Analysis of Russian Policy on China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR)

through National Identity

Noviawati Lesmana and Radityo Dharmaputra

International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Airlangga

Keywords: Russia, OBOR, China, National Identity, and Asian Pivot

Abstract: China’s new policy the One Belt One Road (OBOR) which is a new policy to improve connectivity and

integration among countries in the world. The policy is reaping responses from various countries, one of them

is Russia. Russia gave a very positive response to being a member of OBOR. Russia seeks to give its best role

and effort to realize China's policy. Russia's policy to follow OBOR can be analyzed through national identity

which is one tool to see why Russia is excited to follow it. In this paper, the authors argue that national identity

is indeed one of the factors influencing the policy. Response given Russia closely related to the position of

Russia who want to become a pivot in Asia. However, the national identity is not the tool that’s enough to

analyze Russian policy as a whole because of the weaknesses and limitations that exist when doing the

analysis.

1 INTRODUCTION

The One Belt One Road (OBOR) policy is a new

breakthrough organized by China. President Xi

Jinping announced at the end of 2013 that China

would build a Silk and Maritime Line that boosts the

economy between countries. It can be said that this

OBOR initiative is one of the greatest initiatives or

plans in today’s modern era. This path will pass

through other strategic, big, and developing countries.

At the beginning President Xi Jinping wanted to form

the Silk Road through China, Kyrgyzstan,

Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Moscow, Poland,

Germany, and France. Later, China will also build a

Maritime Line that passes through several Chinese

cities such as Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Guangzhou, Belhai,

and Haikou. In addition, maritime routes will also

pass through Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Sri

Lanka, India, Maldives, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, and

Italy (Cai, 2017).

China basically wants to establish better relations

with neighboring countries. This is related to one of

the main objectives of China to increase connections

between hinterland countries to Europe and through

several countries in Asia. China sees that these

countries actually have significant strategic value so

China have a strong to will establish deeper

cooperation within the scope of economy and security

through OBOR. Previously, China also wanted to

increase its peripheral diplomacy aimed at

maintaining the stability of China and its neighbors.

Therefore, China will continue to work to encourage

these countries to participate in the process of

regional economic integration and accelerate the

process of infrastructure development and

connectivity which will lead to the emergence of a

new regional economic order (Cai, 2017).

Through these policies, China has embraced thirty

state leaders to join and actively participate in the

realization of this policy. OBOR is President Xi

Jinping’s ambition in the economic field. According

to Golley and Song (2011), China has had a positive

impact on the growth of the world economy with

efforts to enhance integration with other countries in

the world trade system. China’s ongoing new

breakthrough will transform the political economy

relations globally. Therefore, not all countries

provide a positive response to the policy. The

interesting part is that China seems not too difficult to

embrace Russia in its policy, instead Russia is

responding not only positive related to China’s

OBOR but also active to follow this policy.

2 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

ON OBOR

The relationship between Russia and China can be

considered as a good relationship. Especially in 2014,

550

Lesmana, N. and Dharmaputra, R.

Analysis of Russian Policy on China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) through National Identity.

DOI: 10.5220/0010280100002309

In Proceedings of Airlangga Conference on International Relations (ACIR 2018) - Politics, Economy, and Security in Changing Indo-Paciﬁc Region, pages 550-554

ISBN: 978-989-758-493-0

Russia and China have a closer relationship. This is

not apart from the sanctions received by Russia since

2014. Moscow which is the center of economic,

financial, military, and energy export activities is one

of the sanctions’ target. These sanctions were granted

from Western European countries against Russia. This

condition eventually forced Russia to join the

cooperation and establish good relations with

countries in Asia and especially China. In fact, Russia

has been trying to establish relations with Asian

countries since 1992. But the Russian opportunity to

cooperate increase during the reign of President Xi

Jinping around 2013 and has 12 times meeting and

signing several deals for better relations (Upadhyay,

2016).

China has focused its policy on regional security

issues and increased connectivity that can be achieved

through OBOR. In this regard, Russia responds to the

policies positively. This positive response can be seen

through Russian approval to join 29 other country

leaders to join this policy. Not only that, Russia has

also signed an agreement to improve the economy

and weapons with China (Upadhyay, 2016). In

addition, the positive response provided also linked

with the Russian pivot’s goal to Asia. It can’t be

denied that the alienation of Russia by the West

because of the Crimean case changed the orientation

of Russia to lean to the East. This goal is further

emphasized by Putin in 2011 (Dave, 2016).

