The Future Roadmap for the Relationship between the Islamic

Republic of Iran and the Palestinian Hamas Movement

Ahmed Al Madani

and Muhamad Muttaqien

Department of International Relations, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia

Keywords: Iranian Nuclear File, Hamas, Arab Spring, Palestinian Issue.

Abstract: The relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Palestinian Hamas movement varies according

to the nature of Iranian and Hamas behaviour when dealing with regional events in particular. Sometimes we

can see the relationship between the two sides warm when events occur inside Palestinian territories, and

sometimes we see normal relations between the two parties in the case of temporary stability inside the

Palestinian territories. Sometimes there is a bad relationship between Iran and Hamas, especially when it

comes to regional events in the Middle East. The methodology was based on Iranian-Hamas behaviour toward

the events in the Middle East and has been used to try to predict the future relationship between both sides.

Through the principle of predictability in international relations, this article argues the options related to the

relationship between Iran and Hamas especially with regard to their mutual interest, and the impact of these

options on the way Iran will deal with the Palestinian issues.

1 INTRODUCTION

The Islamic Republic of Iran has helped the

Palestinian Hamas movement since the establishment

of Hamas in Palestinian territories. There was a

political vision shared by the two sides on issues

related to the Palestinian regional and international

situation, but with the beginning of the Arab Spring

revolutions, especially in the Syrian Arab Republic,

the relationship between Iran and Hamas began to be

affected by political positions not agreed upon by the

two parties. This led to the emergence of fundamental

differences between Iran and Hamas at the regional

and Arab levels, which in turn alerted the Palestinian

Hamas movement to the nature of Iranian behaviour

in the region of the Middle East and why Iran is

interested in the Palestinian cause.

The emergence of the axis of resistance as the axis

of the Shiite community raised the alarm of the

Palestinian Hamas movement, in addition to the

presence of another axis - the axis of moderation,

namely Arab-style Sunni’s led by Saudi Arabia,

Egypt and Jordan. This also had an impact on the

Palestinian Hamas movement, through attempts by

the countries of the axis of Arab moderation to attract

movement. Hamas is trying to balance all parties

willing to help the Palestinian people achieve the goal

of establishing a Palestinian state.

There are specific determinants for both the

Islamic Republic of Iran and the Palestinian Hamas

movement. Both parties are trying to achieve their

objectives based on these determinants and are trying

to find the parameters agreed upon by the two parties

to achieve their common objectives, whether locally,

regionally or internationally. Iranian and Hamas

behavior toward the common determinants and the

work to achieve them is complex; therefore the article

has presented a clear explanation for the common

interests and their impact on the Palestinian issue

(Thomson, 2017).

2 DETERMINANTS OF THE

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE

PALESTINIAN HAMAS

MOVEMENT

Based on the ideological determinants, the political

determinants of Hamas are defined at the external

level and can be summarized in several points:

 The Israeli occupation is the only enemy of the

Palestinian people and its resistance forces,

Al Madani, A. and Muttaqien, M.

The Future Roadmap for the Relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Palestinian Hamas Movement.

DOI: 10.5220/0008821103250331

In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs (ICoCSPA 2018), pages 325-331

ISBN: 978-989-758-393-3

325

including Hamas. Its hostility stems from the

fact that it occupies Palestinian territories and

violates the rights of the Palestinian people.

The movement therefore has no problem in

dealing with any regional or international party.

Israel has occupied Palestinian territories and

destroyed Palestinian life, causing the

displacement of refugees. Hamas are

welcoming any support or help to end the

occupation and to achieve the concept of the

Palestinian state.

 The Palestinian Hamas movement has

committed itself to a policy of non-interference

in the internal affairs of countries under any

circumstances, especially in light of the Arab

revolutions that began in 2011.

 The Palestinian Hamas movement has built its

relations at both the public and official levels,

in a way that maintains its relationship with the

state and its institutions. It has established

relations at the grassroots level in recognition

of the importance of popular relations.

