New Media Technology and Religious Fundamentalist Movements:

Exploring the Internet Use by Salafi Movement in Indonesia

Asep Muhamad Iqbal

and Z. Zulkifli

Universitas Islam Negeri Bandung, Indonesia

Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia

Keywords: Salafism, Salafis, the internet, religious fundamentalism, modernization, Indonesia.

Abstract: Influenced by the argument of incompatibility between modernization and religion as advocated by the

proponents of secularization theory, some studies suggest that the internet is a harmful product of modernity

to religion and its acceptance by religious communities will make religion lose something of what it is

supposed to be. This paper, however, argues that it is inaccurate to characterize technological modernization

as incompatible with religion; rather, both influence each other and co-exist in fruitful ways. To support

this, we analyzed the relationship between religious fundamentalism and new media technology by focusing

on Indonesia's Salafi movement and its internet use within the Indonesian context. We explored how the

Salafi proponents employ the adopted internet in the frameworks of "cultured technology" and

"spiritualizing technology". In doing so, we mainly used textual analysis as the primary method of analysis

of Salafi web content and Salafi use of the internet.

1 INTRODUCTION

Explaining the interaction between religious

believers and new information and communication

technologies, some observers, who were strongly

influenced by the argument of the incompatibility of

modernization and religion as argued by the

secularization theorists, believe that the internet is a

harmful product of modernity to religion and its

acceptance by religious communities will make

religion lose something of what it is supposed to be.

They argue that internet use has led to the decline of

religiosity among religious believers, arguing that

“the more religious a person is, the less likely he or

she will use the internet” (Armfield & Holbert,

2003); that the internet constitutes a threat to

religious traditions, as exemplified by its

introduction into Confucian societies, because it

symbolizes encourages the American values, which

could be dangerous to Confucianist values of

communitarianism, including freedom of expression,

equal opportunity and capitalist spirit (Bockover,

2003); that “the internet itself is an American

concept”, which is used as an “ideological weapon”

to destroy Islam and Muslims (Adamu, 2002); that

the internet constitutes a challenge to religious

authorities by presenting alternative information that

destabilizes traditional structure of religious

knowledge and creating critical leaders who can

challenge traditional religious authorities in defining

and interpreting religious teachings (Barker, 2005);

and the internet is seen as a threat to the

cohesiveness of religious community as personal

experiences of the internet can lead to the

fragmentation of a religious community by

detaching its members from shared rituals, collective

identity and communal participation (Schroeder,

1998).

This paper, however, argues for the conception

of the ‘good’ relationship between religion and the

internet that new media technology plays an

important medium for religious communities as it

facilitates the religious-ideological needs and

interests of its religious users. To do this, in the

frameworks of “spiritualizing technology”

(Campbell, 2005) and “cultured technology”

(Barzilai-Nahon & Barzilai, 2005), it analyses the

relationship between religious fundamentalism and

new media technology by exploring the ways the

Salafi movement in Indonesia uses the adopted

internet. We focused our exploration on the main

Salafi web, www.salafi.or.id, which represents the

most orthodox group of Salafi movement, as it will

1566

Iqbal, A. and Zulkiﬂi, Z.

New Media Technology and Religious Fundamentalist Movements: Exploring the Internet Use by Salaﬁ Movement in Indonesia.

DOI: 10.5220/0009932115661573

In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Recent Innovations (ICRI 2018), pages 1566-1573

ISBN: 978-989-758-458-9

help us understand better the interplay between

religious fundamentalism and technological

modernization.

Generally, this paper aims to contribute the idea

about the failure of secularization theory in

explaining and predicting the relationship between

religion and modernization. It will show that not

only does religion survive problems and challenges

of modernization processes, but also plays new roles

in modern societies. As Berger (1999) asserts,

contemporary societies are religious as they were,

even more so in some part of the world.

Secularization theory is problematic as it lacks

empirical support (Stark 1999).

This paper is specifically expected to contribute

to the studies on good relationship between the

internet and religion (Campbell 2005; Barzilai &

Barzilai-Nahon 2005) and the appropriation of

global media technologies like the internet based on

their users’ specific locales and situations

(Thompson 1995). It also aims to add to the studies

on the relationship between the internet and

communities within the Indonesian context (Hill &

Sen, 1997, 2002, 2008; Lim 2002, 2003, 2005;

Brauchler 2003, 2004).

