countries that interact

with the country (Lebovic 1985: 47). National

attributes are assets that can be measured as indicators

of a country's potential strength. These national

attributes include size, geographic location, military

capability, economic ability to governance system

(Kegley & Blanton, 2011: 216). Furthermore, the

geographic size and location of a country is an

important part of the national attribute of a country.

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

470

The size and position of a country can be seen and

measured by how large the country is and what region

it is in. Whether the country is in an area with oceans

or as a landlocked state or landlock. In addition,

knowing the borders of what the country is also a

particular concern for policy makers. Small countries

surrounded by large countries will tend to act more

friendly with their neighbors. Geographical location

also relates to the resources owned by the country.

How the resources owned by a country can affect the

attitude taken by the country in the international

sphere. Then, military capability can be measured by

the amount of state ownership of weapons to human

resources in the military. Ownership of weapons such

as missiles, tanks, ships, planes, and so on. Military

ability can provide more restrictions and support to

policy makers in foreign policy, the ability can form

a foreign policy priorities of a country (Kegley &

Blanton, 2011: 219).

Economic conditions can be measured through

the level of economic and industrial development of

a country. In addition, economic conditions can be

measured through productivity levels

and the welfare of the country concerned. In

general, the more economically developed countries,

the more active the country is in the global political

economy (Kegley & Blanton, 2011: 220). Typically,

economic conditions are measured by looking at the

per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), The

Human Development Index (HDI), to the literacy of

a country. In addition, national attributes also include

a government system that can be seen from whether

the country embraces a democratic and open or

authoritarian and closed system. Usually policy-

making within countries with democratic systems

will give greater consideration to other actors within

the country's domestic such as interest groups to

public opinion. While countries with closed

authoritarian systems will tend to consider more elite

circle options only.

The attributes mentioned above can be a

benchmark in determining how the state can be called

a country with great power, middle power, to small

power. With the classification of the state into three

things mentioned earlier, the classification will

provide the state of opportunity or restriction to act

within the international sphere. Christopher Hill

(2003) mentions there are several ways in interpreting

the role of power or attributes in foreign policy,

namely as an end in itself, as a means to an end and

as a context within which states operate. Therefore,

policymakers will see the power they possess through

their national attributes, which will then serve as the

objectives of foreign policy, as well as a tool for

achieving that goal. Policymakers are very concerned

about the ability of the country and its neighboring

countries and countries that have a long distance but

have an active relationship with the country.

Information about the ability of the country itself and

other countries in the world to be the best guide in

playing in international politics. This is because the

national attributes of a country describe the various

possibilities of foreign policy action (Breuning, 2007:

153).

The authors then argue that the annexation policy

undertaken by Russia against the Crimea in 2014 is

due to Russia having a national attribute that moves

Russia to carry out the policy. The peculiarities of

Russia's national attributes serve as a tool for moving

the goal of Russia's foreign policy. In addition,

Russia's national attributes may also serve as an end

in itself as well as serve as a context in Russia's

operation in the international sphere.

This paper is divided into sections. The first part

contains a brief overview of the history of the

development of the crisis in Ukraine which then led

to the annexation of the Crimea by Russia which later

became the central issue raised in this article. This

first part also contains a frame of mind to be used in

this analysis. The second part of the article contains

the peculiarities of national attributes held by Russia.

The third section of the article contains an analysis of

how the peculiarities of Russia's national attributes

affect Russia in adopting a policy to annex the Crimea

in 2014. At the end, this paper tries to give a

conclusion on the issues raised.

1.2 Russia National Attributes

Based on Charles W. Kegley and Shannon L. Blanton

(2011: 216) National attributes include size,

geography location, military capability, economic

ability to governance system. The national attribute

becomes a benchmark in determining or in viewing

the strength of a country which can then become an

important consideration in determining the foreign

policy of a country. If in the first part of this article

has been explained briefly how these attributes can be

measured, then in this section the author will try to

see these attributes in the Russian state. The author

will focus on some of the national attributes that are

perceived to be uniqueness that Russia currently

possesses in terms of size, geographic location, and

military capability. With an area of 17,075,200 km2,

making Russia as the largest country in the world. As

shown in Figure 1, it shows how vast Russia is in the

Eurasian region, extending about 4,500 km from

north to south and 9,000 km from west to east

National Attributes Analysis on Russia Crimea Annexation

471

(Blinnikov, 2011: 11). Russia is 11.3% of the world's

land, bordering 14 neighboring countries Norway,

with a length of 196 km; Finland, 1.340 km; Estonia,

294 km; Latvia, 217 km; Lithuania (bordering

Kaliningrad Oblast), 280.5 km; Poland (adjacent

Kaliningrad Oblast), 232 km; Belarus, 959 km;

Ukraine, 1,576 km; Georgia, 723 km; Azerbaijan, 284

km; Kazakhstan, 6.846 km; China, 3.645 km;

Mongolia, 3,485 km; and North Korea, 19 km

(Blinnikov, 2011: 77).

