Egypt’s Security Policy in the Post Arab-spring Periods: Pragmatism

and Fluidity in the Wake of Renewed Regional Security Threats

Eva Mushoffa

and Ahmad Gifari Juniatama

Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia

Keywords: security, policy, Arab-spring, regional security threats, Egypt

Abstract: This article investigates the Egyptian security affairs in the post-Arab Spring periods. It focuses on the new

policies adopted by the Al-Sisi government to safeguard the state security against volatile circumstances,

particularly in response to the renewed security threats along its land borders during the Arab Spring and

beyond. Furthermore, this article will also analyze the implication of those changing policies not only for the

Egyptian security affairs, but also for regional security involving the Saudi as well as Israeli security interests.

In the wake of complex nature of such regional security threats, this article poses the questions as to what are

the security threats faced by the Egyptian government along its land borders and what strategies adopted by

the Al-Sisi government to overcome those threats. Employing regional security complex theory, this article

identifies security threats emerged in the Egyptian land borders in the post-Arab Spring periods. The changing

strategy of transferring Tiran and Sanafir islands in 2016 from the Egyptian government to Saudi Arabia and

the improving bilateral relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia will be discussed. The article will also

analyze how those strategies employed by the Al-Sisi government influence Egypt’s relations with Saudi

Arabia and also with Israel, considering the security interests vested in Isareli foreign policy with regards to

development in Sinai which is linked to Gaza

1 INTRODUCTION

Egypt has been witnessing another series of

multifaceted instability in its history following the

victory of the Tahrir revolutionary forces. The

implications of such massive domestic turbulence

have been widespread not only for the Egyptian

political landscape but also for other multi-

dimensional sectors and beyond Egypt's domestic

affairs. At this juncture, the security problems which

are particularly related to Egypt's land and sea borders

have been at the utmost concern, due to Egypt's

strategic position in the Middle East.

Several geographical spots have been prone to

security threats, particularly with the increasing role of

the actors involved and their complex interactions.

This article focuses on Egypt’s land border which

could be considered as the buffer zone for Egypt, for

it is connected directly to its unstable neighbors;

Palestine and Israel.

Sinai has long been a point of ‘tradeoff’ between

Egypt and Israel, not only because it historically

recorded the ‘ups’ and the ‘downs’ in the relations

between Egypt and Israel, but also because it

inevitably linked to political dynamics in Gaza. In the

post Arab Spring Periods, the region has become a

breeding ground for non-state armed groups to pose

security threats for Egypt’s adjacent cities along the

Suez Canal up to Cairo and also for the global trade

and peace on the Egyptian-Israeli borders (Eilam,

2014). Similarly, the post Arab Spring political

dynamics in the Gulf of Aqabah had also forced Egypt

to reconsider its treaty with Saudi Arabia, regarding

the possession of the two Islands, namely Tiran and

Sanafir.

Against this background, this article seeks to

identify security threats faced by the post-Mubarak

government in Sinai and the changing strategies

employed to address those threats in the light of

regional security complex theory. This article unfolds

into three major sections. The first section highlights

the theoretical explanation of Regional Security

Complex adopted to analyze the issue at hand. The

second section explores security problems emerging

along the Egyptian land borders in Sinai. The second

section elaborates policies adopted by the al-Sisi

governments particularly during the periods of 2016-

2017.

1598

Mushoffa, E. and Juniatama, A.

Egypt’s Security Policy in the Post Arab-spring Periods: Pragmatism and Fluidity in the Wake of Renewed Regional Security Threats.

DOI: 10.5220/0009932515981605

In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Recent Innovations (ICRI 2018), pages 1598-1605

ISBN: 978-989-758-458-9

2 REGIONAL SECURITY

COMPLEX THEORY AND

SECURITISATION AND

DESECURITISATION OF

EGYPTIAN LAND BORDER

In " People, State, and Fear ", Barry Buzan defines the

regional security complex (RSC) as a condition when

several countries are mutually connected due to

common security problem emerged in their defined

territory. In this context, the security problem

perceived by a particular country links to security

affairs of others. The connection that bind several

countries in a security complex can take the form of

geographical, political, economic, historical, cultural

and strategic interests (Buzan, 1983).