Russia chose to get closer to China and join the

OBOR policy because China is the most active actor

in the region. Of course, in the process of approaching

to the East, Russia is also slowly cooperating with

ASEAN. However, OBOR became one of Russia’s

special concerns to achieve the main goal of pivot to

Asia (Dave, 2016). In this paper, the author will

analyze why Russia is very enthusiastic to join

China’s OBOR. The author will analyze the policy

with national identity level of analysis although this

tool does not fully answer the reason behind Russia’s

acceptance and enthusiasm for the policy.

3 NATIONAL IDENTITY AS

TOOL OF ANALYSIS OF

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

ON OBOR

National identity is a tool in level of analysis that close

to constructivist views and sometimes also close to a

rationalist framework. However, the national identity

itself still has to face some criticism. Criticism is

certainly related to the lack of national identity as a

tool of analysis, among which is fundamentally one-

sided and there is a gap between material and

ideational. Moreover, the national identity itself if

only depends on constructivist then it can’t explain

how the state interpreted the existing structure in the

international world and how the state uses the

structure in interacting with others. This is what the

post-structuralist (Waever, 2002) trying to answer.

Post-structuralist emphasis on the concept of self-

other relations. Not only that, according to the post-

structuralist, language is also an important thing

because through the language can be seen how a

country represents the reality that exists. In post-

structuralists, national identity is not a tool that can

see a great framework for looking at all state policies.

However, national identity can be used to look at

small constellations within a country. Identity is a

rational concept that results from the relationship

between self and others who have influence

historically. National identity is not a tool that seeks

the motive behind a policy but rather takes on other

small hidden factors that may affect the policy

(Waever, 2002).

There are three levels or layers in the national

identity that can be used to analyze Russian policy

towards OBOR. First is the first level or first layer

which analyzes how the state understands itself. This

level consists of how the ideas related to the concept

of the nation state. The thing to do is to see in advance

how the process of forming the nation state. Then,

look at how and why the construction of identity in a

country. The analysis of the construction is seen

internally close to the welfare state and externally

related how the projection of a country from self to

another country. In addition, it is also seen whether

there may be attachments which is emotional and

cultural root that affects the formation of a nation

state (Waever, 2002).

4 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

ANALYSIS RESULTS ON OBOR

TROUGH NATIONAL

IDENTITY

4.1 First Layer: Value, Ideology, and

Russia’s Perspective

First of all, the author analyze through the first level

that will see how Russia is positioning or viewing its

own country. First, related in the formation of nation

state. Russia is a country with a long history of

statehood. Communist ideology is an ideology that has

Analysis of Russian Policy on China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) through National Identity

551

remained firmly held by Russia even since before the

time of the Russian empire has considered itself as a

great power state. However, in the process of its

formation, Russia also had time to feel the revolution

because of the imperial government that seemed to

oppress the society like a slave. Then, there was a

Bolshevik revolution that ultimately contributed to the

formation of Russia as a state. The formation of the

nation state of Russia is also inseparable from the

collapse of the Soviet Union after the Cold War. The

collapse of the Soviets could be a turning point from

Russia’s efforts to change the imperial heritage or

unilateral power transformed into a federal state

(Hahn, 2002).

Russia’s foreign policy also not far from the value

or assumption that Russia is a great power state. This

is because the elites in Russia itself. The elites in

Russia has a significant role and leave the idea that

Russia is a great power even after the Cold War ends.

This can be seen firstly through foreign policy issued

by Russia in 1991. The important point of the policy

is the Russia’s aim to achieve unity between Russia

and the world’s countries because Russia is a great

power state since centuries ago, unique in geopolitics

and has military power that should be considered

(FPC, 1993). However, in practice Russia isn’t

wanting to change the identity or value that has been

ingrained so far, but Russia is now more pragmatic.

This can be seen from Putin’s policy that showing the

reflection and rooted in the consensus of the Russian

elite that identifying Russia as a global great power.

The power of the state is the basic method of

achieving national interests (Clunan, 2009).

Therefore, it can be seen how ultimately identity as

great power has been constructed since before the

formation of the inherited Russia to this day. That is

also led to the expansion of Russia and the existence

of annexation efforts in the Crimea.