Figure 1. (Source Blinnikov, 2011:3)

In addition, by being located in the Eurasian

region, Russia has a fairly extreme climate. Extreme

in the sense that when Russia experiences winter,

some locations in Russia have temperatures below

freezing. Russia has an average temperature of about

-10 to -15oc for 3-5 months in winter, even below -

40oc in the coldest months. It is also similar to happen

in the summer, where Russia can experience a fairly

hot temperature, about more than 350c (Blinnikov,

2011: 23-7). Russian water access can be achieved

through the North of Russia, namely the Arctic

Ocean, although the oceans freeze for nearly 6

months each year. This causes Russia to build a warm

water port in some areas where the water does not

freeze. Furthermore, Russia is also known for

producing energy sources. Russia is considered a

resource-based development country with the oil

sector as a driver of its economic development. The

development of post-2000 Russia relies heavily on

the natural resources of hydrocarbons (Ahrend, 2005:

584). This is reasonable, because Russia has a source

of hydrocarbon energy that makes it rely on that

source to drive the economy. From 1998-2004,

Russia increased the supply of world oil by 48

percent. In 2007, Russia pumped up to 9.8 million

barrels of oil per day, about 12 percent of global

supply (Rutland, 2008: 203).

Until now, Russia is very dependent on its natural

resources to drive the wheels of economic growth.

Until 2015, Hydrocarbon exports are between 55 and

75% of Russia's total exports in one year and generate

up to 380 billion USD in export revenues (Brashaw

& Connolly,

2016: 15). In addition to hydrocarbons, Russia is

also concerned with other natural resources such as

coal. The production of coal in Russia has grown

from 122 mtoe in 2001 to more than 165 mtoe in 2013

with export value of 2.7% of total Russian exports

(Brashaw & Connolly, 2016: 15).

In addition to the geographical area as well as

geographical location, the author tries to see the

national attributes of Russia with the other side. One

of them is the military capability possessed by Russia.

Since 2012, the armed forces have undergone

modernization under the new Minister of Defense,

Sergey Shoygu. Although the desire to reform the

armed forces comprehensively has been present since

2008. The modernization program brought by

Shoygu promises to channel 700 billion dollars

between 2011 and2020 to increase all of the state

owned weapons such as the purchase of 2,300 tanks,

600 fighters, 1,000 helicopters, 28 regiments of the S-

400 air defense system, each with 72 launchers, 16

submarines, 51 combat ships, and other equipment

systems (Golts & Kofman, 2016: 3). As a country that

has a large area, Russia has more responsibility to

maintain the sovereignty of the country. Russia has

purchased heavy equipment weapons ranging from

nuclear strategic equipment, submarines and ships, to

fighter planes, tactical fighters, and a number of

ground warfare systems. The level of Russia's modern

equipment has increased from 30 to 47 percent, and

will reach 50 percent by the end of 2016 through the

State Armament Program 2011-20 or the Armament

Program

This country (Golts & Kofman, 2016: 3).

Furthermore, on land forces, Russia has developed

and purchased new weapon models. There has been

an increase in tanks and armored vehicles with

increased protection and mobility, missiles and

artillery systems with the ability to target precision

and electronic warfare through more sophisticated

communication systems (Klein, 2016: 12).

On air power, there has been modernization in

combat aircraft systems and air defense systems. One

example is the arrival of the new fighter Sukhoi Su-

34 attack aircraft and the Sukhoi Su-35

multifunctional fighter aircraft that will gradually

replace the old ones such as Su-24, Su-27, MiG-29

and MiG- 31 (Klein, 2016: 12). this modernization of

Russian air power significantly enhances the Russian

air military capability in terms of ability to lock in

targets, maneuvering up to reach. Though often

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

472

focusing military power on land, the State Armament

Program also focuses on the modernization of

military capabilities at sea. This military upgrading in

the maritime will then increase its capability for

coastal defense, combat support and anti-area / access

denial operations in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and

the Mediterranean Sea in particular (Klein, 2016: 12).

In addition, Russia also focuses on modernizing its

nuclear power. The State Armament Program seeks

to procure 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBMs, SLBMs) based on sea and terrestrial as well

as 8 strategic submarines (SSBNs). By 2022, all

former Soviet ICBMs will be replaced with new

missiles. This development is based on the fact that

President Putin describes nuclear weapons as "claws

and teeth of the Russian bear" (Klein, 2016: 11).