Buzan and Waever then redefined the RSC as a

situatuin in which a group of units perceive the same

securitization, desecuritization, or both processes. In

this context, the national security problems of one

group member crould not be resolved separately. With

this also, the focus which is previously linked to the

state-centric and military-centric approach become

much broader. however, the main ideas of this concept

remain part of the process of securitization and

desecuritization (Buzan &Weaver, 2003).

Securitization is a statement (speech act) carried

out by securitizing actors to convince the public that a

referent object is facing a serious security threat.

Referent objects in securitization itself experience an

expansion of security issues, from being initially

limited to security issues that tend to be militaristic,

then expanding and then covering security issues that

are non-military in nature. (Buzan &Weaver, 2003).

Securitization is often used by the ruling elites or

the state to gain control over a security issue. A

particular issue will also become a security issue

depending on the perception of the country's elite on

the issue. Therefore, the threat of security that drives

the process of securitization is basically not only

objective but also has a subjective element. For this

reason, in this securitization process, the statement

made a state’s leader imply security affairs accepted

by the public internally or externally (Buzan

&Weaver, 2003).

After a security threat can be overcome, security

actors (elite or state) generally carry out the process of

desecuritization by returning an issue to the normal

level. The process of desecuritization itself can be

done in four ways, namely change through

stabilization, replacement, rearticulation, and

silencing (Hansen, 2012).

Change through stabilization is the conversion of

a security issue into a non-security issue. Then

replacement, is the replacement of a securitized

security issue by replacing the position with other

security issues. Rearticulation is the conversion of a

securitized security issue into a political issue, in this

way the political path is taken to be a solution to

security threats and dangers. Finally, silencing is a

process of depoliticizing the issue by marginalizing

the issue (Hansen, 2012).

In the context of Egypt security policy after the

Arab Spring, the emergence renewed and complex

security threats such as terrorism in its land border in

Sinai, the destruction of some of economic

infrastructure such as gas pipes or the assault of

Tourists on the Sinai coast, piracy and arms smuggling

in the Red Sea have prompted Egypt issued several

security policies to reduce these threats.

Nevertheless, the increased security problem in

Egyptian land borders in Sinai in the 2011 post-

revolution has not only threatened the security of

Egypt, but also become security concern for other

countries that are geographically close to Egypt such

as Israel and Jordan.

The escalation of terrorist acts in Sinai which was

marked by the mushrooming and the strengthening of

several militia groups were able to cause threats to

Israel which controlled area bordering Sinai. Jordan,

which geographically locates near Egypt, also felt

security threat stemming from Egyptian borders,

especially with regadrds to the possibility of

expanding security threats from Sinai.

The emergence of various threats in this region

then led to a security complex for Egypt and several

countries neighboring it. So it is not surprising that

Egypt then issued a security policy that should take

into account its positions to face countries such as

Israel or Jordan. In this context, contrsry to the

common attitude of defending territorial integration,

Egypt acted controversially to issue policy of

surrendering the Tiran and Sanafir islands in the Tiran

strait to Saudi Arabia in 2016. In light of this case,

this article analyze why did Egypt made such

controversial policy amidts its unstable security and

economic condition after the removal of President

Mubarak in 2011.

Securitization is often used by ruling elites or the

state to gain control over a security issue. A particular

issue will also become a security issue depending on

the perception of the country's elite on the issue.

Egypt’s Security Policy in the Post Arab-spring Periods: Pragmatism and Fluidity in the Wake of Renewed Regional Security Threats

1599

3 EGYPT AND THE BORDER

SECURITY CRISIS IN SINAI

Since the establishment of the Republic of Egypt, the

country had persistently faced continuous Security

challenges due to its geographical position bordering

Israel in the one hand, and connecting to the Arabian

Peninsula on the other hand. Consequently, national

security interests have become a major concern in both

Egypt's domestic and external affairs, for it determines

its survival in volatile neighbors and its power

relations with both regional and external competitors.