The data needed for this study were obtained

through online observation. The related postings by

the web administrator and contributors were

analyzed for topics, arguments, and responses. A

textual analysis was employed to analyze the

collected postings to reveal categories of the internet

use by the Salafi proponents. In the context of this

study, text comprises the Salafi website, which

mostly includes posted articles.

In the following sections, this paper, first,

describes briefly what Salafism is, its origin as a

Islamic transnational religious movement, and how

it spreads in Indonesia. Second, it explores how the

proponents of Salafi movement in Indonesia use the

adopted internet as a new important resource for

their socio-religious interests. Finally, this paper

provides some conclusions and higlights its possible

contribution to the related studies.

2 SALAFISM AND ITS SPREAD

IN INDONESIA

2.1 The Ideology of Salafism

The term Salafism (Arab: Salafiyyah) is derived

from the Arabic salaf (plural: aslaf), which means

“predecessor”. The salaf refers to the first three

generations of the Muslim community that include

the companions of the Prophet Muhammad

(sahabah), a generation after the sahabah (tabi’in),

and a generation after who followed the tabi’in (tabi

al-tabi’in). The Salafis believe that the Salaf were

the best Muslim generations because they learned

and implemented the pure Islam under direct

guidance of the Prophet or those who knew him. So,

Salafism refers to an Islamic ideology that makes the

Salaf as a model and direction in its attempts to

understand and implement the ideal and authentic

Islam in the present and future. One who follows the

method of the Salaf is called Salafi (Arabic: salafiy;

plural: salafiyyin).

Moreover, the Salafis believe that legacy of the

Prophet and the Salaf is normative and universalistic

in nature, which is to be strictly followed and

imitated by subsequent generations of Muslims in a

“contextual vacuum across the space and time”

(Duderija 2007, p. 347). The methodological basis

of Salafism is characterized by the commitment to

return to the pure Islam, which was believed as to be

only materialized in the times of the Prophet and the

first three generations of Muslim. Hence, the Salafi

movement is founded “on a romanticized and

utopian view of the past, ignoring or demonizing the

balance of Islamic history” and rejecting the legacy

of the long established juristic schools of thought

(madhhab) (El-Fadl 2003 cited in Duderija, 2007).

According to Mansoor (2000 cited in Duderija

2007, p. 351), the Salafis consider tradition a perfect

guidance that provides answers to all present and

future problems. Religious texts (nash) should not

be understood through reality as they are seen to

precede and thus guide the latter. Rather, reality

should be understood through the textual sources,

though it might contribute to the formation of the

latter. Likewise, the past, namely the prophetic time,

should precede and should not be understood

through the present. Rather, the prophetic time must

be used as guidance for the present realities.

Therefore, the authenticity of one’s identity is

determined by his degree of returning to the tradition

and historical time of the Prophet and the early

Muslim communities (Duderija, 2007). This

reductionist view seems very interesting to Muslim

masses because it is seen to constitute an

authenticity and legitimacy of the Salafi ideology.

What distinguishes Salafism from other Islamic

fundamentalist movements is that it believes that the

true way of going back to the Qur’an and the Sunnah

is following closely and explicitly the ways of

understanding and practices set by al-Salaf al-Salih

(the righteous predecessors). They call this manhaj

al-salaf (the method of the Salaf). This method of

returning to the authentic Islam is based on their

New Media Technology and Religious Fundamentalist Movements: Exploring the Internet Use by Salaﬁ Movement in Indonesia

1567

belief that the Salaf is the best generations of

Muslim community who understood and

implemented Islam under direct guidance of the

Prophet so that they constitute as the perfect models

for the following Muslim generations. For the

Salafis, following the Salaf means following the true

Islam and protecting Muslims from mistakes, sins

and evil acts (Noorhaidi, 2005).

This sense of certainty has led the Salafis not to

compromise and bridge differences with a number of

Islamic sects or groups that are considered deviants

such as Sufis. It is this consistency with the

authentic Islam that has attracted followers to join

the Salafi movement and helped it spread rapidly

across the national borders. Salafism has become a

forceful Islamic missionary movement without

adopting ideas from other movements or groups,

which is committed to establish a transnational

community of true believers who are committed to

the true Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2001).

