PAS Dilemmas in the Era of Abdul Hadi Awang

Saiyid Radzuwan Syed Sopi

and Faridah Jaafar

Political Science Section, School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800, Penang

Keywords: organization, mainstreamer, reformist, ulama and politicians

Abstract: The objective of this research is to identify what will happen to the PAS organization when the result of 61

Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) muktamar (general assembly) in Kuala Selangor, June 6, 2015 revealed that

the PAS leadership has been dominated by ulama leaders, labelled ‘traditionalist’ or ‘purist’ and the

‘mainstreamer’ or ‘reformist’ had to admit that they have lost their positions in the party. The focus of this

research is to identify that when Abdul Hadi Awang, the PAS president, had successfully purged the

reformist from being a part of the party members, he and his factions had made an unpredictable action to

withdraw from multi-ethnic opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) in June 16, 2015. As a result, PR was

dissolved and the rift worsened after the PAS leadership was captured by conservatives and the party

accepted a motion by its conservative ulama (clerics) wing to sever ties with the Democratic Action Party

(DAP) and People Justice Party (PKR). Hadi realized that it is near impossible for PAS to be in power on

the national level without assistance from the opposition parties. However, this research found that although

Hadi was a veteran politician, he asserts that his ideology, political thought and his ways of solving political

problems are against with PH. Hadi was categorized as an arrogant who always disagrees with his

colleagues, lacks of coalition spirit, and always makes a controversial statement towards PH.

1 INTRODUCTION

The result of 61

Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS)

muktamar (general assembly) in Kuala Selangor,

June 6, 2015 revealed that the PAS leadership has

been dominated by ulama leaders, labelled

‘traditionalist’ or ‘purist’, and the ‘mainstreamer’ or

‘reformist’ admits that they have lost their positions

in the party. PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang

believes that his party will continuously be a

competitive party even without the reformists. The

result of the muktamar was well organized by Hadi

and his followers, and they will ensure that only

those with religious background will retain the top

brass of PAS leadership, while the reformists have

option to make a decision whether to keep their

loyalty and accept the defeat or quit the party and

create a splinter party; the reformists choose the

second option. The reformist factions agreed to form

a new political party on Sept 16, 2015 known as The

Trust Party (AMANAH).

Ironically, during the former PAS President

Fadzil Noor era, he encouraged many professionals

to give up their university or government positions

and participate in the party as full-time activists in

the 1998-99 national crisis, which saw PAS double

its membership from 400,000 to 800,000 within

months (Liew Chin Tong 2007: 205). The influx of

new recruits updated the membership profile from

that of being mainly led by rural-based religious

scholars at various levels to one that included the

new urban middle class created by the social

engineering of the New Economic Policy (NEP). His

successor, however, Abdul Hadi Awang has done

much detriment to the party when he and his

followers have purged most of the reformist factions

through the muktamar. Hadi ensures that only those

with religious background will control the party

management and he believes that PAS will be a

stronger party without the support from the

reformists.

In comparison, in the early years of Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP) rule in Japan, the Japan

Socialist Party (JSP) had been a powerful and

seemingly growing party. It had the support from a

large number of the young, well-educated urban

electorate as well as the organized blue-collar

workers, precisely those constituencies numbers

were being rapidly increased by Japan’s rush toward

industrialization (Curtis, 1988: 117). In addition,

Syed Sopi, S. and Jaafar, F.

PAS Dilemmas in the Era of Abdul Hadi Awang.

DOI: 10.5220/0008891806450649

In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Multidisciplinary Research (ICMR 2018) - , pages 645-649

ISBN: 978-989-758-437-4

645

local professional politicians, lawyers, journalists

and a number of high-ranking national government

bureaucrats who saw the JSP as a vehicle to national

politics power also populated its Diet member

contingent. Seen as a party of the future by many of

the politically ambitious, it was able to draw on a

relatively large pool of talent for its Diet candidates.