The biggest major security challenges faced by

Egyptian new administration after the downfall of

Mubarak in 2011 was along its land border in Sinai. It

was the first spot witnessing the escalation of security

threat in Egypt following the 2011 the Tahrir

revolution. Although Sinai has experienced security

problems prior to the Arab Spring, yet instability

increases significantly afterwards, particularly after it

was left ‘vacuum’. Limited number of security forces

was posted in Sinai during the Mubarak

administration, despite the increasing security

problem there since 2004.

To the surprise of many, the Mubarak regime

might consider Sinai and its inhabitants as the second

priority in his development plan. This was partly due

to the prevailing perception that the Sinai Bedouins

maintained cordial relations with Israeli government

(Siboni & Barrack, 2014). Such a discriminated view

was also linked to different historical and cultural

backgrounds between the Sinai Bedouins and most

Egyptians. Economic marginalization has only

exacerbated the tension between the Sinai Bedouins

with the Egyptian government and eventually

triggered the emergence of radicalization among

them. Throughout the periods of 2004- 2006, a series

of bombing attacks targeting foreign tourists had been

common in Sinai (Mäkelä, 2014).

This serious security problem gained more

currency in 2011 when a group of radical Bedouins

attacked the police stations in Rafah and Sheikh

Zuwayed. This group also targeted Egyptians military

and the government offices in North Sinai. In April

2011, the trans-Sinai pipeline was also hit by the

sabotage and attacks which continued until 2012

(Siboni & Barrack, 2014).

Under President Morsi, these security problems

were addressed through a dialogical approach

involving the Sinai Bedouin communities through the

new development plan replacing the earlier failed

plan. At least, this strategy was temporary successful

to reduce terror attacks in Sinai (Siboni & Barrack,

2014).

However, the ousting of Morsi has once again

created instability in Sinai. A month after the removal

of Morsi from the presidency, the situation in Sinai has

been more unpredictable. A series of attack hit back

several objects, most government offices, and military

posts, in North Sinai, SheikhZuweid and Rafah

causing 30 people killed and approximately 150

injured (Swale, 2015).

Another serious security problem in Sinai was

related to illegal arms trade in cooperation with

Rashaid traffickers among the Bedouins. Although

most Bedouins involved in arm-trade have been

economically motivated, yet the impacts of such

illegal actions have been far-reaching. The arms were

brought to Egypt through the Sinai Peninsula by ships,

often with the help from the bribed Egyptian security

officers (Zohar, 2015).

These smuggling activities have contributed to a

wider instability not only in Sinai but also in the

region. Some important neighboring areas have been

involved in the smuggling route. Generally, Sinai and

Gaza are major areas destined for the smuggled

weapons; and this has dragged Yemen and Sudan into

the smuggled route. Most weapons were brought in

the beginning from Yemen before they were shipped

through the Red Sea to Sudan. From Sudan, those

weapons were then dispatched via the land route to the

Egyptian border (Zohar, 2015).

Apart from this smuggling issue, more alarming

security problem for Egypt in the context of Sinai has

been the emerging of multiple actors and their cross-

cutting links. Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya

(Hamas) for instant has allegedly made intense

contacts with the radical group of Bedouins in Sinai.

The group has played an important role in the

recruiting the Bedouin youth into extremist activities

(Ronen, 2015). the recruiting the Bedouin youth into

extremist activities [5]. Another actor who has also

posed security threat by the Egyptian government was

the Muslim Brotherhood (IM). Since the removal of

President Morsi in 2012, this organization turned into

an opposition group.

IM has long been historically associated with

Hamas. The latter is known as the offspring of IM, for

it was established with the help of IM. The early

figures of Hamas were also members of the

Brotherhood, [6]. IM allegedly made links with other

radical groups based in Sinai known as Salafi-Jihadi.