 The Palestinian Hamas movement operates

only in the occupied territories and is directly

present against the occupation of the land of

Palestine. Hamas does not exercise military

action against any state or territory of any state.

This policy has led to the awareness of all

regional and international parties that

resistance action against the occupation is not

an act of futility or an abstract desire to fight.

Rather, it is the performance of a national

struggle against an occupier to achieve the

political goal of establishing a Palestinian state

with Jerusalem as its capital.

 The Palestinian Hamas movement welcomes

any assistance or support in the face of Israeli

occupation from any Arab, Islamic or foreign

country provided that it does not intervene in

internal Palestinian affairs and that the support

is unconditional.

 The Palestinian Hamas movement balances its

foreign policy in relations with all countries,

whether they are Arab, Islamic or international,

so as to balance with all members of the

international community and to deliver the idea

of legitimate resistance against the Israeli

occupation to the whole world.

 At the Arab and Islamic levels, the Palestinian

Hamas movement is trying to unify the Arab

and Islamic ranks to confront the Israeli

occupation by supporting the Palestinian

people and by resisting the Israeli occupation in

all forms of peaceful resistance, both popular

and even armed, as well as boycotting Israeli

goods at the Arab and Islamic levels.

3 DETERMINANTS OF THE

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

3.1 Religious and Geographical

Determinants

The Islamic revolution in Iran was based on the

religious authority in place. Religion has a prominent

role in guiding foreign policy as well as a strong role

in the social and cultural structure of Iranian society.

Khomeini considers that the best government is an

Islamic government. This credit is due to several

basic considerations identified in his book, entitled

‘Islamic government’. Regarding the application of

the provisions of Islam at all areas and levels, the

second consideration concerns the unification of

Muslims and their liberation from colonialism. On

this meaning, Khomeini has said that ‘we do not have

the means to unify the Islamic nation and to liberate

its lands from the hands of the colonists, except

through the establishment of our Islamic government’

(Khomeini, 1970).

The Iranian revolution has made political actions

linked to the attitudes of the clergy, who doubt this

dependence as a source of religious authority

deprived of any role in the political power of the

country. Pre-revolutionary clerics were reluctant and

inclined to distance themselves from political action.

Khomeini's book, ‘Wilayat al Faqih’, encouraged the

clerics to present Islam to the people in its true form

and to link Islam to all forms of life, including

political life. The slogan of the separation of religion

from politics and the demands of Islamic scholars not

to interfere in political and social affairs was spread

by colonialism (Zuwairi, 2015).

There are many voices in Iran that believe that the

Wilayat al Faqih must be given absolute authority, up

to the point of granting legitimacy to the entire

system, which is derived from a singular leader.

Moussa Ardebili stated that we must mention that the

government, the Shura Council and the government

officials are all, in fact, under the authority of the

Wilayat al Faqih. From him comes all orders and no

one shall do any action contrary to his will (ALsayed,

2016).

According to the Iranian constitution, the supreme

leader of Iran is the supreme leader of the country,

and above his post is the head of the country itself.

ICoCSPA 2018 - International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs

326

Some have even likened the president of Iran to the

prime minister or an actual president. This is in

accordance with the theory of "Wali al-Faqih",

adopted by Iran by Khomeini after his revolution,

which ended the regime of the Shah in 1979. He

devised a system of government not seen in the world

before, declaring clearly and through the constitution

that it aims to apply this system to all countries. Said

countries will be controlled under the name of

"Islamic Jihad" and the "Unification of the Nation"

(Amoun, 2016).

The geographical location of the Islamic Republic

of Iran is important, both politically and economically

in nature, as it links East Asia and West Asia, with

borders overlooking the Arabian Gulf as well as its

proximity to Arab countries including Iraq, Syria,

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

There are two major geographic regions that are

the focus of Iranian interest; the first is the Caucasus

and the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, located in northern

Iran and the second consists of the Gulf States,

located to the south. The importance of these areas for

Iran is because of the cultural heritage that they

possess, which is represented in the Shiite doctrine,

and in the economic wealth that is found in the

reserves of oil and natural gas (Awaid, 2014).