Then, there are other values that Russia holds as

their identity. The history of the formation of the

Russian state is also inseparable from past attempts to

protect the region from invasion. Therefore, Russia is

a country with a community of courage and has a very

strong will-power. In addition, Russian society also

assumes that he is the winner (Likhacheva and

Makarov, 2014). On the other hand Russia is also a

country that can be said not close to Western

countries especially Western Europe. It can be said so

because Russian society itself considers that Russia is

a unique country and different from other countries.

If viewed through historical facts, there is not a

spreading of belief that Russia is a marginalized state

among other European countries. This is evidenced

by the existence of three princesses from Russia who

became queens in Norway, Denmark, Hungary, and

France. Currently, Russia considers itself has a high

cultural and spiritual level that may be even higher

than Europe. Therefore, in fact the Russian society

has a different culture and spirituality that will never

merge with the West (Lavrov, 2016).

Russia that not merged with Western countries

including Western Europe became one of the

important factors why Russia finally got closer to the

East. Russia feels that its original culture is closer to

Eastern Europe or the Eastern world. This can be seen

from the similarities of language and art relating to

Antiquity and Byzantine times (Likhacheva and

Makarov, 2014). Moreover, after the Crimean case

caused Russia to get sanction. In fact, prior to the

Crimean case, Russia also felt threatened by the

presence of the NATO alliance (Zevelev, 2016). The

Russian approach to the country in the East can also

be seen from its policy in 1993. Russian policy since

1993 has stated that indeed Russia will focus on the

country in Asia especially China, Middle East

countries, and ASEAN as Russia considers that these

countries are emerging state (FPC, 2013).

Then, in the final stage of the first level is related

whether there are attachments that are closely related

to the nation state. Of course in the Russian state there

is also a spirit of nationalism associated with the

formation of a nation state. It has been mentioned that

indeed from ancient times Russian society has been

constructed into a brave society by having to fight the

invasions (Likhacheva and Makarov, 2014). In

addition, the attachment that is closely tied to the

present day is Russia which considers itself as a

global great power. Although there is little change in

foreign policy that currently leads to pragmatism, that

value is still firmly held by Russia.

4.2 Second Layer: Russia’s Position

vis-à-vis China

Then, after discussing the values and ideology that

underlie his own view, the author will discuss how

Russia sees China. It is clearly seen that Russia views

China as one of the partners or friends they can work

with since the Soviet collapse. Although, at the time

of the leadership of Mao Zedong and Nikita

Kurschev, Chinese relations were not good with

Russia because of ideological problems, alliance

relations continued after the fall of the Soviet Union.

This is due to the decline experienced by the Soviets

at that time that requires the relations normalization

with China (Lukin, 2016). After that, in 2016 to

commemorate the 15th anniversary of Russia’s

relationship with China, the two countries signed the

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Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly

Cooperation (Upadhyay, 2016).

In addition, Russia also considers that 2/3 of its

territory is located in Asia. Russia sees that the Asian

region, including China, is a thriving region and

focuses on economic and political interests which is

also Russian interest. Therefore, Russia has

established a cooperative relationship with China

since 2010. This is because by establishing economic

cooperation relations with China, Russia sees an

opportunity and challenge to return active in the

international world. Chinese and Russian

cooperation can also be seen from the emergence of

BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South

Africa) and RIC (Russia, India and China) (Lukin,

2016).

Seeing China and the Asian region promising the

development for Russia, Russia ultimately wants to

be an Asian axis or often called Pivot to Asia. Asia is

regarded as one of the important keys to the source of

energy and military security for Russia. Therefore,

China’s cooperation with Russia continues until the

issuance of China’s OBOR policy, regarding China’s

ambition to expand the production market to the

European market. Of course this is very interesting

for Russia to join with China. According to Fattibene

(2015), there are three main reasons why Russia is

finally keen to join OBOR’s policy. First, Russia sees

that to fulfilled their ambition in Eurasia by

recognizing China as emerging power. Secondly,

Moscow has arranged and convinced Beijing to

recognize the EEU as one means for joint discussion.

Third, the $ 40 billion funding for the Silk Road will

be a crucial resource for Moscow to improve its

infrastructure. Therefore, OBOR is seen as one of the

maneuver that can be used to fulfil Russia’s ambition.

4.3 Third Layer: Russia’s Positive

Response on China’s OBOR

In the early formation of Russia, a decision or a policy

is indeed regulated by the political elite in Russia. To

see the actors who play an important role in Russia’s

policy towards OBOR is none other than Putin and

other political elites. Putin and other Russian elites

justify that Russia is strongly responding positively to

the One Belt One Road policy launched by China.