2.2 Salafism as a Transnational Islamic

Fundamentalist Movement

Salafism is a transnational movement which aims to

propagate the puritanical approach to Islam and

connect the members of an “imagined community”

of true believers all over the world. It is one of the

contemporary Islamic movements that grow and

spread fast in many countries. Though its exact

number of followers cannot be accurately identified,

the Salafi presence can be easily seen in the

countries of the Middle East, North America,

Europe, Australia, and Southeast Asia. The

development of the modern Salafism owes mainly to

the supports, ideologically and financially, of the

Gulf countries, particularly Arab Saudi, which have

produced and exported Salafi publications, Salafi

missionary works and humanitarian aids (Noorhaidi,

2005).

After World War II, Saudi Arabia adopted a

policy of propagating Salafism as one of its major

foreign policies. Politically, it was aimed as a

counter attack to the expansion of Arab Socialist

Movement led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel

Nasser, which eventually brought the kingdom to the

Western bloc led by the United States that were

involved in the Cold War with the Soviet Union-led

communist bloc (Kepel 2002 cited in Noorhaidi,

2005).

In addition, in response to the Iranian

Revolution, Saudi Arabia was determined to contain

the shocking effect of the revolution by undertaking

the following measures: at the domestic level, it

attempted to prove that the kingdom was committed

to Islam by enforcing strict Islamic law; and, at the

international level, it intensified its commitment to

disseminate Salafism to the Muslim world and

include in its doctrines anti-Shiite and anti-

revolutionary elements (Noorhaidi, 2005).

The global Salafi dissemination was a political

reaction to the eruption of the Iranian Revolution in

1979 that brought Ayatullah Khomeini to power. For

Saudi Arabia, the Iranian Revolution was a threat to

the existence of the kingdom in the Muslim world as

it provided a model for the establishment of an

Islamic State that long been dreamed of by political

Islamists. Saudi Arabia feared that such a revolution

would spread its influence to other Muslim countries

and put its own monarchy to an end. In response to

the Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia was

determined to contain the shocking effect of the

revolution by undertaking the following measures: at

the domestic level, it attempted to prove that the

kingdom was committed to Islam by enforcing strict

Islamic law; and, at the international level, it

intensified its commitment to disseminate Salafism

to the Muslim world and include in its doctrines

anti-Shiite and anti-revolutionary elements

(Noorhaidi, 2005).

2.3 The Development of Salafism in

Indonesia

In addition to the emergence of new social and

political groups, Indonesia post-Suharto regime

witnessed the rise of religious fundamentalist

movements which were initiated by certain religious

groups in the country. Islamic Salafi movement is

one of these religious movements that have

characterized Indonesia after the collapse of the New

Order era in 1998. It began to (re)emerge taking

benefit of the relative absence of the state control

over civil and political spaces of the Indonesian

societies. The political landscape of post-Suharto

Indonesia provided the fundamentalist groups with

opportunities to express their identities that were

previously restricted by the state. They made use of

the new freedom resulted from the newly born

democratic, but unstable country.

In Indonesia, Salafism spreads mainly through

the Middle Eastern graduates, particularly those who

finished their studies in Saudi Arabian and Yemen

universities, which gave rise to a new generation of

Salafis in Indonesia (Noorhaidi, 2005). Having

finished their studies in these countries, they became

determined to propagate the Salafi thoughts in their

homelands in a systematic way, particularly among

‘secular’ university students. Among them were

ICRI 2018 - International Conference Recent Innovation

1568

Chamsaha Sofwan alias Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz

Asifuddin, and Aunur Rafiq Ghufron, who were

assigned to teach at some pesantrens (Islamic

boarding schools), including the pesantren al-

Mukmin, Ngruki, Jawa Tengah (Central Java)

(Noorhaidi, 2005).