Their relationships have been increasingly more

intense since the overthrowing of Mubarok's rule in

the recent Egyptian revolution. For this reason, IM

often expressed their sympathy for this militant Salafi

group on several occasions through their affiliated

media channels such as Misr al-An or Rabiah TV

(Ranko & Nezda, 2016)

Another security threat which Egypt concerned

much in Sinai was Israel. Although the two countries

have signed the peace agreement, but mistrusts often

emerge between them. On 2012, Israel built a 240-

kilometer security fence from the Rafah border to Eilat

through Sinai. At the same time, Israel also increased

the number of its Defense Forces (IDF) along the

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1600

border (Mäkelä,, 2014). This naturally sent an

alarming signal for Egypt. The increased Israeli

security activities can be interpreted as a form of threat

for Egypt. This raises a security dilemma, because the

uncertainty of the intentions of states will lead other

states to take security measures with the aim of

protecting themselves from the perceived threat,

particularly in the wake of a growing mistrusts and

lack of understanding between states.

Not only that, Egypt is certainly still wary of the

Sinai region, which once had been occupied by Israel

for fifteen years starting in the 1967 war. Indeed, the

occupation was a historical defeat for Egypt which

was at that time held strong position in the region. The

Sinai occupation ended in 1982 after the two countries

agreed to sign a peace agreement in 1979. Egypt gave

official recognition for the state of Israel thereafter

(Brecher, 2018).

Sinai's occupation by Israel caused historical

trauma to Egypt which eventually led to a "cold peace"

between Egypt and Israel. Apparently Egypt’s

decision to accept peace from the the Sinai agreement

in 1974 until the 1979 Camp David agreement was

significantly affected by the US which rewards aid as

a condition to stop the hostility with Israel (Aran &

Ginat, 2014). Nevertheless, resistance to Israel

continues to occur in the social context. This was

demonstrated among others for instance by the

prohibition of Egyptian parliamentarians from visiting

Israel during Mubarok's reign, the difficulty for

entrepreneurs to establish economic cooperation with

parties from Israel and the critics from domestic media

for whatever Israel did. Cairo has been also

unwelcome to the ascendancy of Israel as the central

force in the Middle East, for it challenges Egypt’s

leadership position in the region (Aran & Ginat,

2014). Egypt's suspicious attitude towards Israel has

been strongly influenced by the past events; and it has

been understandable. Because history, both explicitly

and implicitly can influence a country's policies.

Particularly in the security aspect, Eliot Cohen argues

that history is a lesson for strategic considerations in

security matters (Cohen, 2005). Cohen also added that

history can influence the establishment of a military or

security decision.

Sinai itself is an area that has the potential to be a

place of battle between Egypt and Israel should the

two countries are in conflict. Therefore, securing Sinai

for Egypt is about maintaining the pride or self-respect

of the state, in addition to national security.

Furthermore, Egypt has also wished to abolish the

demilitarization of the region which has been in place

for decades as one of the points stipulated in the

agreement between the two countries (Eilam, 2014).

However, despite being in a bond of peace

agreements, both Egypt and Israel do not relax the

strength of each country's military and are prepared to

anticipate possible security threats from one another.

One form of preparedness was demonstrated by Egypt

in 2012 as they held military exercises at Sinai.

According to General Mohammed Hegazy, the

exercise was meant to get the Egyptian army prepared

if Israel attacked the Suez Canal. In October of the

same year, the Egyptian military chief at the time,

General Abdul Fattah As-Sisi stated that military

activity in Sinai was aimed at preparing Egypt's

military readiness for various forms of threats,

including those from Israel (Eilam, 2014).

Israel also showed the same level of alert tone, as

one of the country's top military officials, Oded Tira,

stated in April 2013 that Egypt was a "possible

enemy" or a party that could potentially threaten Israel

(Eilam, 2014). The country even established a military

base in the Negev which is located near Sinai. The

military base is the largest in Israel (Hareetz, 2012).

The establishment of the Israeli military base could

pose a threat to Egypt. Particularly, considering the

background of the establishment of the military base.

Its construction has been prepared since the

withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai, following the

peace agreement between the two countries

(Claiborne, 2018). Such threat could be even more

visible by the disclosure of Israeli nuclear weapons.

Various media reports, analysts, writers and think

tanks were convinced that Israel has nuclear weapons

which the number of warheads most likely reaches 80.

Overall, the geographical complexity combined

with socio-political dynamic of Sinai are most likely

to pose security threats for Egypt. It is the Egyptian

strength and weak points at the same time. The Sinai

geographical position connects Egypt with its

important neighbors but equally exposes it to the

unpredictable circumstances exploding particularly in

the wake of new emerging actors.