3.2 Economic Determinant

Economic self-sufficiency means that the state has

reached a stage where it does not have to extend a

request for help to rich countries in order to obtain

financial or in-kind assistance such as weapons,

aircraft etc. Thus therein is the ability of the political

system to withstand, through local production and

self-sufficiency, to produce political power in the

international community by making independent

decisions without any effect regionally or

internationally. The imbalance in this leads the state

to a cage of dependence abroad, pushing it to making

political and security concessions, which threatens

the existence of the state and independent

sovereignty.

This is what Iran is aware of. Energy is an

important element in calculating the power of the

state at the internal and external levels. It must work

seriously to provide the potential energy for life and

economic development, and to find other sources of

petroleum energy. Iran's development of a nuclear

program is one manifestation of this realization. Iran

has been able to achieve some scientific achievements

in this regard. It successfully enriched uranium using

centrifuges.

The Iranian nuclear file is one of the most

important priorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran at

the internal and external levels, especially with regard

to the axis of resistance. With the increase of the

Islamic Republic of Iran, the result is that it is seeking

to increase Iran's political power in the regional arena.

This gives strong impetus to the Palestinian Hamas

movement in the face of the Israeli occupation.

Mahmoud al-Zahar, the Hamas leader closest to Iran,

said that his movement was stronger than during the

recent Israeli war on the Gaza Strip in the summer of

2014. Zahar added that the Palestinian people would

not be broken and that they would continue to resist

the Zionist occupation until the liberation of all of

Palestine. Zahar leads the wing, whose relationship

with Iran has not dissipated even at the height of the

confusion over Hamas' position on the Syrian war,

when the movement announced a stand against Syrian

President Bashar al-Assad, Iran's ally. Its offices were

closed in Damascus and moved to Qatar (Middle East

Online, 2015).

3.3 Security and Political Determinants

Iran has adopted a revolutionary foreign policy since

1979, when the ruling class at the time had a vision of

the outside world reflected in its foreign policy. This

vision was carried out with a view of international

isolation and a negative view of Iran. However, by the

end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Iran

seemed to be more realistic in its foreign policy,

especially with the rise in real trends. As a result, Iran

sought to restructure its regional and international

relations while retaining its strategic powers. It

moved from the revolutionary role of Khomeini to a

more balanced role in international relations as the

pillar of internal revolutionary support, focusing on

peaceful diplomacy and balance in its foreign

relations. Solid and soft power, away from

sensitivities, in order to rebuild what was destroyed

by the Iraq-Iran war. Nevertheless, neighbouring

countries have continued to meet every Iranian policy

with a look of extreme suspicion and caution.

This turbulent environment has made Iran acquire

the idea of targeting it militarily in the context of what

Washington calls the axis of evil. Iran is still in its

regional and international relations with deep

mistrust. Fifteen neighbours face a tension that makes

Iran and its regional and international actors be in

permanent doubt. This will certainly be reflected in

the effectiveness of Iran's foreign policy, which is

considered to be a relative failure of its overall policy.

Iran continues to feel that it is targeted from both near

and far. This is reflected in its vision of the world,

The Future Roadmap for the Relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Palestinian Hamas Movement

327

which prevents a positive and constructive

interaction, which has negative repercussions on its

foreign policy system. The isolation and the threat

against Tehran has made Iran's political thinking

based on the potential of a plot, which is perhaps the

driving force behind the attempt to acquire nuclear

weapons (Estuer, 2016).

On the basis of this, the foreign policy of the

Islamic Republic of Iran was built through several

factors in the Middle East. The problem here is that

the Islamic Republic of Iran is not the only player in

the Middle East where other major countries exist

with their military bases, be they American or

Russian. It complicates the understanding of Iranian

foreign policy, but as we explained earlier, the

ideological determinant is the basis of Iran's political

system, leading to the creation of Iran's foreign policy

based on the same foundation.