They began their activities by disseminating

Salafism among the university students. It was

Chamsaha Sofwan alias Abu Nida who took an

initiative to propagate the Salafi movement among

the university students. With the support from

Saefullah Mahyuddin, the head of DDII (Indonesian

Council for Islamic Propagation) branch of

Yogyakarta, Abu Nida started to promote the Salafi

ideas by giving lectures at the Jama’ah Shalahudin, a

Muslim student community which was attached to

the Gajah Mada University, and organizing halqa

(study circles) and dawrah (religious trainings) at

mosques located in some universities and high

schools in Yogyakarta (Noorhaidi, 2005). In the

early 1990s, the arrival of other Middle Eastern

graduates reinforced the campus da’wa activities,

which was initiated by Abu Nida. They were Ja’far

Umar Thalib, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas and Yusuf

Usman Baisa who were assigned by LIPIA (the

Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic) to teach

at the Pesantren al-Irsyad, Solo, Central Java. These

graduates promoted the Salafi thoughts by

organizing da’wa activities at Diponegoro

University, State University of 11

March,

Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta, and also

Gadjah Mada University (Noorhaidi, 2005).

Other channels that helped the dissemination of

Salafism in Indonesia are DDII (Dewan Dakwah

Islam Indonesia [Indonesian Council for Islamic

Propagation]) and LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu

Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab [the Institute

for the Study of Islam and Arabic]) (Noorhaidi,

2005).

To accelerate the Salafi propagation and

reinforce the existence of Salafi communities, the

Saudi Arabian and Yemeni graduates established the

Salafi foundations with the financial support from

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. These include As-Sunnah

Foundation and Majlis al-Turats al-Islami and the

Islamic Centre Bin Baz in Yogyakarta, Al-Sofwah

Foundation and Lajnah al-Khairiyyah al-

Musyarakah (the Cooperative Committee for Islamic

Charity) in Jakarta, As-Sunnah Foundation in

Cirebon, Al-Huda in Bogor, Nidaus Sunnah in

Karawang, and the Wahdah Islamiyyah Foundation

in Makassar (Noorhaidi, 2005). Besides, the Salafis

disseminated the Salafi ideology through

publications by publishing As-Sunnah, the first

Salafi magazine in Indonesia, and establishing

Pustaka Azzam, a publishing house of Salafi

ideologies, in Jakarta (Noorhaidi, 2005).

Moreover, the coming of the information

technology revolution in the form of the internet to

the country helped create civil spaces for society.

The Salafi movement was one of the first

fundamentalist groups who welcomed and embraced

the internet as a tool to promote their identities and

develop networks with other local and global similar

groups.

3 THE SALAFI USE OF THE

INTERNET

Our exploration revealed that the proponents of

Salafism in Indonesia had adopted the internet as a

new important resource to pursue their social-

religious ideals since the coming of the internet to

Indonesia in the early 1990s. Based on exploratory

analysis of their use of one of the main Salafi

websites, www.salafy.or.id, the Salafis’ use of the

new media technology can be identified into four

forms of internet use as The copyright form is

located on the authors’ reserved area.

3.1 The Internet as a Medium of

Mission

First of all, the Salafis used the internet as a means

to promote the ideology of Salafism. The Salafi

website states that the Salafis regard the internet as a

medium of dakwah salafiyyah (Salafi mission) with

which they attempt to spread and communicate

Salafi ideas to a wider audience (see “Tentang

Kami” section). This missionary use of the internet

can be seen in the Salafi website use to publish

articles and fatwas on the principles of Salafism and

other teachings.

The Salafis employed the internet as a new

resource to propagate the principles of Salafism as

seen in their posting of articles by Indonesian Salafi

authorities with references to Salafi ideologues in

the Middle Eastern countries as well as the

translated works by Middle Eastern Salafi

authorities. These postings are mainly related to the

Salafi core teaching of the method of the righteous

predecessors (manhaj al-salaf al-salih), which is

regarded as the best way to understand and practice

Islam for it was prescribed and practiced by the

Prophet Muhammad and his best generations of

Muslims, namely his companions (sahabat), a

New Media Technology and Religious Fundamentalist Movements: Exploring the Internet Use by Salaﬁ Movement in Indonesia

1569

generation after the companions (tabi’in), and a

generation after them (atba’ al-tabi’in).