Union leaders accounted for less than 30 percents of

JSP candidates in the first post-merger lower house

election in 1985. Two decades later, however, the

JSP had changed their political strategy and

channeled almost through that part of the union

movement organized into the Sohyo union

federation. As a result, by relying so heavily on

Sohyo, the JSP declined in popularity among voters

and by the 1970s, JSP was no longer a predominant

urban party. In the 1976 lower house election, for

example, it won 60 percents of its seats in semi

urban and rural districts. Only 26 percents of his

lower house members were elected in urban districts

and just 14 percents in metropolitan ones (Curtis,

1988: 118).

When Hadi has successfully purged the

reformists from being a part of the party members,

he and his factions has also made an unpredictable

action to withdraw from multi-ethnic opposition

coalition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) on June 16, 2015. As

a result, PR was dissolved and the rift worsened

after the PAS leadership was captured by

conservatives and the party accepted a motion by its

conservative ulama (clerics) wing to sever ties with

the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and People

Justice Party (PKR). In response, DAP's Secretary

General Lim Guan Eng said that the PR no longer

exists. Analysts believe the DAP and PKR will try to

link up with a new partner to form a new opposition

party before the next general election because this

remains their only realistic path to defeat Barisan

Nasional (BN). Therefore, after the PR dissolved, a

new opposition party called Pakatan Harapan (PH)

was founded on Sept 22, 2015 consisting the former

PR parties except PAS and two splinter party;

AMANAH and Malaysian United Indigenous Party

(Bersatu).

This article analyses the distinctive patterns of

conflict and frictions that emerge within PAS and its

relations to PH. Two distinctive patterns have

become particularly conspicuous. First, the

triumphant performance of PR in general election

(GE) 2008 and 2013 has in great part attributed to

opposition party strategies, and many vacancies

were offered to the party members upon political

appointments. However, what will happen to those

who are appointed upon political appointments when

Hadi and his factions finally agree to sever ties with

PH? In addition, should the PAS’s assemblyman

keep loyal to the party even though some of them

disagree with what Hadi and his factions have done?

For instance, the DAP has asked PAS

representatives to resign from their posts in the

Penang state government and its agencies. PAS does

not hold any influence in the state assembly as it has

only one lawmaker while DAP dominates the 40-

seat state legislature with 29 assemblymen.

Second, prior to the existence of PR and PH,

there was a political cooperation in 1999 among

opposition parties, and it was known as Barisan

Alternatif (BA). However, on the political front, the

conservative Islamalist position of PAS leadership

under the newly elected President Abdul Hadi

Awang severely has offended their non-Muslim

political partners, especially the Chinese-dominant

DAP, in the opposition coalition pact, BA.

Subsequently, DAP withdrew from the coalition

altogether and the opposition pact was dissolved in

2004 as a result (Kikue Hamayotsu, 2010: 165).

What surprised and bewildered outside observers

was why PAS was in antagonism towards DAP

despite their status also as an opposition party? As

Liew Ching Tong (2007: 201) mentions that it is

near possible for PAS to win national power on its

own, and it was supported by Mohd Izani (2014:

42). PAS believes that to compete in democratic

politics which has becoming increasingly

competitive in Malaysia, it should accept and

participate in the sharing power. In other words,

PAS can no longer move alone even if the party is

the only opposition party that manage to survive

since the first election in 1955. Why have these

trends grow conspicuously within PAS?

2 PAS’ ANTAGONISM TOWARDS

The PH’s triumphant in the GE 2013 attests that

political cooperation is the best strategies to be in

power. Once in power, the PH can create a job

vacancy through political appointments and most of

the posts are occupied based on politics connection

rather than qualification. The political post is created

after winning an election, and it gives government

jobs to its supporters, friends and relatives as a

reward for working toward victory and usually the

post is a contract or no limit time. Mohamad Sabu

and Mujahid Yusof Rawa, for example, have taken

the challenge to resign from their posts in various

ICMR 2018 - International Conference on Multidisciplinary Research

646

state agencies when Hadi declares that PAS has no

longer tied with PH. The question is does Hadi

realize what he has done to PAS when his party has

severed ties with PH, and can all the PAS members

follow Hadi’s summons in order to reveal their

loyalty to the party?

As a veteran politician, Hadi realizes that it is

near impossible for PAS to be in power on the

national level without assistance from the opposition

parties. Besides, PAS claims that his party has a

million of members and party branches all over the

states in Malaysia - this statement perceives that

PAS can achieve the election victory despite being

alone. However, in the plural society, working alone

to topple BN is not a good idea as Mahathir argues

after his party has joined PH, "when I fought the

previous elections under BN, I knew the opposition

would lose because they were fighting each other.