3.4 The Future Roadmap for Iran-

Hamas Relations

According to the regional events that took place in the

Middle East, whether in Egypt, Syria or Yemen, the

positions of the Palestinian Hamas movement and the

Islamic Republic of Iran were not completely

identical. This indicates the independence of the

Hamas decision from any foreign intervention, even

if it is an ally and headed by the Islamic Republic of

Iran. This is problematic as we mentioned earlier,

regarding the Iranian reaction to the decisions of the

Palestinian Hamas movement.

Hassan Ahmadian, an Iranian scholar, predicted

that Hamas’s options for dealing with regional events

would be very limited. The Hamas leadership learned

that the rhetoric and philosophy of the resistance did

not conform to the priorities of the Gulf States - Saudi

Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - in the region.

It is clear that Iran has continued its rhetoric and

policies in support of the movements that adopt

armed resistance. Hence, Iran's options are limited in

its relations with Hamas (Ahmadian, 2015).

The Iranian researcher predicted that the options

of Hamas place them between the return of Hamas to

the incubator of regional resistance and to the axis of

resistance led by the Islamic Republic in Iran. The

second option is the continuation of Hamas in betting

on the replacement of Iran and its allies with other

players in the Gulf. According to the Iranian

researcher, the first option is the return of Hamas to

the axis of resistance, where he stressed that there are

indications of the weighting of this option by some

leaders of Hamas. Hamas's anti-Syrian rhetoric has

declined, and Hamas has rejected US military

interventions against the Syrian regime.

If Hamas is likely to deal with regional changes,

then it will have to raise the sectarian dimension that

entered its speech after the Arab Spring and to return

to emphasizing the initial discourse in resisting the

Israeli occupation. It is clear that such an option

would exclude some of the leaders who have

committed the great strategic error that brought

Hamas into the regional equations that were

indispensable, a mistake that played down Hamas

both at home and abroad. Tehran will accept this

return and will understand that Hamas is distancing

itself from the Syrian crisis and its neutrality towards

its players, and will continue to support Hamas.

The second option is the continuation of Hamas in

betting on replacing Iran and its allies with other

players in the Gulf. It is clear that these countries do

not adopt the philosophy of the particular resistance

rhetoric or policy that is aligned to the Palestinian

cause. If this option is weighted, then Hamas will

have to move gradually away from the resistance and

enter the cycle of negotiations that Fatah has entered

before and end its control over the Palestinian

decisions.

Hamas will increase the strength and voice of the

other resistance movements that will grow at the

expense of Hamas and steal the leadership position of

Hamas in the Palestinian resistance, just as happened

to the Fatah movement after offering the option of

resistance.

Hamas is expected to split into its respective

military and political wings. In this case, the gap will

be between Iran and its allies on the one hand and

Hamas on the other. Hamas will lose its unconditional

Iranian support, according to Mahmoud al-Zahar, and

in order to receive conditional support, it would lose

its independence and drag it into Fatah movement.

The third option is to continue with the oscillation

between the two options. In this case, the regional and

internal pressure on Hamas will increase, and the

disgruntled public tone of Hamas' lack of resources to

manage the sector will grow.

The researcher believes that the first option could

be a future road map for the relationship between the

Islamic Republic of Iran and the Palestinian Hamas

movement by focusing on the Palestinian issue

without entering into regional problems. Iranian

support must be without political conditions for

Hamas. On the other hand, Hamas is trying to activate

the relationship with the Gulf States without going

into the political problems between the Gulf States

and Iran.

ICoCSPA 2018 - International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs

328

In a report issued by the Zaytouna Center for

Political Studies in 2014 on the future of the

relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and

the Palestinian Hamas movement (Farhana, 2014),

the report touched on points of disagreement and

agreement at the regional level between the two sides

through several key points. The most prominent areas

of agreement and cooperation between Iran and

Hamas, according to the Zaytuna Centre report were:

 The position of the Israeli occupation, the

complete liberation of Palestine and the

recognition of "Israel".

 For Iran, Hamas is a Sunni lever and a

counterbalance to Tehran in regional

geopolitics. Palestine has a central Arab and

Islamic status, thus strengthening Iran's

regional standing in the region.