Like most Muslims, the Salafis

emphasize that

the very core of their mission is a call for tawhid

(monotheism; the oneness of God) and avoidance of

shirk (polytheism), the main messages of all

prophets. They highly emphasize the importance of

tawhid in Islamic faith and the danger of shirk (see

‘the place and urgency of tawhid in Islam’; ‘Beware

of shirk’; ‘About tawhid’). But, what distinguishes

them from the Muslim majority is their particular

strict ways in understanding and practicing the

doctrine of tawhid in that they attempt robustly to

purify in belief and practice the doctrine from all

forms of un-Islamic innovations and influences.

They believe that the prophet Muhammad began and

finished his mission with the tawhid doctrine (see

‘Monotheism, the mission of all prophets’).

In a posted article, the Salafis elaborate the

method of Salafism that involves two steps. First,

tashfiyyah that refers to purification Islam from

bid’ah (innovations). This step encompasses the

movement of purifying Islam from all forms of

beliefs, thoughts, and practices that have no basis in

the religious texts and no precedence in the practice

of the prophet and the early Muslim generations.

Second step is tarbiyyah that involves education of

the pure Islam for Muslims. This aims to educate

Muslims with the pure Islam and cultivate them to

live their lives with the true Islam (see ‘The method

of the Salafi mission’).

Through their website, the Salafis also attempted

to promote other main Salafi doctrines such as al-

wala’ wal bara’ (loyalty and disassociation), a

doctrine that Muslims should love each other, while

show enmity toward non-Muslims including

refraining themselves from imitating non-Muslims’

way of life such as clothing, and strict behaviors

which are regulated by rigid interpretation of

Quranic-Sunnahic texts such as growing beard,

wearing Arabian dress styles, and strict men-women

relationship. Moreover, they disseminated the

doctrine of apoliticism, a belief that Muslims are

prohibited from involving in practical politics and

rebellion against a ruler. Muslims’s political

participation should be conveyed in the form of

advice and pray for the ruler, no matter how unjust

he rules, as conducted by the Prophet’s companions,

the Sunnah followers and Salafi authorities.

3.2 The Internet as a Place of

Cyberwar

In addition, the Salafis harnessed the internet as a

place to wage cyberwars against individuals and

groups considered the enemies of Salafism. Through

their websites, they extended off-line enmity and

conflict into cyberspace. This cyberwar was also

seen in their condemnation of Muslim individuals

and groups believed to have breached the Salafi

methods of practicing and understanding Islam.

In this regard, in their postings, Salafis employed

their website as a medium to attack Syi’ah Muslims

(Shiites) due to their beliefs in taqiyyah (concealing

one’s faith in certain conditions for safety), mut’ah

(temporary marriage contract) and the infallibility of

Shiite supreme spiritual leaders (imams), Jaringan

Islam Liberal (Network of Liberal Islam) due to

allegedly their use of reason in understanding

Islamic texts, Hizbut Tahrir due to their use of

politics to establish Khilafah (a global Islamic state),

and Ikhwan al-Muslimin due to its ideology which is

strongly influenced by the Salafis’ enemies, namely

Shiites, Kharijites and Mu’tazilites.

It is interesting to note that the Salafis also utilise

cyberspace as a place to wage a cyberwar against

other Salafi groups, but believed no longer embrace

the true Salafi ways. This use shows that the internet

is a place where internal conflicts among the Salafi

supporters in Indonesia are extended into

cyberspace. The fragmentation among the Salafis

began when a group of them were accused of being

sururis, the supporters of the views promoted by

Muhammad ibn Surur, one of the main proponents

of politico-Salafis who severely criticised the Saudi

government in the case of the presence of American

troops in the Arabian soil during the Gulf War. This

group developed dakwah (propagation) activities by

establishing two Salafi foundations, Yayasan al-

Sofwah (al-Sofwah Foundation) led by Muhamad al-

Khalaf and Majlis al-Turas al-Islami (the Assembly

of Islamic Heritage) directed by Abu Nida. These

foundations were believed as to have established

links with overseas foundations that support Ibn

Surur, namely al-Muntada al-Islami Foundation of

London and al-Jam’iyyah Ihya al-Turats of Kuwait

(see ‘A testimony of Ustadz Muhammad Umar as-

Sewed’; ‘Ihya ut Turats is a deviant foundation’;

‘Disclosing the crimes of Ihya Turas, the enemy of

the Salafis’; ‘The danger of JI network of Kuwait

and al-Turas’).