That's why we need a united opposition coalition,"

he was reported to have said, according to a post on

Facebook. Mahathir has urged the component parties

to set aside their ideological differences and unite if

the coalition wishes to defeat Najib administration.

In GE 13, PR had retained their victory in

Penang, Selangor and Kelantan and technically

Penang was ruled by DAP, PAS in Kelantan and

PKR in Selangor. In state legislative, PAS has won

one from 40 seats in Penang and 15 over 56 seats in

Selangor and this resulted asserts that PAS has

showed their good performance in Selangor. When

Hadi and his followers urge their party members to

sever ties with PR, Selangor PAS leaders, in

particular, scramble to warn party bosses against

going through with the motion to sever ties with

DAP (read PR), which the leadership forced through

the assembly without debate, much to the anger of

some delegates. In principle, PAS members should

show their loyalty to the state government after the

party has severed ties with PR, but it does not work

and why the top brass of PAS leadership does not

instruct their members to resign from their state

posts. In this scenario, what is more important;

holding on to your principles or your posts?

Kikue Hamayotsu (2010: 166) argues that Hadi

and his followers are increasingly dissatisfied with

their party’s diminishing influence within PH

despite making huge ideological compromise to stay

within the coalition. Some of the PAS supporters

insist that PR should be led by PAS due to their

party experiences in politics, background and

reputation. Hadi and others top party leaders feel

disappointed when some of his senior party

members leave PAS and form AMANAH. Once

AMANAH has been registered, Hadi constantly gives

negative perspective towards that party and assumes

that AMANAH will be eliminated within two years

from its formation. Besides, Hadi believes that

AMANAH will never get any supports from voters

because most of AMANAH members are unloyal to

the mother party.

Tan (2002: 150) argues that it is often noted that,

like any large organizations, political parties are

hesitant to change if the changes cannot bring any

benefits to the party. The question is what will

happen to the party’s mission when Hadi and his

followers have purged the reformists, and will their

party management be more systematic if the party is

merely led by the ulama? Without reformist in the

party committee, what changes have been made by

PAS? After GE 13, Kelantan is ruled by PAS and no

evidence shows that Kelantan administration

becomes more reliable after the reformists have been

purged from the party. It is often heard from PAS's

top brass of leadership that they will implement

hudud law in Kelantan and in generally, the hudud is

an old issue and has become an election campaign

before PAS rules Kelantan. However, until now,

PAS has failed to implement hudud law in Kelantan

although Kelantan Menteri Besar has repeated his

promises to implement hudud law at the latest by

2015. Besides, Kelantan government has faced a

chronic management and administration leak when

they are burdened with court suits such as the people

highway issue and Kelantan Timber Complex.

PAS believes that politicians who have lost in the

muktamar will retire, be inactive in politics or not

involved in any political party. However, their belief

is totally changed when the losers in the muktamar

have set up a new party and given competition to

their old party. After the formation of AMANAH,

PAS has made sundry negative perspective to

AMANAH and the most negative view that has been

done by the PAS President is he has made a

controversial statement that AMANAH will survive

within only two years after the formation. Basically,

the process of set up a new party or a splinter party

is not an odd phenomenon in the political system

because Japan politics have some experiences when

Ichiro Ozawa declares out of the LDP and set up a

new party to give pressure to his old party. Ozawa

with some of his colleagues and supporters have

arranged a brilliant idea and set up a strong pact due

to ensure that the LDP is no longer a ruling party,

and Ozawa's planning hits the target when they win

the 1993 general election. (Christensen 2000: 11-

12).