4 REDUCING RESISTANCE

STRATEGY: THE MAKING OF

SAUDI ARABIA AS THE

MAJOR SPONSOR IN THE

SINAI DEVELOPMENT

Egypt are aware of its unstable circumstances,

particularly after the removal of Mubarok in 211. To

defend the country in such conditions, the state must

strengthen their security. This is a rational choice for

a country to avoid potential threats from other

countries. The behavior of this country is termed Alex

Mintz as deterrence. In this context, the state blocks or

prevents possible security hazards from any potential

threats that could weaken the national security. In this

case, Egypt tried to minimize the potential threat by

carrying out development in Sinai, a place that became

their weak point. Because a country's insecurity is a

combination of various threats and vulnerabilities of a

Egypt’s Security Policy in the Post Arab-spring Periods: Pragmatism and Fluidity in the Wake of Renewed Regional Security Threats

1601

country. Therefore from the very beginning, Post-

Administrations in Egypt has given priorities for

developments in Egypt. Both Morsi and Al-Sisi

government paid more attention for administrations.

In the context of the Sinai development, Al-Sisi

government has taken important step of the making of

the Saudis as the major sponsor for development

project in Sinai (Sanger, 2014). From the regional

security complex theory, this article argues that such

policy can give positive outcomes for Egypt in wider

aspects.

Saudi is a country that recently made a good

relationship with Israel. Although in history it is often

in conflict with Israel and both have no history of

diplomatic relations, but in recent years Saudi appear

to have made clandestine relations with Israel. This

can be seen, for example, at the meeting of two

important figures from both countries in Washington

in June 2015. Anwar Eskhi from Saudi is a former

Military General, and Dore Gold from Israel is a

former Ambassador to the United Nations who is

projected to occupy the position of director general in

the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sanger, 2014).

The Saudis and Israel have been in a relationship

since 2014. In that period the two countries have held

five meetings. Both often discussed Iran's nuclear

program which is seen by both as a threat. In addition,

they have an interest stemming from the strengthening

of Iran's influence in the region. It is this similarity of

interests that makes Saudi and Israeli relations soften.

However, this articles also argues that the cordial

relations between Cairo and Riyadh and the making of

Saudi as the major partner for economic development

in Sinai cannon be isolated from the the security

factors Egypt faced in its land border after the Arab

Spring.

More specifically, the decision to transfer the two

islands; Tiran and Sanafir by al-Sisi government to

Saudi administration, though controversial, can be

understood from regional security complex theory.

From the position of the island, both are located in the

intersection of the four countries namely Egypt, Saudi,

Israel, and Jordan. The Gulf of Aqaba, the water area

in which the two island is located is a strategic point.

Any geopolitical clash in the region, involving one

country will drag another countries into conflict.

It is important at this point to see the history of the

islands of Tiran and Sanafir as it is also necessary to

look at the history of the founding of Egypt and Saudi

Arabia. Because on the historical journey of these two

countries, the two islands located at the entrance of the

Gulf of Aqaba were not infrequently considered as an

important element in the attitude of the two countries

at the beginning the period of determining the

territorial line of each region. Thus, historical lines

that are quite relevant to be drawn as a starting point

to see the dynamics of two countries related to these

two islands can be started in 1906, when the

administrative line Turco-Egyptian was proposed by

the British (Enazy, 2017). The relevance between the

1906 boundary line and Tiran and Sanafir Islands lies

in the fact that the line was used by Egypt as a tool for

claiming the two islands. On the other hand, Saudi

Arabia also has claims on the two islands on the

grounds that the two islands are actually part of the

Hijaz Kingdom, which is an embryo from the country

of Saudi Arabia (Enazy, 2017).

Then in every subsequent chapter of history, these

two islands are often included in the dynamics of

relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. But the

most decisive period of the history of the two islands

occurred in the 1950s. The recognition of the Egyptian

claim to Tiran and Sanafir began during the Arab-

Israeli war in 1948. In March 1949, Israel succeeded

in occupying the Ummu Rashrah port and continued

to occupy the Eilat area in the Gulf of Aqaba. Egypt

planned to prevent Israel from widening its territorial

gains, and to do so Egypt needs to occupy Tiran Island

as the most strategic place, as they locates the entrance

to the Gulf of Aqaba. To carry out this strategy, Egypt

requested permission from the Saudis to place military

forces on Tiran Island (Enazy, 2017).