Through their website, the Salafis have focused

their attacks on these two foundations. Umar as-

Sewed in his postings asserts that al-Sofwah

ICRI 2018 - International Conference Recent Innovation

1570

Foundation does not follow the manhaj al-salaf as it

is closely affliliated to al-Muntada Foundation of

London led by Muhammad ibn Surur. Sewed refers

to Syaikh Rabi’ al-Madkhaly, a Salafi authority in

the Middle East, who said that “if the foundation (al-

Sofwah) is similar to al-Muntada of London, we

think, it will be a major enemy for dakwah Salaf

movement in Indonesia”. He argues that those

involved in al-Sofwah Foundation are not the Salafis

because they support Ibn Surur and Ikwan al-

Muslimin, but they pretend to be Salafis. To

supports his arguments, Sewed provides evidence

that al-Sofwah’s deviation from the manhaj al-salaf

is seen in its attempts to publish al-Bayan, a

periodical that is published by al-Muntada of

London, and books written by Sururi authorities,

support the activities of groups regarded as ahl al-

bid’ah (the supporters of religious innovations) such

as Tarekat Sufi, Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Negara Islam

Indonesia (NII), and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, and

invite the Sururi authorities to give lectures in

Indonesia such as Ibrahim al-Duwasy (see ‘A

testimony of Muhammad Umar as-Sewed’).

3.3 The Internet as a Tool of Response

Furthermore, the Salafi community harnessed the

internet not only as an instrument to promote their

Salafi ideology and practices but also as a medium

to express their concern and views about

contemporary issues of local and global society. Our

investigation on the content of their website revealed

that the Salafis used the internet as a tool to show

their interest in the current socio-religious issues in

Indonesia. For example, in their response to the

Tsunami wave that hit Aceh in 2004 and

earthquakes in Yogyakarta in 2006, they posted

fatwas on some Tsunami-related issues such as how

to deal with tens of thousands of bodies of the dead

Muslims, whether it was permitted to work together

with non- Salafi people in providing help and relief

to the survivors, and condemnation on the Christian

missionary work attempted by some international

aid organizations to convert the victims, mostly

Muslim children, to Christianity disguised in a

humanitarian aid.

The Salafis’ response to local issues can also be

seen in their postings on the issue of al-Qiyadah al-

Islamiyah, a new group that declared its leader had

received a revelation and was appointed by God a

new prophet. The Salafis view that that al-Qiyadah

al-Islaiyah is a misled group because its supporters

believe in a new prophet after the Prophet

Muhammad and the religious unity of Judaism,

Christianity and Islam, reject the Hadis as a valid

religious text, and interpret the Qur’an not based on

accepted methods (tafsir) as practiced by the Salaf.

There is no doubt that, the Salafis assert, these

doctrines promoted by the new group are

unacceptable and a serious contravention of the

principles of Islamic faith (aqidah) so that the

group’s presence in a Muslim society can incite

social disorder (see ‘The new prophet is al-Masih al-

Maw’ud – al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyyah is a deluded

group’; ‘The new prophet’s teachings have incited

social disruption in Yogyakarta’; ‘The new

prophet’s Quranic interpretation – disclosing al-

Qiyadah al-Islamiyah’).

In addition, the Salafis make use of cyberspace

as a tool to respond to international issues. Their

postings showed that they were aware of global

issues and events, particularly those are concerned

with Islam and the Muslim world. Responding to the

crisis of the Muslim world such as in Lebanon,

Palestine, and Iraq, the Salafis used the internet as a

tool to communicate their belief that crisis resulted

from the Muslims' negligence of the true Islamic

teachings so that they are not under the God

guidance. This has made Muslims weak and

provided enemies with opportunities to dominate

and destroy the Muslim countries.