PAS Dilemmas in the Era of Abdul Hadi Awang

647

3 POWER SHARING

The idea of power sharing is important to create a

space for competing groups to share their view,

work together, and perhaps be able to avoid

hostility. The reality is sharing limited resources

work best in the plural context allowing each

competing entity to acknowledge the need to work

collectively. To stay in power as a dominant party,

BN can be seen as a role model due to their success

to reign Malaysia for six decades. This complex

multiethnic nation is being integrated wisely by

government that seeks to ensure that plurality and

diversity are accepted in a delicately balanced

relationship (Shamsul, 2011: 35). Furthermore, the

power sharing formula is adopted by BN was

applied since 1973 and successfully able to maintain

its domination as the ruling party since independent

of 1957 until 2018. Although the GE in 2018 and

2013 marked a significant shift of urban voters and

the loss of 2/3 majority in the parliamentary seats to

the opposition, BN rules still (Kartini Aboo Talib,

2013: 278).

Political scientist scholar; such as Lijphart (1969,

1977, 1991) argues that power sharing is the means

in order to maintain a harmonious relationship

among all groups, each may have to practice a high

degree of tolerance for any emerging issues.

Unfortunately, ulama leaders from PAS believe that

remaining in PR dominated by multi-ethic PKR and

DAP means that PAS runs the risk of giving up its

fundamental vision of state and society based on

Islam and Syariah (Islamic law) that the party has

long been championing (Kikue Hamayotsu, 2010:

167). Hadi and his followers realize that if their

party want to compete in democratic politics, which

have become increasingly competitive in Malaysia,

they should accept and participate in the sharing of

power. In other word, PAS can no longer being a

single party in order to achieve a victory in the

election. However, why did PAS still maintain their

decision to sever ties with PR although they realized

the risk if they moved alone as a single party?

According to the leader of the PAS Ulama

Council, Harun Taib, PAS has reached some

resolution, and suggests that political cooperation

between PAS and its allies in the opposition,

especially from PKR and DAP should be reviewed

due to the declined of the Malays support for PAS

on GE 13. Kikue Hayamatsu (2010: 166) argues that

Hadi and his followers are increasingly dissatisfied

with their party’s diminishing influence within PR

despite making huge ideological compromises to

stay within the coalition. Harun Taib also makes

some statements that the allocation of seats among

PR component parties does not give much value to

the strengthening of the position and influence of

PAS in PR. Besides, he added that in order to gain

more support from non-Malay, PAS has sold their

dignity and as a result, this scenario has reduced the

confidence of Malay voters to PAS (Al

Husseyn51.blogspot).

PAS members have fully supported the decision

suggested by Harun Taib, and why almost PAS

members agree with Harun Taib although they

realize that Harun Taib’s action will gave detriment

to the party. Probably every party member must

assert their loyalty to the party and there should be

no objection from the grassroots. PAS top leadership

always gives advice and encourages their followers

to get involved strongly in any discussion on the

party matter, but in reality, there is no platform for

PAS’s members to make the argument. Besides,

Mohd Izani (2014: 43) argues that PAS’s influence

in the PR is weakening despite an increase in public

support – in other words, PAS is not a leader but

merely a follower in PR. However, Hadi and his

followershave have made thousand announcements

that their party should lead the PR due to the

reputation, seniority and establishment of their party.

Coalition in a majority system offers ways to win

voters’ votes. Bargsted and Kedar (2009) mention

that in a majority system, voters’ preference is

subjective, but they are likely to incorporate chances

for victory when choosing a candidate or political

party, either individually or as part of a coalition,

before casting their ballots. According to Mahathir,

before his party becomes a coalition member to PH,

he has given some advices to the opposition party

that they will never be able to topple BN if they fight

each other. Mahathir has warned to the opposition

party that if they want to be a part of government or

ruling party, they have to temporarily forget about

their enmity with each other in order to pursue their

vision. Therefore, Hadi and his followers should

take notice what Mahathir has told because Mahathir

has wide experiences in Malaysia politics and the

greatest memory that he has is becoming a prime

minister.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Wickham (2004: 207-212) argued that leaders and

political parties moderated their agendas in order to

exploit new opportunities for electoral participation

created by democratization. Based on democratic

process, leaders and political parties are willing to

ICMR 2018 - International Conference on Multidisciplinary Research

648

de-radicalize their stances, including efforts to

reconstruct, renounce violence and abandon the goal

of revolution in post-transition elections, particularly

in Southern Europe and Latin America. However,

Hadi as a President PAS believes that his party has a

strong fundamental to rule the country without the

support from other political parties. Furnivall (1948)

mentions that “a plural society is rich with conflicts”

and Hadi should take a note with this statement

although he has strong confident that PAS has their

own strength to manage the Malaysia politics.