Saudi then responded Egypt’s request positively

by allowing Egyptian to take necessary actions.

Through a telegram from King Ibn Saud on January

17, 1950, the Saudis openly granted permission to

deploy troops to Egypt (Enazy, 2017). Upon the

licensing, the Egyptian government through their

Ministry of Defense instructed the occupation of the

two islands and placed weapons and raised the

Egyptian flag on the islands of Tiran and Sanafir

(Enazy, 2017).

Then in 1954, Egypt confirmed its claim to the

island of Tiran and Sanafir in the eyes of the

international community. The claim is based on

historical data that the two islands were once included

in the Egyptian administration in 1906. This claim is

also based on the Saudi agreement that freed Egypt

from occupying the two islands in 1950 (Enazy,

2017). After 1954, officially Tiran and Sanafir were

under Egyptian rule. The long historical value

possessed by the islands of Tiran and Sanafir is in line

with the strategic value inherent in these two islands

for the Egyptian defense line, even more than that the

two islands also have strategic value in the economic

aspect.

Strategic values from the economic aspects of

Tiran and Sanafir Paul A. Porter’s work entitled “The

Gulf of Aqaba: An International Airway, Its

Significance to International Trade” explained that the

location of the island at the entrance of the Gulf of

Aqaba made the two islands important to the world

trade route. There are four countries around the island

and the bay which have mutual interests, they are

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Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia (Porter, 1957).

In line with Porter, Abir (2005) also mentioned that

the water area had become a pathway for Israel to

establish trade relations with East Africa and Asian

countries. Israel was particularly concern with any

activities which could disrupt its way to advance its

energy projects in these areas. For instance, Israel had

difficult times to build an oil pipeline from Eilat to

Haifa to supply the country's energy needs at when

the six-day war broke out in 1967. This war made the

Israeli economic activity stalled (Abir, 2005).

What Porter said about the strategic value of the

Gulf of Aqaba is indeed relevant if related to the

current context. Now, Israel does have vested interest

in the Gulf.The official website of the country's

Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned specifically an

explanation of how important the area is for Israel. It

highlights the strategic position of the Gulf of Aqabah

as a strategic shipping route for several countries

around it (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

Israel also has several strategic planning in the

economic sector in the region. One of them is the

agreement between Israel and Jordan, in which the

two countries are committed to cooperate in economic

and cultural aspects in the Eilat (Israel) and Aqaba

(Jordan) regions. Israel also has a Taba-Eilat-Aqaba

Macro Area (TEAM) Working Group program

consisting of Egypt, Israel and Jordan. The program

aims to increase development in the area around the

Gulf of Aqaba (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

2017).

The description above shows that the Gulf of

Aqaba is a place of intersection for strategic interests

of several countries in the region. Therefore, Tiran and

Sanafir Islands which are located at the entrance of the

two islands also become very important. So it is not

surprising that the Israeli Minister of Defense, Moshe

Yaloon, issued a statement about the Saudis regarding

the transfer of the sovereignty of Tiran and Sanafir

(Wagner, 2016).

The strategic value of the actual political aspects

of the two islands is in their second position in the

geopolitical map of the surrounding countries. This

geographical position is indeed very important,

because the geographical location of a region from a

country will be able to influence the behavior of a

country and be taken into consideration from its

government in determining a policy or political

decision (Ajorloo & Turk, 2015).

Geographical factors like this can be an advantage

because the waters area is a strategic place if there is a

geopolitical conflict that occurs between countries

around the waters such as Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and

Saudi Arabia alone. The two islands can be one of the

strongholds in the ocean (Ajorloo & Turk, 2015).