Responding to the crisis of the Muslim world

such as in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, the Salafis

use the internet as a tool to communicate their belief

that crisis has resulted from the Muslims’ negligence

of the true Islamic teachings so that they are not

under the God guidance. This has made Muslims

weak and provided enemies with opportunities to

dominate and destroy the Muslim countries. In

Lebanon, according to Salafis, Hizbullah is a Syi’ah

group that has infringed the principles of Islamic

faith, insulted the honourable companions of the

Prophet Muhammad, and changed the Qur’an just

like the Jews changed their scriptures. Quoting a

fatwa issued by Shalih bin Muhammad al-Luhadain

of Saudi Arabia, the Salafis label the group not as a

party of God (hizbullah), but rather a party of evil

(hizb al-syaithan). The same is true for crisis in

Palestine and Iraq. Hamas in Palestine is a fanatic

group (hizbi) that follows the sectarian ideology and

ignore the true ideology of Islam as practiced by the

Salaf. Those who fight against the US invasion in

Iraq are Syi’ah who slaughtered the supporters of the

Sunnah (ahl al-sunnah). These groups have not

waged jihad as prescribed by God in the Qur’an and

exemplified by the prophet and his companions. So,

through their website, the Salafis suggest that the

only solution to the crisis in order to gain victory

New Media Technology and Religious Fundamentalist Movements: Exploring the Internet Use by Salaﬁ Movement in Indonesia

1571

over the enemies is that Muslim must return to the

pure Islam as practiced by the prophet and the first

generations of Muslims (the salaf) (see ‘A fatwa on

the crisis in Libanon part 1-2’; ‘Syaikh al-Luhadain:

Hizbullah is hizbusy syaithan (the party of evil)’;

Hamas is a deviant jihad fighters’; ‘On America in

Iraq‘).

3.4 The Internet as a Medium of

Linkage

Lastly, our investigation revealed that the Salafis

utilised the internet as a medium to establish

networks and sustain solidarity among local,

national and global Salafi supporters. Through this, a

global Salafi network in the Middle East, for

example, can have an impact on local Salafi

networks as well as a local Salafi network in an

Indonesian city, for instance, can influence a

transnational Salafi network. Through their website,

the Salafis developed links to other local websites

that also promote the ideology of Salafism. They

have built affiliation with ten local websites operated

by the supporters of Salafism located in various

cities in Jawa, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. The

affiliation can be seen, among others, in their

reposting articles or news previously posted by other

Salafi websites, such as As-Syariah Online

Magazine (www.asysyariah.com).

The Salafis not only developed networks with

local proponents of Salafism but also with global

Salafi supporters. Their website indicates that the

Salafis have developed links with global Salafi

websites in various parts of the world. They include

nineteen Arabic websites and eighteen English

websites, which located in the Middle East (sixteen

websites), Europe (thirteen websites) and USA

(eight websites).

Most of these are privately operated websites,

but some are state-owned ones, such as

http://quran.al-islam.com and http://hadith.al-

islam.com, that operated by the Saudi Ministry of

Islamic Affairs, Endowment, and Propagation.

These websites are clearly dedicated to propagate

the Salafism worldwide. They range from the

personal webs of the Salafi authorities in the Middle

East, such as the sites of Ibn Baz, Utsaimin, and

Rabi al-Madkhali, to online Quran and Hadis

services. Based on this, I argue that building links

with other websites enables the Salafis to

communicate with other local and global Salafi

groups and enforce the propagation of the Salafism

through cyberspace to a wider audience across the

regional and national borders. It also suggests that a

local Salafi community (the purist Indonesian

Salafis) can have a global impact in that they

constitute as part of global network of Salafism and

at the same time the global Salafi network can have

a local repercussion as its presence is needed to

enforce the existence of a local Salafi community.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to the conviction that the internet presents

harmful effects to religious communities as

suggested by some studies, this paper has shown that

the internet plays a new important medium and

useful resource for religious communities facilitating

the needs and interests of religious users. It might be

true that to some degree the internet undermines the

traditional structure of religious communities. But,

religious communities are active agents who can

employ opportunities resulted from the internet for

their own needs and interests. In other words, the

positive effects of the internet outweigh its harmful

consequences. The fundamentalist movements like

Salafism are not only able to survive, but also

transform modernity products like the internet to

make them serve their religious purposes and needs.