 Iran's relationship with Hamas softens the

sectarian colour of Iran's regional role,

according to a wide spectrum of stakeholders

and audiences in the region. On the other hand,

Tehran is an important regional support base

for Hamas, especially in terms of logistical

support for the resistance.

 The intersection of the relationship between

Tehran, Damascus, Hamas, Hezbollah and

Islamic Jihad has, for years, been an impetus

for the resistance program and created a

regional backing for its course.

4 AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES

 The difference in sectarian colour, and their

inability to overcome it, in light of the

atmosphere of the existing sectarian

mobilization, and their inability to develop the

relationship in a similar alliance because of it.

 The sensitivity of the region, its peoples and

their political systems to the Iranian role and its

project in the region, as Hamas finds its

strategic (especially popular) backbone in the

same regional space.

 The independence of Hamas and its rejection of

the territorial subordination of any parties; in

return, there is a desire for the hegemony

inherent in a number of decision makers in Iran.

 Hamas’s sensitivity to its involvement in

regional alliances, contrasting with its strategic

vision. There is also Tehran's desire to develop

the relationship into something similar to

building a homogenous bloc in a highly

coordinated policy.

5 POSSIBLE FUTURE

RELATIONSHIP OPTIONS

Based on the political reading of the map of the

relationship between Hamas and Iran and its

intersections and contradictions, and by trying to

draw their support in the current regional scene, the

future of the relationship can be estimated as follows:

 The first option:

Relaunching the relationship, including the

return of financial and logistical support to

Hamas by Tehran.

 The second option:

Blocking of communication between the

parties, and the arrival of the relationship

between them to a state of total estrangement.

 Third option:

The communication between the two parties

stay on the level of "normal" relationship such

as relations with some countries in the region.

According to the report, the Zaytouna Centre has

stated the future relationship between Iran and

Hamas, in view of the need of the parties related to

one another, and needing to agree on a package of

common interests due to the similar geopolitical

location of each in the current regional scene. In view

of the contradictions that still exist because of the

Syrian crisis and others, as well as because Tehran is

under the microscope of the West in the course of

talks on the Iranian nuclear file, it is expected that the

relationship between the parties will be between

options 1 and 3 and any associated influencing factors

(Farhana, 2014).

According to the Future Centre for Advanced

Research and Studies, the possibility of re-launching

the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran

and the Palestinian Hamas movement is very strong,

especially with indications of the return of Iranian-

Hamas relations (Future for Advanced Research and

Studies, 2017).

 There is an internal political trend led by Ismail

Haniyeh and Mahmoud al-Zahar, which is

likely to return to relations with Iran, through

the need to build more realistic and realistic

relations with central regional powers,

including Iran. Hamas must diversify tools at

the regional level while not placing all of its

The Future Roadmap for the Relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Palestinian Hamas Movement

329

bets on the only ally in the current complex

regional environment.

 Visiting a delegation from Hamas to Iran over

the past years, whether in 2012 or 2016,

especially with the assumptions from

Mohamed Morsi’s presidency of the Republic

in Egypt. The visits show that Hamas was keen

to take advantage of the event to move relations

forward with Iran through the presence of a

new ally of Hamas, Mohamed Mursi, which

has strained the relationship between Hamas

and Iran, but that did not have a significant

negative impact.

Iran is trying to focus once again on the

Palestinian issue through its relations with Hamas.

Iran’s aim is to restore its role in the Palestinian cause,

especially since the other regional actors are playing

an increasing part, and ensuring that they have a

pressure card that they can use when it is necessary to

serve their regional interests. Iran wants to strengthen

its current and future relations with a big Sunni

movement such as Hamas to improve its relations

with Arab and Gulf countries and to reduce the Sunni

and Arab rejection of Iranian interference in the

internal affairs of Arab countries such as Syria, Iraq

and Yemen.

Iran is trying to use Palestinian movements again

as a political card against both Israel and the United

States, especially since Israel is increasingly

highlighting Iran's nuclear file so that more sanctions

should be imposed on Iran. That is why Tehran

believes it is important to have effective leverage that

can be used against Israel to deter it from hostile

movements against Iran.

