In general, Brazilian behavior during the reign of
President Lula actually shows the general tendency of
foreign policy applied by the state government in the
middle or ambiguous position in the international
system. Sousa (2008) argues that this ambiguous or
hybrid position is obtained in line with the reality on
the one hand that Brazil has all the capabilities as an
important actor in a system that grows in view of the
wide area, population, and rapid economic growth in
recent periods. But on the other hand Brazil is still a
part of developing countries with a level of capability
is relatively lower than the global power like the
United States. The "south-south" approach of
policyBrazil demonstrates the general role of the
middle power states that in some ways is capable of
affecting the international system through the use of
its resources to demand a more symmetrical
relationship and acting as the norm of entrepreneurs
in a developing system. In this position unlike the
previous administration of Cardoso, which seemed to
follow the flow of hagemony and globalization, Lula's
leadership prompted Brazilian diplomacy more as an
anti-hagemonic counter powerseer with China and
Russia. In addition, the diplomacy developed by the
Lula da Silva government also relates to the re-
affirmation of the role of Latin American regional
leaders against regional rivals such as Argentina and
Colombia (de Almeida, 2010). Through a foreign
policy program that emphasizes Brazil as the leader of
a third world country, especially for other African and
Latin American countries, Brazil seems to want to
demonstrate the feasibility of its capability to coexist
with global forces within the UN as well as the overall
system.
Brazil's foreign policy to serve as a forum for
cooperation against third-world countries across the
region is basically also supported by the superiority of
capability possessed against other southern countries.
Sousa (2008) explains that Brazil already has a
demographic and geographical capital that is capable
and can be juxtaposed with countries such as China.
This is then supported by the increase in economic
capability in line with the level of economic growth is
increasingly stable even able to occupy the top ten of
the world economy with an average growth of 5
percent per year. In line with that, in the context of
Brazil's soft power capability also supports the role it
attempted to emerge during Lula's reign as the
"southern" state leader. The mission associated with
co-ordination of the "southern" state is supported by
Brazil's skillful diplomacy and negotia- tion
capability. De Almeida (2010) mentions that the
ability of Brazilian diplomats has become a separate
force for Brazil in projecting its strength in the global
order. In fact, diplomacy and negotiation skills are
acting as a key capacity compared to aspects of
Brazil's military and economic power in relation to
other countries, especially the southern countries that
have been the focus since the Presden Lula da Silva
era. The calculation of relative capability is a separate
reason for President Lula to increase Brazil's
bargaining power to become more involved in the UN
and WTO by running foreign policy programs that
support the interests of "southern" countries. The use
of this capability source is then applied in policies
such as restructuring relationships to third world
countries including poor countries in Africa and Latin
American dictators. In addition Brazil is also
increasingly active in providing assistance and
support to the state and institutions concerning
developing countries.
In particular, Brazil's relative capability
relationship to the environment associated with
"south-south" policies by the author can be traced
through the dynamics both experienced at regional
and extra-regional levels. At the regional level of
Latin America itself the authors assume that south-
south policy related to regional dynamics that
occurred along with Brazil's position as a natural
leader. This is in line with Brazil's superiority of
power in the context of Brazil's hard power and soft
power when compared to other countries in Latin
America. However, the position of regional leader is
in fact getting opposition from other countries. De
Almeida (2010) mentions that Brazil's dominance in
the Latin American region is only obtained
objectively in terms of its real power. Meanwhile, the
recognition of the position as a dominant regional
force has not been obtained subjectively in line with
the opposition that arises from other major South
American countries, especially Argentina and
Venezuela, as well as relatively smaller countries such
as Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and even Ecuador.
Along with these conditions, it is understood that the
co-operative policy of the "southern" state as an effort
to increase the bargaining power and reaffirm the
position of Brazil as a regional power without going
through aggressive action. Fontine and Siffert (nd)
then argued that the Lula Presidential Government
saw that south-south polic could be instrumental in
gaining momentum in order to reaffirm Brazil's
leading role in the Latin American region especially
to suppress the increasingly dominant US intervention
in the region. This was then implemented by the Lula
da Silva government through a more interventionist
role towards fellow southern states in the region. This
is done through a multilateral pattern in line with
Brazil's growing support for intra-regional institutions
on the one hand enhancing Brazil's involvement in the
region, and on the other hand also creating more
favorable conditions when faced with political and
economic conditions at a global level. In addition to
the multilateral pattern, this policy in the region is also
built bilaterally to keep the alliance's relations
profitable and related to the maintenance of prestige
against certain countries in Latin America.
Both decisions on the application of south-south
policy can also be understood in terms of dynamics in
extra-regional. At this level the author tries to
understand President Lula's policy through the