The justification is supported by a statement from

Alexander Gabuev who is one of the key people in the

Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in Russia.

Gabuev (in Shtraks, 2016) states that indeed Russia

and China are in a cooperative relationship in the field

of investment projects, especially logistics goods and

infrastructure projects that will enhance relations

between the two countries. Then, Russia will also

seek to implement the three pillars of OBOR that is to

increase trade or bring up a free trade zone, economic

partnership, and facilitate trade.

Putin as one of the actors who is equally important

in making positive policy towards OBOR also do

some things that support the Russian response. Putin

often met President Xi Jinping to sign several

agreements including an agreement to engage

actively in OBOR. The meetings of President Xi

Jinping and Vladimir Putin are not only related to the

OBOR issue but the 2017 meeting in Xiamen is to

discuss economic cooperation between the two

countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s

Republic of China, 2017). Several agreements are

held to support Russia’s position on China’s OBOR

policy. Russia continues to strive for how Russia can

be actively involved in the policies issued by China.

5 THE ANALYSIS RESULTS

TROUGH TREE LAYERS OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

ANALYSIS

After going through three levels of analysis in

national identity it can be argued that the national

identity owned by Russia has little effect on Russia’s

policy on China’s OBOR policy. It can be said so

because the greatest influence given by the Russian

national identity is the value that it possesses as a

great power state and the proximity of relations with

the eastern states. If seen through the value of great

power it can be seen clearly that Russia will give a

very positive response to OBOR. To increase its

power, Russia can’t develop by itself. Russia needs

China’s help to remain as a great power state and

achieve its goal of becoming an Asian axis or pivot to

Asia. The Russian policy is also supported by the

political elite and every Russian policyholder. Then

Russia will surely be more inclined to China than the

Western countries because apart from two-thirds of

the Russia’s region located in mainland Asia, Russia

considers that its culture and spirituality is very

different from Western values so that Russia can’t

merge with the Western countries. Therefore, Russia

finally decided to get closer to Asia and approved One

Belt One Road to increase connectivity with other

countries with China. In addition, this positive

response is also supported by how Russia defines the

Chinese state. China is considered as one of the

partners that made Russia gives a positive response to

the policy of OBOR.

Analysis of Russian Policy on China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) through National Identity

553

However, the weakness of the national identity

level of analysis is Russia’s condition that more

pragmatic towards their foreign policy changes

nowadays. The pragmatic nature is finally unable to

explain Russian behavior and foreign policy as a

whole through national identity. This is because of the

pragmatic nature have no fixed pattern in every policy

issued by Russia. Then, values such as courage and

strong will-power impressed not very influential

because of the presence of the pragmatic side of

Russia. Therefore, the author considers that Russian

policy towards OBOR can be explained through

national identity but not strong enough because it

does not see the overall factor why Russia responds

positively to OBOR.

6 CONCLUSION

From the above explanation, the author conclude that

the real national identity is not a sufficient tool for

explaining Russia’s positive foreign policy towards

OBOR. This is because the limitation of the national

identity as the level of analysis. If you look at the

value of Russian heritage as a great power and see

Russia’s good relations with China after the Soviet

Union then it is an additional factor of why Russia

took the policy. Regardless of its weakness, at least

through the national identity it can be seen that the

value that Russia still holds firmly is how Russia

views itself as a great power state and a winning

country. That is what has become one of the factors

why Russia finally approved the OBOR.

In addition, Russia is also not a country that

integrates with Western countries including Western

Europe. That is one of the important factors why

Russia is finally getting closer to the East. Russia

feels that its original culture is closer to Eastern

Europe or the Eastern world. This can be seen from

the similarities of language and art relating to

Antiquity and Byzantine times. Moreover, after the

Crimean case which caused Russia finally got

sanction. In fact, before the Crimean case, Russia also

felt threatened by the presence of NATO alliance.

These factors lead to why Russia is ultimately closer

to Asia than any other country in the West. As it turns

out, small factors such as national identity can also

have little effect on Russian policy-making.

Russia considers that OBOR’s policy can be used

as a maneuver to improve its economy and military.

Moreover, Russia can increase its great power with

China and become one of Asia’s axis countries. The

limitations of the national identity tool as the level of

analysis can be seen on how pragmatic the Russian

nature in taking its policy especially after the fall of

the Soviets. It is something that can’t be answered by

the national identity level of analysis because in the

pragmatic nature there is no definite pattern in the

interaction between Russia with China and other

countries.

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