The Salafi use of the internet confirms the

process of “cultured technology” by religious

fundamentalists as proposed by Barzilai-Nahon and

Barzilai. It shows ways how the Salafis as an Islamic

fundamentalist group used the internet and make it

as part of their culture. This process involved the

Salafi adoption and adaptation of the internet, as

well as adaptation into it, to the interests and

purposes of their community.

In addition, the ways the Salafis employed the

internet represent what Campbell calls

"spiritualizing the internet" as they adopted the new

media technology and put religious legitimacy on it

to make its use religiously acceptable. In certain

ways, this involves endorsement and utilization of

the new media technology for the Salafi social-

religious interests within a worldview that is rich

with spiritual meanings and values, which are absent

from the new media adoption by non-religious

groups.

ICRI 2018 - International Conference Recent Innovation

1572

REFERENCES

Adamu, A. 2002. Internet and the Internet. Retrieved from

http://

www.kanoonline.com/publications/islam_and_the_int

ernet.htm.

Armfield, G & Holbert, R. 2003. The Relationship

between Religiosity and Internet Use. Journal of

Media and Religion, 2(3), 129–144.

Barker, E 2005. Crossing the Boundary: New Challenges

to Religious Authority and Control as a Consequence

of Access to the Internet. In M. Højsgaard & M.

Warburg (Eds.), Religion and Cyberspace (pp.67–85).

London: Routledge.

Barzilai-Nahon, K., & Barzilai, G. 2005. Cultured

Technology. The Information Society (21), 25-40.

Brauchler 2003, 2004

Bockover, M. 2003. Confucian Values and the Internet: A

Potential Conflict. Journal of Chinese Philosophy,

30(2), 159–175.

Brauchler, Birgit. 2004. ‘Islamic radicalism online: the

Moluccan mission of the Laskar Jihad in cyberspace’,

The Australian Journal ofAnthropology 15:3, pp.267-

285.

Brauchler, Birgit. 2003. ‘Cyberidentities at war: religion,

identity and the internet in the Moluccan conflict’,

Indonesia 75, pp. 123-151.

Campbell, H. 2005. Spiritualizing the Internet:

Uncovering Discourse and Narratives of Religious

Internet Use. Online-Heidelberg Journal of Religions

on the Internet, 1.

Duderija, Adis. 2007 ‘Islamic groups and their world-

views and identities: Neo-Traditional Salafis and

Progressive Muslims’, Arab Law Quarterly 21, pp.

341-363.

Hill, David and Sen, Krishna. 2008. Internet in

Indonesia’s new democracy, RoutledgeCurzon,

London,

http://www.newasiabooks.org/index.php?q=node/6372

Hill, David and Sen, Krishna. 2002. ‘Netizens in combat:

conflict on the internet in Indonesia’, Asia Studies

Review Vol. 26 (2), pp. 165-187.

Hill, David and Sen, Krishna. 1997. ‘Wiring the warung to

global gateways: the internet in Indonesia’, Indonesia

63, pp. 67-89.

Kluver, R. & Cheong, P. H. 2007. Technological

Modernization, the Internet and Religion in Singapore.

Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 12,

pp. 1122-1142.

Lim, Merlyna. 2005. ‘Islamic radicalism and anti-

Americanism in Indonesia: the role of the Internet’,

Policy Studies 18, East-West Center Washington,

Washington.

Lim, Merlyna. 2003 ‘From war-net to net-war: the internet

and resistance identities in Indonesia’, International

Information & Library Review 35, pp. 233-248.

Lim, Merlyna. 2002. ’Cyber-civic space in Indonesia’,

International Development and Planning Review 24

(4), pp. 383-400.

Noorhaidi. 2005.

Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the

Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia. The

University of Utrecht: Netherlands.

Schroeder, R., Heather, N., & Lee, R. 1998. The Sacred

and the Virtual: Religion in Multi-User Virtual

Reality. Journal of Computer-Mediated

Communication, 4 (2).

http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol4/issue2/schroeder.html.

Thompson, John B 1999 The media and modernity, a

social theory of the media, Polity Press, London.

Wiktorowicz, Q. 2001. The New Global Threat:

Transnational Salafis and Jihad. Middle East Policy,

VIII (4), 21.

New Media Technology and Religious Fundamentalist Movements: Exploring the Internet Use by Salaﬁ Movement in Indonesia

1573