Egypt actually posseses its own interests in the two

islands. Apart from the location of the islands’

strategic position, it is also due to the strategic value

the Egyptian could gain by controlling them. In

addition to control over the Suez Canal, which is one

of the most strategic waterways in the world, the

ownership of these two islands will strengthen Egypt's

position in controlling international trade routes

(Ajorloo & Turk, 2015). Control over the Suez Canal

coupled with control of the Tiran Strait will make

Egypt the most dominant country in controlling the

waterways in the area. However, this did not happen

because the Camp David article 13 agreement

between Egypt and Israel stated that the waters of the

Tiran Strait must be open to all ships from various

countries (Ajorloo & Turk, 2015).

Historically the two islands possess more strategic

value for Egypt. It had been an important battleground

in the six day war in 1967. During this time, Egypt,

which had earlier obtained authority over the

occupation of the island, was displaced by Israeli

military forces occupying the repelling Egyptian

military power in the strait of Tiran. With its strategic

value and historical facts, the two islands are an

important element in Egypt's national security.

Nevertheless, this strategic aspect could not be fully

utilized by Egypt because it was entrenched by the

Camp David agreement with Israel. One of important

point stipulated in the Agreement is forbidding the

establishment of Egyptian military power in the region

(Ajorloo & Turk, 2015). With such conditions, Egypt

had limited capability to protect its security from the

possession of Tiran and Sanafir Island.

From this perspective Al-sisi decision to transfer

the two islands to the Saudi government was plausibly

understood as it could give Egypt better position in

dealing with Israel. In this context, the transfer of the

two island ownership, will change the authority which

administer them. The two islands will be under Saudi

Arabia. It was Saudi Arabia which would directly face

Israel in Tian and Sanafir islands, should a tension

arises with Israel in the Gulf of Aqabah. Israel is seen

as a country that provides continuous threats to the

security of the Middle East region, Since the first

Arab-Israeli war (Korany, 2012). In this context, the

conflict has been a driving force for the emergence of

regional militarization. Other benefit that could Egypt

enjoy was the deterrent effect stems from the Saudi

military. Although Saudi military strength is not as

strong as Israel, its strong alliance with America can

be a factor that can reduce the threat from Israel, for

Israel itself is another major US alliance in the Middle

East. This could also serve to rectify the ties between

Egypt and the US which has loosened in recent years.

So the attitude of Egypt here can be understood as a

rational tactical step. This at the same time confirms

the tendency of state to increase its national security

or political power. Egypt acts rationally in this case to

issue policies that could guarantee its security and

Egypt’s Security Policy in the Post Arab-spring Periods: Pragmatism and Fluidity in the Wake of Renewed Regional Security Threats

1603

strengthen its position vis as vis stronger toes in its

neighborhood.

Military capability and alliance patterns are

fundamental factors in security. Both can serve as the

triggers and deterrents from conflict. The policy of the

two island surrender by Egypt demonstrated strong

intention from the Egyptian part to build strong

relations with the Saudis, restore security stability and

avoid the potential additional threats that could come

from Israel.

5 CONCLUSION

This study focuses on Egyptian land border security

threats emerged in the post 2011 revolutionary era.

The period limit analyzed in this study began in 2016

until 2017. During this period, Egypt carried out

several important policies to safeguard its land borders

and stabilize its internal security in Sinai. In this

context, Cairo moved to intensified its relations with

Saudi Arabia which subsequently became its major

sponsor in economic development in Sinai.

Nevertheless, Egypt also made controversial move of

transferring the two Islands: Tiran and Sanafir in 2016.

This article argues that the policies of taken by

Cairo were made in regional security context. Egypt’s

security problems in Sinai has considered wider

regional security repercussions. In this context, Egypt

needed to control the Bedoins in Sinai and their

networks to Israel and radical groups emerged in the

post-Arab Springs. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia as

major economic partner in Sinai to stabilize economic

development in Sinai. economic stability in Sinai

would in the long run reduce security problems in

Sinai. the stable Sinai would also beneficial for Israel,

as Israel Additionally, Egypt acted to transfer the two

islands to Saudi government due to its regional

interests. The geostrategic positions of Tiran and

Sanafir islands which is at the gates of Gulf of Aqaba

has benefited in Egypt for it would get a better position

vis a vis Israel, for it is Saudi now which should face

Israel should the tension arises in the region.

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