Some of the previously mentioned Russian

national attributes are the uniqueness of Russia today.

The author considers that with an enormous area of

17,075,200 km2, stretching about 4,500 km from

north to south and 9,000 km from west to east,

making Russia the largest country in the world.

Located in the Eurasian region, Russia is not

classified as a landlocked country, a country not

directly adjacent to the sea. This is because the

Russian region has access to the Arctic Ocean.

Nonetheless, with sufficient climates in the country,

the Arctic Ocean froze for almost 6 months each year

that forced Russia to make warm-water ports in other

regions. Coupled with Russia still dependent on

energy in moving its wheels of economy, the

geographical region of Russia becomes one of the

peculiarities for Russian national attributes. In

addition, today Russia is experiencing modernization

in its military capabilities. With a program called

State Armament Program 2020, Russia is conducting

comprehensive reform of the armed forces. In order

to improve its military capability, Russia channeled

700 billion dollars by 2020 on its defense budget. The

results of the program have been seen with the

addition of a number of members to armed equipment

in the land, air to sea.

1.3 Russia National Attributes in

Crimea Annexation

The author then noticed that the national attributes

described in the previous section were the drivers of

policy-makers in Russia for the annexation of the

Crimea in 2014. On March 17, 2014, Russian

president Vladimir Putin signed the presidential

regulation On Recognation of Crimea, then a day later

Putin indicated Russia , the State Duma, and the

Federation Council that local Crimean institutions

have submitted a desire to join Russia and on the same

day together with local Crimean institutions signed an

agreement on recognizing the entry of the Crimean

Republic into the Russian Federation (Grant 2015:

68) . President Obama stressed that the United States

would not recognize the Crimean referendum and

warned that Russia would get sanctioned for its

actions. These sanctions include economic sanctions

against Russia and travel restrictions and asset freezes

on some Russian officials (Kalb, 2015: 162). The

actions undertaken by Russia are heavily criticized by

several international actors such as the United States

and the European Union. Russia has also violated the

Budapest Memorandum of 1994 that ensures that

Russia will respect the independence and sovereignty

that is in the territory of Ukraine and refrain from

using threats or violence against territorial integrity

and political independence of Ukraine.

The author sees that the main factor causing

Russia to take action to annex the Crimea is Russia's

desire to defend the Port of Sevastopol on the

Crimean peninsula. The Port of Sevastopol is a port

that became a Russian naval base in the Black Sea

region. The Port of Sevastopol has a seawater

desalination plant that has sufficient capacity to

supply water (Deliagin, 2015: 14). The existence of

the navy in the region is part of a 1997 agreement

between Ukraine and Russia which granted

permission to reside in the Crimean territory until

2017. However, the agreement was renewed through

the Kharkiv Accords to extend the permit until 2042

(Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 256). Furthermore,

according to Biersack and O'Lear (2014: 257) The

Black Sea is a region rich in energy, the presence of a

Russian naval base in the region is not intended for

defense but to enter the energy-rich region. With the

annexation of the Crimea, Russia will increase its

maritime territory by obtaining an area of 36,000

square miles surrounding the Crimea. The

hydrocarbon wealth possessed by the Black Sea also

has a significant impact, Russia will get the oil and

gas wealth contained in the Black Sea as seen in

Figure 2.

National Attributes Analysis on Russia Crimea Annexation

473

Figure 2. (Source: Biersack & O’Lear, 2014:259)

From Figure 2, it can be seen that if Russia

executes the Crimea, then Russia will get a part of the

territory on the Black Sea that is believed to have a

large hydrocarbon content. In addition, Sevastopol is

also the only Russian warm-water port in the Black

Sea region (Srivastava,2016: 5). Warm-water ports

are a port that does not freeze in winter, required by

Russia because Russia needs a port to trade, with the

Arctic Ocean region often frozen for 6 months every

year, a warm water port is needed by Russia. Russia

has only three warm-water ports in the Pacific region

(Vladivostok), the Baltic (St. Petersburg) and the

Black Sea (Crimea).

The desire for annexation of the Crimea can then

be understood because of Russia's national attributes

as a country with an energy dependent state. As

described earlier, Russia's Hydrocarbon exports

account for 55% to 75% of Russia's total exports in

one year and generate up to 380 billion USD in export

earnings. This indicates that Russia depends on its

resources or resource-based economy. Based on

Rudick Arhen's explanation (2005: 592), a country

with a great dependence on energy will then have a

negative impact of limited energy available. With the

negative impact offered to resource-based economies

like Russia, the annexation of the Crimea with greater

access to the Black Sea becomes an option that can be

taken to keep Russian energy available. In addition,

the geographical location of Russia near the Arctic

Ocean that often froze for 6 months in a year requires

Russia to secure its geopolitical position in the Black

Sea region. The presence of warm-water ports in the

Black Sea region will secure Russia in trading

without being hindered by the extreme climate of

Russia.