Iran wants to diversify its network of relations

within the Palestinian territories. Through the

establishment of a new movement in the Palestinian

territories to be the reference of this new movement

through the Shiite doctrine, the movement of Saberin

in the Gaza Strip and the Iranian goal of this

movement is to alert the Palestinian Hamas

movement in the sense that Iran found itself an

Iranian follower within the Palestinian territories (the

movement of Saberin) and working to establish a

public base for this new movement. If Hamas

movement rejects the Iranian approach in dealing

with regional issues, there is another Palestinian party

that agrees with this Iranian path.

Tehran is trying to strengthen its relations with

Hamas to achieve Iranian goals at the regional level,

through the resumption of Iranian aid to Hamas in the

financial and military levels. The Iranian regime is

trying to tilt the balance in favour of a supportive

political movement within Hamas. The influential

trend includes high-level political and military

leaders who favor building unique relations with Iran.

The Iranian offer is due to Iran's fears that the

opposing current is working to find other options,

such as having stronger ties with the Arab and Gulf

states at the expense of relations with Iran.

6 CONCLUSIONS

There are regional determinants of the relationship

between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the

Palestinian Hamas movement. These regional

determinants have a significant impact on the nature

of the relationship between Iran and Hamas,

particularly with regard to the Syrian and Yemeni

files

The Islamic Republic of Iran has tried to incite the

Palestinian Hamas movement into the regional files.

This is what Hamas rejected, which negatively

affected the axis of resistance by reducing Iran's

political, military and financial support to the

Palestinian Hamas movement.

The relationship between the Islamic Republic of

Iran and the international community, especially the

United States of America, regarding Iran's nuclear file

has an impact on the Palestinian Hamas movement,

as the international determinants of the relationship

between Hamas and Iran are determined by the nature

of international engagement with Iran's nuclear file.

The options of dealing with the Islamic Republic

of Iran and the international community are complex

and difficult given the nature of Iran's behaviour,

which is inconsistent with Iranian statements, leading

to international and US economic sanctions on Iran

and its allies, including the Palestinian Hamas

movement.

On the regional level, the relationship between the

Islamic Republic of Iran and the Palestinian Hamas

movement will be based on the mutual interests

between the two parties through the independence of

Hamas’s political decision stemming from the

Palestinian national interest, by focusing on the

Palestinian issue and through non-interference in the

internal affairs of other countries. This contrasts with

the behaviour of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as it

interferes with Iraq, Syria, Yemen and the Gulf

region.

At the international level, the options to deal with

Iran's nuclear file are stymied by Iran's unclear

behaviour. One of the most important options is the

military option between the resistance alliance and

the US and its allies in the Middle East. This will put

ICoCSPA 2018 - International Conference on Contemporary Social and Political Affairs

330

the Palestinian Hamas movement within the axis of

resistance. Military action against Iran will be the

Palestinian Hamas movement on the side of the

Islamic Republic of Iran against the United States and

Israel.

Here is something new. Here in the Middle East,

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the rest of the Arab

and Islamic countries will stand with any military

confrontation between the United States of America

and the Islamic Republic of Iran through the principle

of clear Iranian interference in internal Arab affairs,

which will impose on Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the

UAE Bahrain and a group of other Arab parties the

obligation to stand against the Islamic Republic of

Iran in any possible war between the US and Iran.

The sectarian mobilization of the Islamic

Republic of Iran is negatively affecting the

relationship with a Sunni movement, the Palestinian

Hamas movement. All of the Islamic Republic's allies

are Shiites in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or Yemen, which

is contrary to the Sunni principles of the Palestinian

Hamas movement. Therefore, the Palestinian Hamas

movement is aware of this sectarianism and tries to

distance itself from it as much as possible. However,

the Palestinian Hamas movement is accused by Arab

countries of a Sunni nature of standing with Iran, with

a Shiite nature. This accusation affects the position of

Hamas and the Palestinian cause in general.

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