This research found that although Hadi is a

veteran politician, he asserts that his ideology,

characteristics, political thought and the way he

solved the political problem are against with PH.

Hadi was categorized as an arrogant, who disagrees

with his colleagues, lacks of coalition spirit and

always makes a controversial statement towards PH.

In Fadzil Noor era, he emphasizes that PAS needs to

combine the strength of the religiously and the non-

religiously educated and this statement shows that

PAS should seriously involve in political

cooperation in order to be a good governance.

However, Hadi believes that his own strategy and

his arts of politic can make his party reliable, and

PAS can survive without doing collaboration with

other political parties. As a conclusion, Hadi is an

out dated politician although he is supposed to get a

noble prize in his career as a politician.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author gratefully acknowledges to Universiti

Sains Malaysia and the Dean, School of Distance

Education for the kindness and the supported due to

approve the short term grant 304/PJJAUH/6313302.

REFERENCES

Al Husseyn., 2013. Harun Taib gesa PAS kaji kerjasama

dengan PKR, DAP.

https://alhusseyn51.blogspot.com/2013/09/harun-taib-

gesa-pas-kaji-kerjasama.html (July 26, 2018).

Asrul Haji Abdullah Sani. Jun 18, 2015. Break up of

Malaysia's opposition bloc Pakatan Rakyat: What

happened and what's next?

http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/break-up-of-

malaysias-opposition-bloc-pakatan-rakyat-what-

happened-and-whats-next. (April 17, 2018).

Baharudin, S. A., 2011. Culture and government survival

as a nation. Ethnic Studies Paper Series. No 2. KITA.

UKM : Malaysia.

Bargsted, M. A. & Kedar, O., 2009. Coalition targeted

durvergerian voting : how expectation affect voters

choice under propotional representation. American

Journal of Political Science. 53 (2) : 307-323.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00372.x

Christensen, Ray., 2000. Ending the LDP hegemony :

party cooperation in Japan. Honolulu : University of

Hawaii Press.

Curtis, Gerald. L., 1988. The Japanese way of politics.

New York : Columbia University Press.

Furnivall, J. S., 1948. Colonial policy and practice : a

comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India.

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Lijphart, A., 1969. Consociational democracy. World

Politics. 21 (2) : 207-225.

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2009820

__________., 1977. Democracy in plural societies. New

Haven, CT : Yale University Press.

___________., 1991. Power sharing approach. In J.

Montville (Ed.). Conflict and peacemaking in multi-

ethnic societies. New York : Lexington.

Kartini Aboo Khalid @ Khalid, Nidzam Sulaiman, Wan

Kamal Mujani, Siti Rogayah Tibek, Ermy Azziaty

Rozali & A. Rasyid Ali. 2013. Power sharing in

Malaysia : beyond unity and political duplicity. Asian

Social Science. 9 (10) : 274-281.

Kian Ming, Ong., 2010. Pakatan Rakyat : what is different

this time? The Round Table. 99 (407) : 141-152.

Kikue Hamayotsu., 2010. Crises of identity in PAS and

beyond : Islam and politics in post 8 March Malaysia.

The Round Table. 99 (407) : 163-175.

Liew Chin Tong., 2007. PAS leadership : new faces and

old constraints. Southeast Asian Affairs. 201-213.

Mohd Izani Mohd Zain., 2014. From Islamist to Muslim

Democrat : the present phenomenon of Muslim

politics in Malaysia. International Journal of Islamic

thought. 6 (1) : 37-45.

Tan, Alexander C., 2002. The transformation of the

Kuomintang party in Taiwan. Democratization. 9 (3) :

149-164.

Wickham, C. R., 2004. The path to moderation : strategy

and learning in the formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party.

Comparative Politics. 36 (2) : 205-228. http://dx.doi.

org/10.2307/4150143

Zurairi Ar. June 7, 2015. Three things we learned from the

PAS Muktamar.

http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/t

hree-things-we-learned-from-the-pas-muktamar.

(April 11, 2018).

PAS Dilemmas in the Era of Abdul Hadi Awang

649