Another thing that needs to be taken into

consideration is the national attributes of Russia in

terms of military capability. The author sees that the

military capabilities that Russia possessed at that time

moved Russia's desire for an annexation of the

Crimea. This can be seen from the use of military

force as a coercion or coercion strategy in the early

phase of the Ukrainian crisis (Bartles, 2014: 46).

According to Charles Bartles (2014: 47) Russia has

reformed its military capabilities by increasing its

defense budget allocated for large purchases of

vehicles, equipment to training, the first time since

the Soviet era. This reform can then be seen in the

actions of Russia in the Crimean case in the form of

equipment, communication devices, weapons to new

means of transportation (Bartles, 2014: 48). Russia

places its soldiers known as little green men in the

Crimean region as well as 40 active warships at Naval

base in Sevastopol. Instead of carrying out attacks,

the presence of Russian warships in Crimea

especially in the Sevastopol region as a symbol of

defense of Russian-speaking speakers there (Biersack

& O'lear, 2014: 257).

Russia has also replaced warships resting in

Sevastopol with new ships. Reform of Russia's

military capabilities can also be seen from the

capabilities of soldiers residing in the Crimean

region. Without making any armed contacts, the

Russian army managed to isolate the Ukrainian army

from command and control of the headquarters in

Kiev by cutting telephone lines, disrupting

communications and conducting cyber warfare. The

Kremlin made a covert operations attempt to control

and annex the Crimea by using special forces to take

over the Ukrainian military unit without dropping a

single victim (Karagaiannis, 2014: 413-4). These

efforts illustrate how the reforms that run in Russia on

its military capabilities can go well. In addition, other

evidence of how to increase Russian military

capability to be the basis for Russia's annexation in

the Crimea can be described by Alexander Golts and

Michael Kofman (2016). According to Golts and

Kofman (2016: 9) the effect of increasing Russian

military capability against annexation in the Crimea

is illustrated by the mobility, preparedness and

competence of special forces who have been trained

through reform programs in Russia. In addition,

Russia has also stepped up its capabilities in warfare

technologies such as the use of unmanned aircraft to

electronic war equipment. This indicates that with the

reformed military capability by Russia, annexation of

Crimea realization can be done. Margarete Klein

(2016: 18) also mentioned that Russia's military

capability has a significant role in the annexation of

the Crimea. This is marked by the addition of troop

numbers to reach 90,000 pieces in the region. So the

authors see that Russian military ability has an

important role in Russian foreign policy instruments.

ACIR 2018 - Airlangga Conference on International Relations

474

Russia's military capability to be a means in achieving

the desired goal by Russia, the military capability

provides a possible option for annexation of the

Crimea.

2 CONCLUSION

As stated by James Lebovic, the capabilities or

attributes of a country provide restrictions and

impetus for the state in policy. Policymakers are very

concerned about the ability of the country and its

neighboring countries and countries that have a long

distance but have an active relationship with the

country. Information about the ability of the country

itself and other countries in the world to be the best

guide in playing in international politics. The

Crimean annexation case by Russia in 2014 illustrates

it well. The Crimean annexation by Russia was driven

by Russia's dominant national attributes,

geographical and military capabilities.

Geographically, Russia needs wider access to the

Black Sea region. Russia is a country with a great

dependence on resources, the dependence can then

have a negative impact on the supply of resources

owned by Russia. In order to meet this, Russia must

annex the Crimea because the Crimea offers greater

resources contained within the Black Sea. In addition,

Russia's geographical location also forced Russia to

secure its warm-water port. Furthermore, Russia's

military capabilities at that time also played an

important role in providing the impetus and option for

annexation of the Crimea. After reforming its military

capabilities, Russia then gained a greater possibility

of possibilities for annexation.

Through the case of the Crimean annexation by

Russia in 2014. The author sees that national

attributes provide the possibilities and incentives for

policymakers to carry out their foreign policy. As

Christopher Hill (2003) has pointed out, the role of

power or attributes in foreign policy is an end in itself,

as a means to an end and as a context within which

states operate. Even so, the author also did not rule

out any shortcomings in this article. The authors

assume that this case can also be described in detail

by using different levels such as national leaders and

identities. The author sees that the president of Putin

has an important role in determining the policy as

well as the existence of a Russian national identity

that has a historical proximity to the Crimean region.

Those two things are missed through this article.

Nevertheless, the authors agree that a country's

foreign policy can be driven by the country's national

attribut

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